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Transnational Thursday for February 27, 2025
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Notes -
https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1895896267269808193/photo/1
There's some speculation that this has already affected US submarine patrols.
This is pretty obnoxious behaviour IMO. Unlike Ukraine, Norway is a US treaty ally. Good allies refuel eachother!
It also reminds me a little of New Zealand's decision in the 1980s that they were going to be a 'nuclear-free' zone. That meant NZ required any vessels that entered their waters to certify they didn't carry nuclear weapons. The US refuses to declare which vessels are nuclear-armed. The standoff resulted in the US downgrading its alliance with New Zealand for many years, they 'suspended' their obligations under the ANZUS treaty. The treaty remained in force technically but the Kiwis got kicked out of military exercises, less intelligence sharing, less access to technology.
Ultimately of course New Zealand is totally irrelevant to world affairs and it doesn't really matter if the US only sends ships known to be conventionally armed and powered over there. Europe and Norway is quite a different matter, there seems to be a dangerous level of broad-based hysteria over Ukraine.
When is the allure of ineffectual posturing going to wear off? Is anyone really impressed with this kind of behaviour?
Norway was a treaty ally until Trump signaled extremely clearly that Nato countries cannot depend on US if the push comes to shove by making threats about annexing another Nato country's territory into US and cosying up to the country Nato was founded to protect against (that's actively engaged in sabotage in Norwegian territory as well as Norways neighboring countries' territories).
If the US says "Fuck you, you're on your own now!" to a group of countries, it's no wonder when those countries say "Ok, if that's how you want it..." in response.
This is called diplomacy. Ten, twenty years ago it was Western Europe that was interested in good relations with Russia, fuel imports and trade... while the US was very keen on NATO expansion and taking a hard line on Russia.
Now it's the other way around as the US is more interested in Asia while Europe seems to be mentally stuck with the old US policy platform.
The mature and sensible thing for Norway and other European countries to do is not throw a tantrum but to adapt to the changing global dynamics and reflect on the workability of their strategy. Maybe it was a poor decision going out of their way to get Russian soldiers killed with military aid? I wonder why there are Russian sabotage operations going on, what could possibly be the reason why these munitions plants keep having anomalous explosions?
If the Russian threat is so great, why antagonize the US? Wouldn't you want to appeal more to the US? If the US is a threat, maybe consider rapprochement with Russia? Or China? There's a massive shortage of strategic flexibility in Europe.
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so is it "ineffectual" or "dangerous"?
This stunt is ineffectual but it reveals a dangerous and hysterical attitude. It doesn't help the situation in any way!
Also it seems that Haltbakk Bunkers is a bit of a nothingburger company according to the community note. I get what I deserve for trusting Osinttechnical!
https://x.com/i/birdwatch/n/1896196567369232513
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That'll show Putin! Or something.
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The Russian economy is the size of Italy’s and they were never going to use nukes. The need to appease them was and is minimal, it’s weird that Trump cares so much.
"Minimal" to the US, the EU or Ukraine?
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In purchasing power, Russia’s economy is the size of Germany’s, and purchasing power being what actually matters is at least as true as GDP being what actually matters.
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How do you think a war between Russia and Italy would play out as a 1v1? How about Benelux vs Russia? According to the economists they have similar sized economies.
These economic figures are just numbers. There's no relation to real world performance and strength, it's pure fantasy. Nominal GDP figures don't even measure the economy, they measure the imaginary value of goods and (imaginary) services in imagined dollars by some arcane metric. 'Imputed rent' is 6% of US GDP - homeowners enjoying their house is not real economic activity but they count it anyway.
Measure the number of workers in arms manufacturing, measure steel production, measure the count of soldiers, measure anything even slightly tangible rather than the 'economy'.
The wage of my job doesn't determine my chance to win in a fight, what matters is my size, skills, environment and weapons. Money may buy those things. Or it may not. There are things that money cannot buy that require time and effort and natural ability. Money does not matter, what matters is capacity.
