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Notes -
Who wants to hear about who blew up the Nord Stream Pipeline in September 2022?
If you haven't heard in the news yet- the official take of the 2022 Nordstream Pipeline explosion is hitting the news, as Germany has issued an arrest warrant for a person of interest, and the Wall Street Journal is fielding one of those totally-not-Government-assisted exposes on what happened (somewhat).
Was it the dastardly Yanks? Perfidious albion? The sinister Russians?
No, it was someone that many including the Russians insisted at the time couldn't be responsible because the culprit was so blindingly obvious it didn't need to be discussed further...
...which is to say, it was the Ukrainians.
To quote-
If sorry / not sorry hashtag could apply, I suspect this would be one of those moments it would.
Various points of interest from the WSJ article include-
Zelensky was initially on board with it, but (supposedly) tried to turn it off after being warned by the CIA-
The CIA, warned by the Dutch, also warned the Germans in advance, indicating all three knew of the plot in advance.
If true, this would both explain why the 'USA did it!' theory never held sway in the upper German government, and also why the government was keen to keep it underwraps (because it would be not only a scandal on the foreign policy side, but a government-competence issue to have been warned but still failed.)
The position of the article is that Zelnsky tried to cancel the project after being found out, but that his military Commander in chief Zaluzhniy went rogue.
...a bit of a skip to when the attack occurred...
Take that for what you will, and be as skeptical of the claim as you want. Valeriy Zaluzhniy was relieved in very early 2024 as part of the start-of-year Ukrainian reorganization... but possibly as (well-premptive) damage control, and other potential motivations.
So if Germany wanted to pursue this line of prosecution, it'd involve going after an ambassador in a European partner.
The resourcing of the operation was not particularly impressive.
...a skip of an initially more elaborate plan...
Note this is actually one of the reasons the Russians had an interest in downplaying / denying a Ukrainian attribution- the Russians have invested great sums in having state capacity to target underwater infrastructure as part of their deterrence / great power model vis-a-vis NATO. A minor group of oligarchs being able to do the same not only could give ideas to others, but would undercut the Russian exclusiveness of the threat.
Obviously this has its own implications for German foreign policy...
...but said foreign policy runs into the reality that Germany's NordStream policies were, shall we say, not supported by the neighbors whose views on its destruction differ from those who would want Germany to take a hard line.
As for why the Ukrainians did it? Despite claims to the contrary years ago that only the US had an incentive, well-
...
...
So there are three general incentives characterized, though not with emphasis, in the article.
1- To hurt Russia
2- To reduce the economic leverage Russia had over Germany and other Russian-gas-dependent countries (which was a major factor in 2022 in blocking aid, i.e. the German helmet aid package)
3- (Unstated) Economic incentives to force Russia to continue paying gas transit fees to Ukraine (as opposed to cutting off the pipeline)
Inflicting costs on Germany is framed as a consequence, not a goal in and of itself- though I do fully expect this to be the angle the anti-Ukraine partisans to appeal to going forward.
Though maybe not the Russian state-backed angle. One of the implicit reasons Russia had to push against the Ukraine-Nord Stream theory in the past was that it undercut the Russian positions on both underseas deterrence (casting it as a difficult state-only capacity that gave it deterrence leverage and could be used as evidence to blame the US when the pipeline was destroyed), and because it would reveal the fragility of the Russian energy-connection arguments that a lot of the pro-Russian arguments relied on.
This is because if a country with marginal projection capabilities like Ukraine could blow up a pipeline when their security interests were threatened, so could any other Baltic country if Russia attempted to leverage the energy blackmail like it was attempting over Ukraine. The energy leverage over German policy making can't be rebuilt once the argument of 'good relations with Russia could lead to reliable cheap energy' was blown up, because even if an angry German government wanted to retaliate and make energy alignment with Russia a priority again, it could, again, just be blown up. German-Russian energy ties transitioned from being a bilateral issue that could isolate other countries, to being hostage to the Russian ties to everyone who could sever them, which is frankly nearly anyone.
