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Notes -
In Which Dean Points to New and Upcoming News as Reason to Expect the Ukraine War to Continue For Some Time
TL;DR - We are entering a few weeks in which Trump/Republican/American support for Ukraine is likely to transition to a more stable sustain-aid-to-Ukraine footing. The post-inflexion point where the future trajectory is clear will probably be apparent in May with the state of ceasefire negotiations. The longer-term balance of aid politics will probably be apparent by late August, with the 2026 US national budget proposals for FY26.
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Start
In the spirit of 'possible foreshadowing for the next week of this crazy ride we call life'- the Trump administration signals it is ready to 'move on' from Ukraine peace talks if no progress in the coming days.
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What Has Happened / About to Happen?
The very abbreviated summary of what's new is that Trump has been raising frustration with the (lack) of progress on the 30-day general ceasefire proposal in public and private, which is reaching media through official and unofficial channels. While the Trump administration has raised concessions such as raising recognition of Crimea as Russia as part of a framework and some forms of sanction relief, this has been undercut by elements like Russia announcing that the 30-day energy truce is over and that a broader Ukraine ceasefire is "unrealistic." As Ukraine signaled support for the broader ceasefire proposal back in early march as part of the post-Trump-Zelensky White House blow up that included the temporary intelligence / aid freeze, and has been publicly supportive/aligned since despite clear misgivings, I doubt Trump will be blaming / punishing Ukraine if that 'insufficient' progress decision is made.
Not least because, and totally coincidentally, the Trump administration signaled an expectation of signing the Ukraine mineral deal late next week as well. The deal is not without its critics within or outside of Ukraine. However, after a US concession / clarification / [choose weaker term of choice] that the deal would respect / not hinder Ukraine's EU obligations as part of EU process. This would still leave the formal ratification through the Ukrainian parliament, as if it were a treaty, but this does not appear to be an obligation on the US side... but will be doubtlessly be raised by Trump as a diplomatic / economic triumph for his domestic audience.
So we have a Trumpian warning / demand for immediate progress on a broader ceasefire or a drop of peace process.
What does this mean?
No necessarily much, but enough for a 7-point effort post.
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Point one, it's not necessarily as time sensitive as it is being presented, as opposed to being part of a possible multi-week push for a truce.
This can be your typical negotiating tactic of trying to create a sense of urgency for Russia to close a deal. People on all sides can recognize it. What does (or does not) happen next week will not 'prove' anything on its own.
However, that doesn't mean there isn't a limited window of opportunity. There are other geopolitical priorities competing for Trump's attention. There is Latin America migrant repatriations. There are (indirect) negotiations with Iran. There are (many) trade negotiations over tariffs. There are (broader) China issues. There is everything else, including the upcoming federal budget negotiations. Some of these (the 90-day tariff pause, US budget negotiations) are more predictable than others.
Ukraine peace is a policy priority of choice, not necessity. Trump can, and eventually will, move on to some other issues. The only dispute is whether this is a matter of weeks, months, or years. Trump is signaling / claiming days-weeks. You don't need to believe that to recognize that even a window of weeks (or even months) is still a window.
This creates a risk that even if all parties wanted to end the war, they could miss the opportunity if some (Russia) attempt to draw out negotiations in the name of trying to get more.
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Point two is option two- the (unlikely) prospect that Russia reigns in its demands to accept a cease-fire deal is likely sooner than later.
This is not presented as the 'expected' option. Arguments have been made in the Motte and elsewhere that Russia has no reason to stop if they feel they are winning and expect to keep winning. There are separate lines of argument that Putin has political and social reasons to maintain the war, and some of these reasons apply regardless of whether Russia is actually able to win or not.
I've made no secret in the past that I view Putin as a strategic procrastinator, and these tendencies can compound to drawing out negotiations on the belief that delay will improve your result. Especially when a 30-day military ceasefire would give Ukraine a full uninterrupted month to patch up eastern fortifications and thus increase Russian costs in resuming an offensive afterwards.
However- just because it is an unlikely option doesn't mean it's impossible. And if it does happen, that would be more likely in the coming works than right after Trump publicly moves on. And if that happens, expect a surge of international attention and maneuvering as Trump attempts to close a deal on a longer peace, and everything that means. The month after a ceasefire could see everything from a surge in Russian recrutiments (as people attempt to leverage enlistment bonuses on the expectation of a lot of money without having to fight) to European efforts to make their ability to veto Russian demands of them (i.e. sanctions relief) a veto/leverage point.
