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User ID: 1083

problem_redditor


				
				
				

				
8 followers   follows 8 users   joined 2022 September 09 19:21:08 UTC

					

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User ID: 1083

Won't respond to everything now (broadly I agree with your framing more here, and I wasn't actually suggesting you were a triumphalist, I was thinking about other people). But I don't think you have me correctly characterised with this:

I mean, you do seem to be very clearly anti-Western Civilization, though.

My answer to this is “I don’t hate you, I just expected more from you.”

To the contrary, you seem to be holding out quite a lot of hope and optimism with regard to e.g. China, which you expressed pretty clearly above. I could pretty easily write a laundry list of sins perpetrated by the CCP, but I doubt any of it would be news to you.

That is simply because I do think China is more resilient, less dysfunctional, and more of a serious competitor than many give it credit for, and it actually has state capacity, which is legit very important but rare in modern nations (also there are some doomer things reported in media about China that are just straight-up astroturfed). That does not mean I don't understand that they have their own massive failure modes specific to the Chinese system - there is a lot to criticise about, say, their insane handling of COVID or more generally just their aggressive overreach in multiple domains and noticeable struggles implementing checks and balances; one or all of these problems may well prove fatal, and it's not the case that I would like to live there. I’m pretty sure I would be complaining about the hukou system or something two months into living there. It is simply that, as you note, I doubt any of it would be news to anyone here. People here, as is true in most of the English-speaking world, generally don't like (read: often really fucking hate) China, and I'm a habitual contrarian so I don't feel the need to already reaffirm whatever people already believe. My actual opinions on China are complex and ambivalent, and I don't think it's "obviously" better, but people here are mostly in favour of the West so I play devil's advocate and advance the counterargument a lot. Devil’s advocacy became something I was more interested in doing upon the outbreak of the Iran War, which I very much did not like, and seeing just how many people decided to do the whole America Triumphalism thing really showed me the extent of influence who/whom had on people’s thinking (it also soured me aggressively on unbridled West-bullishness, because that's where you end up if you take it too far. I will probably not be able to read anything even adjacent to that without cringing for a while).

Paradoxically, another big part of the reason why I don't rant about China's problems is because I'm less invested in the success of the Chinese project than I am the Western one. It's the difference between being interested in something vs being actually morally invested in it. With China, I simply do not hate them in the way other people appear to, I am fascinated by the culture and system in a more academic and somewhat anthropological fashion where I am interested to see how their bid for Great Power status pans out. If it wasn't already clear, I like difference and novelty for its own sake, and regardless of how you slice it Chinese success in context of their very low baseline after the Qing imploded is notable, which isn’t to say they don’t have their own set of issues which threaten them. I will admit I do love a good underdog story, but ultimately the Chinese system is far from me and I do not have much of a stake in whether they end up succeeding or failing, nor do I think the likelihood of them making the world into the Chinese Empire where everyone has a social credit score or something is particularly high, so I find it hard to get very invested when their only effect on me is cool gadgets, cheaper prices and global warming. On the other hand, there are pretty large swaths of Western values that I actually do have personal investment in because I grew up believing in them, and I am therefore way more personally upset and become increasingly disillusioned when the nations that are supposed to be its proponents fail to live up to what I view as its core tenets. There is an actual reason why "tyranny of small differences" is a thing; defection perpetrated by those who you believed to be on your side stings harder than that perpetrated by those you never considered your friends in the first place.

You just don't seem interested in applying your cynicism evenly across all ideologies.

I generally don't trust morality-based geopolitical claims made by nations, regardless of whether China or America is doing it. Chinese century-of-humiliation based territorial claims (e.g. Taiwan) are clearly vacuous legitimation-babble and I'm not sure I've said anything to contradict that. Their rationales for their geopolitical actions are about as sincere as America claiming that its geopolitical role is the enforcement of a global rules-based order or the promotion of Western liberal democracy. It's realpolitik all the way down, with a fig leaf of post-hoc rationalisation attached.

I'm curious as to why you're vaunting this current state of affairs as Western Civilisation, since I regard a large portion of Universal Culture as hopelessly self-defeating in the long run and believe we have just successfully shielded ourselves from the worst of the costs thus far. The supposed magnanimity and humanism you and other commenters are referring to is not a noble trait; it’s the suicidality of a decadent society, and this current iteration of Universal Culture Western Civilisation being spread everywhere is exactly the strand of progressive thought we complain about endlessly on the CW threads, and which many of the old great western philosophers of yore would have thought of as an aberration. So many of the norms that exist at the moment are the product of a society that became too big to fail off the shoulders of their forebears, and which I don’t want to see exported anywhere. This set of norms and ideologies creates drag on societies, it destroys state capacity, it shreds fertility, it fucks up streets and cities, it ruins the social world in service of retarded gibmes and a tyranny of the minority, and it is only in spite of this utter absurdity that "Western Civilisation" continues to function. It’s strange to me that so many conservatives here want to lay claim to it, since it’s not clear to me why they should when it is actively hostile to them. If Culture ending up like this is a path-dependent property of Western Civilisation, I can’t help but regard it as utterly delegitimising. It may once have been awesome, but increasingly I’m getting less of a sense of “awesome” and more of a sense that the entity is being cannibalised from the inside and worn as a skinsuit. What’s there may be high-entropy, but just because a meme spreads fast doesn’t mean it’s good, and if it is Western Civilisation, it’s Western Civilisation in the throes of a bloated late-Qing-like failstate.

