Dean
Flairless
Variously accused of being a post-modernist fascist neo-conservative neo-liberal conservative classical liberal Nazi Zionist imperialist hypernationalist warmongering isolationist Jewish-Polish-Slavic-Anglo race-traitor masculine-feminine bitch-man. No one has yet guessed multiple people, or a scholar. Add to our list of pejoratives today!
User ID: 430
Ukraine has burned through 10 percent of all the Patriot batteries that exist in the entire world.
Which, in turn, are not exactly part of the US Navy or the indo-pacific stockpiles, unless you think 90% of all Patriot batteries are intended for a war with China and not also for a war with Russia.
Which, also in turn, goes back to the armament production base requirement, and not simply stockpiles.
Which, in turn, goes to the fiscal affordability flub, now with new variation.
Why exactly does Trump thinks it is so important to take this option as early as possible is a whole different question.
One thesis is 'the US should always arrive a few years late to any world war, rather than be in it from the start.'
Particularly in the more modern technological era, the opening period of any great power war is going to be the costliest- the use of long-range precision munitions that are expended faster than they are produced, the utilization of 0-day exploits in cyberattacks before they can be patched, the shutdown of critical infrastructure to make any major conflict go to a negotiating table of 'do you really want to continue'
This is a not-particularly-quiet part of anti-American strategies for the last few decades- that you present a fait accompli and then threaten such high costs that the (American) adversary chooses not to counter-escalate. And as technology has increased, so has the ability to inflict those front-end costs.
IF you are going to enter a world war at all, the best time is a few years in, after the primary belligerents have battered eachother first and used up most of their means of devestation.
Dean
Flairless
2d ago
I have been repeatedly assured that fears of WW3 are sincere and responsible, with all the negative moral accusations or insinuations that skepticism to that thesis entails. I have not seen any particular evidence or compelling reason to believe that Ukraine was/is a forever war, given how the Russian sustainment has been by the very much finite depletion of Cold War stockpiles and generally observable quality issues.
they don't feel like squandering air defense munitions on it indefinitely with China looming?
Which air-defense munitions particularly useful against China do you believe were being squandered, given that the Ukrainians weren't exactly being given from the US Navy or indo-pacific stockpiles?
Particularly when the key lesson of the Ukraine War was that the armament production base- not stockpiles- was needed, with support for said conflict being the political/congressional basis for funding expansion of production?
The 'the US can't afford to keep supporting Ukraine' argument has never carried fiscal weight, particularly in the China context. Ukraine had been the bipartisan basis for expanding defense production to overcome a shortage- if that was too much fiscally for the advocates of cutting off Ukraine, there's no particular reason to believe they are willing to fund the much larger, more expensive, and more enduring industrial ramp up needed for a China contingency.
That was certainly their strategy with the LNR/DNR.
However, conscripting in the extreme is (usually) not considered genocide. The reasons why Russia would merit genocide under international law is on the basis of expansionist parts of the genocide definition that I've in the past noted I feel are improperly used to over-use the term.
Credibility to do what? Back down?
There's often two competing lines of thought on the prospect of American intervention in any general issue- 'the Americans won't have the commitment or be willing to accept large costs on behalf of others,' and 'the Americans are willing to accept costs and turn this into an economic-attritional struggle.' Both of these are true to differing extremes- it's more of a spectrum than either-or- but the later is what provides meaningful strategic deterrence. At the end of the day, the US way of war is to try and leverage economic advantages and supporting local partners it depends on for regional access.
However, the Zelensky affair is Trump signaling a lack of willingness to endure costs- not only resource (which were not particularly large at scale), but even just reputational.
Further, it demonstrates Trump's willingness to actively pay clear opportunity costs- the extremely favorable implications of the Ukraine mineral deal over future long-term expansions of Ukraine's mineral economy- rather than let a reputational cost stand.
This, in turn, gives competitors a basis to justify a belief that Trump would similarly much prefer to back down rather than risk actual or reputational costs over time. If Trump is unmoved by opportunity costs, then it's relatively easy to establish conditions where actual short-term costs for a major US intervention would be much, much, much higher than the American support for Ukraine, and along with it the reputational costs to Trump for incurring those costs, and so believe Trump would back down rather than avoid the opportunity costs of backing down.
