@The_Golem101's banner p

The_Golem101


				

				

				
0 followers   follows 0 users  
joined 2022 September 05 12:31:34 UTC

				

User ID: 548

The_Golem101


				
				
				

				
0 followers   follows 0 users   joined 2022 September 05 12:31:34 UTC

					

No bio...


					

User ID: 548

I believe that others have called you out on this completely insane narrative around Maidan that is needed to make it into an original sin for Ukraine rather than Russia and Yanukovych fucking up (on the 21st of Jan they sent US$2 billion on condition he cracked down - which he did), I guess it is now my turn:

We have the full list of deaths, and the days they occurred - it's ~108 for the protestors and 12-18 for the police depending on your start and end points. More details emerged in 2023 to fill in the gaps, but some remain. However, the fact there are gaps, does not mean that every area of uncertainty was a CIA op.

The 2x casualties claim of security forces vs protestors is clearly not true as a narrative, unless you cherry pick an exact tiny window, as you have from one source that otherwise highlights how insane and unprovoked the attacks on the protestors were, and only look at casualties not deaths for the three hour window - remember it started with 3 protestors being shot on the 22nd of Jan (plus the tortured body of Yuriy Verbytskyi being found), then on the 18th of Feb you have the police using live rounds to stop a march - 11 protestors and 4 police were killed, then you have the police trying to clear the square - 17 protestors, 5 police died then, including actions by police and "titushky" irregulars. They were certainly not outgunned then, though they failed to break the protestors' lines and clear the square.

The "obviously not very neutral Ukrainian court" records you mention but not cite (https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/114304164 for those who can read Ukrainian) found that 10 protestor deaths could not be attributed clearly to gunfire from police lines (Berkut) over the full period, but that other positions (Alfa in particular) or irrgular titushky fire from government supported could have done it, or perhaps friendly fire, accidents or deliberate protestor action. I do note that the Canadian academic Ivan Katchanovski (who really hates Ukraine, fine he can, but it's his theories being spun as some kind of fact from the court when they are his own supposition and it did not go through peer review) who cites parts of the 2023 verdict left those comments out and jumped straight to the false flag idea and that it was all a trick, despite that not really working - the fighting was already in full swing by that point.

Even best case, that still leaves 98 deaths directly from police and government action, who definitely deserve the blame for starting and escalating each major event in the timeline. They used live ammunition first, attacked the square, disappeared and tortured to death protestors prior and all of this was with Russian support and backing.

There is a citation in my post - RUSI's paper right there. It's open source, and they list where they got the information from where possible. You can disagree (especially where it's author interviews or him with a clearance seeing multiple copies of captured Russian equipment or the same documented instructions), but here you go if you cannot open the link for some reason, it's footnote 70: In Kherson, see BBC News, ‘Inside Russian “Torture Chambers” in Ukrainian City of Kherson – BBC News’, Youtube, https://youtube.com/watchv=AE_45TrZqU8, accessed 18 March 2023; in Kharkiv oblast, see John Ray, ‘Ukrainian Retraces Steps to Torture Chamber where he was “Electrocuted and Beaten for Six Days”’, 22 September 2022, < https://www.itv.com/news/2022-09-22/ukrainian-retraces-steps-to-torture-chamber-where-he-was-beaten-for-six-days>, accessed 18 March 2023; in Kyiv oblast, see Erika Kinetz et al., ‘“Method to the Violence”: Dogged Investigation and Groundbreaking Visuals Document Bucha “Cleansing”’, AP News, 11 November 2022; author observations around Bucha, June 2022 and Kharkiv oblast, October 2022.

In particular, I would also highlight this from right at the start of the war: "The population was divided into five core categories:

  1. Those deemed leaders of Ukrainian nationalism who were specified for physical liquidation on a high-priority target list, or for capture to enable show trials.
  2. Those suspected of intending to support acts of resistance who needed to be recruited or suppressed including anyone associated with Ukrainian law enforcement, local government, the military or related to officials that were not actively collaborating.
  3. Those who were deemed apathetic.
  4. Those actively collaborating with Russian forces.
  5. Individuals who were necessary for running critical national infrastructure and had to be controlled.69"

Source 69 above, is: The methodology was set out in an instruction issued by the Russian Presidential Administration and obtained by the Intelligence Community of Ukraine. Author interview with Q (Senior Field Counterintelligence Officer in Ukrainian Agency 4), Ukraine, February 2022; author interview with G; author interviews with R (former head of Ukrainian agency 2), Ukraine, February 2022; author interviews with J (deputy head of Ukrainian agency 5), Ukraine, August and October 2022; see also Erika Kinetz, ‘“We Will Find You:” Russians Hunt Down Ukrainians on Lists’, AP News, 21 December 2022.