Bizarre Soviet-style denial of basic economic capacity isn’t a rebuttal of any value to this argument. Of course military production matters; after all, Pyongyang is capable of destroying Seoul. But Russia has no desire or intention to conquer the West and isn’t going to be nuking London, Paris or Washington any time soon because of a minor regional conflict in Ukraine, that being utter WW3 hysteria.
Strange that someone defending Vance’s comment would appear to have a much lower opinion of Russian strategy than someone criticizing it.
It's not bizarre or Soviet style to acknowledge that Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands are no match for Russia, nor is Italy.
Nominal GDP is just a made-up number, it doesn't mean anything significant. It is silly to write off Russia as weak because some economists made up some numbers.
It is also the case that Russia is not nearly strong enough to conquer Europe (IMO, others like Shrike seem to think it's more even and he is at least initiated in these matters). Nor does Russia have the intention to conquer Europe. But Russia isn't weak enough that it's wise or cost-efficient to force Russia from Ukraine, as is now being recognized in the US government. You seem to consider this appeasing Russia.
The US seriously considered nuclear strikes in Korea and Vietnam, faraway wars without major ramifications at home. The Ukraine war is much more important for Russia and nukes should not be discounted. If as you say the Russians weren't willing to use nukes over Ukraine, then why not simply demand Russia withdraw or face direct NATO intervention backed up with nukes? Easy win since Russia was never going to use nukes! In reality, it's not that simple. There is a certain point at which Russia would use nukes, just like there's a certain point at which they'd give up on diplomacy and invade.
I don't even know what Vance statement you're talking about or how this relates to anything I've said.
When did I advocate that? I advocated a negotiated peace early in the war. I don’t believe in escalation. But I also don’t believe Russia is this terrifying for where, if we don’t make a deal with them right now, we’re risking WW3. That’s hysterical.
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The problem with GDP as a measurement of war-making capability is that the United States can’t actually nationalize Netflix, Facebook and Pornhub and use their factory floors to build tanks.
But the US can nationalize those companies and force them to show propaganda-- or they can conscript their programmers out from under them and force them to work on software for autonomous killing machines. American deindustrialization is strategically dangerous... But it's not like the US gets no strategic advantages in return for being the global center for information engineering (inclusive of coding, financial services, and software.)
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The US can, within reason, print money and build more factory floors very quickly. Russia’s manufacturing capacity prewar was also heavily overstated and very outdated. China is a much bigger threat in those terms.
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The pope has inhaled vomit and required mechanical ventilation this afternoon, undoing nearly a week of steady progress.
That....is not good.
There's actually a semi-decent chance it represents improved consciousness- Vatican bureaucrats are much less transparent than popes and their report would likely be something like 'the pope has increased his oxygen flow but it resting well'.
But yes, it is probably not good.
You know I thought he might have been intubated which would have been seriously bad news but it sounds like that isn't the case which is indeed positive.
Supposedly he’s on and off mechanical ventilation, which would be bad but not ‘certain to die soon’ bad.
I saw something about non-invasive mechanical ventilation, not quite the same (although medical reporting is always ass). Basically he probably has a mask on, not the same as intubated and likely sedated.
However he might get an infection from his recent misadventure.
Well he had another set of breathing crises today, although the details are less forthcoming. He supposedly required two bronchoscopies without sedation which is a, shall we say, bad sign.
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What the hell is going on with Ukraine? Zelensky seems to be in Washington to sign something, but there are very scant details. What is US getting, what is Ukraine getting?
Looks like nothing is being signed now. The biggest public political fuckup I can remember in my lifetime. I sympathize with Ukrainians a lot, but it looks like they are up for some very tough times now. Utter disaster.
Do you still stand by this comment of yours from a year ago?
How was this all ever going to be anything else than an utter disaster? How is him "sucking up to whatever Western weirdo" even different in any way from this big public political fuckup, considering that both obviously stem from the exact same attitude? Even if this fuckup somehow never happened, wasn’t it a bit unwise in his position to bank on the Democrats winning both the presidency and the senate in 2024?
