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It absolutely is not trivially true, in fact it is trivial to prove the opposite. People in Donetsk and Luhansk and Crimea welcomed their Moscow liberators in 2014 and ended up being conscripted as cannon fodder for Moscow's new war with Ukraine in 2022. If Ukraine welcomed their liberators in 2022 then who knows, maybe Ukrainians would end up in meat wave assaults against Poland or Baltics in 2025.
Recently there was an article in Czech media loosely titled Russian Border Ends Where it Recieves a Beating. There is large grain of truth in that, not only for Russia but also for other expansive empires.
Where did this bizarre term come from and why are people using it?
Maybe it's a combination of the terms "human wave" and "meat grinder", which both have been used to describe Russia's tactics in the current war.
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This has been a popular talking point in media, but it appears to be based on exactly nothing. There is nothing anywhere within Russian rhetoric to suggest that they have the slightest interest in Poland. Even the archetype of launching a surprise attack on Poland, Hitler, spent years talking about the Danzig issue before invading. While it was a surprise attack, Germany's motivation was not a surprise. Russian would need to not only launch a surprise attack, but would need a surprise motivation. Likewise, Russia's invasion of Ukraine did not have a "surprise motivation," but rather a motivation that was well-known and is consistent with Russian thought. The same would not be true of a hypothetical Poland invasion.
If you are such an expert, you know about SuwaĆki Gap. Russia could invade Poland using Ukrainian stormtrooperzz in order to protect the 40 miles gap while simultaneously marching into Baltics thus connnecting enclave of Kaliningrad Oblast with motherland, achieving its strategic goals. Exactly the reasoning why they invaded Ukraine to protect Crimea.
And what would be the response from NATO? Article 5 is weak,
So yeah, in alternative universe Russia gets Ukraine, invades Poland and Baltics in 2025 in order to protect Russian minority from ânazisâ, and makes it fait accompli - just like with Mariupol in Donetsk Oblast and Zaporizhzhia oblast and Kherson oblast, that Russia already officially annexed. Germans would send helmets to Poland and US agonizes if sending Himars can cause WW3. Was not NATO expansion in 2002 grave mistake provoking Russians anyways? Nobody has to do anything.
Per Wikipedia, Mariupol was conquered by Russia in May 2022, months after the Putins special operation had been begun.
For NATO to be effective, it does not have to be 100% committed to starting WW3 over a few square miles. Instead, following the method EY outlines in planecrash, it would be sufficient to escalate with a probability which is high enough to make the expected value of the defection of your opponent negative. Even a low but finite probability of responding in a way which will eventually lead to nuclear escalation will be enough to outweigh the gain of a bit of territory.
I think that NATO reactions to an invocation of Article 5 would be quite different from Western reactions to the invasion of Ukraine for game theory reasons.
If a slice of Poland gets invaded, and the rest of NATO is like 'well, they have already ceded so much territory to Russia in '45, surely they can spare another 50 square kilometers', then NATO as a defensive pact is dead. There can be some discussion if present day Russia is a credible threat in the same way that the USSR at the height of the cold war was, but if it was, then the options would be simple. Either your soldiers now fight Russia in your neighbors territory, or they fight them in a year in your own country, or they end up fighting someone else for Russia in two years. So the least-bad option would be to support your allies in a conventional war.
Of course, there have been precious few large-scale conflicts between nuclear powers, so the likelihood of such conflicts staying conventional for long is unknown. But both sides would have an interest to cause attrition to their enemies nuclear capabilities, and at some point someone might decide that faced with the choice between losing the retaliatory capabilities of a missile sub or silo or escalating to a nuclear conflict, it is not in their interest to defer nuclear escalation any longer.
What do you even know about the conflict? Are you not aware of siege of Mariupol, one of the most hard fought battles in the war?
Exactly. Why even risk invoking article 5? Donât you think?
Originally, you used the term
with reference to Mariupol.