I am confused how you missed it? I dug through your AI and the links weren't easy to find - or were not there - but this one was directly next to the text.

*edit: Oh, for others of a paranoid persuasion, that RUSI link is also a good overview of what an occupying force of high levels of brutality but using dumb troops of not high numbers and limited time might do to you and your family if you were ever occupied - and its very readable.

There are a lot of links here, but at least the helicopter one seems to be a Russian psyop - Ukraine used helicopters close enough to the front for Russia to film, with footage released of their landing, this then became claims of helicopters lost in the comments with no footage, instead all I saw was grainy footage of FPV attacks on individual soldiers from another location? Have you got any footage of an actual blackhawk being downed or a clear continuity? Ukraine certainly loves to publish their helicopter kills.

Pokrovsk itself has been fought over for 1 year 3 months now - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pokrovsk_offensive (I hate Wikipedia too, but that start date seems pretty fair, surely?), and while pressure is mounting along the line there's hardly crazy breakthroughs considering Russia is still outside of Bakhmut (which was hoped to open up new offensive options), and the Donbass is ~10% Ukrainian? It seems like Ukraine is launching a limited counterattack, like with the 47th at Andriivka, where they use fresh elites to push up and hold a pocket open, and get the last men out before withdrawing - a pocket it should be stressed that is hardly Stalingrad.

I think it is still unclear how this will end as a war, Ukraine is under a lot of pressure but Russia is seriously underperforming and taking a lot of strategic hits with a base that might come apart over years more fighting (have you seen the refineries campaign? How many haven't been hit at this point?). However, you seem certain that this was all folly, and Ukraine will crumble with a situation worse than surrendering at letting Russia do what they will? This time next year, do you think there's going to be a lasting peace agreement? What broadly would be its terms - unconditional Russian wargoals from day 1?

On the first days Russians fired into random civilian cars, with the BMP engaging pensioners who didn't know they were at war right at the start pretty famous now. This was at the point where it was going to be a 3 day special operation, and at least their command was sure that Ukraine would just fold - then there was Bucha where soldiers ran riot. That was all Feb-March 2022, and things did not get better from there.

There's quite the list of warcrimes now (you may not agree all of these happened, but most Ukrainians would if you're trying to understand their theory of mind: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_attacks_on_civilians_in_the_Russo-Ukrainian_war_(2022%E2%80%93present)). In addition, it seems that capture/kill/torture lists were common for the advancing troops. Remember, early on Russia was super confident, and sent in various paramilitaries to remove sections of civil society and kill chunks of them - it seems like they wanted a literal decapitation of civil society so that the puppet regime they installed would last and be able to become another Belarus - (RUSI has a report here: https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/preliminary-lessons-russias-unconventional-operations-during-russo-ukrainian-war-february-2022 - in particular there were standardized torture equipment found in trucks, which is brutal as fuck, these are not people who anyone should be indifferent to ruling over them).

Imagine you believe that, like many Ukrainians do - and there is a solid argument that their resistance prevented Buchas across most of the country. Put yourself into that frame, imagine you believed the above. What would you do if that was your country, your home, and you knew people who were killed or tortured? People here reasonably say that one of the key lessons of the 20th century is do not be ruled over by people who hate you - if its true for the red tribe USA than the Ukrainians should be celebrated surely?

I would fight, and I think the situation is far less bleak than @No_one paints it, both now and over all the past times we've seen this argument (we're almost on year 4 of the special operation to de-nazify Ukraine, and with a few more years of this pace Russia will at last have all the Donbas, is this really a situation where Russia is going to occupy the country soon?). For example, I do note that Russia is taking a lot more long range hits this year, to very difficult to replace refining (only one (1) refinery has not been hit, and those cracking towers are not easy to patch) and strategic air assets no less. We're still in the hard pounding, Ukraine might break but it isn't over yet. It's a very interesting war.

His point as I understand was, 1) Ukrainians are bitter, because 2) they only fought because (stressed in all caps above) the USA assured them they would get US support and therefore defeat Russia and 3) this has proved a disaster and Ukrainians regret trusting the US and the war deaths could have been largely avoided had they known the all the above - furthermore these war deaths are half a million as Russia claims.