But the more unlikely it is, the more likely any window-of-opportunity with the Trump administration is to close. And re-opening a window can be much, much harder the second time than the first.
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Point three is what Trump 'passing' on the peace process means for Ukraine if it does occur.
My position is that a collapse of US-Russia negotiations means sustained, not diminished, US aid for Ukraine.
The crux of the Trump ukraine peace plan that was raised as far back as last election was that aid to Ukraine would be a lever against both parties to bring them to the negotiation table. The point most reported- typically by those who were opposed to Trump, or wanted to believe that Trump would end Ukraine support entirely- was the point that Ukraine would not receive weapons if it did not participate in peace talks with Russia. However, the plan also stipulated that if Ukraine did do so, then the US would continue to arm Ukraine so that Russia would not attack again after a cease fire concluded.
Obviously, negotiation results with Russia could change that. However, absent those results, the question becomes why Trump would cut off all aid to Ukraine regardless.
An argument made is the monetary / cost issue will motivate Trump. The past arguments of affordability, replacement costs, and so on.
This is where the context of the mineral deal negotiations comes up as a way to offset costs, with the historical analogy of the WW2 lend lease politics in which the lending was backed by other things of value.
The relevance of the mineral deal is that it is a profit motive / political cover for military aid. We know this is a paradigm Trump has considered because the Trump administration raised the prospect of framing past aid as a loan the mineral deal could pay off. While Zelensky pushed back against past military aid as a loan to not be compensated for, and the US softened its position on past aid during the negotiations this is what we would generally consider a 'suspiciously specific denial.' 'Old' aid, after all, is rather distinct from 'new' aid.
In other words (from sources more sympathetic to Ukraine to the US), the mineral deal cann be seen as a proposed reparations mechanism to pay back American aid. And if this isn't going to be applied to old aid...
This may go a non-trivial way for weakening/neutralizing the 'the US cannot afford to give away aid to Ukraine' line of arguments in the US government for cutting off Ukraine aid entirely. Aid that is 'purchased' can be replaced at cost, or better- with all the beneficial implications for scaling up an arms industry for another conflict (China) on basis of orders (paid to fight Russia).
Future military aid may no longer be 'aid' in the sense of coming at no cost to the recipient, but it is more likely to come even from relative skeptics if it is 'purchased.'
And that, in turn, changes some of the Russia-Ukraine war dynamics going forward in ways that do not support a mid-term end if the near-term window of opportunity closes.
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Point four- parallel negotiations as a means of leverage on each other.
This final point is a framing to help understand why certain unpopular/criticized things of the last months have occurred, but also why they can support a longer Russia-Ukraine war. In short, the Russia-US ceasefire negotiations and the Ukraine-US mineral deal negotiations increased US leverage in both.
The Russian diplomatic/economic strategy for years has been to try and keep Ukraine separated from western military aid, so that relative Russian economic size could be an advantage, as opposed to relative western economic size. In this context, the pending US-Ukraine mineral deal is a theoretical leverage, by promising / threatening sustained western aid. This may not be enough leverage, but it is a basis for pushing Russia to make a cost-saving concession sooner. However, if the mineral deal is executed, this potential leverage goes away- the US political-economics involved make backing out of a one-sided deal (in the US favor) exceptionally difficult.
On the other hand, the continuation of the war is itself leverage for the US over Ukraine in the mineral deal. The more the Ukrainians expect to need continued aid, the more the US can make military aid conditional on future reimbursement. The more the Ukrainians need to reimburse, the more value the mineral deal has over time as a means to cover the collateral. If the Russia-US negotiations culminated before the mineral deal, however, those negotiations could more easily have terms that prevent the long-term interest in forming in Ukraine. Which, in turn, means less ability to secure American aid.
So the 'I expect Russia to come to the table soon' is not just a matter of the Russia-US negotiations. It also serves as a second-order pressure on Ukraine to seal the mineral deal. Which includes things like getting it through the Ukrainian Rada (legislature), including the Zelensky administration spending political capital to overcome criticisms to do so in a timely manner. Either a Russian conciliation for more serious negotiations or a Russian intent to keep fighting indefinitely both providing incentive to sign the deal and keep the weapons flowing.
