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PaperclipPerfector  2mo ago (text post)   30049 thread views

Culture War Roundup for the week of November 18, 2024

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What's bizarre to me is that Russia is clearly winning the war,

I would disagree. Russia is clearly losing the war, not least because they already defined what victory looks like, and it's not like circa 2025.

Saying Russia is winning the war requires ignoring the vast majority of the context, and claimed reasons, for why Russia started the war in the first place. It requires forgetting what they themselves claimed was the impact and implications of victory as they intended it to be when they thought they were in reach of their earliest intentions. It requires forgetting the pre-war demands, the pre-war justifications for what the war would achieve, and what the war was supposed to result in.

Russia is not winning the war because it is taking and may keep territory in the Donbas, it is losing the war because Russia itself framed the war not as a conflict between itself and Ukraine, but between the Russian world and the west. Instead of a campaign to unify of the Russian peoples, a gain of the Donbas is the formalized loss of the greater Ukraine in a civil war of the Russian peoples that will cost the Russian nation blood and treasure for decades and centuries to come. Millions of Russian-worlders have died, fled, or defected to the adversaries that the war was meant to improve the Russian position against. In so much that NATO is worse off in 2024 than 2022, it's because of reasons other than Ukraine, and in many respects NATO is considerably stronger and more threatening than before.

To quote a wit, the Russian invasion of Ukraine was worse than a crime, it was a mistake. One does not clearly win a mistake.

Edit

To elaborate by copy-pasting a response lower down up here-

When Russia invaded Ukraine, it did set out with clear goals on the scope of its intended Ukraine results at the time.

For example, we know they sincerely considered taking Kyiv a capital as a war goal in the opening days of the war not only because they indicated regime change as a goal (the de-nazification line, the flying of Yanukovych to Belarus in the early days to stage with the probable expectation of imposing him as a figurehead of a new government), but because early Russians were found with parade gear and a Russian riot police convoy memorably drove past the front lines into Kyiv. This would make no sense in the 'it's a feint' cope argument from 2022, but is entirely consistent if your stated goal of replacing the current government is an actual goal.

We also know because the Russians accidentally auto-published pre-written post-victory propaganda editorials that reflected the intended narratives and framings they intended. Here is a reddit post of a full machine translation. RIA is a Russian domestic news agency, with this message being intended for the Russian audience what this victory means for Russia.

These sort of 'what victory means to us' are propaganda, but propaganda useful for identifying what was to be considered a Russian success to the Russian audience. Part of why they are so useful is precisely because only the strategic-level planners knew enough ahead of time to write and plan the release, and thus give insights into the mindset of what Russian leaders wanted to convey as why the victory was a glorious success. These elements of success, in turn, are goals- goals the war is meant to change versus no war.

Noting that this was published under the expectation that overall victory was achieved by that non-decisive fighting remained, relevant points of 'did this war succeed in its goals' include-

Russia is restoring its unity - the tragedy of 1991, this terrible catastrophe in our history, its unnatural dislocation, has been overcome. Yes, at a great cost, yes, through the tragic events of a virtual civil war, because now brothers, separated by belonging to the Russian and Ukrainian armies, are still shooting at each other, but there will be no more Ukraine as anti-Russia.

Will the post-war Ukraine be anti-Russia?

If yes, war goal failed.

Vladimir Putin has assumed, without a drop of exaggeration, a historic responsibility by deciding not to leave the solution of the Ukrainian question to future generations. After all, the need to solve it would always remain the main problem for Russia - for two key reasons. And the issue of national security, that is, the creation of anti-Russia from Ukraine and an outpost for the West to put pressure on us, is only the second most important among them.

Will the post-war situation leave the Ukraine issue as an issue for the next generation to deal with, and leave a anti-Russian/pro-Western Ukraine?

If yes to both, two war goals failed.

The first would always be the complex of a divided people, the complex of national humiliation - when the Russian house first lost part of its foundation (Kiev), and then was forced to come to terms with the existence of two states, not one, but two peoples. That is, either to abandon their history, agreeing with the crazy versions that "only Ukraine is the real Russia," or to gnash one's teeth helplessly, remembering the times when "we lost Ukraine." Returning Ukraine, that is, turning it back to Russia, would be more and more difficult with every decade - recoding, de-Russification of Russians and inciting Ukrainian Little Russians against Russians would gain momentum. And in the event of the consolidation of the full geopolitical and military control of the West over Ukraine, its return to Russia would become completely impossible - it would have to fight for it with the Atlantic bloc.

Will the post-war situation in Ukraine mean Kiev is returned to the Russian house? If no, war goal failed.

Will the post-war situation in Ukraine mean that a following fight will mean having to fight with 'the Atlantic block' in the next round? If yes, war goal failed.

Now this problem is gone - Ukraine has returned to Russia. This does not mean that its statehood will be liquidated, but it will be reorganized, re-established and returned to its natural state of part of the Russian world. Within what boundaries, in what form will the alliance with Russia be consolidated (through the CSTO and the Eurasian Union or the Union State of Russia and Belarus)? This will be decided after the end is put in the history of Ukraine as anti-Russia. In any case, the period of the split of the Russian people is coming to an end.

Will the war end with Ukraine in some form of Russian alliance-consolidation (CSTO, Eurasian Union, Union State, etc.)?