My point is no Ukrainian I know would express those 3, and they're extremely Russian coded. If No_one wishes to correct this misunderstanding I am all ears. Heaven knows it's hard to be clear on this forum, and I'm feeling a bit confused myself.

I worry there's a motte and bailey here - the motte being "Ukrainians would like more support from the USA, and feel that they're hot and cold which isn't helpful to the war effort" and the bailey being "Ukrainians fought the war because the USA promised them the moon and couldn't deliver, and are very bitter, and the deaths could have been avoided without the US meddling".

I'm very curious on your original assertion, that Ukrainians as a class are bitter on the US forcing them into fighting Russia, when they had no hope and it has gone so badly for them - taking half a million deaths in the process, such that suggesting Ukraine is right to fight and America is right to help them would therefore earn you their hatred. To me that sounds the same probability as "I'm Johnny Walker, from Texas Oblast, and I think that the USA is stupid to provoke the mighty Russian bear" as a being a genuine statement on US citizen's views on foreign policy - that's the inglourious basterds three fingers meme right there on every level. It's just... Russian signaling all the way through. Are you sure these are Ukrainians?

But to be fair, you also asked me a question. These warhawks have been fighting, have family fighting, and broadly support conscription when I asked them, though there was some discussions about draft dodging. Maybe they are foolish or p-zombies, but I myself am British, and so there's something very impressive about people paying a price and are willing to pay it to go fuck you to a fucked up bully even as others think you're foolish (1939-41 were our best and worst years). I do note they've done a lot better than anyone expected, aren't done yet, and have proven that even Russia can really bleed, they've done magnificently. I don't think of them as sheep or conformist, possibly to a fault - one issue of cossacks is they can be like herding cats, but they certainly have a common enemy today (even if they want Zelensky out tomorrow).

Maybe sober reality will make them regret their actions, but honestly, I think the fact Ukraine made itself into a very unwelcome meal for Russia is unlikely to be regretted, and they are proud so far of what their country has done (which includes rolling over the 4th Guards tank div, which is one of the funniest things to have happened to a power that claims to be super in a very very long time, imagine if a US armored division was routed in the Gulf war and their tanks captured to a degree that the Iraqi army could restock vs pre war, the T-80U is now on the endangered species list).

Finally, and this is utterly vital to stress, they also clearly have their own agency. Ukraine chose this, for better or for worse.

I like the fuckers, it's vibes for me, and I think while this is hard pounding, they may well pound the longest. I think it would be good if they do.

Remember these aren't civilian towns anymore, they're warzones, you're supplying soldiers in an area with enough water to survive, alongside food, ammunition, entrenching equipment etc, and taking fresh men in and the wounded etc back. If Russia could stop every truck into a given area, they would control it and quickly occupy it, it's not defensible, same for Ukraine the other way around, their effective actions around Izium mostly involved Russian units panicking as their supply lines were close to being closed and they ran for it.

For a town close to the front you use trucks, for one on the front you use MRAPs and APC/IFVs, for a fighting position on the edge of town you use runners through your trenches, but again interdiction means that you are degrading but not stopping this, which might largely happen at night, under fog etc. It's absolutely not the case that Russia can stop anything like all deliveries even to these contested areas, but it be high cost for the Ukrainians, forcing them back in the end. Here's a video (that's certainly wrong in bits, but gives you an idea) that covers one of these key town sieges: https://youtube.com/watch?v=igFrblANpQk .

Almost none of the civilian infrastructure is working, these places are wrecked, and the utility pipes are shredded. Meanwhile, Russia is trying to degrade utilities to big cities, but they can be repaired, there's some redundancy and defended by AA assets etc. If your assumption as to why Russia is moving too slowly is that they're being far too soft, that almost certainly isn't the case.

I'm skeptical on that number, though I'm sure there are reasonable costs higher than the direct aid due to the sanctions etc you can't take all inflation as a cost and put it all due to the Ukraine war, that guy's speech in 2023 to Singapore isn't exactly a knock down argument...

I am personally acquainted with several dozen Ukrainians, and know several fighting. They're of the exact opposite opinion - I'm not sure how you came to meet so many that seem to support a Russian talking point? I'm genuinely curious, what's their background?

And propaganda or not, they think that Russia is taking far more causalities than they are, and no one seems to be talking about half a million deaths?

