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Pretty much, and this is the reminder to the American audience that many Europeans feel they are in a war context due to the nature (and the justifications) of the Russian war in Ukraine. One can disagree with it, but the European geopolitics is reflecting the sort of balances and compromises that come with significant geopolitical insecurity.
In a way, this is what the birth of a more strategically autonomous, multipolar Europe looks like. The Europeans are following in the footsteps of the American policy transition of the early cold war, when covert actions and interference rose as way to address concerning developments near home and further abroad.
Where are you getting this from? I never heard anyone say this, so while there might be some people believing it, I wouldn't call it "many". In any case canceling elections due to a "war context" without a formal declaration of war seems like shameless authoritarianism.
...from various European diplomatic and government reporting, many of which have been posted in The Motte over the years, as well as personal engagements?
I call it a war-context rather than simply war because while there are no direct European Union/NATO-member involvement in combat operations, it's not exactly hard to find acknowledgements of the contextual perceptions on views of the Ukraine War (explicitly noted as a reopening a war in Europe to change territorial borders) with demands for reshaping the European security order (with pre-war terms that would only be achieved by war), reasonings for why supporting Ukraine is important for more than moral reasons,, the Russian gas cutoff that accompanied (the fulfillment of long warned/disbelieved geopolitical hostage taking and an understood consequence of a war), Russian-associated sabotage efforts (of which there was just a naval vessel standoff in the Baltic), the perceived role and purpose of Russian information activities (to influence election results) and political-ally cultivation in European politics (including support for Russia-amiable leaders like Orban who then go on to develop their own more authoritarian shifts), beliefs that Russia has attempted direct coups of European community members (especially Moldova), the reasons why Trump's NATO non-support threats are so concerning (because the perceived need for NATO has overwritten nearly two decades of increasing NATO skepticism), and various others.
If you do not believe many Europeans view themselves in a major geopolitical conflict with Russia which includes stakes of state and governmental survival, we will have to disagree. If you think that this conflict is unfair to be described as a war-context despite much of it happening in the context of the Ukraine War, I am open to other terms. I would support some varient of 'Cold War,' but the cold war was a war context in many ways, so that would confudle the distinction.
I would still maintain the point that many Europeans do not share an American-centric perspective of Russia as a not-really-significant threat, and view the Ukraine conflict's greater context (as in, the context that led to the Ukraine conflict rather than Ukraine itself specifically) with far greater concern. This greater concern, in turn, drives decision making and value-compromising that would not occur in less concerning geopolitical contexts.
And I am not trying to dissuade you from that perception. Instead, I am trying to make a point that the lack of shame is driven due to the perception of necessity in geopolitical conflict.
'We are afraid of Russia' is not a mere figleaf excuse insincerely held to justify self-interest by people who are not afraid of Russia.
Geopolitical fears, in turn, drive the substitution of value/rule-prioritizing deontological ethics in decision makers with more utilitarian/consequentialist models, particularly due to increasing the dependence on institutions biased towards more consequentialist professional ethics (i.e. military and intelligence services) and partly because the raising of stakes can lead to belief that failure will see the losses of action occur regardless. (i.e. the cold war fear that letting a Communist foothold solidify would lead to a different authoritarian of worse geopolitical effects than your own supported strongman).
What we are seeing by and from the Europeans is sad, but very much consistent with shifts from when stakes are perceived to be low (and thus deontological consistency has lower costs) to a higher-stakes competition perception. We know that the EU leadership elite has a capacity to accept the elections of governments that they strongly dislike- see the Poland PIS and Orban- and we are now seeing differences in behavior that correspond in differences to attribution.
This is a perception difference that creates a gap with many Americans, who do not view the stakes of the Russia conflict as particularly high-stakes outside of nuclear escalation risk, which itself is a reason to de-prioritize the other elements of the conflict. Which, in turn, feeds into European leadership perception on the need to act for themselves, contributing to the cycle.