Counterpoint- if the specter of WW3 with Russia is enough for Trump-aligned parties to want to cut ties with Ukraine to hedge risk and cut potential costs, the specter of WW3 with China is enough for non-Trump aligned parties to want to cut ties with Trump-aligned parties to hedge risk and cut potential costs.
I'm fully open with calling both of them hyperbolic, but hyperbole has a lot of sway in the governing coalition of the current white house, and those who embrace hyperbole on one side of the world don't exactly get to claim that others are being unreasonable for similar framings of concern on the other. The use of the framing as legitimate enough to drive sudden shifts in US policy likewise legitimizes the use of framings by other parties, including in directions against american preferences.
Dean
Flairless
3d ago
There is a related-but-distinct line of clothing chic with Zelensky, and that is that a suit is not as benign / respectable in his context, since suites are often associated with the rich, powerful, and connected- i.e. the corrupt oligarchic class, whose reputation for selling out Ukraine is so well known that it shapes American doubter perceptions of Zelensky.
Americans like Trump want suites because it's seen as the normative / proper thing to do at high-level engagements, and being underdressed can be insulting as a sort of claim of 'I'm so important I can ignore it.' But this is not a universal view, and Zelensky breaking character not only at Trump's behest, but specifically for a very one-sided natural resource deal that could be characterized as selling out Ukraine, would be an obvious propaganda attack line.
Put another way- if the first time Zelensky put on a suit was to give the Americans a potential veto of 50% of future Ukrainian mineral projects going forward, it would not be seen by the Ukrainian home audience as a respectable and uncontroversial business attire, but something appropriate for an oligarch.
They do. As a legal authority matter, the aid legislation is usually for sending material to Ukraine or replacing lost stock already sent, which allows the president to not-send on the basis of replacing already-sent.
As a game theory matter, a permanent cutoff right now would be a bet with a high risk of losing relevant leverage with Russia. If the US has already cutoff aid and is threatening to send no more to Ukraine, then the US cannot use either the offer of a cutoff or threat of more aid to pressure Russia. It also creates issues with leverage with Ukraine, since you can't threaten to cutoff aid if you've already cutoff aid, and while there are many who would gleefully relish Ukraine doing worse on the battlefront, that's a consequence, not an impossibility or even a categorical collapse. This is why opponents of Ukraine aid typically resort to 'they'll deserve the consequences' rather than address how a cutoff will end the war.
The key word in that, however, is 'permanent.'
As a kabuki theater/kayfabe matter, never a bad metaphor to remember with the US, a temporary cutoff allows both parties to play well for their respective political bases, before a mediated 'reconciliation' by third parties (such as the Europeans) who can facilitate a nominal compromise (such as Europeans buying weapons on behalf of Ukraine). Given how even Trump didn't appear that upset at the summit breakdown (the 'this will make for great TV' bit), and how I hardly expect Trump to refuse arms sales to Europe if offered, this could play out over weeks or even months.
My personal bet is on the later, which will play into the UKR-EU summit later this week, with any mitigation plans only revealed later this month.
Which is to say- I will be neither particularly surprised or alarmed if there's an announcement of a cutoff of military aid this week. I will be curious to see what form it takes if it does happen, particularly any concrete demands for a resumption of aid-
-because if there are easily fulfillable conditions, then that's an easy trigger for the US to flow aid back into Ukraine, which is what preserves the negotiating leverage with Russia, and lets all parties play to their preferred propaganda narratives of how they are taking advantage of it / the other parties are losing from it. And if the demand is generally unreasonable (i.e. resignation of Zelensky), then this is itself subject to a choreographed resolution via later reconciliation or managed turnover (which Zelensky has repeatedly signaled) with less stated understandings.
Which is to say, kabuki.
Which is coincidentally well timed given that Trump is due to speak to a joint session of Congress tomorrow (Tuesday) to lay out his priorities and Ukraine intentions.
Other people orbiting the Trump administration have voiced similar opinions re China, basically that it doesn't serve US interests to continue fighting with them.
And these people are notably orbiting the Trump administration rather than being a part of it's leadership structure because the Trump's key military and diplomatic appointments are China hawks who see Ukraine as a distraction for focusing on China containment. They are 'pro-Russia' in the sense as they see Russia as wrongly prioritized and better left delegated to the Europeans, not that they see Russia as a potential ally against China, and they certainly aren't against China containment in principle.
