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Notes -
I posted this in the main week thread, but feel I probably should have posted it here instead.
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In non-American election news of note, the German governing coalition has collapsed with German Chancellor Scholz (SDP party) sacked his Finance Minister (FDP), setting the stage for a snap election in the next few months, possibly as early as January.
The collapse occurred for typically German reasons, which is to say over money and budgets and deficit spending. Specifically, how to cover a 60-billion euro hole in the budget after a German court in November 2023 annulled a plan to repurpose COVID emergency funds, when more money is needed to conduct domestic stimulus / address EU issues / further support Ukraine. Scholz and other members of the coalition wanted to suspend the German balanced budget amendment, i.e. the 2009 debt break amendment to the constitution. The FDP, a more neoliberal minority member of the coalition but who had the finance minister portfolio, refused. Scholz had an exceptionally emotive press conference yesterday, and now the issue is turning over to the timing of the vote of no confidence to bring forth a new election.
Yes, Germany- the country which helped replace multiple governments in southern Europe in the name of enforcing austerity and balanced budgets- just saw its own government collapse over deficit spending. There are jokes to be made here.
While this issue was German internal politics in nature, however, the timing was almost certainly a consequence of the US election, which is to say we could blame Donald Trump. The issues are not new and have been building for a year, while German election results in recent elections have shown a rise of the right that worries the German establishment whose coalition is as much to keep them out as it is to keep itself in. The confluence or risks was acceptable while Biden was in the white house, and might have continued had Harris won.
The victory of Donald Trump in the American election, however, provided new future risks. If the previous German expected election cycle occurred in OCT 25, that would be the better part of a year in which budget-locked Germany couldn't maneuver diplomatically on any major financial issue, even as Trump is almost certainly going to make that a major issue. Further, Scholz would have been in a lame duck position as the months ticked by, unable to do much and no one necessarily expecting his continuation into 2026.
By quickening the election to as early as January, right as Trump transitions into office, Scholz will (possibly) mitigate those risks, while also (probably) benefit from substantial anti-Trump sentiment in Germany that will probably support the SDP more than it's further-right rivals. While Scholz himself may / may not be the leader of the next government, the election may break free the FDP log jam on deficit spending.
Which, to put it lightly, will have major political (and social) implications for not just Germany, but Europe as a whole.
German political power in Europe- overt and soft- has for a decade and a half been limited as much by German budgetary restrictions as by German reputational inclination towards fiscal restraint. But if Germany is willing to spend big, this will be a tidal wave of money no one else in Europe would be able to match, which no existing systems were expecting to absorb and utilize, and so a lot of money which many in the European Union will seek to channel. This is both in terms of other countries trying to get what benefits they can out of spending to benefit their own needs, whether that's debt cancelation or military investments or so on, but also at the EU level, where Germany will have a lot more purse for a lot more power of the purse. There have long been dreams of German-financed financial consolidation in the EU that were economically impossible so long as Germany barred itself from funding them- but if the debt break barier is removed, then it's 'merely' a very difficult lobbying effort.
It will also create an interesting context for other countries seeking to shape the incoming government. In 2021, for example, remember that the Belarus migration crisis was itself timed to the German government formation, and which led to a partial rapproachment between PIS-Poland and Germany due to Polish tactics to force back migrants aiming to go to Germany (and thus the enabler-governments behind those migrants willingness to poke Germany in the eye at a senstivie time). Expect non-trivial cross-europe lobbying and advocating within Germany as well, as countries try to enable foreign voting from their territory (if they think ti might benefit) / mobilize expatriats / good old fashioned election propaganda and social media and newfangled AI-propaganda influence efforts.
None of this is a guarantee, mind you. The German election could be more divided and create a weaker government rather than a stronger one. There's no guarantee that the FDP fiscal log jam will be expelled. The government might be 'worse' by whatever standard of good you choose.
But this could be significant that will impact the next years of European politics.
It's a good speech. But it doesn't accept the concept of tradeoffs between climate goals, social goals, defense goals: min 15:
Makes sense that the FPD would be against it.
Honestly he is taking the moral high ground, but it's kinda fake. I expect it to be convincing to the German people though.
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The latest Forsa/INSA polls from 05.11 give the following ratings (averaged):
I assume both the SPD and the FDP will lose a bit of popularity after Scholz's gambit, but assuming the numbers remain stable, what are the possible coalitions? GroKo (C*U + SPD) is an obvious choice, but what if the SPD doesn't want to play second fiddle? I assume that they have to somehow assemble a coalition that is bigger than the C*U, but who can they turn to?
AfD is firewalled
FDP is the reason why their coalition fell apart
SPD + The Greens is just 26%
SPD + The Greens + The Left is 29%
SPD + BSW + The Left is 27% and I doubt these two red parties will agree to work together
SPD + The Greens + BSW is 33%, but The Greens hate BSW, plus this will lose to C*U + FDP or C*U + The Greens
C*U + BSW? No less reasonable than C*U + SPD, and Wagenknecht can't complain about playing second fiddle.
That's not even 40% of the vote?
As long as FDP, Linke + Others stay below 5% each while still adding up to almost 20% it might be enough.
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Don't know how they do things in Germany exactly, but votes don't necessarily translate to seats 1:1. It's been a while since I bothered voting but 30+% was often enough to form a stable government, depending on how the competition did.
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