The consequence of fear-driven actions, however, is that much as it's hard to make someone understand that their paycheck depends on them not understanding, it's hard to find shame in people who believe what they are doing is necessary to avoid worse outcomes. Shame for these sort of things comes later, when the sense of urgency has faded (and often retroactive information consideration makes past dilemmas seem obvious), or from outside, by people who didn't share the context-perception in the first place.
Some Europeans, especially in Eastern Europe, are genuinely concerned by Russia. Others (including many politicians and newspaper writers I read) are blowhards who switch seamlessly between "Ukraine is losing, we must send missiles so they can resist" and "Ukraine is winning, we must send missiles so they can finish the job" depending on the latest reports. The idea that Russia is about to sweep Europe is ridiculous.
Personally, I think there is a pretty sizeable contingent of Europeans whose performative fear of Russia is driven by the usefulness of being able to suppress dissident parties and call local dissent 'Russian misinformation'. It may well be that they have convinced themselves, of course. But in my personal circle (UK) anti-Putin sentiment is driven far more by disgust than fear.
They most certainly do not.
We are now seeing increasingly bald authoritarianism due to their failures to destroy right-wing governments in more subtle fashion - financially and procedurally. Plus the looming threat of populism in their own countries driven by their absolute failure and arrogant incompetence.
I mean, in my personal bubble anti-Putin sentiment is driven by straight Russophobia of the they’re all Mongolian savages, non-western barbarians invading Europe type. I wouldn’t oversample too much.
Yeah, mine too, and it's pretty funny since we are a Slavic nation, one that might not compare favorably to Russia when it comes to civilizational accomplishment and so on.
A certain aspiring class in our countries seems to be possessed by a complex of lesser value, and would rather see their neighbors fail, even though to a German we may as well be the same. Like that scene in Borat.
Then again, probably all parties are guilty, don't doubt for a second that Russians are bad winners and arrogant. Slavs may be fine individually, but our group characters on average and in a political aggregate will never be able to overcome our history and circumstances like Scandinavians did, for example. Nobody is even interested in that.
You are Ukrainian?
No, Croatian
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Fortunately I did not making an argument premised on that idea, having mocked the premise myself in the past, nor do my characterizations depend on people subscribing to that idea.
Your personal circle is, notably, located on an island that chose to not self-identify so much with the European identity, and whose strategic perspective is arguably even more influenced by the Americans.
In fact, Brexit helped contribute to the current norms of Russia thinking in Europe by taking out a counter-point against it. Rather than Continental Atlanticism, where the purpose of US-European ties is the security climate in Europe, the UK-American strategic culture has always been more globalistic view that prioritized further off areas of interest (Asia, the Middle East) far more than many continentals, and as such also discounted various concerns on Russia. With Brexit, a significant globalist perspective that would have countered Russian-centric thinking left the European elite community, and took with its the values and norms its leaders might have contributed (such as a stronger British political tradition of adherence to democratic practices at governing-party expense).
They most certainly do, because they did.
They disliked them, they tried to restrain them in various ways, they will be happy to see Orban go, but even the EU was able to acknowledge free elections it disliked.
What has changed is not that values has changed, or even the key actors in many cases, but the geopolitial contexts within which those values and actors operate.
If you think I am making any sort of moral defense on the ethical quality of the Europeans, don't. Most people are values-first deontologist until they are in a context where consequences encourage otherwise, and that is not a compliment.
I wasn’t intending to make a personal comment, I hope it didn’t come off that way. I have a deep contempt and loathing for the Powers That Be in our current age, and it shows.
I do seriously think people who should know better are subscribing to this belief, however.
In all sincerity, I appreciate the sentiment.
For a given value of ‘acknowledge’. If my colleague is promoted over me and I dedicate myself to getting them fired, I don’t think that counts as genuine ‘acknowledgement’ of the situation. It is merely a recognition that the cost-benefit ratio of publicly disputing it is bad.