If not, war goal failed.

And here begins the second dimension of the coming new era - it concerns Russia's relations with the West. Not even Russia, but the Russian world, that is, three states, Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, acting in geopolitical terms as a single whole. These relations have entered a new stage - the West sees the return of Russia to its historical borders in Europe. And he is loudly indignant at this, although in the depths of his soul he must admit to himself that it could not be otherwise.

Will post-war Ukraine act as a geopolitical whole with Russia?

If not, war goal failed.

Did anyone in the old European capitals, in Paris and Berlin, seriously believe that Moscow would give up Kyiv? That the Russians will forever be a divided people? And at the same time when Europe is uniting, when the German and French elites are trying to seize control of European integration from the Anglo-Saxons and assemble a united Europe? Forgetting that the unification of Europe became possible only thanks to the unification of Germany, which took place according to the good Russian (albeit not very smart) will. To swipe after that also on Russian lands is not even the height of ingratitude, but of geopolitical stupidity. The West as a whole, and even more so Europe in particular, did not have the strength to keep Ukraine in its sphere of influence, and even more so to take Ukraine for itself. In order not to understand this, one had to be just geopolitical fools.

Did Russia give up Kyiv?

If yes, war goal failed.

(I will break flow to note here that this refrain of Kyiv is part of the very explicit acknowledgement that Russian war aims were well beyond the eastern most Russian-speaking provinces. There was no 'we only wanted the Russia-speaking bits,' which has become a more modern revisionism of downplaying Russian failures by de-scoping the initial claims.)

More precisely, there was only one option: to bet on the further collapse of Russia, that is, the Russian Federation. But the fact that it did not work should have been clear twenty years ago. And already fifteen years ago, after Putin's Munich speech, even the deaf could hear - Russia is returning.

Will this war end with Russia returning as a great power?

If not, war goal failed.

And so on. Most of the article then begins pontificating on geopolitics, where you get more into bad analysis than actual objectives, but what the Russian perspective of Russian victory to a Russian audience is already established enough for the point.

Perhaps it's too soon to say? Potentially, this is a precursor campaign to a wider conflict between democratic and revisionist states, and if you take those blocs as the relevant units of analysis, the ledger is less clear. The American public increasingly has less commitment to maintaining the existing order, and the Ukraine war has set a precedent and provided an example for other states to learn from. If those end up causing a wider conflict to resolve favorably to the revisionist powers, ideologues in Moscow will be patting themselves on the back for putting an end to the looming Atlanticist threat etc.

On the other hand, Russia becoming a poorer farming and resource extraction vassal for a foreign power isn't quite what I'd call a glorious victory for the Russian nation, but I guess everyone has their own goals and values.

Perhaps it's too soon to say?

If it is too soon to say, then it's too soon to claim victory either, which is to say one lacks the grounds to claim a policy success.

Moreover, if conditions you want are occurring for reasons other than your policy- like the American public continuing it's trend towards disinterest in European affairs- then the resources you invested in your policy for an effect that was already going to happen were wasted. Sure, you can pay the weatherman money until you get a sunny day, but a policy of paying weathermen for sunny days is a bad policy even if you get sunny days.

why Russia started the war in the first place

To keep NATO from militarizing Russia's southern border. Since then NATO has spent vast resources trying to do so and the Ukrainian military is largely defeated.

but between the Russian world and the west. Instead of a campaign to unify of the Russian peoples

A large portion of the Russians are now under Russian control together with the valuable land in Ukraine. Left is a dysfunctional rump state with a demographic pyramid that makes South Korea's look healthy.

Russia is succeeding with its main objective, a multipolar world order. NATO has been cutting down on military spending for 30 years and deferring expenses and investments. Vast resources have been squandered in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ammunition stockpiles are low, equiptment is old and bases are in a sad state. Most European militaries couldn't even put together a functioning brigade before this war. Russia has created an endless black hole for military resources. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians will have to be trained over the next decades. Ukraine has the world's fourth largest air defence at the start of the war. It is effectively spent and they are currently burning through NATO's stockpile at a far higher rate than NATO can manufacture. Meanwhile SAM systems are being consumed at a high rate in the middle east. Ukraine's military is a quarter the size of the US military. Rebuilding it from ruins after the war is going to cost vast resources for many decades.

Russia's army is bigger now than at the start of the war and is fighting more effectively. Their airforce, navy and nuclear force is pretty much undamaged. The arms production has increased substantially. Between China and Russia NATO doesn't have the capacity to invade Iraq or play global hegemon. Russia doesn't have to defeat NATO, they just have to soak up resources to the point that the empire can't be sustained.

When russians fight, they only gain experience and become stronger. When ukrainians fight, they just die.

When russians have to re-equip their army, they only get better and more efficient at manufacturing. When westerners have to re-equip a small army, their empire just collapses.

When russians fight, they only gain experience and become stronger. When ukrainians fight, they just die.

To a great extent yes. Ukraine has lost more officers than Russia. They are running into German WWI problems where they take their best men and put them into elite units and send those men out first. Ukraine leads more from the front which causes higher death levels among officers. Ukraine rebuilt its military in a more western fashion with a professional NCO corps which is much harder to replace casualties in.

