naraburns nihil supernum
1yr ago
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Israel-Gaza Megathread #3
This is a refreshed megathread for any posts on the conflict between (so far, and so far as I know) Hamas and the Israeli government, as well as related geopolitics. Culture War thread rules apply.
A 9000 word deep dive I wrote on the Tactics and Geostrategics of the Gaza invasion and why there's a real risk that one wrong step from Israel might end in them not being able to break off or achieve a Ceasefire.
This is interesting, and I don't disagree for some of the broadest tactical (ground war in urban combat sucks) or political (Hamas had as goals to undermine Israeli normalization and for the economics of terrorism) components, but :
I'll accept the joke about borders and despotism like a libertarian should, but as a matter of law and policy there's actually a lot of restrictions on exit or export from most modern countries. It's technically illegal to leave the United States as a citizen without a passport, there's a biometrics scan that's required for air travel and keeps getting floated for sea and land, and if you don't do all the paperwork for a serious export you'll risk getting pulled over by anything from a cop car to a literal Blackhawk depending on situation.
"Starve the Garrison" works only as a pre-modern tactic: in the modern era, any anti-Israeli forces that embeds with civilians will receive humanitarian aid before any serious literal starvation, and most of these groups have turned smuggling arms and material with aid shipments into an art form. That doesn't mean the IDF is too smart to try it (motions at Netanyahu), but it means you really need to consider other possible plans. Given other constraints (the available manpower you mention, that longer-lasting land grabs will jeopardize the Abraham Accord normalization that was the longer-term political target for the October 7th attacks, so on), I think it's more likely that the efforts in your 'gap' are going to be followed by a bombing and ground rapid strike campaign.
Looking at the West Bank from a country-level map gives a pretty misleading understanding of what's going on there. The real map looks more like this -- the clusterfuckery with Area C is one of the more sympathetic issues for Palestinians, but it also means there's a lot of IDF military infrastructure in the West Bank. Controlling the border with Jordan doesn't become perfect in that situation, but it does remain something that can be plausibly attempted.
I think you're underestimating how hard tunnel work is, and how readily it can be disrupted, and overestimating capacity. The tunnel under the falls at Niagra was excavated with dynamite, to go less than a half-mile.
A lot of the countries around Israel have the same problem: "better inside pissing out than outside pissing in". This is most overt for Saudis and the Houthis what with the religious stuff, but Egypt, Jordan, and Libya are all extremely aware that the Palestinian movement does not consider them just rulers or serious combatants. If Israel disappeared tomorrow, very few of those armed combatants would pick up a plow. To the extent Iran might reduce support, but Iran doesn't really like a lot of these other countries either, even if Iran hates them less than Israel.
I think the mistake is assuming that many Middle Eastern armies are competent. There are a handful of 'competent' fighting forces in the region - Hamas, Hezbollah, some of the Houthis, some units of the Syrian army that have better training and a good culture, some of the Iraqi Shia militias, and arguably the IRGC's Quds Force although as an actual fighting force they have a mixed record. For a successful full assault on Israel all of them would have to participate and do so extremely successfully, in addition to a poor showing from the IDF. That's possible, but not necessarily likely. It would also open the door to all of the domestic and regional conflicts that most of these groups are ordinarily dedicated to managing. Israel could fund Sunni Islamists more heavily and keep much of Iran and allies’ strength tied up in Iraq and Syria if absolutely necessary, for example.
An Islamic crusade against Israel has always been the 'primary' risk, but conversely the risk to the Saudis that the 'Shia crescent' encircles Arabia is existential in a way that Israel certainly isn't, Turkey has a strained relationship with Iran even if it isn't hostile for now, Egypt certainly doesn't want Hamas to gain in prestige because a resurgent Muslim brotherhood inevitably means some degree of destabilization. Failed ceasefire attempts have been ongoing in Yemen for years. For them to put aside their differences would take a lot.
That Egypt scenario is a complete nonsense. Egypt doesn't want the war no more than Israel wants the war, especially a war for Hamas which Egypt has very little use of, besides the obvious joy of making Israel suffer. It wants Israel to have all the troubles in the world, but so that it ends on the Egyptian border. The time where Egypt sponsored the Fedayin was 70 years ago.
