Dean
Flairless
Variously accused of being a reactionary post-modernist fascist neo-conservative neo-liberal conservative classical liberal Nazi Zionist imperialist hypernationalist warmongering isolationist Jewish-Polish-Slavic-Anglo race-traitor masculine-feminine bitch-man. No one yet has guessed multiple people, or a scholar. Add to our list of pejoratives today!
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Well, that certainly won't help in the broader judiciary-versus-executive political fight over deportation processes.
But do you honestly believe the interstate commerce clause grants the federal government the unlimited ability to interfere with how states delegate municipalities the power to decide how they're going to charge people for using vehicles on their roads? If this argument was about interstate highways I'd understand your point, but the congestion fee applies to municipal roads.
New Deal jurisprudence allows for interstate commerce regulation of plants grown solely in a state solely for personal consumption with no commercial transaction intended or engaged in. Road policies that affect the ability of out of state residents to work or travel to or through NYC is far, far, far more proximal than that extreme.
Interstate commerce.
Boooo!
(I upvoted. But boooo!)
I think a US "withdrawal" coupled with an EU "entry" could curiously be the closest to an actual winning strategy for the Western bloc in this war.
If this happens, I actually have an outline of a long-post lined up for how this is consistent with the Biden administration's Ukraine strategy from the earliest years of the war, including it being a potential reason for why Biden took some oft-criticized decisions such as slow-rolling the expansion of aid / escalation options in the way he did. IE, why did the US wait so long before providing [X] asset or crossing [Y] redline.
Long-story short, the US strategy was a long-term strategy that prioritized developing a support-coalition that would survive exit of given members, including the US, after political turnover over maximizing short-term gains the US could provide on its own without European concurrence/co-contributions.
Is this a format the judge would have accepted as 'facilitation'? If not, why does it matter as a proposed alternative?
Ok, then why do Russia or America have armies?
In the last 30-odd years since the end of the Cold War?
Russia
To wage wars of territorial expansion and to rebuild a sphere of influence, and because it considers itself an unjustly undefered-to great power.
America
To wage expeditionary wars of choice based on ideology, global interests, or- in some of the worse- inconsistent morality from its position as a great power.
Why does China?
To conquer Taiwan, counter the United States, and because it is fits the CCP leadership's view of what a great power does
Why does Israel?
To fight a regular series of insurgency conflicts based on immediate neighboring terrain, shape how openly certain regional actors support them, and maintain a means of geopolitical influence/favor currying to leverage into diplomatic support via security relationships that also bring in useful income.
Why does France?
To have a seat in the table of any American geopolitical coalition, as part of its strategy to build leadership influence in the European Union to advance french interests with European heft, and because the establishment considers France a temporarily embarrassed great power.
They all have second strike capability, it’s just a giant waste of money for them to have armies.
Only if you think the only non-waste of money use for armies is to defend against invasion.
All of the powers you listed have either fought or indicated an interest of fighting wars of choice against non-invaders.
And thus them invading Ukraine does nothing to keep them from dying. It is a false pretense that doesn't resolve the problem it was claimed to prevent.
Why would they lose and die when losing and dying is followed by the end of the world for the attacker who forces them to lose and die?
This is where we get to the sillyness of pretending nukes don't matter or adopting inconsistent nuclear deterrence paradigms. Somehow nukes would be used for the end of the world, but not the end of nuclear state to hostile invasion which will result in the death of the people with nukes regardless.
If you're an accelerationist, vote for AOC-aligned candidates in the coming Democratic power struggle. The progressive/PMC caucus is one of the current drivers of the wedge in the black-democrat coalition, and it's likely to make things worse the better the AOC-wing does in its struggle for the 'soul' of the party.
Progressives and the 'black community' are pretty far apart. Part of this is where they are on the cultural war, but part of this is literal- the progressive urban power centers are not the black political machines. The black political machines are mostly along the south-eastern and southern seaboards (because that's where state-influencing political machines exist in those port population centers). The progressive wings are more the pacific seaboards and interior cities. They've co-existed with the neoliberals who are more in the north-eastern coast and also interior. There are overlapping areas, of course, but typically their machines dominate their respective areas.
The black machines are very comfortable with playing Democratic coalition power politic, and they have had a multi-decade alliance with the neoliberal wing of the Democrats that align with Clinton/Obama/Biden. For the last generation, the black-machines have basically been democratic kingmakers in the neoliberal candidate primaries. African-americans don't win the total election, but they do swing the party.
