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KulakRevolt  1yr ago (anarchonomicon.substack.com)   1830 thread views

Teach a Man to Revolt: Dreams of a Dark Bill of Rights

anarchonomicon.substack.com

Long take I wrote on what sustains a cultures values and the dream of a "Dark Bill of Rights" that could be unalterable and untarnish-able, like the 1400 year long tradition of Sharia.

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I have to say I’m on board with this, which is why I think the elites are so opposed to the idea of revelation and deontology as systems. People who have hard lines that will not be crossed are incredibly hard to manipulate into complying with things they disagree with. Religion is one way this happens and because of the firm belief in the Book (whichever book it happens to be) gives people lines that will not be crossed. A vague deism (or poly-deism) in which nothing about the religion is taken seriously (see liberal Christianity and gay rights despite the Bible) cannot do that because they don’t hold the text as inviolable or inflexible on those points. So when the state does something they don’t object.

It’s a huge point of respect I have for the Abrahamic Book Religions. They simply won’t give up on the main tenets. Jews and Muslims won’t accept the idea of compromise or shirk because they have the book and therefore you simply cannot violate the book and be a good believer.

Elites are opposed to deontology because from the outside, it looks like a stupid, close-minded reason to reject what should be a good deal. This is not specific to elites. It is the normal response of anyone outside a given deontology.

Resistance to manipulation is a subset of resistance to negotiation. In the abstract, great—one can respect that as a signal of belief. Practically speaking, that respect buys a certain level of tolerance. And such tolerance is inversely proportional to how much one is personally affected.

I like deontology for the very simple reason that no matter what the specific system, even a religious one, I can know where the lines are and what will be off limits. If I believe in thou shalt not kill then I can know that no matter what happens, murder is off the table. Maybe taking other people’s property is off limits.

And going back to the original thesis, I think a book or document is a very necessary condition for large scale deontological systems. A document with no standard interpretation and no firm adherents isn’t going to work, but likewise strong adherence to traditional standards doesn’t work either as you can easily make changes through culture that go unchallenged. Torah will always be Torah, Qu’ran will always be Qu’ran, Bible will always be Bible and because you can’t change the plain meaning of the text, as long as people take the text seriously there are hard limits. Going to non original it’s thinking about a definitional document destroys it.

People choose things they know are wrong all the time. Murder and theft are decidedly on the table in any large-scale society. The lines are just as imaginary as the utilitarian's.

I'll agree that successful deontologies rely on an external anchor, like a book. Believers have to buy in to the premise that it is revelatory, uncorrupted, and genuine. For someone who doesn't buy in, though, those beliefs are absurd. Elites are going to complain that, say, Baptists are dogmatic and make no sense. So are secular proles. So are other Christians!

What principled way do you have to resolve conflicts where two deontological injunctions conflict? All possible means of mediating them seem to require pointing at outcomes, which is just implicit consequentialism.

"I will not steal" and "I will do the best for my family" conflict when they're starving to death and your only way of getting food is stealing a loaf of bread.

All possible means of mediating them seem to require pointing at outcomes, which is just implicit consequentialism.

I don't think any ethical theory can get away with not placing an importance on outcomes, an ethical theory must be a guide for behaviour in particular real world circumstances after all, but the distinguishing factor of utilitarianism is a levelling of all outcomes along a single dimension of value.

For example for a deontologist like Max Scheler who argues for an objective hierarchy of values - pleasure utility, vitality, culture, and holiness, it is never right to temporarily compromise the higher for the lower except (and this is my reasoning on what I remember of his work) when not doing so would permanently compromise your ability to achieve the higher. The lower values are only justified as a means to the higher, whereas for a utilitarian the lower values are commensurable with the higher and that words like "higher" and "lower" values may only represent differences in quantity, if they mean anything at all. A deontologist might say that the pursuit of a certain amount of physical pleasure is justified for the fact that great discomfort can hinder you from fulfilling your higher duties, a utilitarian would allow for a scenario where a certain amount of pleasure is altogether preferable to the achievement of those higher values and you should have no moral qualms about making that trade.

(I broadly agree with what you said)

That's just kicking the problem up by another tier. What justifies one injunction being higher than another, and how do you choose between two of the equivalent seniority?

At any rate, I'm not a utilitarian, more of a consequentialist with idiosyncratic values.