Yes, it was. He should have started making peace with Trump (including sucking up to him, yes, if necessary) months ago, preferably before the elections, when it was clear he has a good chance to win. As I said, there was a lot of chances for that - Trump's government is full of ex-Democrats that switched sides, and he has absolutely no problem with them, if anything, he's proud of accepting people who previously opposed him. Instead, Zelensky chose to bet on antagonizing Trump and relying on anti-Trump forces in US and Europe, likely hoping they would support him out of pure spite if not anything else. I think it is extremely unwise strategically. Maybe it stems from the same attitude, but one has to change when circumstances change.
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Who the hell thought it was a good idea for Zelensky to fly to DC to talk with Trump face to face? Or to spat with him online? Trump's supermassive ego responds well only to buttering up. The correct response to "you owe us 500 billion" should've been "I've dispatched my best people to hammer out the details to make sure it's the best possible deal for both countries" and then a bunch of platitudes that insinuate that Putin listens to nobody, but surely he will obey the bestest president of the bigliest country.
Talking to Trump is not a problem per se. He's a dealmaker, he is used to negotiations and bridging disagreements. A lot of people talked shit about him and then made peace with him (Vance himself is one of the many examples) and Trump has no problem forgiving such things. All his latest boasting and grandstanding is just establishing a position for negotiation, he clearly wasn't hung up on any details or specific numbers. His ego, while indeed massive, can be dealt with, behind closed doors, and he is known to go back on things he promised many times, if he's convinced later it's for his advantage. But challenging him in the Oval Office, publicly, right in front of the cameras and essentially saying that all his efforts are worthless and he doesn't know what he's talking about, right at his seat of power - that's some otherworldly arrogance right there. I mean what did he think would happen - Trump would say "oh sorry, thank you for educating me, I was totally wrong and stupid, please teach me your ways?" Of course he'd blow up when challenged like that. Vance actually told Zelensky a couple of times to take it offline but he just kept pushing. Mind-boggling failure of awareness. Or, alternatively, a calculated play to blow up the whole thing - betting on Congress to go around Trump and keeping Ukraine financing despite his wishes. Which looks like an extremely dangerous and stupid gamble, IMHO.
Judging by Lindsey Graham's reaction, "the risk I took was calculated, but man, am I bad at math".
To had the greatest Ukraine hawk to ask for your resignation is rarely a symptom of success. Trump is just to early in his term for such games.
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Macron, apparently.
Which, given his timely response after the meeting failed, and Zelensky's setup for the European summit next week, has me raising an eyebrow on how spontaneous any of this breakdown was. Kabuki theater is a metaphor for American politics for a reason.
AFAICT all of the facially-retarded diplomacy that Canadian politicians have been doing on the Trump issue has in fact been pretty effective for their internal political fortunes -- not sure I see an angle here for Zelensky/Macron, but that'd be the way to bet.
For Macron, it's easy- not only internal French politics, but the general French geopolitical ambition to be the leader of Europe vis-a-vis the US. Pay no mind that five years ago France was generally more pro-Russia than the US; Trump is reliable, strategic autonomy, and that means buy more French military stuff and deference to French attempts to define the European strategic interest and concern to be concerned about. (Which- until a few years ago- was distinctly southward rather than eastward, if you listened to French diplomats.)
For Zelensky, my views are a bit more speculative, but the very short version is I see a strategic gamble being made here, that there will be enough of a weapon supply line open (particularly via the Europeans, both directly and via the Europeans buying American weapons) to push through 2025. While the loss of American support in its entirety would be significant, the Russians are having some undisguisable issues of their own which are expected to get considerably worse later this year and into next. If you believe that Trump won't close off everything permanently, or can be transactionally negotiated with to keep the lines open, then pushing into 2026 would likely have Putin, being closer to economic and manpower-political limits and even less of the Soviet stockpiles remaining, further reduce demands of long-term requirements.