Or at least, they did. The issue with the post-biden crackup of the Obama coalition is that the neoliberal-dominant party is now in question. It's no longer neoliberal vs neoliberal, black machine is decisive. Rather, the AOC/progressive/socialist wing is contesting the neoliberal democrats in the non-black-machine turfs. That is, the internal and northeastern city enclaves.
This is why David Hogg, the progressive DNC leader, indicating he's going to primary various democrats is so significant. We're in the opening phase of a contest for control of urban political machines where progressives could be competitive. That is, well, not where the black machines are. It is, however, a struggle between progressives and neoliberals over who dominates.
The issue is that if the progressives lose that, the generational alliance between black machines and neoliberal machines will be replaced. And what it's replaced with will probably crack the black machines more.
There is no meaningful difference. Any existential invasion from any direction remains deterred by second-strike nuke capability.
Breaking the paradigm of there being a collective black identity to have collective relations with. No one talks in terms of Asian-Arab or Asian-White American relations because there are no coherent groups to hold a collective positions.
One of the aspects of the 2024 election that helped Trump win so much was the margin of black voters who voted against the Democratic party. Trump had something of 20% of the black vote, which was historically unprecedented in modern US black election politics. It was 1/10th female and 3/10th male, but given that the historical norm for generations has been 90%, that is a crack from the normal political machines and social cohesion structures that could deliver 90% votes.
If that trend continues- and there's a good chance it is given the macro-fractures in the democratic coalition- then gradually you get a ethnic group no one speaks for.
Why not just attack from NATO territory in Poland, Finland (only decided to forego neutrality because of the Ukraine invasion), or the Baltics? They are closer to the presumable targets anyway.
Because nukes.
Any geopolitical discussion on what Russia needs to survive as a state that does not acknowledge or address the role of second-strike nuclear deterrence is not a serious discussion.
Every time I'm reminded of that quote, I'm reminded of a person who insisted with a straight face that they were mature enough to sleep with a subordinate without it compromising their leadership of their team.
Depends on how you define it, but it's also a red herring: there are more to sanctions than SWIFT.
Which is a separate question from 'wanted to imprison this citizen for reasons other than US say-so.'
'US say-so' implies the US wants the man imprisoned. It is agnostic on the reason why.
'This man is a gang member' is a motive that can apply regardless of US desired results. It is agnostic as to the source of the information.
The gang affiliation is also a matter of US record that predates the current Trump administration's deportation push. There's no allegation I am aware of that it was invited in the last three months since Trump's inauguration.
...are we ignoring El Salvadorian President Bukele's extremely well documented inclination to imprison known and even suspected gang members, which occurred despite US say-so?
Or Bukele's comments last week?
The administration was ordered to “facilitate” his return. That’s different.
For anyone else just reading this topic for the first time- the lack of definition of what 'facilitate' entails was the crux of last week's discussion thread on this topic.
If 'facilitate' is used in the sense of 'make easier,' then no change in the person's actual location status is required. 'Facilitate' does not mean 'achieve.'
If 'facilitate' is used to demand a result, this becomes a foreign policy requirement, and especially an international sovereignty conflict, which creates a constitutional issue against the court demanding such a result.
As Prima notes, the Supreme Court did not order a result. The courts that have denied 'make easier' efforts as sufficient facilitation are lower courts. Tthe Supreme Court has not specifically weighed in on their ability to demand a result versus an effort.
And to think, just last weekend I posted some of my thoughts and predictions on last-Friday's foreshadowing. I wouldn't have been surprised if this came even weeks later, but nothing here changes my position in general.
I'd agree with you that this is a good deal for Russia, but I'd disagree that Puti is no nationalist. I think nationalist reasonings would be the reason Putin does not accept this- either by outright refusal or waiting long enough that the Trump administration walks away or most likely by trying to blame the Ukrainians. The 'we're winning and we'll keep winning and if Trump walks away that's good for us to keep going until total victory' is a political force, and Putin is a strategic procrastinator unless faced with clearly bad decisions of setback or worse setback.
This is not that. This is 'good' versus 'could be better later.' If US is willing to recognize Crimea now, there's no inherent reason why Trump wouldn't be willing to recognize Crimea later, or Russia might not demand other (European) countries do as well. Things like preventing Ukraine from having unfettered access to the Dnieper is a point in and of itself for permanent long-term maleffects to Ukraine. Similar with threatening Ukraine power system prospects.