(This weapon flow in turn is why this may be a one-sided but not solely to American benefit / Ukraine expense. Note that securing American aid against Russia not only provides the means to resist Russia / increase Russia costs if it chooses to pursue conquests. It also weakens the Russian negotiation position vis-a-vis Ukraine, if Russia can no longer expect to completely separate Ukraine from US aid in the future. This increases Ukrainian bargaining posture for any peace deal, as while it may take longer in the near-term for the Russians to internalize that, it will decrease the Russian ability to demand long-term concessions that would leave Ukraine more vulnerable to another war.
This is not an argument of 5D-chess / 'everything is going according to plan.' But it is a model for understanding how seemingly separate lines of negotiations, and unsightly diplomatic conflict, play into each other.
Take the Trump-Vance-Zelensky blowup in late February. Most people can understand, if not like, how the following military aid/intelligence cut off improved leverage via making Trump aid cutoff threats credible. The willingness to do so can also be generally understood as a credibility booster for the US entering into the Russia-US negotiations, that the Trump administration was willing to break with the prior Biden administration and consider concessions the Ukrainians/old-guard would not want. That credibility might not be enough, it might be the basis of Russia pressing for more, but it is a form of credibility of good-faith* effort. *For a certain perspective of good-faith.
But not everyone will recognize that the more promising (or unfortunate for Ukraine) the Russia-US negotiations appear, the more leverage that applies on the mineral-deal negotiations in turn. Or how that has a feedback loop where progress on mineral negotiations can influence Russian negotiations, such as the Russian offer of mineral incentives to the US, including from Russia-occupied Ukrainian territory. Which is its own feedback loop back to the Ukraine deal, and so on.
(This isn't limited to ceasefire-mineral relations either. It can apply to other aspects as well. The US-Ukraine mineral deal shapes Ukraine-EU relations. That means it is also an aspect of US-EU trade relations, currently under negotiation. What is also subject to negotiation is the EU's publicly-mooted 'lots of money for rearmament, but not from Americans because we don't trust them' funds. Which are, however, open for negotiation by other non-EU members. Quid-quid-quid exists.)
Feedback loops are not infinite. They are not all-powerful. As noted above, if the Ukraine-US mineral deal goes through, that undercuts the US leverage against the Russia position. And if the leverage against Russia fails, then the war goes on.
But that's not for a lack of a 'good-faith' effort. And what's also often not recognized is the importance of good-faith effort at the cease fire to legitimize the lock-in of American support to Ukraine.
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Point five - the importance of having tried and failed, over having never tried at all, and covering the costs with a skeptical-but-not-hostile electoral base.
The not-quite-final point I think the two news stories brings up, of ceasefire windows and mineral-deals-for-weapons, is what this means for the Trump coalition and its willingness to continue supporting ukraine if Russia is blamed by Trump for a lack of ceasefire.
The general American republican-versus-democrat divide on Ukraine support centers on whether the US provides too much support to Ukraine or not. Last month, a Gallop poll from 3-11 march of Americans, broken by party, characterized the Republicans as relatively divided. 56% said the US was providing too much. 56% is indeed a plurality, and some may take it to mean that the US republicans collectively oppose any aid to Ukraine.
But it is a plurality with nuance. 12% of Republicans were in the 'not enough' camp, and 31% were in the 'right amount' camp. That alone is a 43% share of 'right amount or not-enough.' A 5.6 to 4.3 response is an advantage, but it's not an overwhelming advantage.
It's also subject to future change, just as it was subject to recent change. Back in December 2024, the 'too much' category was 67% percent, and the 'not enough' was still... 12%. And the 'right amount' was 20%. But remember- 'not enough' was 12% in both december 2024, before Trump entered office, and in the march 2025 polling. This means the only real change was between the Republican 'too much' versus the Republican 'not enough' factions.
That means nearly the entire shift in Republican support for Ukraine aid corresponded to Trump's handling of the Zelensky white house issue of the previous week, including both the aid-freeze but also the indications of its return.
The poll was 3-11 March. 3 March was when the post-blowup military aid freeze was announced. On 5 March the administration was indicating the aid would come back if negotiations were pursued.