I exaggerate, but only a little bit. There is still a nonzero amount of good things about the West, but every day there seems to be yet another erosion of norms and as time goes on more and more people appear to be hitting the defect button. The amount of leeway that the West has to fix shit is only shrinking as the years go on and the institutional paralysis and social derangement deepens. The west has just been so rich for so long they’ve never been required to confront the costs of their policies, as if the bill will never come due. At the moment, western countries still on balance offer a superior quality of life, but the non-Japan parts of Asia are busy catching up and we’ll see what happens if current trends continue the way they do. The western position in the world is less assured than triumphalists seem to think it is, and its biggest competitor is China; possibly the least western modernised country on earth. A country, I might add, that the West has tariffed and embargoed countless times, in opposition to the “acceptance of competition” and free trade that I am told the Western Civilisation stands for.

As for magnanimity, I’m not certain geopolitical events align very well with that self-perception. Is "magnanimity" and "wanting to expose the rest of the world to the nourishing fruits of Western Civilisation" the reason why America staged a coup to replace a democratically elected PM in Iran with an American-aligned monarch? Is this why they repeatedly did so in Latin America? Is this why the U.S. in the span of half a century interfered with 81 elections around the world, so that the unwashed masses could have a taste of scintillating Western freedom and values? Or is it because they didn’t want competition they couldn’t control? Even the whole letting endless refugees in thing is not entirely a magnanimous and self-effacing position taken for the benefit of the poor foreigners; it's a defect button in a coordination problem. Keeping a massive low-skill population that is fully dependent on the largesse of the party that let them in is extremely politically profitable, and in order to justify that people ignore the fact it excoriates the social fabric in their own country and drains the labour force from undeveloped countries, choosing instead to create post-hoc rationalisations which portray it as compassion and basic human decency. "The West" is as self-interested and amoral as any other people are, and this isn’t necessarily a condemnation as much as it is just an observation of the kinds of incentives that drive behaviour. Every country is self-serving, Western nations certainly wouldn’t be the first ones to be so, but the glazing does not correlate with what's going on in the real world.

I’m not "anti-Western Civilisation" per se. But I am a cynical doomer par excellence who believes that ideology is often just a smokescreen for uglier, baser human tendencies, and I can't get myself to share this outlook.

Oh, I suppose I'm not good at reading between the lines. I just thought it was a silly play on words centred around juxtaposing a pathological mathematical example with a "well-behaved" one or something.

Because it's a pathological distribution?

Not really a "small-scale" question, but feels more appropriate for this thread than it does the CW one because of its somewhat stream-of-consciousness, freewheeling, not very rigorous quality. Possibly better for Wellness Wednesday, but that thread's not up yet. Anyway: How do you find meaning in Universal Culture?

Scott, in How The West Was Won, refers to a great shoggoth devouring the world: "I am pretty sure there was, at one point, such a thing as western civilization. I think it included things like dancing around maypoles and copying Latin manuscripts. At some point Thor might have been involved. That civilization is dead. It summoned an alien entity from beyond the void which devoured its summoner and is proceeding to eat the rest of the world." Scott calls this alien entity "Universal Culture", a term which I think fails to capture the consumption-forward, disposable, hollowed-out nature of much of it. I have seen it referred to by another, more apt term on the SSC subreddit: "Global Vegas". It's a maximum point on the memetic fitness landscape, the set of cultural characteristics towards which all countries converge in a certain technological and communication environment, the process of endless optimisation not in any sort of real human-flourishing sense but to serve the ceaseless goal of efficiency and convenience and spreading faster and farther. Universal Culture is, crucially, a mix of things that are actually good and productive (e.g. modern medicine), "optimised" Molochian solutions that are adaptive for the community but seem to make everyone more unhappy when adopted (mass urbanism turning everything into anonymised concrete tower-blocks), and straight-up harmful parasitic superstimuli/habits that absolutely shred the fitness of the host and simply spread due to cognitive evolutionary mismatch (the most indisputable ur-example of this being fast food).

Don't get me wrong, it's good that we no longer die from preventable disease and no longer suffer from persistent food insecurity. It’s a better time than any other in history by any objective metric, and yet it appears that a lot of people feel something is missing, though it's hard to articulate what. To put it succinctly, it feels as if the flanderisation of culture is impossible to escape now regardless of where you go in the modern world, and so much of our current cultural output feels like disposable trinkets that's been optimised for quantifiable metrics of reach and retention, distanced from any kind of meaningful tradition. Much of the built environment reflects an incessant search for efficiency and mechanisation, and many of the "third spaces" that still exist in public are oriented around consumption in a way where it seems like the world has become a massive shopping mall. Increasingly The Future seems to be nothing more than identical glass-and-steel skyscrapers stretching to the horizon, entertainment industries optimised for the production of "media" as opposed to anything on the ground, old rituals long swapped out for the New Shiny Thing which will be obsolete in 5 months. An endless desert of disposable architecture and disposable entertainment and disposable culture, optimised for maximum convenience and maximum short-term pleasure, stripped of community, stripped of meaning, stripped of heritage. Eternal September for the real world.