This not only undercut one of Russia's early/pre-war goals (to increase German energy dependence on Russia), but explains why the German government has been largely sitting on the issue over the last two years. Not only was the pipeline not as popular in-country or in the near-abroad as it was with the government and business circles, but the foundations for the energy relationship have been fundamentally blown up on multiple angles. The connections aren't reliable even if the Russians wanted it to be, and the Russians demonstrated they were willing to be unreliable suppliers for political purposes, and the limits of the German state to protect it were revealed even when pre-warned by NATO and European allies, and the necessary neighbor support to go after the issue after the fact was opposed by other NATO/European allies. While the German government may not like that, it's the reality of a strategic context they have to act within.
None of this was advantageous from a Russian perspective, and while the Russians may adapt to the change... well, they've been resisting the Ukrainian accusation for the last two years already, and minimizing the threat Ukraine can pose to them abroad remains in their negotiating interest for what they're trying to frame for peace talks in the future.
I suspect this issue will be used by angry partisans, particularly from those far from government, but I'll be surprised if the German nation significantly shifts. Not only has this been hinted at with increasing directness for awhile, and I've not seen evidence that the German public is particularly moved, but the government's strategic interests aren't really changed from when it was last informed about it 2 years ago.
This isn't new news, but this is a new directness of what was once the primary contemporary anti-American conspiracy theory. While it will be interesting to see who pivots with as much vigor, this has a lot of the characteristics of stories that- even when publicized- quickly fade in general disinterest.
But I found it interesting enough to elevate here. Cheers.
Christ. If this true, Ukraine deliberately sabotaged European infrastructure and, by extension, our long-term economy. And our response will be to make a frowny-face and give them lots more money. Can we please, just once, try and find some allies who don't sabotage us? Both inside and outside the UK. As it is, I feel like I'm being ruled by masochists.
It's not true.
It's useful to claim.
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Impoverishing Europe might make Ukraine a bad ally to Europe, but it makes them a very good ally to the US State Department. Reducing the EU to a US vassal and lapdog has been a long term goal of theirs.
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That depends on who you think 'we' are, and who 'our' economy refers to, and what an alliance entails in terms of from others to you, but from you to others.
In the case of Nordstream, for example, it was not European infrastructure in a political sense- it was German-Russian infrastructure project series, built over the objection of European partners, only stalled due to organized Anglo-European lobbying against German interest groups and German government positions which prioritized German economic self-interest over the economic and security concerns of a number of their eastern neighbors. It was an extension of an economic dependence to a power who would- just as predicted by the warning of Germany's allies which were repeatedly disregarded- attempt to blackmail the German economy to the European detriment. And it was one which the Germans- even when aided by the warnings of allies- was unable to defend, but relied on other parties to ignore even if doing so came at the expense of their own interests and to german benefit, even though the Germans were not allies (and were shaping their policy on the basis of the Russian blackmail to Russian benefit vis-a-vis Ukraine).
If one wants to apply a bad-ally model, this would beg the question of who the bad ally up for consideration is: the Ukrainians being a bad ally to the Germans and Europeans, or the Germans being a bad ally to the Europeans and Ukrainians. It's not as if the Germans were ignorant of the history of Russian gas-coercion against European Union members when they were investing in Nord Stream, which would have had the effect of negating German costs, and thus inherent alignment with their European allies if the Russians did so again in the future (as they ended up doing).
That the German economic model at the heart of Europe was dependent on what was functionally a subsidized Russian export scheme to cultivate influence was never a secret, and neither were the consequences if that link of subsidized gas broke.
Ultimately, international relations is anarchy, and anarchy sucks. It's not masochism to endure it, it's that it doesn't suck less if you break off connections with people who don't prioritize you over their own interests even as you do the same to them.