When russians have to re-equip their army, they only get better and more efficient at manufacturing

Russians have done a far better job at scaling manufacturing during this war. Also They aren't trying to control the middle east and fight a war against China.

I'd just add that the biggest W for Russia in terms of creating a multipolar world order was financial and diplomatic, I think, not even military – for instance, Western nations freezing their assets and cutting them off from SWIFT, which both allowed them to popularize their alternative and put non-Western nations on notice that their assets in the West and any financial system that depends on Western countries are at risk.

(However on the flip side, I'm not sure the Russian air force is undamaged; they've lost a lot of Su-34s and Su-25s, haven't they?)

Russia is not winning the war because it is taking and may keep territory in the Donbas, it is losing the war because Russia itself framed the war not as a conflict between itself and Ukraine

Ok, question: did Shogunate Japan lose the First Imjin War? They occupied Korea, but by your logic they lost because Hideyoshi had once told his retainers that his ambition unironically included “world conquest”?

How was world conquest supposed to be achieved by occupying Korea?

If world conquest would not be achieved by invading Korea, then not achieving it is not an actual objective of the invasion of Korea. Maybe, in the future, it could matter for a different / later conflict, in which case Hideyoshi indisputably failed that broader conflict, but that conflict is not the conflict for the Korean peninsula.

By contrast,

When Russia invaded Ukraine, it did set out with clear goals on the scope of its intended Ukraine results at the time.

For example, we know they sincerely considered taking Kyiv a capital as a war goal in the opening days of the war not only because they indicated regime change as a goal (the de-nazification line, the flying of Yanukovych to Belarus in the early days to stage with the probable expectation of imposing him as a figurehead of a new government), but because early Russians were found with parade gear and a Russian riot police convoy memorably drove past the front lines into Kyiv. This would make no sense in the 'it's a feint' cope argument from 2022, but is entirely consistent if your stated goal of replacing the current government is an actual goal.

We also know because the Russians accidentally auto-published post-victory propaganda editorials that reflected the intended narratives and framings they intended. Here is a reddit post of a full machine translation. RIA is a Russian domestic news agency, with this message being intended for the Russian audience what this victory means for Russia.

These sort of 'what victory means to us' are propaganda, but propaganda useful for identifying what was to be considered a Russian success to the Russian audience. Part of why they are so useful is precisely because only the strategic-level planners knew enough ahead of time to write and plan the release, and thus give insights into the mindset of what strategic-level planners wanted to convey.

Noting that this was published under the expectation that overall victory was achieved by that non-decisive fighting remained, relevant points of 'did this war succeed in its goals' include-

Russia is restoring its unity - the tragedy of 1991, this terrible catastrophe in our history, its unnatural dislocation, has been overcome. Yes, at a great cost, yes, through the tragic events of a virtual civil war, because now brothers, separated by belonging to the Russian and Ukrainian armies, are still shooting at each other, but there will be no more Ukraine as anti-Russia.

Will the post-war Ukraine be anti-Russia?

If yes, war goal failed.

Vladimir Putin has assumed, without a drop of exaggeration, a historic responsibility by deciding not to leave the solution of the Ukrainian question to future generations. After all, the need to solve it would always remain the main problem for Russia - for two key reasons. And the issue of national security, that is, the creation of anti-Russia from Ukraine and an outpost for the West to put pressure on us, is only the second most important among them.

Will the post-war situation leave the Ukraine issue as an issue for the next generation to deal with, and leave a anti-Russian/pro-Western Ukraine?

If yes to both, two war goals failed.

The first would always be the complex of a divided people, the complex of national humiliation - when the Russian house first lost part of its foundation (Kiev), and then was forced to come to terms with the existence of two states, not one, but two peoples. That is, either to abandon their history, agreeing with the crazy versions that "only Ukraine is the real Russia," or to gnash one's teeth helplessly, remembering the times when "we lost Ukraine." Returning Ukraine, that is, turning it back to Russia, would be more and more difficult with every decade - recoding, de-Russification of Russians and inciting Ukrainian Little Russians against Russians would gain momentum. And in the event of the consolidation of the full geopolitical and military control of the West over Ukraine, its return to Russia would become completely impossible - it would have to fight for it with the Atlantic bloc.

Will the post-war situation in Ukraine mean Kiev is returned to the Russian house? If no, war goal failed.

Will the post-war situation in Ukraine mean that a following fight will mean having to fight with 'the Atlantic block' in the next round? If yes, war goal failed.

Now this problem is gone - Ukraine has returned to Russia. This does not mean that its statehood will be liquidated, but it will be reorganized, re-established and returned to its natural state of part of the Russian world. Within what boundaries, in what form will the alliance with Russia be consolidated (through the CSTO and the Eurasian Union or the Union State of Russia and Belarus)? This will be decided after the end is put in the history of Ukraine as anti-Russia. In any case, the period of the split of the Russian people is coming to an end.

Will the war end with Ukraine in some form of Russian alliance-consolidation (CSTO, Eurasian Union, Union State, etc.)?

If not, war goal failed.

And here begins the second dimension of the coming new era - it concerns Russia's relations with the West. Not even Russia, but the Russian world, that is, three states, Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, acting in geopolitical terms as a single whole. These relations have entered a new stage - the West sees the return of Russia to its historical borders in Europe. And he is loudly indignant at this, although in the depths of his soul he must admit to himself that it could not be otherwise.