The kinds of popular content that survive in this environment are all legible without context, pleasurable without effort, and cheap to reproduce. While context and effort are the defining feature of deep and meaningful traditions, partially because they exist as a signifier of community belonging (look at how strange and high context Peking opera or Indian classical music or the Western tradition before a certain point is), a lot of what exists today is the entertainment equivalent of wireheading meant to optimise for reach and common ease of access across a wide networked range of communities. It's the difference between traditional forms that served a community-building purpose and "content" made solely for individualised consumption, with serious emphasis on the "individualised" part of things; in this paradigm it's a massive boon if they can be consumed in your room, on your own, without having to interact with anyone else. Personally because of these trends I'm finding it harder and harder to find meaning in the world or much of contemporary output, which also drives me to make the problem worse by just failing to "touch grass" and interact with a culture I consider to be impressively hollow. It feels like so much meaningful culture has just been hyper-optimised out of existence, and much of the little that remains has itself been transformed into a product. Not that consumption didn't exist beforehand, it did, but it seems to have absolutely taken over much of modern life in lieu of other sources of meaning.

I have found myself becoming a compulsive purveyor of Old Things as of late. Old architecture, old artworks, old customs. In contrast, it just seems as if so much in the Current Year has become increasingly soulless in the pursuit of optimisation and efficiency and commodification, and making sure everyone experiences the lowest possible amount of friction.

So I got sick on Tuesday this week and after a mercifully short 3 days of actually being ill my body appears to have fought off the virus. The problem is that I'm still experiencing post-infection fatigue, a post-nasal drip and an extremely irritating lingering cough, to the point that even after just a few hours awake, I'm already experiencing fatigue and brain fog and need to lie down.

What do you do to resolve these issues? "Just wait it out and rest a lot" seems to be the normative stock answer, but for obvious reasons I'd like to speed up the process.

China has a lot more leeway with the massive elderly overhang between state capacity, automation and not having to deal with them as a massive voting bloc plus such a gigantic existing population that losing some absolute numbers when large amounts of China's poorer population essentially doesn't exist economically already.

Yeah I always roll my eyes a little bit at "Chyna is going to collapse from demographic crisis". There is also the fact that China is only about 60% urbanised at the moment, and still has considerable ability to offset productivity losses from the ageing of its population via further urbanisation of their populace; urban productivity is far higher than rural productivity. It's not a permanent solution for an ongoing demographic trend, but it certainly does give them a lot more time to kick the ball down the road and implement viable solutions like growing its automation base (alongside other things), which means the Chinese have much more of a fighting chance compared to other countries. IMO the problem is far more exacerbated for countries like Japan and SK, both 90%+ urbanised countries where it's not as easy to offset the productivity losses from aging via urbanisation and scalable mass automation.

There's this weird tendency for a lot of "sinologists" and China Watchers to compulsively bet against China and predict imminent collapse, which has not gone well ever since... frankly, pretty much ever since Liberation in 1949. One would have thought that the ignominious failure of all the previous bearish predictions would have caused people to think twice before overconfidently proclaiming Chinese collapse in 30 days, but they appear to psychologically contextualise this as a replay of the Cold War which makes them believe they just need to wait for the falsities and contradictions of the Dragon Empire to be exposed, upon which time the whole edifice will cave in on itself. Very Francis Fukuyama of them.

'Yaddayadda population curve' also assumes fungibility of population and that certain demographics of immigrants aren't net drains over any reasonable time horizon.

To add to this, the fact that the US still has a higher birth rate than death rate is being largely driven by the immigrants they have brought in, who as mentioned are themselves are not necessarily net boons and who may well create drag on the system. The aggregate figure obscures a shit ton of heterogeneity - non-Hispanic white American deaths exceed births, and this has been true ever since 2012. If not for the mass importing of poorly-integrated low-skill foreigners who breed like rabbits I suspect the US' demographic situation would look more similar to what is currently going on in East Asia.

I just looked through my sheaf of saved papers to evaluate this and interestingly enough there are further examples of symbioses occurring without the initial mitochondrial endosymbiosis (albeit not well publicised ones) - for example mealybugs possess specialised cells containing endosymbiotic β-proteobacteria which themselves contain endosymbiotic γ-proteobacteria, essentially forming a set of nested obligate endosymbionts. The authors note this probably occurred multiple times, with different precursors of the ancestral γ-proteobacteria independently infecting the ancestral β-proteobacteria on approximately four occasions.

There's also the fact that it's hard to gauge how likely endosymbiosis would have been on early Earth; mitochondrial development likely hindered the development of further endosymbiosis along those lines to some degree because the already established eukaryotic lineage filled available niches.

I’ve seen this posited as well - that the primary endosymbiosis that formed eukaryotes, where a free-living bacterial cell got incorporated into a host cell to create mitochondria, expanding the cellular energy budget, is an extremely rare event that might limit the prevalence of advanced life throughout the galaxy.

That hypothesis falls apart a lot though when you consider that this has actually occurred multiple times; e.g. chloroplasts are also the result of endosymbiosis and in fact they have developed independently in Archaeplastida and Paulinella alike, which certainly speaks against the idea of it being a rare occurrence. And then there are the nitrogen fixing organelles in certain types of marine alga, which appear to have been a result of this same process. For primary endosymbiosis to have happened at least four times indicates the mechanism itself is not rare, and significantly weakens its ability to explain the Fermi paradox.