If you're just raising that someone is making a message, sure, ok- always has been. 'Sees the US as adopting a hypocritical foreign policy since the start of the Cold War and glossing over its own bad actions' is practically a cliche, and has been on the left and the right if you knew where to look.
But anybody who believes that Musk has more foreign policy prediction value on the future of NATO than Pete Hegsworth, Trump's chosen Secretary of Defense, are probably going to be as confused as people who lament that Mearsheimer wasn't heeded in the 90's, without understanding why Mearsheimer wasn't heeded in the 90's. If someone wants to argue that personnel are policy, it generally helps to recognize the personnel who are actually setting policy.
Beneficence of the Ukrainian people
Will of the Ukrainian people
Hatred of Russia
Desire to retain power
Why do you not posit Fear of Russia as a primary candidate?
Particularly since it can overlap and even supersede the framing of any of the other categories you do posit.
For an attempt to psycho-analyze a leader, or even discuss what a 'will of the people' would entail, it's odd to not address the role 'fear,' both collective and individual, would have in driving decisions. Particular for a war that will quite possibly qualify as a cultural-generational trauma event, if you believe such things can exist.
Dean
Flairless
4d ago
I particularly enjoyed the Xianxia, very deserved AAQC!
Pease feel free to do more in the future!
Who would be Europe's plausible geopolitical partners other than the US and the Anglosphere?
Mid-sized African countries willing to be paid to receive European deportees. (There are no large ones.)
Between population decline, relative economic winnowing, and its own strategic priorities, Europe will likely lack the capacity to spare for power projection abroad when prioritizing Russia, and other geopolitical powers are unlikely to want to help Europe with Russia. This limits Europe's plausible geopolitical partners.
Unless you want to think in terms of a presuming the breakup of various other major global actors, but I'd expect the EU to break up more than most of the others.
Does a closer relationship with China or India make sense, or would Europe be better placed positioning itself as a leaders of an equivalent to the non-aligned movement in the Cold War?
No, no, and no respectively.
No, a closer relationship with China doesn't make sense, because China will prioritize Russia for its resources and strategic utility against the US and Europe has little to offer beyond market access. This doesn't mean China wouldn't accept that, but if Europe is just wanting to be an uninvolved economy, it doesn't need to be a geopolitical partner to do that, and it's hardly going to fight Russia on behalf of Europe.
No, a closer relationship with India doesn't make sense, because Europe cannot help India with its security challenges, particularly if Europe is a willing market for China and consumed with its own issues, and India isn't interested in Europe geopolitically as much as just a technology transfer target, which will dry up and doesn't require an alliance.
No, Europe will not be a credible leader of a non-aligned movement. Colonialism and post-colonial grievance aside, Europe is currently and probably will be engaging in exporting detention camps against the global south most interested in being a part of it, while the sort of xenophobia that supports anti-Americanism as a guiding principle will be even more pronounced against much of the global south.
How should Europe square US domination of digital media and tech with a much cooler relationship?
Mass censorship and a gradual partition of the internet with a European enclave, mandating use of European government monitored / controlled platforms while criminalizing others.
Should it aim for a "Red Tape Firewall" that makes it progressively harder for US digital services to operate in Europe, both as a cultural-and-security measure and as a kind of technological importation substitution?
As long as it's willing to accept increasingly direct American retaliation against non-digital service sectors, and to have the European digital service sector largely limited to Europe as others take on equivalent red tape firewalls that Europe has justified establishing.
What does NATO look like in a world where no-one trusts that the US would honour Article 5?
Much the same as it does in a world where no-one expects the non-American elements to be able to honour Article 5- people will make their judgements based on the Americans and their strength of relations directly, not the NATO treaty, even as the potential of an American support shapes political issues.
Does it remain as a zombie organisation?
Possibly, though less so if spite lists occur.
Do European countries formally withdraw, in favour of a European alternative?
What would be the point? Just build the European alternative in parallel.
It's not NATO membership that stops a European alternative. It's the point that NATO is the means by which Europeans try to (politely) counter-balance against the French and the Germans, and European Alternative projects tend to be jobs projects disproportionately to the benefit of France and Germany.
There are a lot of ways to try and use that wife metaphor in a counter-argument that come off as variously inflammatory or quibbling about the nature of the relationship. (Like- where is the violent and abusive husband coming from?) So I'm going to move past that after just noting the awkward metaphor.
