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Continuing with the recent theme of geopolitical posts:
What's the steelman for Trump's withdrawal from the JCPOA ("The Iran Deal") in 2018?
I feel I've only seen universal condemnation for this decision from the editorial sections of journals, newspapers and other forms of media, with defenses only mounted by the occasional conservative pundit. Naturally, it's not hard to find elected Republicans in favour of pulling out, but it's difficult to tell how much of that is due to partisanship vs their objective thoughts on the situation. Still, the increasing political homogenisation and partisanship of mainstream media over the last few years (or maybe I'm naive and it's always been like this) means that I no longer assume that their editorial stances are primarily motivated out of concern for the truth either, so I'm curious about the opinions of people here. While I asked for the steelman for pulling out, as I'm particularly interesting in hearing the defenses of this decision, I'm keen to hear people's thoughts about the deal more generally.
To help with sparking some dialogue, here are some angles from which I think it's interesting to come at the topic:
1/ To what extent does whether or not the deal was good for the US depend on political positioning (i.e. interventionist/isolationist, pro-Israel vs anti-Israel (and possible SA?), attitudes regarding oil/other commodities, etc)?
2/ Even if the deal was bad, was it bad enough that withdrawing from it was a net positive for the US?
3/ Regardless of whether withdrawing was correct or not, have the two US administrations acted sensibly in advancing their ME aims (which are obviously not identical) in this post-JCPOA reality?
Feel free to ignore the above suggestions however and come at the topic any way you like!
The fullest extent possible.
A person's support for JCPOA depends on how they reason about America's unipolar superpower status. Ie. Is Pax Americana enforced primarily by carrot or stick ?
Stick Believer:
Carrot Believer:
Ideally, the carrot and the stick work together. But, they've increasingly divorced themselves from the other.
JCPOA was a carrot solution for a country that hadn't given into the stick since the 1990s. By 2016, the US had tried the stick with the whole middle east. Initial successes turned into embarrassing failures as these forever wars dragged on. At face value, JCPOA sounds like a good idea. But, the aforementioned divorce meant that America implements both the carrot and stick with a degree of naive optimism.
Yes, withdrawing was the correct solution.
Naive pro-stick optimism leads to forever wars, a drain on the economy, thorough destruction of the victim and development of perpetual hatred towards America. It's squalor but never a threat. On the other hand, Naive pro-carrot optimism is exploited by bad actors to turn themselves into credible threats towards the US. Pakistan exploited America's (and IMF's) naivety for decades, only to become the home for every one of America's most wanted. Obama was smart enough to withdraw support for Pakistan in his time, but chose wrong on Iran.
Now here's the thing. Iranians are scary smart. Iran is a civilizational state with real history. Its diplomats are among the world's best wordcels socialized to western-elite culture. This coaxes democrats into a false sense of security. Surely, these people (white & cultured) can be brought into Pax America without much friction.
Dead wrong ! The clergy hold a strong grip on Iran's power structures. Leadership of the global shia-aligned militia & (credible threat to) Israel are fundamental to maintaining that control. Against an increasingly militarized Israel, having nuclear weapons would've been an essential component of the clergy's politics.
Also, unlike Pakistan or Myanmar, Iran isn't a failed state. The lives of citizens aren't bad enough to trigger internal revolution or military coups. This means that a stick wasn't yet a 'last nail in the coffin'. On the other hand, unlike North Korea or Venezuela, this is a well-fed civilized society. So, if culture itself shifts then a peaceful transfer of power is a possible outcome. What does opening up to the US get you ? Liberalization and further power transfer to Tehran liberals ? Why would the clergy want that ?
The stick (withdrawing JCPOA and replacing it with crippling sanctions) was the right solution. You do not negotiate with a natural adversary. Especially when they're better talkers (liars) than you.
Post-2016, a bunch of (unforeseen?) geopolitical changes have vindicated the pro-stick faction. In 2016, Iran looked like a stable and non-radical middle-eastern Muslim nation. The rest of the middle east was rubble, mid-arab-spring or chain sawing journalists for sport. Yeah they hated Israel, but who in the middle east didn't. If anything, the shias were moderate.
Since then, 3 big changes happened:
JCPOA withdrawl would have been a slam dunk, but geopolitical changes outside the middle east ruined it.
IMO, all American international policy should be structured towards counter balancing China. America has utterly failed here. The whiplash between Trump & Biden has given China space to plant its flag as an equal alternative to the US rather than a #2.