Interesting about Macron -- Zelensky, I think he just doesn't get the joke TBH. Too much getting high on... if not his own supply, that of the social media egregore which turns out not to have much actual power.
That said I didn't really seem much in the deal for him, so he hasn't really lost anything. Does Trump even have the power to unilaterally cut off aid? I thought that was mostly a Congress thing.
That depends a lot on what Congress actually authorized. If they said "X dollars must be spent on Y" then there may be claims that if the president refuses to spend on Y, he's going too far. Even then it's not entirely clear how to make him do that, given that he owns the executive branch and is effectively immune to any court decisions while in executive capacity, but there might be ways, maybe. However, in fact the Congress rarely says anything but "up to X dollars are allocated to spend on Y", and then it's up to the executive to decide how much is spent and what exactly is bought. The reverse is easier - if the Congress doesn't give money, the President can't spend it, so it's relatively easy for the Congress to defund. But if the Congress authorized the President to spend money, they usually can't really do much to actually spend it if the President doesn't want to. And, as correctly noted in other comments, most of Ukraine aid is not even money per se - it's military equipment that already exists somewhere in storage and then being sent to Ukraine, and the Congress just controls how much of this can be done. If the President wants none of that, Congress can'd do much here I think. And especially when we're talking about foreign country, I'm not sure Congress would even want to get in fight with Trump over this.
I'm thinking of stuff like this:
https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/5692
Granted it doesn't say "send Ukraine X tanks and Y artillery shells", but doesn't Trump get into impoundment issues if he just sits on the allocation?
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Overly long review of the deal is a bit lower in this thursday thread. Bottom line- it gives the US a major interest hook to stay invested in Ukraine's defense (major influence over the resource economy), sets up a potential payment mechanism that could be used for military aid (justified in the name of defending sites), and gives the US a reserved right to take any action it deems necessary, which is close to the language actually in NATO Article 5. It's basically a reserved right to retroactively claim a security guarantee, without a security guarantee.
As for cut-off, basically yes. General language is that Congress authorizes the President to transfer military equipment, not that everything has to.
That said, I don't think it's likely he will in earnest (read- in totality / for very long). From what I've seen / looked into, this seems more Vance-initiated, and while Trump will back Vance in the moment, I also wouldn't be surprised if Vance takes a more background role in Ukraine stuff going forward- Vance actually is the one without power on ending the war, whereas Zelensky is the one Trump needs to make a deal happen.
We'll see going forward, but I imagine it will be a loud next few weeks, as this will lead into the European summit next week, and they can be expected to circle the wagons around him, and then we'll deal with that summit's fallout.
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Remzen has provided a link to a claimed copy of the agreement. If true, it reads like what people think the neocon fantasies had in mind in terms of Iraq and Oil, mixed with a bit of .
Even setting aside the article's own acknowledgement of potential changes, the undefined Fund Agreement and any other parallel agreements not formally combined in this one, there are some jumping out points that are interesting in how they can be interpreted in a more... 'if you can't see how a government could twist this, you haven't tried hard enough' sense.
Starting from the Article
'The fund agreement, which will be more specific than this first document, will be statutory law for the Ukrainian government.'
Which is to say, this document is the outlines, to be clarified in language fewer people will actually see.
Note, however, there is no claim that it will need ratification by the American Congress. So not a treaty, but...
Entering into the text itself-
'It will be statutory law in Ukraine for the government of the United States of America to have a significant* say in Ukrainian domestic resource projects going forward.' *Understatement to be elaborated later
This is your 'the US government, and not US commercial entities, will maintain major influence in the management of the fund, more to follow.'
The more to follow, in turn, should be strongly expected to involve, if not a controlling American interest, a prospective American government veto on the Fund's management on things that the Americans Strongly Disapprove of.
How that prospective veto will be provided will remain to be seen. It (probably) won't be a formal US government veto, and effort will be taken to present the fund as respecting Ukrainian sovereignty so it can pass the Ukrainian legislature.