If you're looking for sort of stupid histrionics an emotional and impatient actor would do, I guess I could point out that taking 50,000-60,000 hostages (the US military presence in Europe) to be held hostage and exchanged for all Europeans in the US and all Americans of European origin willing to immediately migrate over and begin long-term re-naturalization would be an idea. Maybe you can also pressure all European-based religions to excommunicate all American political officials who take positions against European interests, while conducting crackdowns on any churches based in America with branches in Europe. You could also invest into cybercrime, and try to just steal all the bitcoin to fund a European renaissance, while forging American dollars in the gajillions to fuel American inflation while buying all the things.
But you asked me what a focused and thoughtful actor would do. And what a thoughtful and focused planner would do is practice strategic patience and wait while building up strength until they are ready, because thought reveals the need (I am not ready), and focus delivers the patience (I will prioritize getting ready before acting for my own satisfaction).
If doing so also happens to give grounds for further strategic cooperation... that's not a humiliation. Or rather, it shouldn't be, unless there's an issue with having to entice a military alliance when you need one. But there's already that concession going on- just referring to Europe as Europe collectively.
Dean
Flairless
6d ago
I've seen estimates of Academia as high as 20-to-1 on left-right splits, which is to say less than 5% right. Saying they'll vote 'more' blue is reaching levels of statistical impossibility- you can't have a 10% swing if less than 10% of the voter base is up for grabs.
Dean
Flairless
6d ago
replacing weapons or defense articles provided to Ukraine from the U.S. inventory, and
This is your Presidential catch all. He's not sitting out the allocation by not sending things to Ukraine- he's simply replacing weapons or defense articles already provided.
Dean
Flairless
6d ago
Bottom line- a more focused and thoughtful European spitelist wouldn't be a spitelist, it would be a clinch-list. Rather than trying to punch the other guy in the face and get pinched back, try to get as close as possible to mitigate his ability to punch you.
A fundamental issue that is both causing the Euro-American rift and would be made worse by a spitelist is that the Europeans are not militarily capable of meeting what it views its security needs as vis-a-vis Russia. This is one of the foundational issues of the conflict with Trump- Trump called on the Europeans to do more, he was laughed at, and now he's in transaction mode. Worse, as bad shape as the Russian military is at the moment, it is still in greater position in the immediate-near term to pivot from any sort of Ukraine stop to do something in the Balkans or the Baltics than the Europeans alone are able to resist.
However, even if you think the US should be classified as a strategic competitor, this doesn't mean you want to start pushing away the Americans as fast as possible. Immediate American departure- especially on hostile terms- is the third-worst case scenario. (The second-worst case scenario is immediate American departure, followed by a Russian Baltic / Balkan crisis. The worst case is if the Americans can't be persuaded to come back.)
Instead, you want to build up your own strength before they leave, while still leaving the option for them to be there. Even if they aren't being relied upon to fight, there's no reason to make it harder for them to do so if they were open to it in the future, and kicking them out of the country means it's both physically harder to get them in, and much less likely.
Which means, in turn, that maybe you start your aircraft replacement program ASAP... but instead of kicking the Americans out of those bases, you cover more of the stationing costs. It's paying more, yes, but it's making them less likely to leave- and as long as they are in the country, that's still a deterrence value all of its own.
Similarly, cutting off European export supply chains to American critical industries is stupid. You want to maximize that shit. Invest heavily in certain shared benefits, so that IF something bad happens, THEN you can take it down, or threaten to.
Some things are relatively, and can be done at any time. There's never been anything preventing the French from extending their own nuclear umbrella across Europe. Other things have costs and are irreversible- if you announce a French nuclear shield for Europe, then the Americans may change their minds on the need of their own nukes in unit, and withdraw- and if those go, a lot of the political weight does as well. (After all, the American lives are there to help drive the use of American nukes- no nukes, less basis for Americans.)
But start going through these sort of considerations- and thinking in terms more than a decade away, well after Trump leaves office-
-and a spite list will be pretty shortsighted. You don't act solely out of spite of your strategic competitors, you try to coopt them to your own advantage, even when they do things you don't like.
Dean
Flairless
6d ago
You took professionalism ethics in your education, did you not? About how professionals get social trust and deference due to not only their specialized skills, but the self-regulation they entail amongst themselves to meet minimum standards of competence and ethics to be deserving of that trust, and holding those who fail to account?