What justifies one injunction being higher than another, and how do you choose between two of the equivalent seniority?

I'm not defending any system here as I don't think I have yet found the ultimate ethical theory, but to continue with Scheler as an example he would say that you can objectively say that some values are subordinate to others on the basis of their relying on the other for their existence as values:

Among essential values there are two that have medium rank: the value of utility and the vital value. It is evident that the latter is preferable to the former. We can also speak of the value of “preservation” and that of “expansion,” the value of “adaptation” and that of “conquest,” the value of the “tool” and that of the “organ.”

This preference is determined by the nature of each value. The values of the first series are founded on those of the second in the sense that they can only be experienced if the others are given in some measure. Every value of utility is a value “for” a living being. Something is “useful” if it is a controllable cause for the realization of a good that is agreeable to the senses. But the feeling of pleasure is itself determined not only by the nature of a mind in general, but of a mind that acts through some specific form and organization of life which, taken as a whole, represents a certain vital value. This vital value cannot be reduced to the criterion of pleasure, since acts and things that tend to diminish vital values can also be “pleasurable.” One can easily imagine vital values without pleasure, but the reverse is impossible (. . .) Through its relation to pleasure, the value of “utility” is equally dependent on the value of vitality. This dependence is further enhanced by the fact that not every cause for pleasure is useful, but only that cause which can be controlled by volition. Only the living being can exercise this control. The measure in which a cause is useful for pleasure is partly determined by the degree to which it is subject to such control.

From Scheler's Ressentiment.

Elites are opposed to deontology because from the outside, it looks like a stupid, close-minded reason to reject what should be a good deal. This is not specific to elites.

Well are you using "deontology" to mean "weird superstitious beliefs" or are you using deontology to mean "non-utilitarian thinking[1]"? If it's the latter, I don't see why that should be "stupid and closed-minded". There are plenty of reasons to be skeptical of utilitarian ethics.

Torture vs. Dust Specks is one such case. But for a more practical example: statistically speaking, you're probably not an Effective Altruist, and if you are, you probably don't commit yourself to it as much as you could (please correct me if I'm wrong!). Unqualified utilitarianism places extreme demands on all of us to work to increase global utility (or preference satisfaction, or however you want to formalize it). If you think that people have any sort of right to choose their own life project, independent of the consideration of starving people on other continents, then you're using deontological reasoning. It's difficult to see how utilitarianism can account for a concept of rights or freedoms.

Maybe you would describe your own position as consequentialist but not utilitarian? But, that already seems like a sort of hybrid position to me. If you accept that there are counterexamples to strict utilitarianism, then you're committed to the idea that some things just matter independent of what the math tells you about net global utility. The only argument at that point is over specifically what things just matter, and how much.

[1] (Virtue ethicists might say that their position is neither utilitarian nor deontological but I think we can ignore that for now)

I’m using it in the same sense as M’aiq. Perhaps “revelatory” was the load-bearing word.

Insofar as “elites are so opposed” to, say, Islam? It’s not because they’re afraid of ubermenschen who can’t be manipulated. Rather, it’s because working with an opposing deontology is a pain. This is true whether or not one’s own ethics are utilitarian or even deontological. Deus Vult.

Jews and Muslims won’t accept the idea of compromise or shirk because they have true book and therefore you simply cannot violate the book and be a good believer.

The problem comes when you can find increasingly contorted justifications using the book to (attempt to) excuse whatever behavior you want. For example, this article describes how the Conservative Rabbinical Assembly, a rather large organization of rabbis adhering to the movement/branch of Conservative Judaism, voted on specific rituals to be used in gay Jewish weddings. While the rabbis do pay lip-service to the Book, they ignore its spirit. For example:

“We acknowledge that these partnerships are distinct from those discussed in the Talmud as ‘according to the laws of Moses and Israel,’” said Nevins, referring to the words used in kiddushin, “but we celebrate them with the same sense of holiness and joy as that expressed in heterosexual marriages.”

So yes, there is an acknowledgement that these marriages aren’t quite by the Book— but who really cares, there’s still the holiness and joy, and certainly no reference to Leviticus 18:22. And by the way, sufficient wordcelery will do away with that prohibition directly.

That’s why Kulak, in this article, seems to be emphasizing not the Book so much as the culture. Words can be twisted; culture cannot.

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