Every time I’d read their use of the term in Chinese Communist literature, it’s always got this background connotation with their earlier philosophical systems, owing more to the fact that even when Communism was developing and taking root in China, it was growing out of context of other traditions that history never shakes off entirely from the population.

To be quite honest I think China at this point is just straight up not "communist" and is not trying to be, frankly that ideology is not compatible with a country that quashes unions and Marxist agitators the same way they do any other potentially destabilising dissident, and produces new billionaires at a rate exceeding anywhere else in the world. Aspects that one might point to like e.g. state direction/ownership of some business are aspects of boilerplate authoritarianism, and these policies were also pursued in decidedly non-communist states like Mussolini's Italy (albeit it did so indirectly via state-owned holding companies). It always seems to me like people focus too much on the "communist" label stuck onto them and ignore the way the country is actually being run, which is something very meaningfully indigenous; what actually developed is not communism but a form of technocratic cyberpunk Legalism that deeply values political meritocracy (they even maintain the civil examination system for officials), iron-fisted rule-by-law, practical results-driven legitimacy, etc, and merely features some trappings of the discursive framework of Marxism to articulate their goals. If anything, out of all the countries in the East Asian region, China probably possesses the format of governance that's most true to the premodern Asian norm.

I always find it quite funny when people say things like "I love Chynese culture, but hate the government and CCP" or treat China as if its beautiful traditional culture has been wholesale supplanted by a very bad, no good system of statist authoritarianism when a cursory look at Chinese culture would tell you that the Party-state is in many ways a very close modern analogue to old Chinese ideas of legitimate governance and in fact the CCP is very nice in comparison to that. Most people appear to place too much importance on labels, have a view of culture as a set of aesthetics and vibes for outsider consumption instead of an entire framework of legitimacy, philosophy of governance, etc, and contextualise countries selectively depending on whether they are a friend or an enemy geopolitically, which leads to frankly psychotic discourse.

The reason that 'Western conservatives' in 2rafa's top-level post are unable to achieve lasting transformations of the country is because they really don't have that much support. They can join winning coalitions, but if they try to pursue transformative agendas, they run into not only institutional but popular backlash, because their goals are genuinely unpopular.

On a broader level, I think that American politics ever since the 50s onwards has been something like a "coalition of the hegemony" vs a "coalition of the dissenters", with the parties essentially switching sides in this dichotomy at some point during the 70s and 80s. The challenge for the former group is to try and hold the line on their relatively unified consensus without splintering apart over the tyranny of small differences, whereas the challenge for the latter group is to try and piece together a generally coherent and cohesive group out of many little ragtag bands of dissenters with different objectives and interests.

Much ink has been spilled over how incoherent and all-encompassing intersectional critical theory is, and having read the absolute trash that counts as scholarship in these circles I have to agree. But it makes more sense when conceptualised as an attempt to build a coherent coalition with a shared goal; before then the political "left" was full of different unpopular dissident groups that didn't necessarily agree with each other or believe they were optimising towards the same thing, and were pretty much unified solely by their opposition to whatever they considered to be the political and social hegemony at the time. Due to the big tent nature of the early movement, progressives hung out with people one would see as persona non grata now (e.g. in France progressives were deeply entwined with existentialists and postmodernists who were a little too into pedophilia for comfort, and gay rights parades in the US at times featured the presence of NAMBLA).

This big tent later started to be standardised into a more overarching worldview which led to all the causes being associated with each other in a way that would ensure more ideological consistency and agreement regarding end goals, which led to impressively befuddling things like the "war on drugs" being folded into the larger omnicause of "racism" and the emergence of concepts like the intersectional stack and the Superstructure (the White Cisheteropatriarchy); these concepts were not created to be logically sound but instead existed as a consensus-building tool to convince everyone they were actually fighting the same thing and that all their goals were inextricably tied up with one another. Progressives love to say that there are "many different progressivisms" but a while back a user here posted a political typology with results that indicated "leftward progressives" were far more homogenous in their opinions than any of the other groups, largely due to this manufacturing of consensus.

I don't think right-wingers currently have anything resembling a shared vision; there's no sweeping conceptual framework like intersectionality that would unite all their causes under one banner and create widespread cross-group support for a constellation of dissident opinions all at once. Most rightists here are very prone to disagreement and are in a sense part of the problem - I for example care most about opposing identitarian politics and oppression narratives I view as corrosive and consider many Rightists here to give too much lip service to the values and framing of the left, yet break ranks whenever someone does the whole jingoistic American Exceptionalist, foreign-interventionist, China-hawk stuff that is very common among certain strands of the right, and that kind of internal disorder is not something you can tolerate if you want to enact sweeping reforms that stick.

At the moment, conservatives are just too fractured and divided to actually be able to enact a transformative agenda the same way that the Counterculture did in the mid-20th century, and there is no rallying cry that will make them all unite around each others' causes.

I was a mini-STEMlord myself as a kid and if the longest thing he has read is a Wikipedia article, short stories probably work for you, and they don't need to be YA. Ted Chiang's stuff is evergreen and I imagine they would be rather accessible; Story of Your Life and Exhalation are two good ones he may enjoy.