I think an alliance more-or-less entails long-term mutual support, which in practice usually requires some distance. Britain and Portugal have been allies for 900 years, Britain and Japan have usually got on pretty well. Likewise Britain and Australia. It is fundamentally different from vassalage (support from a superior power in exchange for obedience from a lesser one) and mutual cooperation (countries who pursue their own competing interests but cooperate on occasion).
Almost no countries in the EU are allies, except of convenience, and I find the constant desire to pretend otherwise tiresome. Britain's politicians fawn over every foreign connection they can find, our newspaper write stirring paeans to the bravery of Ukranian troops who we basically treat as meat-shields and who would in turn butcher us all if they thought it would help against Russia, and we just tank knife after knife in the back with a smile on our face.
Allies of convenience are still allies, and expecting others to pretend otherwise based on one's own unique definitions of what an alliance is / is not is certainly a position one can take, but it's also one that will be continually doomed to disappointment. Particularly if the criticism comes from a position dripping with historical irony- there are reasons Perfidious Albion is and has been an international relations meme for centuries. (Centuries longer than the last British-Japanese war even, which makes that appeal an interesting example of alliance-compatible behavior.)
If common understanding of alliances breaks with your convictions of what an alliance fundamentally should be... swell! Such a standard also means there is no moral injury deserving sympathy over the violation of a standard that never applied. If long-term mutual support on the time frame of centuries is required for there to be an alliance, then countries that have not existed as independent polities in their current form for even 50 years will never be able to be bad allies. Being a bad ally is conditional on being an ally, after all.
But it does undercut the earlier criticism of Ukraine's actions as being those of a bad ally, as the new standards of alliance and allies puts even less onus on the Ukrainians of having committed any sort of immoral action for you to be aghast over. After all, what was targeted was not 'our' infrastructure, but the infrastructure of non-allies by not-allies that was being leveraged against the interests of other not-allies, both in the immediate context and for years/decades prior.
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You could, if they existed. The concept of independent nations in Europe conclusively ended on July 6, 1944, the day the Americans launched a full-scale invasion of the [German-led] European Union; after that, there was no turning back. UK probably should have stayed out of it, but in hindsight there was no real way to know that back then, and if Britons ever were to be slaves they were going to choose the US as their master anyway.
I am honestly unsure what you trying to parody here. And whether you are ranting about EU or going for "Nazis did nothing wrong, also I hate Jews" tangent.
Por que no los dos?
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Another point for team Nothing Ever Happens, yay!
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If the story is true, why is U.S. intelligence leaking the details now?
I think it does increase the likelyhood that the Ukraine did it rather than the United States, but I am taking the story's allocations of personal responsibility with a shakerful of salt.
Ukraine is losing, so they need to look like they deserve it.
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Limited_hangout
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Probably because the Germans earlier this week released a warrant for one of the Ukrainians allegedly involved, and with it opening up the story to be a potential international media event.
The US govt. rational for the WSJ article would be to shape the public discussion following the German warrant announcement, both to head off information drift / theorizing and to cast their version of events in a way to mitigate fallout. I'd fully encourage you to take the story's allocation of personal responsibility with a shaker of salt, but some elements claimed (such as pre-warning the Germans / assisting them afterwards) are the sort of specific claims that are either are decisively rejected if false, or undermine the capacity of someone to reject the broader position. (In other words, the German political establishment cannot simultaneously admit to prior knowledge, and then be super-shocked / react heavily to publicly learn it was the Ukrainians. From a policy shaping perspective, this helps mitigate the risk of a German political backlash / cut-off of aid to Ukraine, as it emphasizes that the German government has known and yet gone through every major aid-escalation all along.)
Now, there is a separate question from this short-answer, which is why the Germans released the warrant now?
Part of this may be that prosuction angle of this is beyond the German government's ability / willingness to stop (as a government cover up of the Nord Stream pipeline would be too politically costly to engage), but not beyond their ability to shape the timing of... and it was released this week, because this was a very convenient Ukrainian good-news week to drop it.