Will post-war Ukraine act as a geopolitical whole with Russia?

If not, war goal failed.

Did anyone in the old European capitals, in Paris and Berlin, seriously believe that Moscow would give up Kyiv? That the Russians will forever be a divided people? And at the same time when Europe is uniting, when the German and French elites are trying to seize control of European integration from the Anglo-Saxons and assemble a united Europe? Forgetting that the unification of Europe became possible only thanks to the unification of Germany, which took place according to the good Russian (albeit not very smart) will. To swipe after that also on Russian lands is not even the height of ingratitude, but of geopolitical stupidity. The West as a whole, and even more so Europe in particular, did not have the strength to keep Ukraine in its sphere of influence, and even more so to take Ukraine for itself. In order not to understand this, one had to be just geopolitical fools.

Did Russia give up Kyiv?

If yes, war goal failed.

(I will break flow to note here that this refrain of Kyiv is part of the very explicit acknowledgement that Russian war aims were well beyond the eastern most Russian-speaking provinces. There is no 'we only wanted the Russia-speaking bits.')

More precisely, there was only one option: to bet on the further collapse of Russia, that is, the Russian Federation. But the fact that it did not work should have been clear twenty years ago. And already fifteen years ago, after Putin's Munich speech, even the deaf could hear - Russia is returning.

Will this war end with Russia returning as a great power?

If not, war goal failed.

And so on. Most of the article then begins pontificating on geopolitics, where you get more into bad analysis than actual objectives, but what the Russian perspective of Russian victory to a Russian audience is already established enough for the point.

Unfortunately your argument fails because you used the letter “e” multiple times throughout the post. This was supposed to be a constrained writing assignment where you don’t use the letter “e”. You may have made some good points, in a well-written post, but unfortunately you fail because you didn’t meet the arbitrary victory conditions that I just made up.

Fortunately we can refer to victory conditions that Russian authorities established nearly four years ago, instead of inventing new arbitrary victory criteria. :-)

Here is a [reddit post of a full machine translation.]

I think you forgot to insert the link.

Oops! Thanks.

By domino strategy: take your own troops and conquer Korea. Take Korean troops and conquer China. Take Chinese troops and conquer the world. A strategy Genghis Khan also used quite successfully with many defections even of Han Chinese generals and troops into his army. Mongol invasions of Japan or Đại Việt were only minority "Mongol" armies with majority fielded by subjected nations,.

This would be your reminder that Genghis Khan not only failed to conquer the world, but failed to conquer Japan, and vice-versa when Japan's occupation of Korea did not in turn to conquering the steppe (or even China).

Ultimately, strategy game snowballs mechanics of win more to win more don't actually pan out in reality. Even the historical domino theory was simultaneously vindicated (the fall of Vietnam to communists did lead to communist takeovers of the Indo-China peninsula) and it's disrepute (the fall of Indo-China did not translate to ever-building momentum for further communist takeovers).

He died before conquest of China was even completed and his grandsons were mediocrities. He probably would if he had twice more DALY. If anything, the empire continying to expand for decades after his death (unlike Alexander's) is quite an accomplishment.

A peace activist might say that nobody wins in any war, as the price measured in material cost and human lives is often enormous compared to any gains.

While Russia is not winning by its original stated victory conditions, Ukraine is not winning either by its own stated conditions (no territorial concessions), which look more unlikely for Ukraine to achieve by each day. Slow Russian progress implies that currently Russia is *losing less'.

What were their formal goals? What did Putin actually say at the start of the war?

Demilitarization, denazification and neutrality. He was saying this in early 2022, they constituted the original peace offer and he's still maintaining these demands today. These three were the primary goals of the war.

Demilitarization looks like it'll be reached at some point if only via attrition and Ukrainian military defeat. Denazification = installing some kind of more acceptable government - still up in the air. Neutrality, still up in the air.

Then there are various formally annexed provinces of Ukraine, some of which Russia has control of on the ground. These were added as goals with the constitutional changes in September 2022.

Russia has thus achieved partial success on 2 of 4 of their primary goals and seems to enjoy the upper hand on the battlefield. This we can observe since the original US-Ukrainian goal (pre-2014 borders for Ukraine) has been largely abandoned.

I'm reminded of this Onion article:

U.S. loses Vietnam War: Ford Urges All Americans to Salute Our Vietcong Rulers

Russia is losing Ukraine in the sense that the US lost in Vietnam. They are failing to achieve their war objectives and are paying a high cost in blood and treasure.

But, in a different way, they are winning since they are grinding Ukraine down faster than they themselves are being ground down.

In any case, war is almost always negative sum. There can be multiple losers. This seems to be the case here. Russia is losing, but Ukraine is losing ever worse. And, in the end, it will be Russia, not Ukraine which imposes its conditions upon the other side unless a truce is arranged soon.

There can be multiple losers

And there is a clear winner, too, the US.

Even Ukraine being ruined is a good thing if you take the longer view - sure, there will be tensions and resentment for some years, decades maybe, but these are people with a common language and culture. You can't rule out another reorientation in 10 years, so squint a little, and civilizationally degraded and depopulated Ukraine is weaker future Russia.