From my understanding, that term can be phrased as "done deal" and generally refers to a party accomplishing their objective before their opponent has time to react. A central case would be Crimea: from my understanding, it was occupied before Ukraine was even aware that it was under attack and could deploy military units. Rather than reinforcing their battling troops, they would have had to mount a completely new counterattack.
A city under siege is the opposite of a done deal. Attacking besiegers to break the siege goes all the way back to the dawn of warfare. If you besiege a NATO city for a few months, NATO will be under a lot more pressure to act than if you manage to take it overnight and cease hostilities.
I used the term fait accompli in relation to Russian invasion of Poland and Baltics. If Russians invaded SuwaĆki Gap, preventing NATO to supply Baltics, then they could march into Estonia/Latvia/Lithuania in hours or days. Once established there, it would be fait accompli. What would remain is for US/Polish/German/Spanish and other NATO troops to spill blood in house-to-house urban/trench fight to liberate their former NATO allies from the south. I can already see how enthusiastic the coalition would be in that case.
Also Mariupol was a done deal. It was surrounded in 2 days after invasion, the rest was mopping up operation without anybody able to do anything about it, with Russian tanks in suburbs of Kyiv.
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You are saying that Russians do not consider Poland to be within the rightful Russian sphere of influence?
I think it barely matters. Even if article five isnât invoked for some inexplicable reason, the resemblance to the interwar years is mostly superficial.
Thereâs a key difference; Poland would absolutely fucking shred a Russian invasion on a military level. Russia since the war began wasnât even guaranteed on any given day to be the most powerful military in Ukraine.
Polandâs military spending and might is nowhere near the disparity that existed in the 30s when the Soviet Union was an emerging superpower.
If anything this war has revealed that the Russian military is a paper tiger riddled with incompetence and corruption. Theyâre laughable compared to the past, and demographics get worse for them each passing day.
They really are a third rate power at this point. If Ukraine, one of the poorest and most corrupt European nations, is giving them trouble even this deep into the third continuation war, then they donât have a ghost of a chance at winning a war against Poland, or the Baltics, or Finland.
Iâm very sympathetic to the DR in general but the Russia cope is absolutely bonkers, almost a perfect mirror image of the twitchy-eyed Ukraine boosters. That country is completely pozzed on almost every level.
It's funny how differently people see this war! I look at it and see the opposite- even with every single US-aligned nation around the world is sending Ukraine all the weapons they can spare, Ukraine is still steadily losing this war.
They've drafted basically every man they could find, sparing only the ones necessary to work the farms and keep their economy running, with patrols on the border stopping any man from leaving (but women are fleeing the country). Meanwhile, Russia has still not needed to send in the conscripts who make up the bulk of its army- it's still able to coast on just volunteers, prisoners, and foreign mercenaries, so the average Russian citizen isn't affected.
We laughed at how mighty the western GDP was- turns out GDP does not magically turn into real weapons. Instead, Russia and its allies continue to massively outproduce all the rest of us in artillery, which is what counts the most. The US makes something like 25,000 a month while Russia makes 250,000. Instead, Ukraine has to rely on what they can scavange from old Soviet nations- the big news lately was that Armenia has agreed to send them some stuff. Armenia, the arsenal of democracy! (meanwhile, North Korea is sending literally millions of shells to Russia)
We boasted about our high-tech superweapons that would make the old Soviet stuff look like a joke. It turns out that GPD-guided munitions are easy to electronically jam, long-range missiles are too expensive and few, and the wiz-bang F35 that's supposed to do everything is too precious to be risked in Ukraine. Instead, the most practical weapon seems to be cheap, simple drones manufactured in Iran.
It's not a quick, flashy war of maneuver, sure. It's a slow, grinding, war of attrition. But they're winning. It boggles my mind that people still seem to think that Ukraine is doing great and will be marching into Moscow any day now. We need to see the reality and adapt- either cut a deal that gifts Russia the donbass region, or massively increase the amount of aid going to Ukraine, and restructure the current arms industry to be suited for a serious war.