Put another way- when Trump was actively freezing, Republican opinion shifted about 11% away from 'the US is providing too much aid' (even as the US was freezing aid), and Republicans 'not enough or about right' went from nearly 30% to over 40% of the Republican base.
Now, there are two general ways to read this. One reading is that the opinion numbers reflect absolute value of aid. The other reading is that this change is about how aid is handled.
The anti-Ukraine case could use the chang to argue that the cutoff of aid leads to the 'right amount' polling because 'freeze aid' is 'right amount.' However, this ruling on absolute volume of aid runs into the question of what those who think no aid = too much aid are thinking. Does aid need to be actively negative to not be too-much? Polling challenges occur.
The other reading is that the Republican shift is less about the actual volume amount of money- of which Americans are notoriously unfamiliar with the specifics of- and more about how the aid is handled. This is a conditionality approach- the right amount depends on tying aid to the right conditions on the ground. Cutting aid is appropriate after a high-level fight. Promises to condition aid are appealing if aid is conditioned on peace talks. The amount is less important than the political context.
I'm not here to argue which you should believe is right. My point is that both of these readings suggest that the potential news of the coming weeks- the Ukraine mineral deal and Russia peace deal- may shift the Republican coalition towards a greater 'right amount or more' coalition balance for further Ukraine aid.
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Point six - how the deals (and Trump walkway from a ceasefire) may shape Trump's base into a more pro-Ukraine-aid direction.
For the 'too much' coalition, this is because 'too much' can itself be broken down into 'too much because [cost]' and 'too much because [anti-Ukraine]' subgroups.
For the later [anti-Ukraine] group, any aid is too much regardless of cost because of who it benefits, not the money itself. This is just locked in. It doesn't matter why you oppose Ukraine aid, whether further sub-groups of [pro-Russia] or [anything-but-Biden] or [Ukraine-specific] motives. It can be none of those, even a [US isolationist] position. Any foreign aid/involvement is too much. This is the baseline of the forever-'too-much' faction.
However, the [cost] faction is less locked-in because [cost] is relative to [gains]. These gains may be monetary expectations (mineral revenues to pay back non-old 'aid'), or in-kind (mineral resources instead of cash), or other. The kind of gain is less important than the perception of gain. This is the distinction between [cost] as a motive, and [cost] as argument-as-soldiers. [Anti-Ukraine] factions may use [cost] when it is convincing, but it's not their motive. It is the motive for those who view [cost] as a primary issue.
This is where the Ukraine mineral deal can start prying apart the 'too-much' coalition, because expected future gains can offset costs. And the more Democratic / international media criticizes the deal as 'extortionate,' the more credible it can be to an otherwise unfamiliar base that, hey, aiding Ukraine is not just [cost].
The 'how it is handled' faction in turn will respond to success of the mineral deal / failure of the peace talks.
This is because the 'handling' faction is, again, less motivated by the actual amount of aid as much as the perception that the decisions are being made appropriately. This may be because they felt Biden was blindly giving away stuff without giving peace a chance. It may be pure partisanship that condemned aid as too much because it was from Democrats rather than Republicans. It may be because they feel aid should be responsive to political power dynamics, approving of a withdrawal because of 'disrespect' but open to 'earned' or 'deserved' aid. Again, the actual value of the aid is not the determining point.
The mineral deal can be a partial salve in this group because a quid-pro-quo is a reasonable 'handling' that can alleviate concerns on the relationship aspect. The more advantageous to the US the better, in so much that it affirms their view of the 'proper' power relationship. It's a bit like 'millions for defense, not one cent in tribute,' where 'give Ukraine aid because you're supposed to' is an imposition of obligation where the premise (obligatory tribute) is more important than the money (millions in defense being more expensive than unacceptable tribute).
However, a ceasefire talks collapse is even more relevant.
Trump-Putin ceasefire efforts may be a partisan reframing of US-Russia pre-war negotiations, but that partisanship is what makes the Trump experience more relevant for 'was peace tried' objections. Trump, by virtue of not being in office, is not held responsible. Trump's position that the war should be ended by negotiation is the basis by which people believe he would [rightly/wrongly] compromise Ukrainian interests in nways Biden would not. Arguably no one but Ukraine has more interest in a near-term ceasefire than Trump.