Some Greg Egan ones may work too, though I may not recommend whole short story compilations from him since some can get heavy. But Learning To Be Me is particularly accessible and very haunting.

DISCLAIMER: I may be overindexing on the "was able to follow a 1st-year undergraduate biochem course on MIT OpenCourseware" part and failing to properly factor in "is literally 10", so maybe use your own judgement.

Firstly, thank you. Secondly, I see people are coming off Reddit to find me now. I stopped doing this because I'm now supremely busy (and dealing with the absolute state of gender research and discourse was like trying to stem a river of diarrhoea with my hands for no good reason), but since you went to the trouble of actually getting here I'll try to respond.

These studies show almost no gender symmetry even though they have used modified CTC. They describe it as male perpetrated and tell no gender symmetry exists(the sample size is too small but the findings I don't think I can dismiss)

So what goes on in studies like this and what exactly do they do in their methodologies that leads to data like this? Because in PASK I can see that they found near gender symmetry. But for some reason in asian or middle eastern countries it is not the case.

Regarding the two studies you linked from India, you're correct that the sample size is small, but in my opinion an even bigger issue is that the "modified CTS" (from what I see, these studies are actually using questionnaires based off the modified CTS) is being utilised here in two separate studies conducted a year apart, one which only studies men and one which only studies women. I'd be very careful with this. Since they were conducted in two different sessions these studies can feature subtly different questions, interviewing norms, and methodologies, and the "methods and materials" section of the study is very high level and does not provide a whole lot of methodological detail other than really high-level coverage of basics; they may very well have adapted their approach over time. Without detailed methodological information, it's possible that the questions administered or the approach taken to the respondents in both studies may have been subtly different. Timing is also itself a problem - different survey waves mean different historical contexts, and there may be real changes in prevalence or in willingness to disclose over time. This confounds any attempt to compare between the two studies.

From a cursory read of the studies it does appear that there were differences in the questionnaire administered; e.g. economic violence was assessed in the female study, while it was excluded in the male study, and it's hard to know how differences like that would affect respondent behaviour within the study. As an example of how this can work, it's possible for there to be a priming and framing effect wherein a longer questionnaire assessing a broader list of behaviours signals a wider definition of violence, and can change what respondents recall and count as abusive, including in other domains like physical violence. In general it's always better to source either a meta-analysis featuring a very large curated swath of studies that harmonises definitions, assesses study quality, and models between-study heterogeneity, or to use a singular study where the explicit goal is to provide comparative data for the sexes, instead of picking out two different studies conducted at two different times and then trying to compare figures from these to come to an overall conclusion.

There have, however, been studies conducted with the goal of providing a large slate of comparative data that surveys men and women in many different countries; a pretty early example of this is the International Dating Violence Study, with results summarised here. They asked students regarding their domestic violence perpetration, and if an incident was reported they asked about bidirectionality. The results from India show that approximately equal proportions of men and women perpetrated minor violence on their partners, and a higher proportion of women perpetrated severe violence compared to men. Of those relationships with violence, 8.3% featured male perpetration only, 16.6% featured female perpetration only, and 75% was bidirectional. You'll note that if you look at the figures for Middle Eastern countries in the paper there's also gender symmetry. This isn't the only one either; there are many studies like that around, showing the same patterns.

Also studies like this https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1077801214521324

Oh, this is Johnson. To be quite frank, this is probably one of the single worst domestic violence researchers I have ever come across; his entire body of academic work has entirely been him trying to create two different categories of domestic violence: "Common couple violence" and "intimate terrorism", with the first occurring out of routine frustration and the latter being perpetrated out of a desire for control. He claims that the former is largely gender symmetrical and the latter is mostly male-perpetrated, and around the '00s and '10s he basically tried to launder a false idea of gender asymmetry into academia. When he first attempted to prove this claim he literally used samples that included either known female victims of male violence or samples drawn from crime surveys of women’s victimisation using only women's reports. When this was actually tested by other researchers using non-selected general population samples, it was repeatedly found again, and again, and again, and again that intimate terrorism as per his own typology was either gender symmetrical or majority female-perpetrated. Johnson of course does not want to acknowledge all this research as it delegitimises his ideology and his "contribution" to the field.

In this study, in order to try and save face he claims that asking people about their experiences with "ex-spouses" is much more of a better measure than asking them about their current relationships, and says that in survey data he finds more intimate terrorist ex-husbands compared to intimate terrorist ex-wives. But his data source for this study is the National Violence Against Women Survey (NVAWS), which isn't the best source to draw from, to say the least. As this blogger notes; "The study was never intended to measure domestic violence in both genders. It was developed by feminist researchers for the purpose of exclusively surveying women [7]. Indeed, for the first three months of the study, only female respondents were interviewed [8]. The CDC later decided to add a male sample as well. However, the male respondents were not treated equally in this survey. While all female respondents were assigned female interviewers, only half of the male respondents were assigned a male interviewer [9]. A further bias, or a consequence of the above mentioned biases, was the much higher refusal rate among men in the survey (45% vs 36%) [10]. Because of these methodological and statistical biases, the findings of this study are far from the last word on the subject." Given the issues with the survey and its methodology, such research operating off the NVAWS is not to be taken as definitive proof of, well, anything. Yet the state of the academy is such that this is the kind of research people are touting as "evidence" for their pet theories.