Trump alienated Europe, driving it away from the US. Then Biden kicked Russia out of all global markets. America's allies supposedly change based on who is elected. America's international policy uncertainty has allowed China to start filling in where the US has appeared flaky.
The Iran-Russia-China nexus has materialized outside America's sanctionable world. Europe, India and Africa have settled into neutral/opportunist policies instead of strongly aligning themselves to a temperamental USA. This means Chinese products (electronics, cars, software) are now competing directly with western offerings. Guess what, China's winning.
The US is still substantially ahead at #1, but their lead is fast crumbling. For now, USD as reserve currency is safe, as China failed to make Yuan happen. China's population bomb is about to explode and they fumbled their leading position in AI due to intense anti-Taiwan antagonism. See how these are all Chinese mistakes, not US wins.
That's the big question. How long can the USA keep banking on their enemies making unforced errors ?
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Various media outlets have been saying 'just one more year of Maximum Pressure and the hated Iranian Regime will finally collapse!' for at least 10 years now. So if we considered them believable and wanted Iran to collapse, then maybe it was a bad idea. Then again, according to them Iran has been 6 months away from nuclear arms for the last 20 years or so.
Trying to lower tension in the Middle East is a good move. Iran has oil they want to sell, the West (perhaps not America these days) has money and wants oil. There's no good reason why we can't have cordial commercial relationships with these countries (and crack down on Islamism at home). China manages it. Islamic countries line up to say 'we don't care about Uyghurs, cuius regio, eius religio' because the Chinese don't go around invading Islamic countries, they just trade and give the right noises on Israel. China's happy to trade with Israel too, it all works out nicely for them. That's the kind of relationship we should be aiming for.
In as far as the JCPOA was a way to withdraw militarily from the Middle East, it was a good move.
And what have we gotten after the JCPOA? We've gotten more war, more conflict and Iran moving closer to Russia and China. How is that a good outcome? Nobody can prove that it would've been better if the JCPOA remains but it's certainly not good that shortly after removing it, things get worse.
We need to appreciate that regions have their own natural equilibriums. We may not like those equilibriums but they exist nonetheless and often we don't have the power to change them. If we do have the power to change them, let's make sure it's worth the cost and risk.
The equilibrium for Afghanistan is an Islamist warlordist/theocratic state. We shouldered a great burden like Atlas (or the Soviet Union before us) but our preferred equilibrium 'ostensibly democratic corruption/pedophilia/drug haven' was massively unstable and relied on vast infusions of cash and competent Western soldiers. It was a bad idea to keep forcing this, we should've left much sooner.
Why are we trying to prop up a democratic Iraq? Why are we trying to pressure Syria into changing? We got masses of instability and ISIS out of both, yet we still haven't learnt our lesson. Why are we trying to pressure Iran, a turnkey nuclear power? Let's pack up and go home, leave some Ozymandias-style monument to regime-change to waste away in the desert. If Iran tries invading Kuwait, that's a clear problem, we should show up and secure our oil suppliers with a quick defensive war. Otherwise, let's leave it alone.
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The strongest possible argument for breaking the JCPOA in my mind is one that doesn't depend on whether the JCPOA was good. So assuming ad arguendo that the JCPOA would achieve its stated goals of integrating Iran into the international economy and community. The steelman of breaking the JCPOA is that integrating Iran into the international community and economy is necessarily bad.
Even if, per the best case scenario of the JCPOA, Iran becomes richer and does not develop a nuclear weapon it would still exercise power culturally and politically and economically in the region. This would be bad for Saudi Arabia and Israel, even if it wasn't bad for the USA. So breaking the JCPOA affirms America's commitment to its allies, and/or is the latest instance of the US being dog-walked by allies who never do anything for the US.
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That Obama tried to circumvent the treaty process by creating a treaty in all-but-name without getting the domestic political support for the not-treaty to exist beyond his own partisan tribe's span of power, mostly by trying to argue that the consequences of ending it were too big to let it end.
This was both bad statecraft and bad precedent, and would have posed exceptional risk to US policy stability if Presidents got accustomed to trying to engineer too-big-to-fail international agreements to bind their opposition-party successors. International relations is a field that relies on stability and predictability, which is undermined if you build castles on sand and then dare your political opponents not to shake them too much. This is a bit like building near a fault line but hoping there isn't an earthquake, and the best way for sound building codes to be enforced is for the occasional reminder of why building codes are needed.