And if that fails- and as importantly if failure is not credibly assigned to Ukraine, which I think is doubtful- then Trump and the Trump base is more likely to blame Russia than Trump himself. This is a question of good faith versus efforts to oppose the talks.
The Trump cutoff of aid to Ukraine and willingness to enter negotiations with Russia was a proof of 'good faith' on Trump's part. The Ukrainian public capitulation / alignment to the ceasefire proposal construct, and the mineral deal, will make it hard to convincingly blame Ukraine as the cause of failure. (That doesn't mean that partisans won't try, but a 'benefit' of the US immigration brohas has been public attention is far more on US domestic politics than the Russia-Ukraine attempts to blame eachother for ceasefire violations.)
And that leaves Russia more likely to catch blame with lower-information republicans. Partly because of clear motives (the more they are perceived as 'winning' in the present), partly because of higher-profile signals of rejection (like calling Trump's efforts unrealistic), and partly because of who Trump is liable to blame if he doesn't blame Ukraine.
This may be a result that many people see coming. This may be a result the democrats wouldn't have needed for their coalition to support Ukraine aid. But it's also a point that some people/groups of people need to try and fail for themselves rather than defer to the judgement of their partisan foes. Only someone 'on your own side' can sell some ideas. Only Nixon can go to China, and all that.
And that leads to Trump.
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Final Point - The Trump Effect: If Trump Supports Aid It Can't Be Wrong
This is point that assumes a part of the conclusion (talks collapse, Trump doesn't blame Ukraine), but as a baseline for making a narrower point about party politics. IF Trump drops the ceasefire project, but continues to support Ukraine aid, the political space for the anti-Ukraine advocates to try and message / persuade in the Republican party decreases.
This is because anti-Ukraine advocates need Trump to be politically relevant, not the other way around. Trump is the one who has created the political space for them to advocate. Trump's tolerance / endorsement is what bestows them not only a platform, but the audience (MAGA-cult, if you prefer) that will think positively of whatever Trump thinks positively up. Trump is not influential because he is [anti-Ukraine], [anti-Ukraine] are influential because Trump indulges them.
But the quickest, surest way to fall out of favor not only with Trump, but by extension his MAGA-following, is to turn against Trump if he stops advancing your pet cause, or letting your advance yours. This is the difference between Musk, who's kept a cordial relationship despite various breaks from Trump, and those like Steve Bannon and John Bolton, who are locked out. Such people have their own pre-existing power/popularity bases, but their influence in the Trump party falls if they fall out with Trump.
This means that once (if) Trump takes a position that negotiations are no longer something he's going to pay political capital for, but that mineral deal/etc. make continued Ukrainian aid acceptable, then the political influence of the [any aid is too much] factions is going to wither. They will still exist, but they will not have the platform or the following if they try to critique Trump-support for Ukraine like Trump signal-boosted their condemnations of Biden-support for Ukraine.
This effect will get stronger the worse you think of Trump and MAGA in general. The more you think that Trump is sensitive to criticism or defiance, the more you think MAGA is a cult, the more any Trump walk-away from the Russia ceasefire talks will shape the Republican aid picture towards the aid-sustaining 'about right or not enough' crowd that will let Ukraine aid keep flowing.
And once the MAGA-support is behind supporting Ukraine, then the question transitions from an internal-party 'should we keep supporting Ukraine' to an external-party 'what can we get for supporting Ukraine' debate. Ukraine support shifts from a 'yes/no' to 'if yes, for what?'
This is where a Ukraine-supporting Republican party that is established this year can leverage this consensus for future negotiations.
Those negotiations can be internal the US, such as the fiscal year budget negotiations. FY 2026 negotiations could, technically, be done without any Democrat support as part of the Republican trifecta. However, if Republicans lose the mid-terms- and that's a safe bet- then the Democrats get a say in the budget either. Something the Democrats poll as caring far more about than the Republicans- like Ukraine aid- is a good piece of leverage.
Those negotiations can also be external to the US. Replace 'Democrats' with 'Europeans,' and the mineral deal paradigm of 'paying back for aid, going forward' has another potential buyer (or seller). The Europeans ran a notable campaign a few weeks back about how much money they were willing to spend on re-armament / aid for Ukraine. Yes, it was framed in 'we can't trust the US' terms. No, that does not mean that negotiations might not offer some quids and quos.