Which should probably be put on the geopolitical calendar, along with expecting major propaganda narratives on the approach.
This makes more sense if you re-word with the bolded clause first, rather than buried.
This is your 'Ukrainian laws limiting foreign ownership will not apply to the United States as far as this fund and it's equities go' clause. This is, while not itself a demand for direct control, allows for outright American majority control of not just the Fund, but potentially projects from the fund.
Moreover, it moves issues of fund management litigation to the American legal system ('extent permissible under applicable US laws'), not the Ukrainian legal system. In other words, to argue that the American side of the Fund is mismanaging the Fund, this must be argued in... American federal court.
This is your 'Ukraine cannot force the Americans to give up any controlling interest of the Fund' clause, while enabling an American veto of Ukrainian desires to offload their own shares to anyone the Americans don't want to be able to buy in to the Fund and the monies it manages. How like that is will, in turn, be a matter of how strong the American potential veto power is.
Depending on how 'interest' is used- and I strongly doubt this is financial interest- this is likely to enable an American veto on Ukrainian government selling project elements / control shares to anyone the Americans want to resist, even as a Ukrainian decision to do so would likely water down its own control in favor of the American government's interest.
This is the 'hook' for the American government to have a long-term strategic interest in Ukraine. it is the geopolitical bribe / American interest mechanism to keep the Americans engaged, and with stakes in the survival of the Ukrainian government.
This deal clause requires no specific input of the American funds, but is rather a systemic transformation of how Ukraine's natural resource extraction economy- as least the government owned portion- is run.
In maximalist terms, this language- without mitigation in the Fund Agreement- would be that 50% of revenues of ALL future resource projects would go into the US-overseen fund, even if the USA is not involved in the project. So if, say, Ukraine and Europe make their own mineral deal under Ukrainian sovereign control, 50% of the revenue of that European investment goes to the American-influenced fund. And it's not just natural resources, it can also- with the agreement of both US and UKR- also include other critical infrastructure, such as gas terminals and ports.
While this does not effect 'current' sources of revenues, meaning those could be further invested into and expanded, it does open up negotiating space to claim jurisdiction of future new resource investments that provide money to the Ukrainian government. If China wants to open up a new agreement, and start a new mine on a new find, then 50% of the revenue- not the profits, the revenue- goes into the American-managed Fund, regardless of how Ukraine and China split the remainder.
In more moderate forms, this is likely to be tempered by (undecided) Fund Agreement and the interpretation of 'relevant.' One should probably expect this to apply to projects heavily invested in by the Fund Agreement.
Which- itself- would be a very, very potent influence measure... because that would mean that any government-owned natural resource fund that uses this fund as seed capital- say as part of a joint venture between the Fund, Ukrainian Industry, and Europe- would, as long as the deposit is formally owned by the Ukrainian government, plausible send 50% revenue here.
Since the Ukrainian government will want to use this fund to invest in major infrastructure efforts, especially if it can be used as a matching capital share with other investors (say 25% Fund, 25% Europe, 25% UKR govt, and 25% private), any infrastructure project this fund is invested to should be expected to hit the threshold of 50% revenue to the fund... and while that may be used to cover the other investor interests, it also leaves 50% of the revenue back in the influence of US+UKR management, which is now more able to invest in more things.
-break-
Bringing both varients together- regardless of whether it's a maximalist or 'moderate' form, this clause gives the US influence on Ukrainian natural resource economics that scales with the power of the implicit veto. If the veto is strong, then American interests have to be considered from the start of any buy-in phase.
How will American buy-in be considered? That's up to the American government. It could be the inclusion of American companies into contracts, or terms and conditions that exclude American geopolitical rivals. It could even be geopolitical favor trading... or just plain money. (Unlikely the last, though- the US can print its own dollars.)
But this clause can also be used quote/unquote 'aggressively' against third-party interests. If the Americans and Ukrainians agree that other critical infrastructure should fall under the fund... why, then the revenue has to go the fund. And while there will doubtless be means for the fund to pay the competitive business case / profits back to those prior partners... well, if they want to stay competitive, then they start acting in response to the fund.