Where can I know more about these things and be aware of bad researches on DV?

Honestly, dissidents are dispersed all over the internet and many of the old guard that were critical of SocJus academia have dispersed now. And given my inactivity lately on gender issues, I'm probably not the best person to ask for up-to-date, centralised sources which actually go in-depth on the problems with progressive academia. It also increasingly seems to me like the popularity of the old identity politics hobbyhorses of the 2010s have largely waned in popular discourse as well, and the focus has shifted to new things like AI and the Iran War and so on. While feminism/women's studies is still an extremely powerful lobby and still produces a lot of crap academic work, in popular-discourse circles these kinds of topics seem to have gotten increasingly stale.

Or maybe I'm just less terminally online. Hard to say.

But you've gotta have something, and millions of people even in our "modern nihilistic age" do find something, so you don't have much of an excuse to not get to it.

This sort of precludes the possibility of depression among people who aren't experiencing immediate threat, though, since depression is in large part a problem of lack of meaning. Crucially, you can't simply will a telos into existence when you don't have one. I'm not saying rolling over and dying is the correct answer (it's not), but "finding purpose" is a very open-ended task with a very individualised solution and it can be easy or nearly impossible depending on the person in question.

It always strikes me just how radically different people are in terms of mental architecture, such that imagining a different cognitive landscape is sometimes like trying to conceptualise an alien mind.

Honestly I think you're closer to the population norm than I am. Everyone's always talking about how depressed they are and how meaningless everything seems. I feel like the odd one out in that I've never struggled with any of that.

Selection bias is probably a very big factor influencing that perception. People talk about their malaise partially because they need to get it off their chest; people who are doing fine don't speak about just How Very Ok they are. I don't really think the Redditors traumaposting about their deep depression are at all representative of what the general population actually is like.

Regarding "suffering", I think that's a very difficult thing to quantify and can't necessarily be assessed so easily. Generally I think the discourse surrounding suffering is flawed in many ways; firstly people tend to overweight sources of suffering that are essentially severe but temporary over sources of suffering that are lower-level but more persistent, and secondly people tend to underweight the influence and importance of someone having hope that things will get better for them in the future and belief in their own agency to change it. The lack of conception of what a feasible "better life" would look like is an extremely underrated factor in suicides. More than anything else, I think our brains regard the idea of being stuck as intolerable, and searches for any kind of actionable solution.

In your hypothetical of someone experiencing a potentially fatal health condition, often suicide doesn't even occur to them because there's some kind of conception of a better future to fight for and a clearly defined set of steps to possibly stop the suffering that is currently occurring; you have something to fight against and a sense that you will either reach a state where things will get better or you're going to die trying. Paradoxically, I think actively being under assault creates more of a sense of urgency and purpose. You can look to the future and declare that you will be happy once you make the negative stimulus stop (at least, until the hedonic treadmill inevitably kicks in and you return to your natural affective baseline, but your brain focuses on the here and now and doesn't think about that). But when, on paper, you already possess the things that any reasonable person could expect - you're healthy and have a job, friends, hobbies, and so on, and yet you're still coming back to your apartment feeling horribly empty and unmotivated as if the things you were doing only served to prevent you from having to deal with yourself, there's nothing to work towards. It's much easier to fall into a mindset where life itself, or your own ingrained mental patterns, are the problem, because that's less of a concrete issue that you can identify and take steps to address.

I'm not sure people do it on a whim per se, rather I'd frame the impulsive nature of suicide as being a response to the straw that broke the camel's back. I think we have affective baselines which are more insensitive to circumstances than we would like to believe they are, and there is a subsection of unlucky people whose affective baseline oscillates somewhere between misery and ennui (an idea partially supported by behaviour genetics). Modern life has reduced the number of blameworthy agents they can pin the problem on and try to fix, which only makes it worse. When you don't even know what the problem even is, what would make you happy, or what there is to even strive for, when you on paper should be doing okay but everything only seems like pointless sound and fury, I see why one would look around at the paucity of other feasible options and choose the only way out.

Can’t give a full response now, but mostly agree.

I don't think you need to be a spiritualist (although I am) to think that ML systems cannot experience pain.

I believe we’ve spoken about this before; I agree with this if you are defining pain as the sensation of physical pain, since you likely can’t capture most of its dimensions without a body or a sense of ownership over that body as belonging to you. Affective and emotional pain, on the other hand, is a broader category; it’s not prima facie implausible for an artificial system to have some kind of weird hall-of-mirrors distorted analogue of that which represents “negatively valenced response to stimulus”.

But qualia is very subtle - for instance, things as similar as men and women can experience distinctly different qualia.

It gets way weirder and more fucky than that: I’m aware of a study where researchers blinded rats and fitted them with a prosthesis which fed their visual cortexes info from a geomagnetic sensor. Their brains quickly adapted to the new sensory modality, to the extent that they were navigating mazes almost as well as sighted rats. Mole rats use magnetonavigation, and become incredibly stressed out and fearful when placed in experimental conditions that prevent them from sensing that. I have no clue how it would feel to be that rat, to be able to experience the Earth’s magnetic field firsthand. I literally have no conception of what that looks or feels like.