The specific negotiations here don't matter as much as what negotiations mean. Negotiations that allow Trump to 'win' are things Trump likes. In so much that Trump drives MAGA preferences, they are also things MAGA likes. If/as Ukraine aid-for-compensation becomes a negotiation tool, MAGA will support maintaining the tool that offers wins.
And that creates the issue that when/if Russia finally decides it has had enough of the war and would like real cease-fire/peace negotiations, it is increasingly likely to be doing so in a context where Trump will have to take even higher political costs to re-open the topic and give up existing advantages. The longer this delay occurs, the more entrenched and potentially useful the status quo will be for Trump, and thus the higher costs- personal and opportunity- for Trump to offer the same sort of terms he's offering in the present.
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Summary / Conclusion - What Does This Mean?
For starters, that if I'm totally wrong I'll have an interesting top-level mea-culpa analysis due. Let's say if Trump walks away from talks but also blames Ukraine to the degree of cutting off all aid to the point of not even letting Ukraine/the Europeans buy US weapons. That will certainly drive some reflections.
Outside of that (probably) small chance- and small chances due happen regularly-
In the next few weeks we may seeing the start of a political transition to a more stable US/Republican support for Ukraine aid for the next year(s).
This won't be immediately apparent, but will be observable over the months to follow, particularly by the fall when the 2026 US budget negotiations culminate. How Ukraine aid factors into that will indicate a lot about the new state of the Republican party and Ukrainian aid politics.
This change is based on how Trump has spent a non-trivial amount of political capital prioritizing the Ukraine War. He's also increasingly impatient about it. Impatience does not mean he's obligated to accept any deal, no matter the cost. It also does not mean he's obliged to carry on negotiations as long as Russia feels like drawing them out. Trump absolutely can re-orient his foreign affairs focus to other things, such as the trade war negotiations.
The threat to walk away from ceasefire negotiations is credible. It will especially be so if/when the mineral deal is signed. The more that the mineral deal is 'clearly good' for the US- even/especially if unethically so- the more that a non-trivial part of the Republican base that opposes Ukraine aid is liable to swap over to supporting Ukraine aid going forward. This can be because the mineral-deal covers [cost] objections, that the quid-pro-quo by a president trusted not to simply obligate it out of hand satisfies [handling] concerns, or just because Trump did it for [MAGA fealty].
If/when this transition to a post-ceasefire but supply-Ukraine occurs, the power/influence of the Ukraine-aid opponents in the Republican coalition will be reigned in due to the prospect of fighting Trump. Those who are dumb enough to turn against Trump openly because any aid is too much will get cast out. Those who toe the President's line will remain, but their potential influence restrained by their self-restraint.
The more MAGA-Republicans grow comfortable with supplying Ukrainian aid for compensation- a paradigm that will (probably) be codified in the mineral deal and if cease-fire talks fail and aren't blamed on Ukraine- the more Ukraine aid will become an instrumental asset for negotiations outside of the Republican party. It may play a role in Democratic party negotiations for the FY2026 federal budget. It may play a role in US-European negotiations. If/as it does, the aid will be valued more as a tool worth sustaining.
The more this happens, the more stable the Ukrainian-aid political situation will become on the US end. A Trump-endorsed political consensus on US aid to Ukraine for compensation in return- whatever the form of the concession with whomever- will have significant impacts on decision-calculuses for future ceasefire attempts or peace negotiations.
Does anyone believe Putin will actually sign a peace deal? From what I can tell, the pro-russian side thinks they just have to continue eating through ukraine until just-around-the-corner total victory because obviously the lamb won’t voluntarily sign off on being dinner. And the pragmatic pro-ukrainian side recommended that zelensky just wave through any of trump’s harebrained peace schemes to let putin take the blame when he inevitably says no, which is happening now.
Isn't that the Ukrainian stance too, they thought they were getting Crimea back, not to mention Donbass? The US endorsed this posture under the Biden administration. Only in 2024 did Ukraine start tentatively admitting some land might be permanently lost.
People only wage war when they think it's in their best interests, to get some kind of superior peace treaty compared to not fighting. Russia thinks they have something to gain. Ukraine thinks they have something to gain. That's why they're fighting.
While there is certainly much truth in that, I do not think that it is the whole story.