If by the US you mean the oligarchs and the MIC then yes. Though it seems short term focused given the damage they've done to global finance. For us ordinary serfs living here not much of a win.

They’re paying a cost, but I would argue Ukraine is paying a much greater one and thus losing. Ukraine always had a much smaller population, was less militarized, more rural, etc. than Russia. If NATO a we’re not sending billions in aide and weapons, Russia would be much closer to victory than they are now. Ukraine can absolutely stalemate them for a while — until their military population shrinks to the point where they can’t hold territory, or the “allowance” gets cut off, or the public turns against the war because life without electricity and running water is miserable. Basically all we can do is keep Ukraine from losing for a while, at a cost of billions a month, at risk of Russia going after NATO, and until the last Ukrainian dies in a foxhole. That’s not us winning. It’s certainly not winning for Ukraine.

They’re paying a cost, but I would argue Ukraine is paying a much greater one and thus losing.

By that logic the Vietcong lost the Vietnam war.

Basically all we can do is keep Ukraine from losing for a while, at a cost of billions a month,

Do you think billions a month is a burdonsome amount in the context of government policy?

As a reminder- last year the Americans allocated $820 billion to national defense in 2023. As of earlier this year, the Americans spent about $64 billion in military assistance across the 30-ish since the Feb 22 invasion.

Over 3 years the entire Ukraine War military support costs has been less than 8% of 1 year of American DoD spending, or less than 3% per year on an annual spending level. 3% isn't nothing, but it would take decades for the current level of Ukraine War spending to match (1) year of 'normal' DoD spending.

DoD spending which is, by US treaty-law, required to enable/prepare the US to fight... Russia. Who incurs the harm and cost of every munition provided to the Ukrainians used against them. A war-preparation requirement which is increasingly less likely as the Russians lose their cold war strategic stockpiles and devolve into a Soviet Era military which will require years to decades of recapitalization, particularly if the Russians bork themselves by unsustainable spending for medium/longterm economic overheating issues.

There are plenty of other arguments one can make about Ukraine, and I'm not going to argue them in this point, but 'we're spending unsustainable amounts of money' is the opposite of reality. The business case / government finance case is for supporting the Ukraine War, not against it.

This is the same bot talking point NAFO bots spam all over twitter...

It's less an endorsement of the war and more an indictment of our government spending. DOGE save us.

Thank you for not contesting the point of affordability, I appreciate the concession in good humor. You do, however, bring an interesting question.

What are the maximum, and the minimum, non-indictable levels of military spending?

For the level of spending to be an indictment implies a non-indictable level of spending. That amount, in turn, would morally need to align with the legal obligations that the American legislature has passed on the American government, which includes things like security treaties.

Treaties are pieces of paper, ask the native american's how much the US cares about treaties. Trying to hold the US population hostage to a group of war mongering imperialists because some out of them have made agreements with other countries has nothing to do with morality. It's part of this whole conveniently framing things in bizarre ways in a weak attempt to justify your position thing you have going here that isn't convincing anyone.

Treaties are pieces of paper, ask the native american's how much the US cares about treaties. Trying to hold the US population hostage to a group of war mongering imperialists because some out of them have made agreements with other countries has nothing to do with morality. It's part of this whole conveniently framing things in bizarre ways in a weak attempt to justify your position thing you have going here that isn't convincing anyone.

Thank you for continuing to not contest the point on affordability. Thank you also for continuing the underscore your lack of counter-argument on the issue of affordability by introducing amusing divergences that demonstrate good humor.

Comedy is, after all, about the gap between expectations and delivery. For example, one might expect that a moral condemnation of broken treaties and war mongers of a century ago to be an admonishment to not break other treaties or tolerate imperialist war mongers in the present. Instead, spending treasure to honor treaties and otherwise protect independent states from a warmongering imperialist is itself the basis of condemnation.

This is funny because the punchline is that you don't actually care about unindictable spending or honoring treaties or opposing warmongering imperialists.

American appetite for ending the war is shrinking, which is reflected in Trump's election on pledging to negotiate peace. America might have more money to spend than Russia, but is less willing to spend it.

I'm sorry, I may misunderstand. You think that Trump or his administration is going to reduce government spending?

Not SlowBoy, but I'm pretty sure he was saying Trump was less willing to spend on Ukraine specifically, not government spending in total. He is, of course, free to correct me.

at risk of Russia going after NATO, and until the last Ukrainian dies in a foxhole

Russia will go after nato with what economy and military industrial complex?

He has given several red lines about under what conditions he’d consider using nuclear weapons. The latest one being “don’t allow Ukraine to strike deep into Russia. Good thing we’re doing exactly that…

China's, presumably.

This is all a ploy to teach Russia about the power of friendship imported cheap labor.

To a large extent aren't we already in a position where if China truly cut Russia off, Russia couldn't continue the war?

I remain convinced from as soon as it became clear the Kiev wouldn't fall that the war will continue until Xi decides he wants a Nobel Peace Prize to burnish China's reputation abroad.

I find your framing a bit odd.

Russia is not winning the war because it is taking and may keep territory in the Donbas, it is losing the war because Russia itself framed the war not as a conflict between itself and Ukraine, but between the Russian world and the west.