What you are seeing is the consequence of a failure to maintain professionalism, and professional accountability, across multiple professions. And part of that is a result of people just keeping their head down when people try to hijack the profession for non-professional purposes. Social trust has been lost, and deference is being revoked.
Dismissing it as revenge would be part of the problem that lost the public trust. You are not entitled public trust- no one is.
I do like me a good spite list, especially the sort that counters its own suggestions.
Like, any sort of 'phased NATO transition' matched with an immediate SOFA-termination isn't a phased NATO termination, its an immediate NATO transition, because said American NATO officers will be part of the SOFA-termination.
Similarly, a European phase out of American defense procurement corresponding with the immediate theft of American military technology isn't a phase out. You've just cut off the American resupply that would make a phase out work, without having had time to build a replacement, which is the point of a phase out.
The energy phaseout of American energy exports isn't a phaseout if you're requiring all energy purchases to be in euros. For one, LNG is a fungible export- it doesn't matter who you buy it from. Two, you're not actually weakening the dollar by demanding payment in Euros- you're paying a dollar premium for the conversion mechanisms with people who will go along with the Euro requirement, since they can demand higher prices for your stipulation.
The Counter-Sanctions Framework already exists in various forms. They failed not for lack of balls, but for the same reason the inter-European clearing house doesn't work as a way to escape dollar sanctions- European companies want to sell not only to the Americans, but companies and countries that sell to the Americans. Very classic 'Europe is not the world' moment.
As for the economic retaliation measures, it's always a good chuckle to see offers for the Trump-preferred trade dynamics be volunteered in the name of spiting him. Like, Trump is absolutely a fan of reciprocal and symmetrical tariffs- and he'd absolutely appreciate the assistance to the transition to economic autarky from a supply chain cutoff, since it'd remove a major lever of influence. (Most countries want others to be dependent on them). Similarly, corporate tax equalization would be trumpeted as a major win- Europe is a tax haven for American companies from American jurisdiction, and if Europe were to both equalize corporate tax rates internally and start punitive actions against American companies, pretty soon they'd not stay in Europe.
Good spite list, 4/5, would recommend more whiskey.
How are the American Blue Tribes supposed to get the Europeans, let alone the entire rest of the world on their side against the American Red Tribe?
Even when the Europeans + The American Blue Tribe were also + American Red Tribe on one side in the early Ukraine War, they couldn't get the rest of the world on their side.
Dean
Flairless
6d ago
Overly long review of the deal is a bit lower in this thursday thread. Bottom line- it gives the US a major interest hook to stay invested in Ukraine's defense (major influence over the resource economy), sets up a potential payment mechanism that could be used for military aid (justified in the name of defending sites), and gives the US a reserved right to take any action it deems necessary, which is close to the language actually in NATO Article 5. It's basically a reserved right to retroactively claim a security guarantee, without a security guarantee.
As for cut-off, basically yes. General language is that Congress authorizes the President to transfer military equipment, not that everything has to.
That said, I don't think it's likely he will in earnest (read- in totality / for very long). From what I've seen / looked into, this seems more Vance-initiated, and while Trump will back Vance in the moment, I also wouldn't be surprised if Vance takes a more background role in Ukraine stuff going forward- Vance actually is the one without power on ending the war, whereas Zelensky is the one Trump needs to make a deal happen.
We'll see going forward, but I imagine it will be a loud next few weeks, as this will lead into the European summit next week, and they can be expected to circle the wagons around him, and then we'll deal with that summit's fallout.
You're wrong because the media coverage for just about everyone else, propagandistic or otherwise, will insist that it's far greater than that.
Trump may still have already forgotten about it, but he'll be asked about it, and be grumpy to be reminded over and over by journalists eager to needle him.
Dean
Flairless
6d ago
For Macron, it's easy- not only internal French politics, but the general French geopolitical ambition to be the leader of Europe vis-a-vis the US. Pay no mind that five years ago France was generally more pro-Russia than the US; Trump is reliable, strategic autonomy, and that means buy more French military stuff and deference to French attempts to define the European strategic interest and concern to be concerned about. (Which- until a few years ago- was distinctly southward rather than eastward, if you listened to French diplomats.)