A nation which is prepared to fight a losing war just to make their invader bleed for every inch of land, Causal Decision Theory be damned, will obviously get worse outcomes in the case of a war. But if their pre-commitment is known beforehand, they are also much less likely to be invaded in the first place.
Also, there are outcomes which can be had from fighting which can not be had from agreements. Nations are not monolithic agents. There are a lot of outcomes which may be desirable to a government which are simply not feasible to achieve without war. For example, governments can use "we are at war" as an excuse to bypass normal decision making processes. "We may not be at war, but we negotiated that we will get 60% of all the benefits of being at war, so please curb your expectations with regard to decision making accordingly" will not fly domestically. Or take what the EU is getting out of the Ukraine war: depriving a belligerent Russia of its Soviet stockpiles and of the personnel which can be drafted with the least hassle. This is not something Putin could do politically without a war. Well, I guess he could promise not to use these Soviet stockpiles and soldiers against Europe, but if his promises could be trusted we would not be here in the first place.
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Wanting to win is not a sufficient condition for conflict. Someone’s wrong, someone’s making a mistake. Else the parties would agree on the end-state of the war and save themselves the costs of war.
It is true that they have both made fancy claims. How then do you tell a Tough Negotiator from a Delusional Man? The former makes optimistic claims as an anchoring, negotiating tactic, while the latter actually believes his own bullshit. One way to tell them apart is getting a mediator, and when he presents his relatively unbiased, fair compromise, one will accept it, the other will reject it.
Tariff digression: @Dean thinks Trump is a tough negotiator, I think he is a delusional man (on tariffs specifically). He wants to be paid for buying stuff. That’s not how buying works. The phones aren’t ringing, and his trade partners aren’t going to hand over the crown jewels because he threatened to blow up the economic bridges. Trump is sincere, he has been proclaiming his love of tariffs for decades, way before it could have been a negotiating tactic. The lack of progress on tariff negotiations will be evidence of incompatible views on reality between trump and partners, therefore of trump as the delusional man. And vice versa of course, quick tariff relief based on partners' concessions will be evidence of compatible views, therefore of trump as the tough negotiator.
Specifically in the case of the war in Ukraine? Russia keeps invade and taking territory. A "compromise" in which Russia gets part of Ukraine and Ukraine keeps part of Ukraine is merely the starting point for the next invasion in a few years.
If Putin were willing to abandon the idea of eventually conquering all of Ukraine, there could be a compromise where Russia gets a chunk of Ukraine and Ukraine join NATO to provide a guarantee that Russia won’t take the rest of Ukraine in the future. I don’t think that Putin will go for that.
If you're into schizo-kremlinology, some people floated theories that he might go for that, and even made the offer in a plausibly-deniable way, but the "chunk" would include everything right up to the Dniepr river.
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What fair, unbiased mediator is there in the entire world for a conflict this big? China and India are vaguely pro-Russian, EU and US are pro-Ukraine.
Just today we had US politicians firing shots into Russia. Cringe aside, the US certainly isn't capable of resolving this diplomatically: https://x.com/RepBrianFitz/status/1913299824494944423
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what incentive does Russia have to participate in peace talks if they're not interested?
Presumably whatever incentives the mediators have available to them and care to use: adding or removing sanctions and further military aid to their counterparty. "Come to the table, or we will make this more painful than your regime can bear" is a threat that I had assumed was implicitly levelled. Whether it is or not seems less clear at the moment, but Ukraine-flagged warships (torpedo boats, as is tradition) harassing Russian shipping or naval assets outside the Black Sea with some degree of plausibly-deniable allied assistance. Or actually biting sanctions on Russian energy exports.
These haven't happened yet, and may not be on the table, but it at least strikes me that they could be.
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You would think that avoiding the deaths of tens of thousands of your people would be incentive enough. But the decision lies with a man whose interests are not aligned with his people. His regime, and his person, are a lot more secure with the war on, when there is still hope to win (until you sell, it's not a loss), hope that all of those young russians did not die for nothing. Plus, as a long-isolated and increasingly megalomaniacal dictator, he has a less realistic assessment of the situation than your average ukrainian war spectator, of either side. I think he actually believes nato troops may leave ex-warsaw pact countries if he plays his cards right, as he demanded before he invaded ukraine.
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It costs not much. Can't rule out they'd get a good deal if impossible happens.