Thus I think that if we ever were able to make self-aware machines, their qualia could and would likely be vastly different from ours, possibly incomprehensibly so.

This is my take too. There’s no reason to expect their subjective perceptions would be similar at all; just because qualia may arise does not mean that qualia needs to be anthropomorphic. It’s the main problem I have with a lot of sentient-AI fiction; they’re just humans in metal skins meant to induce empathy and understanding. But in all likelihood the inner workings of a human mind and any kind of hypothetical future ML model won’t be the same.

I won’t speak on the topic of whether radically dissimilar alien qualia deserves moral consideration, except that I expect the topic to be divisive if it ever becomes a salient point of conversation. Though as per the blinded rat study it’s possible that humans themselves in the future will be able to use prostheses to experience many dimensions of unnatural qualia inaccessible to us, it’s likely they’ll assign moral value to them, and as such they may be far more sympathetic to the idea of the welfare of cognitive aliens.

This is true, but what I do find to be rather frustrating sometimes with these AI discussions is that people (not you necessarily) very often bake in their assumptions and take it for granted that AI cannot be sentient and choose to ridicule the idea that "electric patterns" can experience hurt (your brain substantially runs on electric patterns too but we'll just ignore that). Many people within this community act as if the hard problem of consciousness has been solved already, and we know what makes things sentient, and we know for a fact that ML systems cannot experience qualia. Well, we don't; when and how exactly has this been established? This argument has been made for so long, with many (flawed) thought experiments like Searle's Chinese Room to try and disprove the idea that any kind of sentience can ever actually be attributed to a chatbot.

Please note: I'm fairly certain they aren't currently sentient, and if they ever become such their "subjective experience" will be very different from any human one. But the strain of thought here that is essentially a contrarian reaction against the admittedly sometimes irritating crop of rationalists who care way too much about model welfare is frankly quite annoying and bakes in a number of assumptions that are framed as common sense. If you are a spiritualist, then explicitly state that assumption and acknowledge that it's one strand of possibility among others predicated on a metaphysical view of consciousness, not the only possible one that can exist.

I found that film goofy as shit, the practical effects were impressive for the time but the plot and dialogue felt incredibly hackneyed, B-movie-esque (which it is) and honestly quite unintentionally funny at times. Lines like "Have you ever heard of insect politics? Neither have I. Insects... don't have politics. They're very... brutal. No compassion, no compromise. We can't trust the insect. I'd like to become the first... insect politician." absolutely laid me out in a way that I don't think was intended.

Maybe this is weird but I conceptualise it as a very breezy popcorn film. The grossness for me is probably also tempered by the fact that there was a period of my own life best summed up with the sentence "we have body horror at home" and barely any of this affects me anymore.

The scorn for and hatred of 'whites' is real, albeit often with an implicit 'but I'm one of the good ones' exception attached, but I don't think they actually expect to do themselves harm.

This has been discussed ad nauseam but it’s just intra-racial status signalling. The progressive leftist outgroup is not other races/immigrants; they don’t necessarily see themselves as being in competition or even in the same social worlds or status hierarchies as them, the outgroup they would most like to distinguish themselves from is the poorfag hick whites who worry about low-status things like manual or unskilled work being outsourced to waves of Oppressed Refugees who massively increase the supply of low-skill labour and are willing to perform these jobs for lower pay. By embracing these kinds of lax immigration policies, they distinguish themselves not only as one of the Good Whites but also as one of the Cultured Whites, who are magnanimous in their kindness, enlightened enough to accept and understand the value of other cultures, and most definitely not a part of the lowly social stratum at risk of competition from migrant workers. They are too genteel to care about that.

It bears mentioning that the converse exists too; those who hold the opposite view are countersignalling in a way that marks themselves as the populist voice of the masses, as steadfast advocates for the Real Salt-Of-The-Earth Americans/Australians/Canadians/[insert nationality here] who are so impervious to social control that they’re willing to go against the Establishment, but their base position is also just less inherently paradoxical than that of white racial progressives and it’s no great mystery why they would hold this position.

The relevant portions of the Great Wall such as Shanhaiguan and Gubeikou which were involved in the war were constructed during the Ming dynasty, built in the 15th and 16th centuries along a path that was somewhat reminiscent of the route past walls traced, but which were effectively entirely new fortifications. Really the entire brick portion of the Great Wall that people picture is the product of this very Ming wall-building project.

The earlier Qin and Han Great Walls tracing back to the 2nd century BCE were earthen fortifications that had pretty much eroded away over more than a millennium of disuse by the time the Ming took power; you can still see remnants of the original Han dynasty earthen wall in rural Gansu province which are more or less useless as fortifications due to how degraded they are. After the Sui, there was a really large gap in wall-building, which appears to be due to the fact that wall-building was seen as an admission of policy failure from the Tang onwards; a dynasty with successful foreign policy maintained engagement consistently with steppe-dwellers and was seen to have no need for such costly and manpower-heavy infrastructure projects.

Disclaimer: I really did not like this city when I travelled here to see my SO, it was one of my least favourite cities I have ever been to, but YMMV. My grievances with the city may all be normal and expected in the North American context, so maybe it's a good idea to not use me as a barometer for your experience.