I mean, perhaps that was how Russia framed it at home (I trust neither set of sources on this), but it is certainly true that NATO/America has been losing the war as we defined it as well. Putin was a big bad that had to, and would be, soundly defeated by the power of freedom and money. The latter idea, has failed. We are spending many multiples of what Russia is spending to gradually lose terrain.

I suppose this deal is not so bad if you are a Brit or Canadian who cares nothing about Ukrainian deaths. But if you think NATO prestige is important, its a huge loss. Being a NATO proxy is a provably bad deal now. Even with American investment. Heck, the rest of NATO might as well be dead to the remaining civilized world. Minus America, NATO couldn't help anyone anywhere.

In so much that NATO is worse off in 2024 than 2022, it's because of reasons other than Ukraine, and in many respects NATO is considerably stronger and more threatening than before.

NATO is certainly much weaker now than 2020, but not than 2022. We cratered as a legitimate organization under Biden and it is likely impossible to get lower than Russia just invading again after abstaining for 4 years. But its certainly possible. Trump could keep doing the same things but more. And then our support would get discredited even more.

I mean, perhaps that was how Russia framed it at home (I trust neither set of sources on this), but it is certainly true that NATO/America has been losing the war as we defined it as well. Putin was a big bad that had to, and would be, soundly defeated by the power of freedom and money. The latter idea, has failed. We are spending many multiples of what Russia is spending to gradually lose terrain.

Who is this 'we'?

This is neither a common definition of victory, nor even an accurate characterization of the comparable expenditures.

I suppose this deal is not so bad if you are a Brit or Canadian who cares nothing about Ukrainian deaths. But if you think NATO prestige is important, its a huge loss. Being a NATO proxy is a provably bad deal now. Even with American investment. Heck, the rest of NATO might as well be dead to the remaining civilized world. Minus America, NATO couldn't help anyone anywhere.

It is certainly a take that a country that was not a member of a regional defensive alliance, and repeatedly disagreed internally and externally about any need to join a defensive alliance, getting repeatedly invaded and suffering major losses when countries that did join the defensive alliance were not invaded is thus a proof against value of being a party of a regional defensive alliance.

It is certainly also a take where a country vastly outnumbered by a power considered one of the strongest in the world, without the supplies to sustain operations for a year, being able to last years and fight the aggressor with designs on the entire country down to border provinces alone thanks to external aid as evidence that the external aid couldn't help anyone.

By contrast, smaller countries around the world often find these things- not being invaded and being able to substantially resist much more capable threatening neighbors if they are invaded- very very helpful, and often something they drive their entire foreign policies around. Were American alliance structures accurately perceived as such a bad deal, we would expect other American alliance members trying to leave or distance themselves from them.

Instead, over the last four years we saw increased interest in joining or strengthening them from Europe (Finland and Sweden) to the Middle East (reported Saudi Arabian terms for Israeli normalization) to Asia (Philippines re-alignment post-Duterte, increasing trends by Vietnam and India) to Latin America (Guyana). By contrast, the states that have notably tried to distance themselves from the US include such notable allies as... Afghanistan (an indefinite money and resource sink), Iraq (also a money sink), and Russia (if you are of the Mearsheimer school of thought).

What you think 'the rest of NATO might as well be dead to the remaining civilized world' means is unclear. The Ukraine War may have surprised you with the level of apathy / disinterest towards the Europeans security concerns among those countries who didn't care to go along with European sanctions, but I assure you this is very much not new or particular to Europe, and is quite consistent with European sensitivities to other states security interests both near (in Europe itself) and afar.

NATO is certainly much weaker now than 2020, but not than 2022. We cratered as a legitimate organization under Biden and it is likely impossible to get lower than Russia just invading again after abstaining for 4 years. But its certainly possible. Trump could keep doing the same things but more. And then our support would get discredited even more.

Again, I will ask who this 'we' is, because this goes beyond a lack of shared consensus.

In 2020, NATO was so legitimate that the Finns and Swedes didn't want to be a part of it, the Ukrainian body politic was ambivalent and still considered a Russian full-scale invasion impossible at a cultural-identity level, and that the Germans and the French were as a matter of policy trying to strengthen their ties with Russia even at the expense of the security interests of other NATO countries, including arms sales and the Nord Stream pipeline whose energy blackmail implications to both the eastern europeans and Germans was only retroactively acknowledged as maybe a bad idea.

In 2020, Russia had not 'abstained' from invading Ukraine for four years, but was at that very time actively running and had been supporting for years two incited rebellion statelets that it was attempting to leverage for demands of sovereignty concessions that would preserve its proxies and give it substantial veto controls of Ukrainian foreign policy, including economic engagement with Europe. That this was a step too far for the French and Germans, who had replaced the Americans in the Russia-Ukraine negotiations years prior and were simultaneously willing to deepen military and economic cooperation in other fronts, is demonstrative of whether it was a virtuous abstinence or not.

In 2024, by contrast, NATO is presumably less legitimate because a non-member state forcing a stalemate of a nation-scale invasion by what was arguably the strongest land army in the world is embarrassing.

