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Culture War Roundup for the week of April 22, 2024

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Or that the conduct is different if different people are doing it?

I challenge any gay man to have sex with his husband by inserting his penis into his husband's vagina.

More seriously, I've never read Lawrence, and don't particularly feel like subjecting my eyes or brain to tortured legal reasoning at the moment. Is it written in a way that would allow a state to criminalize anal sex in general without regard to the sex of the persons?

The law in question for Lawrence specifically only applied to homosexual sodomy.

But approximately nobody wants to ban the penis-in-vagina conduct, and generally nature conspired to make the straight option the one that has the most unique options available. To get a purely conduct-based rule that prevents same-sex activity, you'd have to write something tortured like "you must not let two penises come in contact", and this would not only give lawmakers the vapours just having to put these words to paper but would also only capture some subset of same-sex activity (and the state would struggle to dispute a claim by a gay couple that they fastidiously avoided that particular act).

Maybe you could criminalise all sexual conduct that is also possible for same-sex couples; good luck with convincing a majority to make that sacrifice just to get at those pesky gays at last, or else to convince the higher courts that any selective enforcement is purely accidental.

Maybe you could criminalise all sexual conduct that is also possible for same-sex couples

I believe the sodomy laws common until 2003 actually did this. It was hypothetically just as illegal for a man to get his dick sucked by his wife as by another man.

But then those laws were almost never enforced against openly gay men and truly never enforced against straight couples using their mouths or butts.

No tortured constructs needed, just prohibit penile stimulation of prostate.

There's a lot of hilarious edge cases that proposal invokes -- could a gay man defend his partner's honour by claiming he just sucked at topping, missed the button every time? Was too short, just let the tip in? The Texas law in question prohibited stimulation with a sex toy (by a same-sex partner), but I've never seen evidence it was enforced; are we just giving up on that here? What happens with a penis sheathe? Strap-on over chastity cage (50+ images on e621)?

There's a lot of hilarious edge cases that proposal invokes

"Constructive Possession" should create lots of hilarious edge cases as well. They become less hilarious when the government simply deploys a YesChad.jpg.

To be clear, this is not an endorsement, but rather an attempt to highlight the fact that the "struggle" inherent in law enforcement is not an innate feature of law enforcement, but rather a choice the enforcers are making. The truth value of the statement "This would be impractical to enforce" often smuggles in a number of assumptions about the nature of enforcement.

Yeah, that's absolutely fair, and 'constructive possession' is in many ways just the tip of the iceberg, as bad as the shoestring machine is. Stuff like autokeycard, the various recent regulatory changes, Abramski, so on, very much show the limits of textual formalism as a control protecting the actually disfavored, even to the point of blocking defendants from raising the text.

For the first type of edge cases, the same thing as sucking at marksmanship or having an insufficient weapon to penetrate the target. For the second type, are you arguing that piv sex in condom is not piv sex?

eta: chastity cages should be outlawed separately, for the reasons of their misandristic nature.

For the first type of edge cases, the same thing as sucking at marksmanship or having an insufficient weapon to penetrate the target.

Charging someone with attempting sodomy, if we're taking the metaphor that direction, kinda just makes it funnier.

For the second type, are you arguing that piv sex in condom is not piv sex?

Dunno. There are sheathes that are like condoms in being full-enclosed (still not rated or tested as contraceptives, though I'd expect that regulatory reasons drive that more than practical ones), but most of them range from an eight-inch to more than a quarter-inch of silicone all around. Their point is to alter texture, appearance, and/or girth/length, but especially since some are dual-use as dildos or even intended for women or trans men to wear, the line between stimulating the prostate with a sex toy and stimulating it with the top's dick isn't very clear.

At least to my intuitions, a condom is very much the same underlying sex act, but there's a point where a gal wearing the same sex toy can hit the same button that makes it a lot harder to call the penis doing the stimulation. But my intuitions aren't anywhere near yours.

Again, how would the state prove that this happened, against a claim by a gay couple that they didn't do that? My understanding is that anal penetration as the sine qua non of gay sex is largely a product of the imagination of homophobes in a narrow sense, as it lives at some sweet spot of triggering their disgust reflex and being easy to describe.

and the state would struggle to dispute a claim by a gay couple that they fastidiously avoided that particular act

Are you familiar with the gun-law term "constructive possession"?