The Ukrainian narratives that I know are that they chose to stand up to Russia, are very happy with countries that helped them with equipment (very pro UK for example), and are confused why America is so hot and cold with shipments but still broadly pro US. They were going to fight with or without US/NATO weapons, at the big defeats Russia experienced at the start were mostly with Ukrainian gear, it was much later till the tanks, IFVs, aircraft and static AA started arriving, which allowed them to continue. They are also of the opinion that if Zelensky capitulates (or is seen to) he's gone next election, he was seen as soft on Russia pre war and is being outflanked by more popular warhawks.

Interdiction means that a percentage of logistics entering the town are destroyed/disabled, or can only move under poor weather, at night etc. You don't need running water or electricity to keep a fighting position supplied, you can truck/carry in their water, ammo, etc. but if part of that is being interdicted your logistic burden is just that much higher, X% is lost, alongside Y lives per tonne needed to sustain fighting.

The Russians are naturally going out of their way to starve out every town/fighting position they can, which is often a matter of ammunition not food or water of course.

Technically this would be an Ordo Malleus call wouldn't it? As it deals with demons? Though, James Workshop is very confusing with how the Inquisition actually operates, and even Ordo Xenos members seem to spend most of their time fighting Chaos in books.

I think this misses the point myself and others raised in response to your thread. "Killing people" via constant attacks into fortified positions where the only reward is another trench to attack and wire to chew on is the failure state, all doctrine over the last century is basically attempts to create or restore options for maneuver rather than positional warfare as it fundamentally sucks for the attacker. The fact Russia is unable to do so shows the weak position it is in, and the massive losses it must be taking. Breakthroughs are hard, and the developments throughout the war have made them harder, but attacking without a breakthrough always causes huge losses and is always the less preferred option.

Russia still might grind out a victory under such conditions from an overmatch of manpower, but it's not a sign of doing well. Indeed, it's incompatible with a positive casualty ratio, if Ukraine has less manpower and that has been depleted faster than Russias for 3 straight years why haven't they managed to restore that maneuver? When Ukraine found gaps in the line they charged in, and slapped about the 4th Guards tank division so effectively that they captured more armor than Russia wanted to set as a maximum for post war Ukraine in their stupid peace conditions. Losses like those would leave a shadow, we are not seeing that shadow, so it seems very unlikely that the losses are there.

I guess those reading this might have changed some of their opinions, but we are something like a factor of 4 off (2:1 vs 1:2), so I guess we'll just have to see.

Do you think it's consistent to have A) a 2:1 ratio in favor of Russia, B) Russia possessing a larger military C) Russia unable to achieve an operational breakthrough since early 2022? I think A) can't exist with both B) and C), but I assume you have another thought on that? Is there a precedent for a larger army on the offensive being unable to advance (and even losing ground in mid to late 2022) despite killing at a 2:1 ratio?

There's also A) a 2:1 ratio in favor of Russia, with D) Oryx (or whatever other open source counting wrecks) showing vastly more equipment losses for Russia, but I assume you would discount that as Ukraine being less mechanized, or Russian footage not being available?

However, no worries if you don't want to go into the weeds on this, I really think we can't finally resolve it until the war ends.

I would be very interested in your estimates, defined as you wish (KIA, KIA+wounded too badly to return to service or whatever) for both sides. What kind of ratio do you think it is?

Oh, totally misread that. That's actually fairly credible although on the high end as an estimate I would guess, I take back my accusations of them also selling obviously silly numbers. However a full million out of the Russian workforce would leave more ripples than we have seen I would assume, like this interview suggested (from December, but his point about a million losses being impossible to hide presumably still stands): https://frontelligence.substack.com/p/war-deficits-and-the-russian-economy

*2027 I assume? But you're right, how about this one: https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2025/04/07/rheinmetall-secures-nitrocellulose-supply-amid-european-ammo-scramble/

I'm a bit annoyed at the Germans and their pace, but Russia's low GDP and sanctions are not great for a war of attrition, and they really have burnt through most of their stored equipment in many categories.

The CEP and kill chain are very different for the systems, and like you say that's also due to the full GPS/ISTAR package around the systems. I really do think that Ukraine had a clear advantage in precision fires from 2023 at least. But it's a bit of a niche point.

I think it's reasonable to say that Ukraine has been defending more than on the offensive? And there are plenty of photos of hundreds of Russian vehicles lost in single pushes from early war if you're worried about the losses shown for Ukraine - the high IQ pontooning meme was a direct offshoot of literally 100+ vehicles being lost as an entire BTG funneled into a kill zone like lemmings. Ukraine's offensive was wildly optimistic and took several company size losses of metal, but it was an outlier, one that they stopped and Zaluzhny should be credited for containing once it was clear there was no hole in the lines like at Kharkiv or Kherson.