Not to put a fine point on it, but supporting the Ukraine War is generally popular in Germany, and more popular with the Ukrainians are visibly succeeding. If the arrest warrant was going to have to come out eventually anyways, dropping it in the midst of a surge of Ukrainian support minimizes the public/political cost of it, as by the time the contextual pro-Ukraine surge fades, so will most of the interest of the media cycle, and thus the political pressure to act / react.
Which, to go back to your question-
The US intelligence is leading the details now (possibly) because the Germans released the warrant this week (possibly) because support to Ukraine is in a popularity surge earlier this week because Ukraine launched a surprisingly-effective offensive against Russia last week.
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Paul Graham thought that Putin blew up Nordstream. https://x.com/paulg/status/1575203891620110337
What a boomer.
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So after all this time the story that the US intelligence agencies are leaking to the WSJ about the attack that turned Europe into an obedient lacky of the US, took away whatever leverage Russia had on them to oppose US foreign policy interests, and simultaneously enriched US companies via liquid natural gas exports helping the regime avoid recession by an economic down turn created by it's terrible economic policy turns out to be this nonsense?
Conveniently the people involved are not Ukraine military, they are some private nobodies, and not Zelensky since the CIA article goes out of it's way to make sure he is absolved of any responsibility even painting him as being a good boy of the CIA and asking to stop the op. The only person implicated that we will ever prove even exists and is alive somewhere on Earth right now happens to be one general that has already been sidelined into a position where he is irrelevant to Ukrainian leadership and simultaneously immune from any sort of prosecution that could potentially uncover information that conflicts with the CIA story.
yea, nobody with a brain is going to believe this. I guess it's better than Russia blew up their own pipeline.
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A bit of an aside, but that's an incorrect comparison coming from the ukrainian's head of the armed forces. I guess that can be forgiven seeing he was a general, not an admiral. Modern torpedoes are wire guided, they can be steered, armed, disarmed, have their homing feature activated or deactivate, or detonated after being launched, provided the wire didn't break (which can happen during manoevers from the ship or the torpedo, from the torpedo tube being closed to reload, from distance, etc...). But broadly speaking, modern torpedoes are guided weapons. There are exceptions (lightweight torpedoes don't always have wires as they are often launched from the air) but yeah.
Which ones do you have in mind?
The NATO standard doesn’t appear to have a wire. None of the ASROC-capable missiles do, seeing as they fly a bit.
China might, except that design is alleged to copy another US design, which doesn’t.
The only ones I saw which consistently mentioned wires were the Swedish series.
Heavy torpedoes, like US/NATO Mk-48's, Russian SETs and UGSTs, etc...
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The mk 48 has wire guidance. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_48_torpedo
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Prorussians: "We told you the Ukies did it!"
Proukrainians: "And they were right to do it!"
Nothing changes.
Eh, the Putin enthusiasts were pretty strident about how big, bad America did it.
But you’re probably right that none of those opinions change.
True, but who will admit that they were wrong?
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Northern Europeans’ reaction to the revelations.
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So is it safe to say that at the start of the next big war a bunch of important submarine cables/pipelines all get cut simultaneously? A bog standard chinese container ship "accidentally" cut a baltic sea pipeline last october, the houthis managed to fuck up some cables in the red sea, it clearly isn't that difficult.
Anyways in this case it was always blatantly obvious the ukrainians did this, they had something to gain, and the americans weren't going to give germany a slap in the face like this.
Simultaneously? Probably not, and possibly not at all depending what level of tit-for-tat one wants in the conflict. Not all big wars start with the intent of being big wars, and not all forms of disruption are tried, and while it's not hard to do it's not impossible to mitigate either.
But cables are notoriously vulnerable, and I can remember reading about fears of terrorists targetting undersea cable landing stations to break inter-continental network connections back in the 2000s.
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That’s been safe to say for a long time now. Russia has tested their capacity in the North Sea and Baltic Sea by doing exactly that several times.
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