We'll see if the war ends with this. I have my doubts*, but it is within the scope of possibilities. On the other hand, so is kabuki for several more weeks. (The offer mentions sanctions since 2014. This does not specify, but likely includes, European sanctions. However, Trump notably has not exactly included the Europeans, who could veto such a relaxation, in his Putin negotiations.) So would a temporary cease fire that returns to fighting.
*I'll actually go further: I hope it stops, but that hope on my part has a tendency is itself subject to interpreting incoming information with confirmation bias.
It’s the same problem that’s occurred since time immemorial and is the reason why (as I understand it) Republican politicians were discouraged from spending too much time in Washington.
That was part of the 1994 Republican Revolution under Newt Gingrich. It wasn't just 'discouragement' either- it was a organizational-restructuring, as the rules of Congress were changed to facilitate frequent travel out of DC. Most notably, Congressional business workflows were centered on the mid-week, so that key votes were Tuesday-Thursday, to make Monday/Friday travel days more viable.
It was part of 'proving independence from Washington' and 'staying in touch with your constituents.' It is the oft-forgotten root of regular complaints that Congress spends too little time in Washington compared to the past, and the associated complaints that Congress gets less done (because they are present less) and don't know eachother as well. On the other hand, it arguably contributes to the dynamic of voters loving their congressperson but hating congress.
It was also, critically, a period where Republicans were also incentivized to not bring their families to D.C., which in turns means the wives and children who stay behind aren't culturally socialized into the blue-tribe-dominated national capital region. But it also means, by extension, that Democratic representative families under the same dynamics aren't socializing with more red-leaning counterparts, and are free to be even bluer influences on their Congressional-spouses.
This is an oft-forgotten / underappreciated rules-level dynamic of national-level political centralization and elite-consensus.
Keeping key elites spending time together and away from their own power-bases that could foster a sense of disconnect from the central authority has been a national cohesion strategy since before Louis XIV and Versailles. This helped political centralization by giving the monarch an easier time keeping an eye on everyone if they were in one part. But it also allowed for political homogenization/consensus-building/shared-identity cultivation of a common French identity amongst elites, as the French nobility were forced by proximity (and tactical political interests) to get along and socialize. Court politics is infamous in fiction for political infighting and drama, but it does create paradigms for collective understandings, interests, and identities, hence the divide of the french estates leading to the French revolution. Nobles infight against eachother, but unite in common cause against challenges to their collective interests and privileges.
Congressional committee placement politics isn't an exact analog to the French Monarchy making appointments dependent on remaining at court, but there are more than a few parallels. If you're not missing key votes because you're spending time with constituents- because Congressional workflows are focused on Tuesday-Wednesday-Thursday execution- then you're not losing your chance at valuable appointments to powerful Congressional committees. The lower the opportunity cost of not-being in the capital, the greater the opportunity-gains of being elsewhere for fundraising / political events / etc. And, again, you're away from your family less if you're free to return to them more often.
These are changes that the Congressional Democrats have kept even when they recaptured Congress. They get many of the same benefits as well. And as the D.C. area is something like 90% Democratic for a variety of reasons, it's hard to see them convincing (or, frankly, forcing) the Republicans to revert to the pre-Gingrich status quo in the name of homogenizing them in an expected blue direction.
Interestingly, it's also a dynamic being actively pursued in the reverse by the movement of property, and not just people.
You can arguably see an implicit effort-to-reverse Federal consensus-centralization ongoing right now, as Trump attempts to push the federal bureaucracy away from the capital region.
One of the less-commented efforts the Trump administration is pursuing is moving federal agencies outside of the DC area and to other states. This has been overshadowed by the media coverage of the personnel management, but the property management is (almost) as important.
Among the earliest executive orders was a direction for agencies to propose relocations away from DC and to other states. This purportedly on cost-reasons. DC property is expensive to maintain, employee allowances are higher to make up for the regional cost of living, etc. The actual cost of moving has to be balanced against savings are likely to provide, but states have an incentive to take some of that cost for their own long-term gain in getting the relocated agencies.
Almost as importantly, Congress persons have an incentive to approve federal agency relocations to the benefit of their own state. Even Democratic politicians who might personally hate Trump. Which is to say, Federal government divestment from DC offers bargaining chips / horses to trade in the upcoming year(s) of budget negotiations.
That this is also is likely to have an employee-composition impact, as the hyper-blue DC environment those agencies recruit and socialize and network within get replaced with more purple environments that are geographically dispersed, is probably not going to be a publicized or recognized until it's as locked-in as the Gingrich Congressional travel changes.