Point is- either way, this clause allows the US to exert a greater and greater voting influence on long-term investments in Ukraine, as the more projects that fall under the fund's umbrella, the more raw revenue that does, and thus the great the influence of the US government on the resource-base investments back into the Ukrainian economy. This isn't just influence within Ukraine, but every major corporation that wants to invest in Ukraine, who either wants to capitalize on the funds capital, or has to bring its own instead.
And naturally, the more influence the US government has, the more interest the US government will have to protect that level of influence investment.
This is your door-opening 'any expense the American government controlling share consents / approves of can be covered by the fund, and lawsuits objecting to the contrary don't have standing in court.'
More pejoratively, this is a potential slush-fund clause.
Since the expenses are those incurred by the newly developed projects, not just for the purpose of the newly developed projects, this offers a lot of leeway for interpretation and approval.
On the 'reasonable' end, this is saying the Americans and the Ukrainians may approve the Ukrainians using fund resources to pay for things like, say, mining companies starting new projects that in turn will fall under the fund. Presumably American, and not Chinese, if you to avoid that American veto. Or even just American allies, who get a Fund Approval for an investment in Ukraine in exchange for some help somewhere else.
On the 'that's not what someone whose last name ends with -tin wants it to mean' end, momma needs a new Patriot Battery to protect a Fund site. Which is, in a manner of speaking, an expense incurred by the government of Ukraine to the site owned by the government of Ukraine. And the American government official will doubtless diligently research all the facts before solemnly nodding and approving the fund being used to cover that project site expense.
And if you disagree, that is the Fund's sole discretion. And if you disagree with that, take it to American federal court, who can kick it out on standing, or on grounds of that being the Fund's sole discretion, or in general deference to US government foreign policy, and so on.
This is your 'the Fund will be expected to align to the American fiscal planning cycle, and can spend more often if the Ukrainians can persuade the Americans.' Things that directly benefit the Americans are more likely to persuade the Americans.
This is also 'the Americans will get to negotiate/write into into the Fund Agreement the means by which the Ukrainians can use these funds,' which is a way to write in anti-corruption and oversight mechanisms.
'And other tangible and intangible assets critical for the reconstruction of Ukraine' is your weasel words for anything, up to and including weapons.
Ukrainian defense capabilities, after all, are tangle assets critical for the reconstruction of Ukraine, since Ukraine won't be able to rebuild as effectively if it can't be expected to defend itself.
Also can be read as 'the United States reserves the right to take such action as to protect and maximize the value of their economic interests in the Fund that would drop precipitously if the Russians were attempt to attack Ukraine in the future and directly seize the American economic interests.'
This is your 'the Americans expect to have oversight not only on Fund contracting processes, but also means for this not to be pre-empted by other agreements promising revenue shares to other countries instead of the Fund.'
Enforceability of the later is questionable, but this goes back to implicit American veto power over the fund that 50% of revenues are going into, and what that means in both the extreme and 'moderate' forms.
This is your 'commerce is whatever we say it is as long as money moves, and if you disagree then see us in American court' clause.
Less flippantly- this is extremely superficial covering language, as anyone remotely familiar with the American regulatory environments should know. And if you aren't familiar- the commerce clause is the primary authority mechanism that the American Congress use to pass almost any law in Congress. The American government understanding of 'commerce' is extremely broad.
Coincidentally, the Commerce clause authority-
-is also used to regulate foreign military sales.
So this part of the agreement is saying- 'Among other things, we acknowledge the Fund Agreement is commercial in nature. Signed, The People who Consider Arms Sales Commercial In Nature
This is your 'the Fund, and thus 50% of all Ukrainian resource revenues governed by the Fund, will comply with American sanctions globally, and the Americans will watch the control mechanisms' clause.
Depending how it is implemented into the more nuanced fund agreement, of course.