And in 2024 NATO is presumably weaker than in 2020 because the addition of Finland and Sweden, years of greatly increased military-industrial investment in their armaments capabilities, and consensus that the Russians are indeed a common threat is... is presumably worth less than the stockpiles given to Ukraine shoot NATO's primary potential adversary in the face, who... apparently grew in relative strength the more NATO munitions were shot in its face and the more of its own munitions it shot at a non-NATO country.

But, you know, vibes.

Who is this 'we'?

Liberal Western State Dept Consensus

It is certainly a take that a country that was not a member of a regional defensive alliance, and repeatedly disagreed internally and externally about any need to join a defensive alliance, getting repeatedly invaded and suffering major losses when countries that did join the defensive alliance were not invaded is thus a proof against value of being a party of a regional defensive alliance.

A true statement if we hadn't declared them a proxy via pouring in oodles of money and having leaders going around making declarations. The Biden-NATO philosophy appears to be "Speak loudly and carry a tiny stick."

Again, I will ask who this 'we' is, because this goes beyond a lack of shared consensus.

"We" are NATO and establishment American foreign policy persons.

Just as importantly "they" are foreign belligerents. What you seem to care about is what France or Finland thinks of these entities. That is largely irrelevant. What Russia thinks is relevant. And they decided that the Biden administration was a good time to invade. They decided that Germany had crippled its own economy with Green pipedreams.

Also its important to keep an eye on one of the most important, but mercurial NATO members: Turkey. Turkey has bucked the rest of the members more than ever and was closer to exiting the alliance 2021-present than any time since it joined.

And in 2024 NATO is presumably weaker than in 2020 because the addition of Finland and Sweden, years of greatly increased military-industrial investment in their armaments capabilities, and consensus that the Russians are indeed a common threat is... is presumably worth less than the stockpiles given to Ukraine shoot NATO's primary potential adversary in the face, who... apparently grew in relative strength the more NATO munitions were shot in its face and the more of its own munitions it shot at a non-NATO country.

That capacity has proven both far too slow to materialize and far to expensive for the welfare states to maintain.

But if you think NATO prestige is important, its a huge loss.

Why? I genuinely know very little about NATO so this question is sincere. Why would Finland and Sweden join if NATO is dead? Why would Ukraine losing discredit NATO when it wasn't even a member? It got a shitload of money just for being a proxy, presumably we would do much more for a legit member. Money can't guarantee victory but money is useful and people want money, why would that prospect not retain its attractiveness? If I offer to give any student at my local high school free SAT tutoring and a student I tutor gets a very low score does that completely discredit me and prove my tutoring was worthless? Not at all, at the end of the day he has to take the test and I can only do so much. The tutoring could remain an extraordinarily good deal for anyone willing to take it.

Sweden and Finland would join because they already were effectively joined as establishment American (to be distinguished from America as a whole) proxies and joining merely formalized that. The problem remains that the whole alliance is entirely dependent on America because the rest of them are sclerotic, and the alliance, unfortunately, comprises countries that encourage the US to follow us down that path.

Money can't guarantee victory

This is antithetical to the theory of being a NATO proxy as Ukraine is. The theory of the NATO hegemony is that American establishment types can just bully the world with their wallet and win. If you actually need AMERICA (aka our 18-40 year old men and the engineers and tradesmen supporting them) to control and win a regional skirmish like Ukraine, the theory is dead.

If I offer to give any student at my local high school free SAT tutoring and a student I tutor gets a very low score does that completely discredit me and prove my tutoring was worthless?

A fairly good analogy. Tutoring for standardized tests has little value (although it has increased recently as the tests have had their predictive qualities intentionally lowered).

If I offer to give any student at my local high school free SAT tutoring and a student I tutor gets a very low score does that completely discredit me and prove my tutoring was worthless?

The problem in the analogy is this + the "free" part. Because its clearly not free. You make regional enemies by agreeing to be a NATO proxy.

Well, on the other hand Georgia (erstwhile NATO candidate) just reelected an anti-Western party, and Erdogan is flirting with BRICS. It may be fair to say that the war galvanised the cultural West, so Sweden and Finland (which realistically had nothing to fear from Russia either way) joined as a symbolic gesture of support; but as far as the idea that siding with NATO will make your life materially better (as opposed to any spiritual satisfaction you may derive if you sympathise with its cause) goes, we have at least weak evidence (and justification) that fence-sitters became more skeptical.

Who do you think the Finns had to defend themselves against, twice, in the 20th century? And after WW2, did they build defenses and spend a lot on their military over the decades just for fun? No.

All neighbors of Russia have something to fear from them. They are imperialist, now as ever before.

Finland clearly joined to prepare for a possible Russian attack in the medium term future.

It may be fair to say that the war galvanised the cultural West, so Sweden and Finland (which realistically had nothing to fear from Russia either way) joined as a symbolic gesture of support

Completely untrue in case of Finland and almost certainly Sweden as well.

On what basis do you figure? There is little use arguing about counterfactuals, but I would have taken a bet against Russia attacking either Finland or Sweden conditional on them not joining NATO at very high odds. I never saw an argument for why they would do so that was not based on some form of "because it would be the evil-maxxing thing to do", or ascribing territorial expansion to them as a motive (which also doesn't really seem to mesh with reality, and is instead fielded as part of a rhetorical trick to deny their stated reasons for attacking UA).