For Zelensky, my views are a bit more speculative, but the very short version is I see a strategic gamble being made here, that there will be enough of a weapon supply line open (particularly via the Europeans, both directly and via the Europeans buying American weapons) to push through 2025. While the loss of American support in its entirety would be significant, the Russians are having some undisguisable issues of their own which are expected to get considerably worse later this year and into next. If you believe that Trump won't close off everything permanently, or can be transactionally negotiated with to keep the lines open, then pushing into 2026 would likely have Putin, being closer to economic and manpower-political limits and even less of the Soviet stockpiles remaining, further reduce demands of long-term requirements.
As opposed to a peace summit with Ukraine without inviting Russia to the table?
This would, indeed, not be a productive way to get actual peace term conditions in place.
Mind you, I don't think it had that purpose in the first place, as opposed to inter-pro-Ukraine-coalition politics, but I fully agree to any point that not inviting Russia to a peace summit makes it a bit of a farce of a peace summit.
Putin has a tender ego, deliberately snubbing and ostracizing him has worked just as well as beating a toddler to make it stop crying does.
And should Putin claim snubbing rights- such as holding a summit without Ukraine or Europe- I would give a shrug.
Coincidentally, I more or less shrugged from the summit earlier this month as well. Propaganda, for sure, but completely consistent with my predictions last fall that the early post-Turmp period would be met with pro-forma rather than substantial negotiations.
I'd also note that this would normalize the consequence of Trump getting a similar result for doing a similar thing.
Having a widely publicized "discussion between two very important countries" first doesn't hurt Ukraine in any way other than wounding its pride, but saving Putin's face might actually help end the war in 2025.
And what if not all the parties involved want the war to end in 2025?
From my perspective, it seems to me that Russia wants the war to end in 2025 because the grind of 2024 for the election year and negotiating shaping are not indefinitely sustainable (as was raised and discussed last year). Reasons why may very, but there is regullar discussions / expectations of significant push potential in late 2025 and into 2026... and with it, the ability to compellingly make demands on terms.
Trump wanted the war to end in 2025 because it frustrates him and he wants to take credit and move past it. Different reads on Trump differ, but I don't think anyone thinks he has a strategic rather than emotional reason for wanting the war to end in 2025.
However, the Europeans and Ukrainians were not the ones who want the war to end in 2025, beyond the general 'we'd love it if our enemies stop fighting' sense, and have consistently signaled hesitation / opposition to a war ending in 2025 on terms Putin finds favorable. Their general position is that better long-term terms are worth fighting longer for, and there is plenty of speculation that they believe Russia's pushing in 2024 is leaving it far more constrained in 2025 and especially in 2026 and beyond.
They have it for their own reasons- the Ukrainians caring more about long-term terms rather than short-term terrain or casualty losses, the Europeans wanting more time for European rearmament- but neither has exactly been shy about supporting more Ukrainian deaths for longer-term security vis-a-vis Russia, which they do not feel they are getting from Trump.
The wisdom / accuracy of their choice may be up for question, but if the war goes on until 2026 or 2027 or even 2028 as a result of this snub-fest, that won't be a failure of the Ukrainians to seek peace in 2025, but a failure of those who actually wanted it in 2025.
(And, for the record, I've my doubts of the credibility of any American shut-off of all forms of aid... but that's another topic and we shall see.)
...?
Elaboration- you are all over the place in that, so much so that I don't particularly see any particular place to begin. You certainly aren't describing 'my' position in any meaningful sense, currently or over the last few years of re-giving it, but I also don't think you're particularly interested in it either, given the length you go to not describe it and then raise issues I have repeatedly raised myself in various forms over the years. (To pick one- Gaddafi. My thoughts on the Libya intervention have never exactly been circumspect. I believe the closest I have ever come to a positive word for it was along the lines of 'I understand why some of the European states wanted it.')
So if you're not going to address my position, and just want to raise history with many ?-marks on issues we have been known to agree on, I will go...
...?
...and, for the sake of your final question, point you back to what you quoted.
This has two parts- a position statement (I have seen no particular evidence or compelling reason to believe that Ukraine was/is a forever war), and a justification statement (finite and depleting Cold War stockpiles enabling Russian sustainment of their invasion and large-scale combat operations).
And looking at what you've posted, the most direct response to it was-
-and a variety of paragraphs that ignore the justification statement's premise, which is a shortage of soviet stockpile equipment to sustain the current war indefinitely.
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