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Culture War Roundup for the week of September 30, 2024

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I agree with pretty much all of this, though I’d add the autobiographical aside that my views on the death penalty have gone from strongly opposed on principle a decade or so ago to weakly opposed on procedure today. Extrapolating my direction of travel, I can see myself overcoming my procedural scruples in time.

That said, it’s quite puzzling to me from a rationality and decision-theoretic framework to incorporate these kinds of predicted value-shifts into your views. For example, imagine I anticipate becoming significantly wealthier next year, and I observe that previously when I’ve become wealthier my views on tax policy have become more libertarian. What’s the rational move here? Should I try to fight against this anticipated value shift? Should I begin incorporating it now? Should I say what will be will be, and just wait for it to happen? Should I actively try to avoid becoming wealthier because that will predictably compromise my values?

Related to some AI discussions around final vs instrumental goals, and under what circumstances it can be rational to consent to a policy that will shift one’s terminal values.

That said, it’s quite puzzling to me from a rationality and decision-theoretic framework to incorporate these kinds of predicted value-shifts into your views. For example, imagine I anticipate becoming significantly wealthier next year, and I observe that previously when I’ve become wealthier my views on tax policy have become more libertarian. What’s the rational move here? Should I try to fight against this anticipated value shift? Should I begin incorporating it now? Should I say what will be will be, and just wait for it to happen? Should I actively try to avoid becoming wealthier because that will predictably compromise my values?

Isn't this the problem that Rawls' Veil of Ignorance is designed to solve?

Given, that is normally offered to justify a socialist solution to problems. The Veil of Ignorance is offered to the rich man to say, imagine if you were poor, wouldn't you prefer a socialist system?

But there's nothing in the mechanics of the Veil of Ignorance that prevents it from being used the opposite way: imagine you were rich, would you dislike any of the redistributive policies you currently advocate for?

Given, it suffers from the flaw of many philosophical tools, in that it relies on "then think really hard about it" as the final step. But it's the clear solution to the value shifts: try to imagine a system of values that would appeal to you regardless of your position.

But there's nothing in the mechanics of the Veil of Ignorance that prevents it from being used the opposite way: imagine you were rich, would you dislike any of the redistributive policies you currently advocate for?

I don't at all agree with Rawls, but I think the point is that there are far fewer rich than poor.

But there's nothing in the mechanics of the Veil of Ignorance that prevents it from being used the opposite way: imagine you were rich, would you dislike any of the redistributive policies you currently advocate for?

There is, the mechanic is "would you hate being poor in a dog-eat-dog world more than you'd hate being taxed a lot as a rich man?".

@anon_

Sure, but that's just a percentage thing, easily disposed of. Rawls would tell you that some degree of redistribution is optimal, but it can still justify Capitalism on a "more goods produced" logic, and set the level of redistribution to maximize everyone's happiness. That's a logic that holds from behind a veil of ignorance. What one shouldn't do within Rawls' paradigm is undertake policies that are not overall utility-maximizing.

Nor is mere quantity of poor and rich people enough to make anything justifiable. Neutral between whether I am the one or the other, I can still feel that there is some level of "fans harassing famous person" that isn't morally correct, for example.

The kind of values shift I have in mind is one that is indifferent to one's position, i.e., not just filling in the variable according to one's position within it. For example, imagine you have a choice of three college courses you can take: one on libertarianism, one on Marxism, and one on library research. The first two are probably going to be more interesting, but you're also aware that they're taught by brilliant scholars of the relevant political persuasion, and you'll be acquainted with relevant rationally persuasive evidence in support of this position. Consequently, you know that if you take the libertarianism course, you'll come away more libertarian, if you take the Marxist course you'll come away more Marxist, and if you take the library research course you'll come away knowing more about libraries. Assuming the first two courses would indeed involve a values transition, under what circumstances might it be rational to undergo it?

If you really knew in advance that the courses contain rationally persuasive evidence for X, you should immediately believe X even without taking the courses based on your knowledge that the rationally persuasive evidence exists.

I doubt that you know that the courses contain rationally persuasive evidence for X. What you do know is that after taking such courses, you feel that you have been rationally persuaded. But being irrationally persuaded feels like being rationally persuaded.

On the off-chance you aren't aware of this already, a similar thought experiment is discussed in Parfit's "Reasons and Persons" and Korsgaard's "Self-Constitution".

I'm not sure it's ever rational to choose which values you will be inculcated in and then forget all about the choice. Ie if you take the course on Marxism, you should later realize that fact and keep it in mind when making value judgments.

Nor am I sure such a thing is entirely possible. I know I spent years of my life trying to shop for a religion that would inculcate values that I liked, only to realize that it was impossible to really believe in a religion learned under those circumstances.

That said, it’s quite puzzling to me from a rationality and decision-theoretic framework to incorporate these kinds of predicted value-shifts into your views.

I think it's the sign of a particularly self-aware mind. The spectrum would go like this:

  • Everyone believes what I believe.
  • Not everyone believes what I believe but they've always been wrong when they didn't.
  • I have been wrong before, but I was always right to believe what I believe (my mistakes are only bad luck, my reasoning and my information are flawless).
  • I have been wrong before, but I always had the correct position for the information I had (my reasoning is flawless but I can sometimes have incomplete or incorrect information).
  • I have been wrong before, sometimes due to my reasoning, but now I am right (my reasoning was flawed, but now it is flawless). <- Most people are here
  • I might be wrong. <- Most people who are not in the previous category are here
  • Considering past trends in my belief, I am probably wrong now. <- You are here

Personally I have always had a hard time pinning down my actual beliefs. I have the habit of being a devil's advocate in the extreme, defending positions whenever I see a hint that they might actually be defensible. So I would probably incorporate the anticipated value shift, even if I find myself on shakier ground to defend for now.

Considering past trends in my belief, I am probably wrong now. <- You are here

I'd go one step further. What he expressed is closer to

  • Most beliefs and values, including the ones I hold now and the ones I will hold in the future, are the end product of a process of ultimately self-serving rationalisation and mental gymnastics

I first saw this taxonomy on the perhaps slightly unfortunately named Hoe Math YouTube channel. Is that where you caught it too, or is it a more established framework?

No, that's just how I schematize it personally. Thanks for the link, though, that's a very interesting video!