The end of JCPOA was a salutory reminder to most parties involved that (a) if you want an agreement with the US get it in binding writing, (b) if you want a binding written agreement with the US it needs to be politically palatable to the American democratic representatives, and (c) if you want a proposal to be palatable to American democratic representatives, you should probably not be killing Americans via a proxy warfare policy.
For the most part, this sounds like the main advantage of withdrawing from the treaty was to make a point (apart from point c in your final paragraph)? Not meaning to be snarky, just wondering if I inferred correctly.
Sure, though there's a bit more to it. It's a content neutral argument- it doesn't only matter if the [insert agreement] was a good idea, it also matters how it was went about. Process matters, and American Presidents who ignore process requirements deserve to get their noses rubbed into it, but there are broader benefits as well.
Short-term utilitarianism (the effects of JCPOA are good, therefore we should ignore process to keep it) is a bad governing and international diplomacy model over time, and thus the best way to negate such bad models is to make them survive or die by their own standard. Americans should not make commitments they are not prepared- or able- to keep, and one of those checks is if they have bipartisan support. Policies that will not survive a transition of party, should not be the policy of the united states, and future presidents should remember JCPOA as a cautionary tale of how not to try and establish a legacy policy.
This is particularly true if we want a more restrained American foreign policy aparatus in the future (i.e. in a more multipolar world), where the American executive's limitations are as much as asset as a hinderance. When other parties know that American Presidents have limitations in what they offer, it increases the need for a party to get their agreement in writing through Congress (after which American courts can later overrule different administrations). This, in turn, requires clearly identifiable- and communicable- benefits to the American Congress, and thus electorate, as to why the American commitment should be made.
If the other party is not willing to make such a commitment- or cannot convince the American electorate as to why an American commitment is appropriate- this is a strong argument against the US executive making a commitment themselves and thus exposing the US to future conflicts that they American political base will not support. Since that would see the US abandon the policy regardless- and thus lose legitimacy / credibility / prestige / whatever form of favor you prefer- it is in many cases more important for Presidents to not make bad deals/commitments than it is for them to be able to make any deal they want.
I'd add that failing to negotiate the JCPOA as an Article II treaty also has implications regarding its effectiveness; properly following processes actually has an impact on how seriously the party you're negotiating with takes the agreement. Foreign leaders are very aware of the political capital necessary to acquire a two-thirds Senate majority, which makes it highly unlikely that the U.S. will renege on the engagement. The President’s predecessors are less likely to back out when support is high; legislators are less likely to pass laws inconsistent with the treaty, putting the U.S. in breach; and foreign heads of state are less likely to resist execution or withdraw knowing that the President, the legislature, their predecessors, and the American people stand behind the agreement. There is a reason why these kind of significant nonproliferation agreements have traditionally been negotiated as treaties: these kinds of matters deserve focus and commitment.
In the absence of this, why in the world would Iran take the agreement seriously whatsoever given that there had never been a demonstration of American commitment to it? Keep in mind too that Iran is a country with a long history of secretly exceeding limitations placed on its nuclear program. The JCPOA was negotiated in the first place because of Iran flouting multiple legally binding UNSCRs for a period of years and blatantly violating its Safeguards Agreement; they were willing to lose billions of dollars in sanctions to continue pursuing nuclear weapons in secret. Without the necessary two-thirds majority, the JCPOA was effectively a non-binding statement of intent; it was a gentlemen's agreement without much force behind it, one which involved a hefty frontloaded benefit to Iran (if adhered to) while basically just asking for Iran's word that it would not violate the rules of international law - something it already had been doing surreptitiously for years on end prior to the JCPOA. Such a weighty and fraught agreement at least deserved to be a treaty, and circumventing the mechanisms meant to ensure consensus was a failure on the Obama administration's part.
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The real question imo is what's the steelman for staying in the deal when "the deal" is that we (the west) effectively subsidize Iran's support for Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, Et Al in exchange for a pinky-promise from Iran not to develop a nuclear weapon before 2030.
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The biggest flaw in the JCPOA was that the restrictions on uranium enrichment, intended to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, expired at T+10-15 years, thus potentially allowing Iran to obtain a nuclear arsenal 'later' rather than 'never'.
Worse than that, it lifted previously existing sanctions/restrictions and thus could arguably be read as giving them permission to obtain a nuclear arsenal so long as they don't actually do so until 2031.
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That does seem like a flaw, but it doesn't seem like a reason for the US to withdraw before 10 years.
True; we should have re-negotiated, changing '10-15 years' to 'until the signatories unanimously agree to lift the restrictions, which won't happen as long as you keep supporting Palestinian claims on Tel Aviv.'
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