Long take I wrote on what sustains a cultures values and the dream of a "Dark Bill of Rights" that could be unalterable and untarnish-able, like the 1400 year long tradition of Sharia.
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Long take I wrote on what sustains a cultures values and the dream of a "Dark Bill of Rights" that could be unalterable and untarnish-able, like the 1400 year long tradition of Sharia.
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I like deontology for the very simple reason that no matter what the specific system, even a religious one, I can know where the lines are and what will be off limits. If I believe in thou shalt not kill then I can know that no matter what happens, murder is off the table. Maybe taking other people’s property is off limits.
And going back to the original thesis, I think a book or document is a very necessary condition for large scale deontological systems. A document with no standard interpretation and no firm adherents isn’t going to work, but likewise strong adherence to traditional standards doesn’t work either as you can easily make changes through culture that go unchallenged. Torah will always be Torah, Qu’ran will always be Qu’ran, Bible will always be Bible and because you can’t change the plain meaning of the text, as long as people take the text seriously there are hard limits. Going to non original it’s thinking about a definitional document destroys it.
People choose things they know are wrong all the time. Murder and theft are decidedly on the table in any large-scale society. The lines are just as imaginary as the utilitarian's.
I'll agree that successful deontologies rely on an external anchor, like a book. Believers have to buy in to the premise that it is revelatory, uncorrupted, and genuine. For someone who doesn't buy in, though, those beliefs are absurd. Elites are going to complain that, say, Baptists are dogmatic and make no sense. So are secular proles. So are other Christians!
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What principled way do you have to resolve conflicts where two deontological injunctions conflict? All possible means of mediating them seem to require pointing at outcomes, which is just implicit consequentialism.
"I will not steal" and "I will do the best for my family" conflict when they're starving to death and your only way of getting food is stealing a loaf of bread.
I don't think any ethical theory can get away with not placing an importance on outcomes, an ethical theory must be a guide for behaviour in particular real world circumstances after all, but the distinguishing factor of utilitarianism is a levelling of all outcomes along a single dimension of value.
For example for a deontologist like Max Scheler who argues for an objective hierarchy of values - pleasure utility, vitality, culture, and holiness, it is never right to temporarily compromise the higher for the lower except (and this is my reasoning on what I remember of his work) when not doing so would permanently compromise your ability to achieve the higher. The lower values are only justified as a means to the higher, whereas for a utilitarian the lower values are commensurable with the higher and that words like "higher" and "lower" values may only represent differences in quantity, if they mean anything at all. A deontologist might say that the pursuit of a certain amount of physical pleasure is justified for the fact that great discomfort can hinder you from fulfilling your higher duties, a utilitarian would allow for a scenario where a certain amount of pleasure is altogether preferable to the achievement of those higher values and you should have no moral qualms about making that trade.
(I broadly agree with what you said)
That's just kicking the problem up by another tier. What justifies one injunction being higher than another, and how do you choose between two of the equivalent seniority?
At any rate, I'm not a utilitarian, more of a consequentialist with idiosyncratic values.
I'm not defending any system here as I don't think I have yet found the ultimate ethical theory, but to continue with Scheler as an example he would say that you can objectively say that some values are subordinate to others on the basis of their relying on the other for their existence as values:
From Scheler's Ressentiment.
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