This is the hook for getting it the Ukrainian government's commitment.
This is the 'Ukraine's bilateral relationship with the United States will be dependent upon actually implementing this agreement and all the implications above' clause.
There are a lot of interesting game theory implications for what a Ukrainian refusal to do this deal would have, especially in the context of the expected progression of the war in Ukraine over the next several months. Which, in turn, has a lot of security-politic implications that will be interesting discussion points later this year.
But too in depth for here.
This is your 'the United States government reserves the right in the future to retroactively act as if it had provided Ukraine security guarantees, without technically offering a security guarantee' clause.
is this a security guarantee in and of itself? No. Also, you wouldn't expect the security guarantee in the economic relationship document. If that happened, then a breakdown of security relationships would mean a breakdown in economic document, and clearly this is a Purely Commercial relationship. It said so right up there earlier, remember?
Is it the sort of strength of language that someone in Ukraine's position who wants an explicit security guarantee? Also no. The popular concept of a security guarantee is far more muscular.
But as a basis of comparison, consider what the NATO Article 5 guarantee actually is.
NATO Article 5 is just a promise that other states will-
And if you remember the earlier clause of interest...
So no, this isn't a security guarantee. The Government of the United States just happens to support Ukraine's efforts to obtain security guarantees, will seek to identify necessary steps to protect its interests that this fund would significantly grow over time, and reserves the right to take actions on the same scope as a NATO Article 5 invocation.
Except, as a matter of choice, not because it's a security guarantee.
Because security guarantees would make this a non-commercial document.
And because it's not a security guarantee, it won't conflict with any Russian demands that there be limits on American security guarantees for Ukraine.
Which this isn't. At all. Because that would be non-commercial. No strategically objectional things here, no siree.
This is worse and better than a security guarantee in some respects. It is a 'reserves the right to act as if we provided Ukraine a security guarantee,' which is not in contradiction with promises to not offer Ukraine a security guarantee. After all, it's not a guarantee- it's just that the United States reserves the rights to protect its / Ukraine's investments in things an expansionist, oligarchic empire might want to seize.
Which is probably why the Russians reportedly offered Trump an analogous but probably less generous rare earth minerals deal for resources in Russian occupied Ukraine.
No word yet if Russia offered an implicit American veto over the commitment of 50% of national resource projects going forward.
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It's a nothingburger. The more important stuff to watch is how the US and Russian talks go.
The full text leaked https://kyivindependent.com/exclusive-the-full-text-of-the-final-us-ukraine-mineral-agreement/
and it states that only new mineral reserves will go to the fund. Which won't be happening any time soon given the condition of Ukraine.
It's also not to repay us for all the money Biden wasted, it's just to invest in Ukraine.
It provides zero security agreements either. Basically it was an attempt by the deep state to further entangle the US in it's Ukraine mess. Except Trump didn't want to provide security, and Zelensky didn't want to give away 50% of it's current mineral wealth to crony capital US contractors that'll "rebuild" Ukraine while skimming off tons of the money for themselves, USAID style. Not without security guarantees at least.
So the deal got watered down to nothing.
Yeah so it says nothing about what the fund will do. Also the Ukranian government, famously corrupt, is going to be pretty squishy about how revenues earned from monetization are going to be calculated and distributed.
To steelman: While there aren't security agreements here, the US won't get any of these resources if Russia conquers the entirety of the country or the land with the most valuable resources. There's still incentive to keep them in Ukraine's borders and under their control.
Not really true, Putin has offered deals on Russia's rare earth minerals in it's new territories.
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4gdx7488g5o
Seems unlikely to happen either way, any meaningful security agreements and Russia just continues grinding Ukraine down and refuses to deal. On the other hand westerners are still adapting to multipolarism and the idealism they could afford under the old unipolar order being gone. So making a deal with Russia for any sort of resources would be a hard sell right now.