Tangent, but â it's not merely a question of production; the war has also revealed that Russian technology is able to adequately counter ours (usually, it seems, after an adjustment period). For instance, the Russians shot down our in-service anti-radiation missiles! That was perhaps predictable before the war, but I still think it's a BIG DEAL because US/NATO air superiority doctrine is premised around being able to destroy enemy SAM launchers with (among other weapons) anti-radiation missiles, and the Ruskies just...shot them down with the air defenses they were supposed to be targeting. And that's just one example of their ability to adopt to our drip-feeding them our most modern (surface) weapons systems at an inoculatory rate.
This really gets my goat since in a real no-holds-barred war with NATO where the first two weeks might be determinate, if it takes the Russians two weeks to adjust to our tactics, their ability to adjust eventually is no big deal. But if we give them that month to adjust now, they'll be better prepared if there's ACTUALLY a confrontation with NATO. And presumably so will Iran and China. (The one upside is that this knife cuts both ways; the West has a much better picture of Russian capabilities now.)
If you see the war as a way to manipulate NATO countries to US interests by ensuring they are weak and dependent on US military aid so that they do not develop their own, independent military and the foreign policy that is downstream from that, 'we' (the US) absolutely don't need to do either of these things. Letting Ukraine bleed dry and letting Putin station a massive, battle-hardened army rebuilt with modern technology on the Polish border is, from a certain point of view, a massive win for US foreign policy.
Whether or not that's actually the US goal here I obviously can't say but I can't help but notice that everything 'we' (the US) has done seems to be nudging things in that direction.
Nah, I don't believe that either side was that smart. The Russians thought they could drive into Kiev in a matter of weeks (which seemed to be what Western analysts also thought at the start of the war). Then Ukraine proved a lot more resolute than anyone expected. So then the US alliance showed up with hundreds of billions worth of high-tech military gear, and everyone thought that would be the end of the war as "orcs" led "human wave assaults" against our most expensive weapon systems. Turns out that didn't work so well either, like you said- they were able to find ways to, eventually, find ways to adapt and counter our weapons. So now we're stuck in this meatgrinder that no one ever wanted or expected, but it's a sunk cost and both sides still want to win.
On the one hand, I'm inclined to believe you! Everyone overestimates government competence.
On the other hand, here's some excerpts from a 2019 RAND report:
Obviously RAND hedges their bets here, and I don't mean to claim that they were clairvoyant, or anything. But while Western analysts underestimated Ukrainian resolve, RAND was able to correctly point out the very serious downsides to sending Ukraine more weapons well before the escalation of the conflict. And then...we sent them more weapons...and the war escalated exactly as RAND predicted it could.
Now, supposing that you are a member of the US diplomatic-security apparatus that is concerned about Russian strength (and, let's say, sharing the common belief that Ukraine will not stand up to Russian might), but also nursing the unspoken (but very defensible) belief that a united Europe with an independent foreign policy is more of a threat to the United States over the long term than Russia will ever be. Just going off of this report, all of the things that RAND outlines as "risks" might look to you like "benefits," since you suspect that Russia invading and annexing more of Ukraine will "spook" Europe and increase diplomatic pressure on Germany to stop placing nice with Russia. Now increasing military aid looks like a win-win: you either weaken Russia or you spook Europe and with any luck you manage to thread the needle and do both by making the Russians look boorish and violent without them actually committing. And, as a strategist, an option where the worst plausible scenario has hidden benefits is a good option.
Things, in this postulation, DON'T go to plan: you're not omni-competent, the needle isn't threaded, Putin actually invades instead of just suffering from the weapons you've been shipping to Ukraine. How do you spin that situation?
I think what we've seen out of DC is consonant with that â pressuring Europe to give away their arsenal to Ukraine and buy American-made weapons systems instead.