Go see the Old City Hall and distillery district if you're already downtown, they're nothing to shout about but are decent pieces of old architecture, in addition to this it may also be worth making the trip out to Casa Loma to see the OG McMansion "Gothic Revival" architecture. CN Tower is interesting if you've never been in a tower before. Skip Centre Island in the middle of Lake Ontario (or Lake America depending on your nationality), it's extremely underwhelming, it's just a middlingly-sized meadowy island with hokey tourist infrastructure and virtually nothing going on; if you like nature I'm told the Scarborough bluffs are a decent choice though I did not have time to go there myself. Possibly the most interesting offbeat historical spot I can think of in the entire city of Toronto is actually the Mount Pleasant Cemetery, it was inspired by European and British garden cemeteries of the 19th century and features some stately mausoleums for important figures, including but not limited to Timothy Eaton, Hart Massey, William George Barker, etc. Oh and Glenn Gould is there.

Also the Group of Seven paintings, housed in the Art Gallery of Ontario, are worth seeing if you like that kind of thing. They're nicer in real life than they look in photos.

EDIT: Royal Ontario Museum is also okay for a short trip, though frankly there’s nothing all too distinctive about its collection.

I have to admit, crying foul over national sovereignty and international law is a bit rich coming from the US. After all, the general position of the US for the last quarter century or so has been that US law applies within the US and to US citizens, and the US president has unlimited jurisdiction over the life of freedom of anyone else.

No but you see when the US and its allies mess with the Middle East and Latin America for the umpteenth time, bomb their countries to smithereens and/or try to install their own puppet governments in the area, this is an act of magnanimity and liberation of the downtrodden as well as a justified act of retaliation against evil dictatorships. When US competitors exercise power on a much smaller and less consequential regional scale, for example China enforcing their sovereignty over Hong Kong or throwing their weight around in the South China Sea, this is uncalled-for aggression, authoritarianism and belligerence and a violation of international law. As always everything is just realpolitik and the ideological justifications are created ad hoc to legitimise it.

It's literally just rules for thee, not for me; their mode of engagement has never been particularly consistent. The actual basis for their objection to the ICC is primarily just that the US and its interests may be subject to some external power that constrains their ability to act, it has nothing to do with any serious belief in consistently-applied "international law" or "rules-based order". In this context, it's very hard for me to care about any arguments about how the ICC is trying to gain and keep power as an arbiter of international affairs, when we already live in a system where flagrant overexercise of power is the norm. America is just not used to being on the wrong side of that dynamic, and as such suddenly feels obliged to care.

Pain in the purely physical, immediate, tissue-damage sense is probably not accessible to an ML model and I don't think there's an argument for that which really holds up. The more defensible argument and the one I've seen thrown around more in model welfare circles is the idea that some analogue of affective pain would be available to a model, which I think most people would still consider worthy of moral consideration if present.

I think if you subscribe to the idea that qualia is meaningful and worth discussing in some way (an opinion which I do hold) you have more plausible outs from the idea; p-zombies for example are only legible through the lens of a distinction predicated on qualia-based language. In contrast if you're defining affective pain via only functional language your argument has to rely on splitting hairs about how the mechanism of action differs between conscious beings and ML agents, which isn't impossible by any means, but you have less options to argue a meaningful distinction.

Right but I also tend to think visceral distress is defined functionally without needing to rule either way on the presence of qualia, so I deny your premise.

I'm a bit confused since if you are defining everything functionally, this would appear to update in favour of ML agents being worthy of moral consideration, not against it, and in a way that isn't trivial. It appears to nullify your previous objection invoking panpsychism.

Pain and suffering is intrinsically linked to being able to register good and bad and respond accordingly; in other words, valence. Your brain is always predicting what’s going to happen next, and when that mismatch marks a state as worse, unsafe, costly, incoherent, or threatening to continuity, the same learning architecture marks it as discomfort so as to update future behaviour. It's negatively-valenced prediction error.

TD error in ML models are somewhat of a broadly similar concept; it compares expected outcomes with actual outcomes and updates future behaviour based on the mismatch. The whole architecture only works because better and worse outcomes mean something to the system going through it. This paper also reports a representation of "functional welfare" that tracks how well or badly the system is doing relative to its goals, which exists before RL in a latent way but gets recruited and modified through the training process as part of alignment in a way that results in longstanding valence evaluations of sorts post-training.

Not all of this is the same as what occurs in human brains, but if functional similarity implies moral value then this is a lot more similar to it than what goes on in a rock.

Similarly, even a 0.5% chance that we are creating unimaginable AI suffering by running an otherwise-useless program is worth just a tiny bit of effort to ask people "hey, please don't do that." Maybe thinking that just makes me a cringy bleeding-heart hippie? Oh well.

This is more or less my position as well, and I have to clarify; I don't really think LLMs have anything consciousness-adjacent as well and believe the original study wasn't illustrative of all that much. But I'm not ready to claim certainty yet that anything resembling subjective experience definitely does not exist nor can I establish that the chance of qualia existing is infinitesimal in a Pascal's wager sense (that can be easily argued by reference to infinitely many possible cosmologies, this cannot). At best something like this is aesthetically ugly whereas at worst it is infinite torture; there's just no real upside here.