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You don't need ceasefires to have peace talks. The front is stable enough so that is in effect ceasefire. Just start the direct peace deal process.
..no, front isn't stable.
With the speed russia is advancing they will get in kiev in 2095
Oh yeah, this argument. You of course pretend to know this is .. I dunno, tunnelling, and not a contest between two almost equally matched sides out of which one can replenish its losses and the other cannot.
Do you truly believe the 30 million population of Ukraine can keep sustaining an attritional warfare with Russia ? Note that Russians could basically keep this war going forever, mortality wise- they're losing maybe 70k people a year at worst, meanwhile they have 600k births of boys per year.
I do believe that the frontline has barely changed in the time since the counter offensive. And there are maps to support me. In 30 years we may all be dead or ai slaves, but right here right now the front line is very stable and there doesn't seem to be chance of big swing in either direction in the next few months. So aside from the body bags this is effectively ceasefire as long as the diplomacy of hammering a deal is concerned.
Ukraine may be sacrificing a lot to keep the things stable, but it doesn't looks like there will be depletion of their ability to provide meat for the grinder in next two years.
Ukraine has been falling back slowly but steadily. It's not 'very stable'. They lost ~4500 square kilometers since the counteroffensive, or perhaps even more.
As to body bags, the last exchange had a ratio of 22:1 of course that's skewed bc Russia is advancing.
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I don't think the Russian military is especially competent but that same logic was used by the Axis in WW2 for propaganda posters designed to demoralize the Allies:
https://i.redd.it/teagx5lffh791.jpg
Obviously the Allies reached Berlin a lot faster than 1952, albeit not from the direction of Italy obviously.
It's futile to argue with a dead nazi propagandist, but a map of the whole of europe would show enormous soviet gains from belgorod to lvov in that same original period, sept 43 to may 44. Extrapolating that distance would bring you to berlin in 45, which of course is how it went down.
The WW2 example also had different acceleration dynamics that favored the Soviets.
In WW2, the allied powers got more capable of conducting offenses over time due to the increasing relative manpower and applied logistical throughput (i.e. actually giving manpower the equipment for mechanized warfare) compared to the Axis. This dynamic accelerated due to the relative tool up of the Allied war-economies vis-a-vis the earlier tool-up of the Axis economies that progressively lost access to resources as the war continued. Put in other terms, as the war continued, the Soviet logistical situation got better, and the German logistical situation got worse.
In the Ukraine War, the difference in warfighting capabilities has decreased, not increased, over time. Russia was at its maximum military-economic advantage in the earlier phases of the war, when it had not only the larger standing army but the larger standing stockpiles to match to it. Russia also began its war economy tool-up faster than the Ukraine coalition. However, as the stockpiles degraded and the military-mobilization phase reaches diminishing returns, Russia has gotten less capable of mechanized warfare advances over time. Similarly, the military-economic mechanics have played out Ukraine has gotten more capable of providing sustained resistance over time now that it's no longer limited by things such as a Soviet ammo standard and such.
There are some dynamics that could yet work in the Russian favor- que 'the Ukrainians will collapse any time now'- but there's a reason that last year's 'significant increases' in rate of territory change were still measured in positional rather than maneuver warfare terms.
Historically wars always start bad for Russia. No matter if they are on the offensive or defensive. Afterwards it is a coin flip if they win or lose.
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afaik the shortening of the lines of communication brought on by the german retreat considerably improved german logistics.
You can't shoot an ammunition futures from a canon. At the end of the war Germany was starved for all and any resources.
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Shortening the lines of communication shorted how far the logistics had to travel. Sustained aerial bombardment of industrial centers, naval blockades from receiving foreign materials including oil, and eventual capture of resource-input regions and industrial centers created far worse logistical capacity.
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That part isn’t true though. The initial invasion force had about 180,000 men, about half of what’s on the front line now. In some parts of the line in 2022 Ukrainian forces had a 6-1 numerical advantage. And if you still believe “confirmed vehicle losses” in the middle of a propaganda blizzard surrounding a war where both sides use the same military equipment, I don’t know what to tell you. There’s a reason that Oryx abruptly shut down in October of 2023 when it was just about to become obvious that they were full of shit.
Did you misunderstand the phrase 'military-economic' to mean 'manpower', per chance?
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