Now, to your point, I don't even know that it requires the level of conscious thought I've put into it, just a sort of self-advantage-maximalizing sensibility, to get the most for the least. Maybe there's no grand strategy, just a sort of shrewd subconscious impulse. But I do find it very interesting that the "US diplomatic and military failure" DOES seem to have turned out in a way to have maximized US leverage over Europe and weakened them considerably. We replaced reliance on Russia for natural gas with reliance on the United States. We persuaded our NATO allies to give away, what, 500 tanks (many in service) while we have a few thousand Abrams in storage, of which we sent...1% (31). (Incidentally, I believe the reason given for not using more Abrams was that the logistics tail was too long. And while I do believe the logistics tail would be long, if we take this at face value it seems to suggest that we wouldn't be able to support Abrams in Europe during a conflict with Russia, which seems...problematic if true!)
So while I'm very uncertain as to how much of what has developed was planned, and I definitely agree that neither side was smart enough to correctly foresee the exact twists and turns of all these events, the extent to which it's undercut Europe to the benefit of the US is worth asking questions about, I think, but I rarely see it discussed.
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Youâve missed my point entirely and in a hilarious way sort of made my point about the discourse surrounding Russia for me.
I never said Ukraine was winning, I never even implied it. I was really talking about the supposed other targets of Russia; Poland & The Baltics. I have no doubt that Russia could win this war given enough time and bloodshed, time and numbers are on their side.
The crux of my point was that Ukraine was an embarrassingly easy target and Russia still canât manage it without enormous difficulty. They might win, they might not. If I had to bet money Iâd bet money on Russia winning.
I have basically no dog in this fight but seeing Russia get its nose bloodied by Ukraine is like seeing a tatted up security guard getting their teeth knocked out by a 90lb twink; Turns out the muscleman was hopped up on bullshido and an inflated ego. Even with material support from the west, the arc of the war reveals a lot about the state capacity; all it took was a couple thousand mercenaries to turn around to legitimately threaten the regime. Youâd expect that from some tinpot African authoritarian regime, but it was shocking to see that happen in Russia.
All your points on the desiccation of the western arms capability I fully agree with. But that has precedent; nothing reveals what technology is cost effective and practical like field testing in combat. And military spending in Poland and the Baltics are ramping up and have been for a while. Russiaâs military capability or lack thereof has been largely revealed, and countries other than the USA and its satrapies and Russia have agency as well.
I think Russia winning the war might not actually improve the Russian position all that much. Itâs not cope, I couldnât give a fuck about the GAE. But every other country on Russiaâs border are hardening against them, both politically and militarily. Aside from maybe Moldova, there are no easy targets left. Every other country that Russia wants to fuck with is much more dangerous than Ukraine.
Ukraine is not Liechtenstein! It is not Monaco! They have an army of 1.2 million men and women. When you figure in the aid they have something like a two trillion dollar military budget. They have a territorial area thatâs equivalent to France and Germany combined, giving them significant ability to use defense in depth. They have been fighting Russia since 2014, which has given them a significant amount of combat experience that most NATO countries do not have. And those years allowed them to build up a fearsome network of fortifications and bunker systems all along the DPR/LPR border. Thereâs a reason they got picked to be the buffer state over Poland, and itâs not because theyâre an easy nut to crack. To assume that Ukraine is the âeasy modeâ before having to take on the NATO final boss is foolishness.
Is it? Russia is almost five times the population of Ukraine and militarily supposedly one of the mightiest nations on earth. Russia is noticeably richer and more advanced than Ukraine, and incredibly itâs less corrupt which is absolutely wild.
Lots of smart people thought the Russians would crush Ukraine in a matter of weeks, itâs incredibly impressive on Ukraineâs part that they didnât. And equally embarrassing for Russia.
Ukraine is largely flat and featureless. Afghanistan it is not. Yes itâs a buffer state but historically buffer states come in many flavors; Ukraineâs particular brew is the easily traversed crossroads type.
A lot has happened between now and then of course, but this whole excercise is, on my end, indicative of the relative weakness of Russia.
Poland, even without NATO protection, is obviously a huge problem for Russia. This whole thread stated with me basically saying that the idea of Russia throwing its weight against Poland is absurd, so Iâll spell it out.