Even if you don't think that Russia has territorial expansion aspirations (which it does, but agreeing to disagree ...), the Finnish public is afraid of Russia invading and wants to defend against it by joining NATO. You can say that it's symbolic by the leadership, and the public is being tricked into being afraid of something that would never happen, but what is the evidence for that?

Since Finland and Sweden hold important strategic locations in the Baltic/Arctic area (northern Finnish Lapland and Åland in case of Finland, Gotland in case of Sweden) that Russia might wish to control in the event of a wider NATO/Russia conflict.

Even if we assume that Russia would actually engage in a direct conventional war against NATO (which continues seeming very far-fetched to me), and somehow could magically summon the manpower and materiel for such an undertaking, I don't see what benefits it would gain from expending its resources (which would presumably still be finite, even if we assume for the sake of argument they are ~10x what they have now) on such an undertaking. The Ukraine war clearly shows that naval area denial currently has the upper hand in a near-peer conflict, so all major surface combatants would be disabled or pinned in port within a few weeks of the beginning of such a war; and with anti-ship missiles taking some one-digit number of minutes to strike a target, an Incheon-style landing around Warsaw would be as unrealistic to stage from Åland as it would be to stage from Kronstadt (or more so, since it would be harder to get an air defense umbrella even over the staging area).

The obvious strategy for Russia to pursue if it for some reason decided to fight a conventional do-or-die war against NATO on the offensive would be to seize the Baltics and then try to ram through the Suwałki gap as in Cold War planning scenarios. They didn't attack Sweden in WWII either, when it still would have made more sense (as naval action had not yet been rendered quite as impossible by modern reconnaissance and targeting) and they had a bigger and better army; and even their action against Finland was decidedly half-hearted, seemingly only serving to loosen the Finnish chokehold on Leningrad's northern supply lines that gave them trouble during the first half of the war. (As much as it may be flattering to you, it seems implausible that they would have been unable to make it past Vainikkala after fighting their way through to Berlin, if they actually were equally motivated.)

It seems pretty clear to me that the Åland/Gotland explanation was advanced by politicians who had personal incentives to make your respective countries join NATO, and lapped up by a media and population eager to see themselves personally involved on the right side in a conflict that they perceived as just (much like in religious apocalyptic fiction in the vein of Left Behind, the devil always takes very specific personal interest in the author's/reader's country and people).

then try to ram through the Suwałki gap as in Cold War planning scenarios

You've mixed up two gaps.

The Suwałki gap is a post-Cold War thing. When the USSR existed, Lithuania was a constituent part of it. And theoretical NATO-fighting Russia would have to secure it before seizing the rest of the Baltics, to prevent Poland from counterattacking.

The Fulda gap was the one from the Cold War, but it's in the middle of Germany right now. It was considered the only suitable place for a large mechanized offensive against NATO.

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The Ukraine war clearly shows that naval area denial currently has the upper hand in a near-peer conflict, so all major surface combatants would be disabled or pinned in port within a few weeks of the beginning of such a war; and with anti-ship missiles taking some one-digit number of minutes to strike a target, an Incheon-style landing around Warsaw would be as unrealistic to stage from Åland as it would be to stage from Kronstadt (or more so, since it would be harder to get an air defense umbrella even over the staging area).

Whuh? Warsaw? Do you mean Gdansk?

Sure, you wouldn't get landings like this, but controlling the Baltic (or, even more importantly, preventing NATO control of Baltic) would still give Russians considerable strategic advantage, starting with the security of Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg. The Arctic circle even moreso - that's where the big missiles would be flying, after all.

They didn't attack Sweden in WWII either, when it still would have made more sense (as naval action had not yet been rendered quite as impossible by modern reconnaissance and targeting) and they had a bigger and better army; and even their action against Finland was decidedly half-hearted, seemingly only serving to loosen the Finnish chokehold on Leningrad's northern supply lines that gave them trouble during the first half of the war. (As much as it may be flattering to you, it seems implausible that they would have been unable to make it past Vainikkala after fighting their way through to Berlin, if they actually were equally motivated.)

If we're talking about 1944, we're talking about a completely different situation due to there already having been 3 years of war. And Winter War was precisely the sort of an invasion of a neutral country to obtain a strategic advantage in the midst of an ongoing separate greater-power conflict we are talking about here.

It seems pretty clear to me that the Åland/Gotland explanation was advanced by politicians who had personal incentives to make your respective countries join NATO, and lapped up by a media and population eager to see themselves personally involved on the right side in a conflict that they perceived as just

The scenarios that I described wasn't concocted in 2022 - they've been standard fare in Finnish and Swedish security debates from the times of Cold War on, a part of a greater security calculus of whether it makes more sense to join NATO and risk getting directly involved a great-power conflict or not join the NATO and still risk being targeted by a separate SMO in preparation of such a conflict or as a separate but still connected part of such a conflict.

For a long time, that calculus pointed towards the "not join" option, with majorities of both the population and the leadership of these countries sharing this view, but a full Russian attack on Ukraine of course upended the calculus almost completely (the year of Russia beating the war drum before the invasion had already started this process but the invasion made the opinion switch permanent) by demonstrating Russia's capacity for brash, previously unthinkable action, with both the people and the leaders basically changing course almost overnight. I live here and follow local politics closely, I am very familiar with how this process happened.

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