All I'm saying is that there are several credible reasons why the Ukrainian military would be perfectly plausibly taking fewer casualties than Russia, while still being under a lot of pressure.

Your post seemed to put credibility on the estimate that Ukraine has taken over 300,000k combat KIA/out of the fight? Where would you put it? I'm guessing at that level or higher? Where do you think Russia's are at?

I do note that Syrsky interview isn't dated in your screenshot, but is shortly after his appointment so presumably over a year ago now? Plus, not sure on your economist article, but they have changed their tune more recently: https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/12/02/how-ukraine-uses-cheap-ai-guided-drones-to-deadly-effect-against-russia and I think most estimates don't put Ukraine behind on drone integration.

The balance since then has shifted sharply, and not in Russia's favor https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2025/04/07/rheinmetall-secures-nitrocellulose-supply-amid-european-ammo-scramble/ (edited to a better link), plus systems like Excalibur and the GMLRS/ATACMS really don't have any qualitative peer in the Russian artillery arsenal (hence why they had to pause and restructure their logistics around them) - I just don't think either of those sources come close to suggesting Russia has and had always a qualitative and quantitative edge that comes close to evening its casualty disadvantage as an attacker. It's also possible that Syrsky was being a slight doomer then to highlight the need for ongoing aid in early 2024...

On the credibility of Russia's claims, they also demand many other things do they not? Some of which include the end to sanctions, rolling back NATO's deployments, the right to veto legislation in Ukraine and more, all of which are still in effect as of their last announcements unless something has really changed behind the scenes (Dmitri suggests not: https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/67fb81259a794798c0cc6be5 *(edited to avoid screwing up the link))? That seems highly non credible, and well well beyond what you say, which would themselves require Russia to achieve a breakthrough it has not managed since Spring 2022. For example, taking two oblast capitals, one of which was never theirs and the other behind a now fortified huge river, that they themselves flooded. That is what I mean by non credible.

There's all kinds floating around - Wikipedia has at least a partial list of official ish ones https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casualties_of_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War#Total_casualties which put Ukraine at 80k military KIA as of Feb 2024 and Russia at 160k ish, for low bounds, but the propaganda numbers for each side go up 800k Russian KIA according to the Ukrainians and just under 1,000,000 KIA and wounded for Ukraine as per the Russians.

I think around a 2:1 Russian to Ukrainian deaths seems plausible, though others have disagreed. I don't particularly rate the method linked in the OP, purely because if Ukraine actually had taken that many KIA it would be already collapsing and the evidence would be everywhere. Similarly for Russia - 800k KIA is too high. So, we're reduced to estimates of obituaries, excess deaths etc which are more solid but likely an underestimate, or arguing about likely ratios from casualty clearing, fires ratios, fires accuracy, anecdotes, the fact Russia is on the offensive, equipment deficits and so on - which could give us a plausible estimate if you trust the logic and person doing it, but is super open to accusations of being propaganda or being rigged by both camps.

Not sure if that helps?

I listened to the interview, and it seems like he was misquoted: https://www.1lurer.am/en/2025/04/14/Zelensky-denied-reports-that-he-spoke-about-100-000-dead-Ukrainian-soldiers/1296200

Zelensky has been fairly clear that Ukrainian combat KIA was 46k ish early this year and rising at a steady rate, and if we believe that or not the official Ukrainian government estimate has not changed on that score.

Other estimates put Ukraine's KIA higher, certainly, but I haven't seen a method that compares Russia vs Ukraine like for like without the ratio being in Ukraine's favor. Sure, Russia has a larger population, but I think it's really hard to find credible estimates that can plausibly estimate that A) Ukraine is taking far heavier losses than Russia, while accepting B) Russia has been on the offensive for most of the war (which is always casualty heavy) while barely advancing since 2022.

There's also C) noting the sheer volume of Russian equipment loss footage, the steadily shifting ratio of fires along the line in Ukraine's favor (Rheinmetall clearly took the attempted assassination of the CEO personally), the fact Russian casualty clearing must be abysmal from their own telegrams and the fact that wounded soldiers in their own lines (where evacuation should be routine in most armies) regularly commit suicide, and the fact that they're launching attacks with civilian vehicles (which I've never seen footage of Ukraine doing?). However, the points of C can be denied as Ukrainian propaganda by some I would assume (though I find the above credible points), so we can set them aside if you want.