Poland is roughly the same population as Ukraine, with tougher and more diverse terrain, and has had greatly heightened peace-time military spending for years. Itâs much richer, more advanced, less riddled by corruption, more homogeneous, and has a much higher state capacity.
And thereâs no reason to believe that the ramp up that Poland could achieve would be any less spectacular than Ukraineâs. In fact there seems to be sufficient evidence for the opposite conclusion.
While Russia is clearly not on the ropes and it appears to me that theyâre winning, it also appears clear that their regime is pretty brittle and couldnât sustain the heightened war state to even look seriously at directly messing with Poland or the Baltic countries, or even Finland.
Even in its current fake and gay state, NATO would absolutely eat Russia alive. I canât believe this is even remotely controversial to stay.
I feel like this is a case where you just have to keep an open mind and be willing to update your views. The smart people who thought that were wrong, on both counts. Russia badly botched it's attempt at a fast, combined arms inivasion, yes. But Ukraine also hung on with much more tenacity and organization than anyone expected, and that counts for a lot. And now they've had 2 years worth of western aid and training, in a fairly large country that is all-out mobilized for war. At this point, like @ABigGuy4U said, Ukraine is not a soft target, and yet Russia continues to advance.
Now, if there were some hypothetical future war between all of NATO and Russia then, sure, Nato wins easy. Except that would never happen, because of nuclear weapons. I also don't see any particular reason why Russia would want to start such a war- there's no area of Poland that's like the Donbass, which has lots of ethnic Russians and a direct land connection to Crimea.
Only the ones in Europe. They're closer than ever now to China, North Korea, and Iran. Not sure about the former Soviet states in central Asia but I don't think there's any real tension there, either.
That said, I agree with your initial point that Russia isn't particularly a threat to Poland, even on its own. So I guess I'm cautiously arguing in favor of a peace deal where Russia gets to keep the Donbass, the other European countries stay vigilent and increase defense, and hopefully there's no more war after that.
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Pre-war, I assumed this would be true because of the EXTREMELY mediocre showing of Ukraine during the Russian invasion of Crimea. But (pretty obviously) the Ukrainians did a lot of work between then and the second Russian invasion.
And if you set aside the question of Ukrainian morale, I don't think they are an embarrassingly easy target at all, on paper. They had a very large inherited ground army, and a large population pool. They're more on the level of Poland, not a softer target (say) Estonia or Latvia or even a medium-hard target like Finland. It's true from what I can tell that their weapon modernization was fairly meh and that their air force in particular was probably lackluster (but see also Poland, which is still flying Su-17s!) but the fundamentals (lots of tanks, artillery, warm bodies) go a long way with proper morale. I think that, e.g. non-US NATO would have struggled to invade Ukraine the same way Russia did.
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While they lowered their top draft age recently to 25, the fact that 18-25-year-olds are still not getting drafted should by itself prove that Ukraine is, in fact, not drafting (even "basically") every man they can find.
Man come on, at least read the full sentence:
Ukraine is a low-tech economy and needs its young men to work the farms and mines. They're not being given a vacation. They're part of the war effort just as much as if they were fighting on the front lines.
Seems very unlikely that all the young men are still just in the farms and the mines, considering that the universities are still running and so on.