I do not think the EU ever had any intention of acknowledging these elections as genuinely legitimate, it merely thought it could do to Orban what it did to the Greek radicals previously, and failed.
My model of European establishment behaviour is that its increasingly open authoritarianism has less to do with fear of Russia, which I don’t think is a genuine concern outside Eastern Europe, and more to do with the escalating failure of institutional soft power to squash emergent challengers. Even in Romania (unlike Poland, say), I don’t think that these judges are operating out of terror of a Putin invasion but out of hatred and contempt for their rivals, and a desire to show that Romania is no longer That Sort Of Country.
I appreciate the clarification (and would have not assumed worse than a hasty generalization), and can concur with your thought.
I think there is an opposite end of the spectrum, people who dismiss real threats because they don't take them seriously enough, but that's a separate thing and also not intended to characterize you or your view.
You are welcome, then, and I hope you have a good day.
I don't categorically disagree with your model in and of itself, but would point out that EU institutional soft power has been a target of Russia for well over a decade.
People forget it now due to the time-distance and the propaganda at the time, but even Ukraine wasn't about the Americans and NATO as much as the EU. Euromaidan initiated over the EU association agreement, not NATO, and the pre-Ukraine invasion demands weren't simply at the expense of NATO, but at the expense of EU institutions (including revaunchist claims that would target non-NATO EU members). I made a post a few years ago noting how the early Russia-Ukraine conflict was in some respects a Russia-German conflict, as Germany was a major driver in eastern European expansion of the EU and Germany pursued an international-media-influence strategy that set the groundwork for a lot of the pro-EU movements in eastern europe like Euromaidan. Russia's influence efforts follow a generally consistent divide model, and while the highest priority is the most obvious (Americans from Europeans), the EU itself is a not-at-all rare secondary (nations from the EU).
So if you wanted to say that the EU is more to blame for its failures than Russia, I'd be inclined to agree, but Russia is trying to make it fail, and for reasons that make otherwise acceptable things more problematic. It's fine, for example, if you can't find what you lost in your own house because you are disorganized, but it's another if you know there's a would-be-thief who is trying to steal.
If there's one part of your model I'd raise as questionable, it's Germany. Specifically where I suspect your model would run into issues on the categorical divide of what is / is not considered 'Eastern Europe.'
Merkel's dominance of German politics for a decade and a half created an impression of a German consensus that wasn't really so, particularly since it was sold on assumptions of Russian behavior (Russia is a reliable economic partner, Russia would never try to blackmail us) that were publicly demonstrated in the lead-up to the Ukraine War, where Russia deliberately caused gas shortages in Germany, publicly boasted about the expectations of freezing Germans, and generally attempted economic blackmail that, while resisted, has led to the major macroeconomic consequences to the Germans both as a matter of adapting (the considerable cost of gas-import infrastructure) but the second-order effects of rebalancing (significant sectors of the German economy no longer being cost-competitive without Russian gas that was kept as cheap as it was to build such dependencies).
While there is a lot of viewpoint diversity in a country of nearly 85 million people, the Ukraine War brought a significant and justified fear of Russian intent and interests to the German viewpoint. It wasn't just that the Eastern Europeans got to say 'I told you so,' it was that the Russians deliberately took a swing at the national economic foundation of the German society, demonstrated Germany's inability to functionally defend itself or others, and did so with an invasion that is figuratively next door. (It is only about a 16 hour drive from Berlin to Kyiv.) This is not just a strategic shock, but even a culture-shock.
Not only does this matter in the sense of Germany itself as the divider between East and West Europe, but Germany's institutional influence on the EU means that whatever Germany cares about, the EU will be more concerned about. Especially if France is also concerned... but here we get to the point that while France was not the leader of pro-Ukrainian support by any means, pro-French states in Africa were where Russia was able to make its most demonstrative retaliatory gains, meaning that the German-French motor of the EU was even more in alignment of Russia, creating its own feedback loops.
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