Potentially Ukraine will still lose a war of attrition, but if it continues to get support it doesn't seem to be soon. Certainly I would be less confident than Russians with Attitude, the Russian economy is showing a lot of strain while Ukraine is being underwritten, and for both sides things can break slowly then fast. We will see.

However, that's all just fog of war, and maybe boring to argue, we can't really know until the dust settles, and I've had discussions on this forum before where we've ended up assuming 1:2 or 1:6 ratios in totally opposite directions without any resolution. I would just drop the following two points for thought:

Has Russia ever come up with peace terms that are close to credible? I haven't seen any, and in the absence of that the war will continue until someone breaks for sure. That seems to suggest confidence from Russia, or desperation, but it seems hard to argue that Ukraine shouldn't fight them to a stalemate if it feels that is possible, which they seem to genuinely do. Maybe they are wrong, but they certainly outperformed marvelously vs predictions in 2022.

Second, Zelensky's political position is a different to the warmonger I've seen put here a few times, at least by my understanding. He was the compromise with Russia candidate, and has that hanging around as a reputation within Ukraine ever since. He's tried to break it by leaning hard into the wartime president role and being tough, but his plausible opponents are all more hardliners (Zaluzhny for one) - it's not the case that Zelensky is forcing the Ukrainians to keep an unpopular war going, he's the one not daring to show weakness in front of them and has no mandate to end the war under the present conditions.

It seems like it is going to last for a while longer, and Ukrainians I know (one who is fighting) have adopted Kipling's The Beginnings, against those whom many of them called brother just recently. I cannot blame them, there's plenty of ruin left in this war, and I would not bet on Russia just yet.

One again, hard pounding this, gentleman, we shall see who pounds the longest.

*Edit: I also wanted to include this as my candidate for Russians with attitude's best tweet https://imgur.com/fK2KhQB . Before bragging about your victory, it is often useful to actually win it

I worry we're getting lost in defining terms here, possibly my mistake.

Making incorrect statements and sticking by them certainly seems to be one type of brainrot (as per OP), but I think it's fair to broaden it out, and to be clear my definition of brainrot isn't "maximizing for heat", though that's part of it, it's also more generally that many people senior in the US government seem to be basically shitposting on twitter. That seems really odd to me, and I include Vance and Rubio in that shitposting category.

I honestly wanted to discuss with people why that might be the case, and if others agree with the shitposting accusation, but if you don't want to discuss that, that's fair too.

I mean I'm not impressed with Musk, Rubio or Vance on Twitter, and all of them seem a bit deranged on it - they're suffering from brainrot from the medium it seems to me. Though I did include some other points which are more not liking their priorities and policies, some of that also seems to be them playing to the social media crowd - maybe I'm wrong there however.

Is Vance not pretty heavily rotted from online discourse too? He seems to have gone a deep end in some ways at least.

I saw his interview on Joe Rogan and thought he was someone who could actually be good: a moderating influence on Trump, an adult who can get some things done while being stabilizing in general versus Trump's more insane flips. I really liked his book too, and thought he might have some of the right instincts. I haven't been impressed so far, and his behavior in the Zelensky meeting and in general on social media have been the opposite at least in my perception, it seems to maximize for heat vs light in the real world.

Twitter shitposting seems to be highly contagious in general, with Rubio recently wading in to shout at Poland, which wasn't my idea of diplomacy. Seems like a clown show in general, rather than showing strength as I assume they intend.

I'm really interested in the opinions of others though... what do you all think?

Certainly Russia claims Ukraine violated the agreements, and they shouted about it loudly and at every opportunity, but didn't they attack Donetsk airport with heavy regular forces (including TOS-1 thermobarics), which was why Minsk 1 collapsed, and launched cross border artillery strikes plus regular army commitments throughout both agreements (while naturally denying everything even as the craters smoked)?

It seems harsh to describe Ukraine resuming fighting following these breaches and putting the agreed reforms on hold as critical violations, but not mentioning the Russian actions prior that the Ukrainians used as justification (right or wrong). That would be serious memory holing too right?

I certainly agree removing Russian as an official language was a huge own goal. Plus, the reliance on Azov plus other militias due to the weakness of Ukraine's regulars in 2014/15 was very poor optics.

In any case, the real devastation of the population across the Donbass seems to have happened post 2022, with mass conscription into poorly equipped units (the mosin brigades) and people fleeing en masse from the advancing Russians. The region seems pretty much wrecked now, in the arms of Russia but not seen as proper Russians - at least as per Strelkov (though he certainly liked to doompost - hence his arrest).