The "struggle" involved in proving a crime exists because the authorities in question want it to be a struggle. if they decide they don't feel like struggling any more, they can simply remove the struggle and go straight to enforcement.

Texas' law was somewhat unusual in that it had originally had prohibited heterosexual sodomy, but had been revamped, possibly by accident, such that only same-sex sodomy was actually punishable. Anal sex, among other things, was defined as "deviate sexual intercourse" regardless of who did it with whom, but it was only an offense if done with "another individual of the same sex".

((It also restricted homosexual oral sex, and possibly using a dildo or a sounding rod on someone else, though I've not seen any evidence of it actually being used in this way.))

And O'Connor's concurrence pushed on this hard: she held that it mattered that the state was expressed moral disapproval not of an act, but of an act being done by a group:

This case raises a different issue than Bowers: whether, under the Equal Protection Clause, moral disapproval is a legitimate state interest to justify by itself a statute that bans homosexual sodomy, but not heterosexual sodomy. It is not. Moral disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause. See, e. g., Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S., at 534; Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S., at 634-635. Indeed, we have never held that moral disapproval, without any other asserted state interest, is a sufficient rationale under the Equal Protection Clause to justify a law that discriminates among groups of persons.

(emphasis added)

But only O'Connor signed onto that concurrence, which even at the time came across as a nitpick. The majority opinion, which received five votes but not O'Connors, didn't rest on it being a status-based offense, in no small part because the courts were still trying avoid committing to treating homosexuality as a special status, with even status-based SCOTUS matters like Romer hiding behind rational basis. Lawrence argued certain types of 'intimate contact' outside the scope of the general police power, so it invalidated not just bans on (consensual private non-commercial adult) sodomy, but also a wide variety of other private behaviors.

The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.

This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by the State, or a court, to define the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects. It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.

In theory. Like a lot of that era of SCOTUS jurisprudence, there's a decent chance that these lofty principles get smothered under balancing tests. It's not clear how this applies to situations like extreme BDSM; so far, the only relevant cases have generally alleged consent violations, sometimes pretty credibly. But where courts have had cause to evaluate restrictions under the assumption they would be applied in a consenting framework, they often do so by reframing Lawrence post-hoc, generally by promoting the O'Connor concurrence:

Under the Lawrence methodology, history and tradition continue to inform the analysis. See id. at 2598 (“History and tradition guide and discipline [the implied fundamental liberty interests] inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries.”). Yet, courts must consider not only the history and tradition of freedom to engage in certain conduct, but also any history and tradition of impermissible animus that motivates the legislative restriction on the freedom in order to weigh with appropriate rigor whether the government's interest in limiting some liberty is a justifiable use of state power or an arbitrary abuse of that power. In this respect, the conclusion reached here under the Glucksberg line of reasoning that there is no deeply rooted history or tradition of BDSM sexual activity remains relevant and important to the analysis. Also relevant and important to the analysis is the absence of a history of impermissible animus as the basis for the restriction at issue here. Sexual activity that involves binding and gagging or the use of physical force such as spanking or choking poses certain inherent risks to personal safety not present in more traditional types of sexual activity. Thus, as in Cruzan and Glucksberg, a legislative restriction on BDSM activity is justifiable by reference to the state's interest in the protection of vulnerable persons, i.e. sexual partners placed in situations with an elevated risk of physical harm. Accordingly, consistent with the logic of Lawrence, plaintiff has no constitutionally protected and judicially enforceable fundamental liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to engage in BDSM sexual activity.

((Probably not helped by the guy in that case probably being a douchebag.))

Technically no, but that's because the logic of Lawrence would extend Griswold and similar right-to-privacy cases to prevent the state from criminalizing sodomy between consenting adults of either the same or opposite sex. Quoting Lawrence:

As an alternative argument in this case, counsel for the petitioners and some amici contend that Romer provides the basis for declaring the Texas statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause. That is a tenable argument, but we conclude the instant case requires us to address whether Bowers itself has continuing validity. Were we to hold the statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause some might question whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct both between same-sex and different-sex participants.

The opinion then goes on to discuss various right to privacy cases and ultimately come to the conclusion a prohibition on sodomy would likely be unconstitutional applied to basically anyone. Quoting Lawrence again:

The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter. The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government. "It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter." Casey, supra, at 847. The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.