As has been seen with some shutdowns like the USAID shutdown, DC-based federal employees have often indicated they want to stay in the DC area. This is natural. Even if they were offered an opportunity to keep their jobs if agencies were relocated instead of shutdown, some percent would refuse and seek other employment in DC. This is just a matter of statistics. It is also an area of precedent. In the Trump 1 administration, nearly 90% of DC-based Bureau of Land Management employees retired or quit rather than relocated to Grand Junction, Colorado.
That's bad if you think an equivalent dynamic to, say, the DC Headquarters of the Justice Department would lose vital experience and expertise and informal coordination with other agencies. On the other hand, if you don't think the headquarters of the US Justice Department should be rooted in the swamp that is 90% blue, and less than a mile from where a 'Black Live Matter' mural used to be maintained on the street...
And once departments are separated, the sort of informal coordination that can occur if you and a friend/ally you know in another part of the government can meet in the same town also goes away. Inter-government lobbying is a lot harder if you are cities apart. Inter-department coordination is also, and almost as importantly, a lot harder to do without a document trail.
And this is where one could infer a non-stated motive for the resistance-shy Trump. One of the only reasons the US electorate learned that the Biden administration white house was coordinating with the Georgia anti-Trump case despite denials was because one of the Georgia prosecutor assistances invoiced the White House for the travel expenses for in-person engagements. In-person meetings, in turn, are one of the ways to avoid Freedom of Information Act requests or Congressional subpoenas for communications over government systems.
This is where the Versailles metaphor comes back, but as an inverse of sorts. It was easier for Louis the XIVth to keep an eye on and manage the nobility when they were in one place. They were scheming, sure, but he could keep watch of them in a single physical location where he controlled the coordination contexts. Trump / the Republicans do not control the coordination context of DC. They can, however, increase political control over the bureaucracy by physically separating it across multiple physical locations, where they have easier means to monitor inter-node coordination.
It is also an effort that will be exceptionally hard for the Democrats to reverse, if they try to. It is a lot easier to divest and reorganize government institutions when you have a trifecta than when you don't. It is also much easier to give up federal property in DC to the benefit of states than it is to get state Congressional representatives to vote to strip their states of jobs and inflows for the sake of DC.
Which means that federal agencies that depart DC will probably not return in the near future. And the longer they stay away, the longer that local employment hiring filters into organizational cultures at the lowest levels. The more that Federal employees have their spouses and children shaped by the less-blue-than-DC environments, and thus shape them in turn. The less engaged, and involved, they can be in the beltway culture.
The Trump administration DC divestment are arguably going to have long-term effects on affected parts of the federal bureaucracy on par with Newt Gingrich's Republican Revolution affects on Congress in the 90's. Affected agencies will be less compositionally composed of, less socially exposed to, and less culturally aligned to Blue-dominated DC in ways that will only become apparent decades from now.
That is perhaps a valid distinction, but I don’t see any indications that Russia’s military economic advantages have actually decreased over the course of the war.
What does it matter that you don't see indicators when you regularly dismiss indicators you don't want to see?
In the last three posts alone, you have dismissed half of a category to fixate on a non-central non-counter, dismissed literal photographic evidence that you don't acknowledge could be processed to deal with your objection, and added a conditional to dismiss an indicator literally visible from orbit. Various elements of each of these can be supported by commercial satellite imagery from any country you choose.
I’m sorry I’m so salty about this, but I spent a solid two years getting downvoted and /k/ope brigaded for the mere suggestion that it didn’t seem like Ukraine was winning a decisive victory.
Have I ever claimed that Ukraine was winning a decisive victory? Brigaded you on any /#/ board? Called on you to be downvoted?
Shortening the lines of communication shorted how far the logistics had to travel. Sustained aerial bombardment of industrial centers, naval blockades from receiving foreign materials including oil, and eventual capture of resource-input regions and industrial centers created far worse logistical capacity.
The key words in that being and equipment, as well as stockpiles, and the other economic factors implied within military-economic.
A rebuttal that focuses merely on the mobilized manpower at the start of the conflict is not a rebuttal of military-economic disparities. Particularly when the non-mobilization of reserves was a policy choice rather than a lack of availability.
Russia may have squandered many of its military-economic advantages at the start of the conflict, but that does not mean it did not have them.
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Do you think so?
If so, why?
You've not made a position. Vaguely gesturing towards quoted material without taking a position is not taking a position.
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