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American weapons, and implicitly greater Ukrainian involvement in the US-Russia negotiations, and longer-term American strategic interests / investment in Ukraine to 'keep the Americans in' as a counter-balance to Russia.
You remember those outrage articles from the last few weeks of Trump demanding extortionate amounts of critical minerals from Ukraine? And how Trump had paused weapon shipments of stuff already promised-but-not-delivered? And the recent Trump-Putin summit, where both Ukraine and Europe were non-invited to? This is what they were building towards.
Exact terms will be seen when it comes, but the basic premise is that this will be a typically Trumpian 'yuge' project in Ukrainian rare earth minerals, with the timeline to start being an ambiguous period in the future (presumably post-ceasefire). American corporations will get to be involved, and the general number I've seen thrown around is 50% of... something. Whether that's 50% of the profits, or 50% of the rare earth minerals extracted being allocated for US purchase / resale, or something else, it's unclear. Regardless- potentially exceptionally high by norms, where states tend to want to maintain a controlling stake in their natural resource projects, and since 50% is committed to the Americans, that means if Ukraine wants to sell other shares (such as to the Europeans), it may be doing so at its own project shares, rather than being able to dilute American project presence.
However, it's not 'just' extortion, but also transaction.
In the near term, signing is almost certain to unfreeze currently already-promised-but-undelivered weapons. Further, it probably comes in parallel with a new framework of continuing American arms support to Ukraine- probably some sort of 'we're not giving these away, but you can buy, and we can discuss favorable loans,' possibly backed by the Europeans, in a different agreeement. This will let Trump defang a non-trivial amount of the Ukraine-aid-skeptics whose motive is money, since going forward more of the weapons will be formatted as sales rather than donations. Since these weapons might be purchased on Ukraine's behalf by the Europeans (who look about ready to radically expand their borrowing potential), or possibly against the frozen Russian funds in European control (and thus putting a ticking clock pressure against Russia on prospects of getting those funds back), the weapons-transfer terms that may or may not formally accompany this deal are probably the more relevant gain in the near-term.
In the medium term, this concession will probably be the basis of Ukraine being a seat at the table in the negotiations (which, strictly speaking, was required for negotiations to be credible), while also creating an expectation against the 'Trump will end the war and the Americans immediately abandon Ukraine entirely.' Even if the Americans get a lion's share of the [profits], this is a lot of gain for the Ukrainian post-war economic restructuring, a basis for rebuilding the country's economic foundations after having lost the industry in the Russian-occupied east (with new mega-extraction efforts created a new baseline), and an encouragement for further European investments.
In the longer-term, it's these sort of investment-interests that provide an acceptable-to-Trump hook for longer-term American involvement in Ukraine post-war, which is part of the real prize for Ukraine. Precisely because this is liable to be framed / accused of being a Very Good Deal (extortion) for the Americans, it becomes a basis for even the Republican-Trumpian coalition to continue to have an interest in ensuring Ukraine's survival... since if Russia were to re-invade and roll over those investments, that would be a rather significant lost investment / rare earth stream. Here is a map of the relative dispersal of rare earth estimates in Ukraine. While pre-war it would have made far more sense to invest in the more developed east, a post-war investment in the west would help have a more secure future-war economic base not in short range of the Russian eastern front line.
Which is why even though the deal expected this week isn't expected to have any sort of long-term security guarantees, it sets the conditions for a longer-term American Interest in Ukraine which is what leads to such security support. Not just from the Americans, but also the Europeans who will be using this extortion for their own counter-balance investments, to further their own economic and thus military interests in Ukraine. As such, even if Ukraine isn't 'formally' part of NATO, Ukraine is 'purchasing' NATO-member buy-in to its future survival (and thus ability to maintain the concessionary deal).
Which, naturally, is something the Russians do not want, which is reason enough for the Ukrainians to consider it, even if they would prefer more favorable terms than Trump is demanding.
That's an interesting neocon fantasy, but the text was leaked https://kyivindependent.com/exclusive-the-full-text-of-the-final-us-ukraine-mineral-agreement/
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