Of course not literally all of them, they can Always search harder and find a few. Even Russiain ww2 didnt conscript "all" their men. Like a tube of toothpaste, they can always squeeze harder and find a few more. But after so many rounds of drafting, it's become a political problem: https://archive.is/6TSk4
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As far as I can tell, observations so far are inconsistent with that model of reality. Why did Russia not attempt to absorb (at least some part of) Georgia when it was lying flat and defeated in 2008, and could have been easily cut off any prospective allied supplies? Why did they wait until 2022 to attack the rest of Ukraine, giving them time to sort out their political turmoil and overhaul their army? There is little there to suggest that they have the cupidity or ambition to pay the blood toll to make their geopolitical situation better; even the war we are seeing now only suggests that they are paying just barely enough to not let it become much worse (as starting a war only to lose it would inevitably do), that is, they are driven by fear/desperation. (No mobilization, no assassination of leadership, barely even any escalation apart from the power plant bombing that they only did briefly during their "darkest hour")
The leadership of the Baltics asserting that they are afraid of being attacked by Russia is not even a signal of them actually believing this (let alone of it actually being likely), because it would be advantageous for them to claim that and fan the Ukraine war even if they were privately assured that it would never happen. Before 2022 the general dynamics of EU politics was such that the smaller countries of the Eastern periphery were constantly being shoved around by Germany on account of its economic might, which as we now have found out was hanging by the thread of cheap Russian hydrocarbons. Being Ukraine's main supporters and playing up the threat to themselves put them at the top of the list for receiving American military aid (or at least newer gear from countries further west in "ring exchange" schemes). It also no doubt plays well with their populations, many of whom still embrace revenge fantasies against Russia for 45 years of communism (not to mention the leaders themselves, who often are old men who were already politics-adjacent back then and thus personally faced the business end of the red boot).
Because Russia continues to believe that maintaining Abkhazia and South Ossetia as "independent" (without actually recognizing them) offers it influence on Georgian internal politics. If it stopped believing that it is very likely that it would first recognize them and then graciously allow their entry to Russian Federation, at least for South Ossetia, the same way as with DPR and LPR.
Russian tanks were in Gori, 25km from the capital, for several days, and if I remember correctly the Georgian resistance was reduced to the level of shootouts with civilian police units. There's little doubt that they could have pushed into the capital and simply installed a puppet government for a tiny fraction of the losses they have taken in Ukraine, which would have allowed them far more influence on Georgian internal politics, if they were actually interested in conquest/expansion beyond not losing what they already had (Abkhazia and South Ossetia).
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You have interesting observations, but I think they are far from trivial. A lot of arguments from incredulity and building up some intricate narratives about which country really thinks what.
While on my side I have facts: Russia annexed Crimea and Luhansk and Donetsk. And they definitely are using LDR and DPR troops as cannon fodder in their latest war, so in fact welcoming Russians did not bring them peace.
Nah, those reconstituted forces are mostly filled with contract soldiers from Russia now. By summer of 2022, they had been destroyed and the cannon fodder spent. The DPR itself announced over 50% casualties in 2022, after they'd already conscripted almost (3/4) every male 18-65. They literally closed down mines and factories, conscripting their entire workforces. 2 years after, no one is left.
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They are mostly facts (except for the "cannon fodder" part, which by its standard definition also imputes a particular speculative motivation), but I don't understand how these facts are evidence either against the point you were addressing originally (that if all of Ukraine had capitulated immediately, they would have had peace) or the additional hypotheses that you added (which are no less of an intricate narrative) that Russia would have assaulted Poland or the Baltics because they supposedly really think that they can expand their borders up to the point where they receive a beating. That Georgia essentially capitulated to Russian demands, was not annexed even though an annexation would have been well within Russian capabilities, and is now at peace, and no Abkhazians or South Ossetians are being sent to fight against Georgia, is also a fact.
I am honestly a bit baffled by the reasoning in your post. Abstracting over the identities of the participants, it seems to amount to something like: A is fighting against B and C over something, and tells B and C that if they just stop resisting, they will no longer have to fight. B joins A, so now it's A and B against C. You come along and observe that B is still fighting (with A against C). Therefore, you conclude that A's initial claim that if B and C both capitulated there would be no fight is false. After all, B capitulated and is still fighting, and perhaps even if C capitulated D would have come along and have had a fight against A, B and C together.
Sure, let me help. This was my original post as a response to quoted part. What are you baffled about exactly?
It absolutely is not trivially true, in fact it is trivial to prove the opposite. People in Donetsk and Luhansk and Crimea welcomed their Moscow liberators in 2014 and ended up being conscripted as cannon fodder for Moscow's new war with Ukraine in 2022.
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So Russia has recent history of using conquered peoples to wage future expansionist wars. What is the bafflement again?
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