And this turn of phrase:
As of writing Drone strikes have just exploded in Egyptian Taba by the red sea. Israel claims to have shot down the drones and blames Iran Aligned Houthi rebels in the region, claiming they were targeted towards Israel’s southernmost towns near Elat
Implying like it's just "Israel claim" which is super suspect, all while the Houthis themselves admitted they did it, and bragged about it profusely. Really, this can't be serious.
you think this is bad, Israel funded Hamas in its early days
People really should stop mentioning this in 2020s as something that is highly relevant to what happens today. It was a very brief episode in the 1980s, and treating this as - which is clearly implied here - that Israel created Hamas from the ground up and there wouldn't be any Hamas if not Israel - is just stupid and counter-factual. Yes, Israel briefly considered using (then younger and weaker) Hamas to fight Fatah, that was 40 years ago, and that idea didn't last long and was soon abandoned. Treating it as it was definitive episode in the history of Hamas and Israel is like saying "US created the USSR" because they were allies for a while in the fight with the Nazis. Even order of magnitude sillier because the ties between Hamas and Israel were never even order of magnitude that close as between US and USSR.
The Jordan angle is bullshit too, unless there's a complete collapse of Jordanian government (not mere "instability") - which they are very determined not to let happen, and are willing to kill a lot of Palestinian Arabs for that, as they amply proved in the past, exactly nothing would happen there. And to achieve such a collapse would take a direct military action from somebody like Iran. Which would a) require them to somehow cross Iraq without Saudis noticing and doing anything, not to mention Iraqis, and b) do that all right under the nose of US air carrier group stationed next door, and also them not doing anything. I don't see how it's a possibility.
The problems of fighting the tunnels are real, and the fact Hamas has been building it for 16 years is real too. But Israel also knew about them for all these years, and they consider it doable. The main problem would be time - the more Israel stays in Gaza with boots on the ground, the more pressure there will be from the Kind People of the World. And if they can easily afford to tell Europe to take a long hike off a short peer, that wouldn't fly with the US, especially not with Dems in power who has their own sizeable pro-Hamas wing to placate. That would be the main problem for Israel for the middle term.
I largely agree. Reading through it, it came across as a 'just-so' story in the same vein as the Trump-era 'how Trump could lead to a nuclear war with North Korea!' book rather than something from someone with actual experience on the subject matter. Far more of a mediocrity of geopolitical punditry by someone clearly not particularly familiar with the geopolitics, or just the regional national politics, involved.
This is fantastic. My previous view was that Hamas launched the attack out of pure evil or stupidity, but after reading this I think they have a real chance of permanently crippling Israel. There is an equilibrium where if most of Israel's neighbors turn against Israel, Israel doesn't have a chance and then, I suspect, the Jewish population of Israel moves to the US, Canada, and/or Australia.
Yes: unless Arab military culture has changed in the past 23 years, the key threat to Israel is not a conventional conflict with its neighbours. A success of Palestinian human shield/"hit while crying" tactics to shift opinion (especially in the US) is more likely and more of a threat, though not necessarily likely.
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Notes -
Israel Could really lose this one
https://www.anarchonomicon.com/p/israel-could-really-lose-this-one?r=1b6v2r
A 9000 word deep dive I wrote on the Tactics and Geostrategics of the Gaza invasion and why there's a real risk that one wrong step from Israel might end in them not being able to break off or achieve a Ceasefire.
This is interesting, and I don't disagree for some of the broadest tactical (ground war in urban combat sucks) or political (Hamas had as goals to undermine Israeli normalization and for the economics of terrorism) components, but :
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I think the mistake is assuming that many Middle Eastern armies are competent. There are a handful of 'competent' fighting forces in the region - Hamas, Hezbollah, some of the Houthis, some units of the Syrian army that have better training and a good culture, some of the Iraqi Shia militias, and arguably the IRGC's Quds Force although as an actual fighting force they have a mixed record. For a successful full assault on Israel all of them would have to participate and do so extremely successfully, in addition to a poor showing from the IDF. That's possible, but not necessarily likely. It would also open the door to all of the domestic and regional conflicts that most of these groups are ordinarily dedicated to managing. Israel could fund Sunni Islamists more heavily and keep much of Iran and allies’ strength tied up in Iraq and Syria if absolutely necessary, for example.
An Islamic crusade against Israel has always been the 'primary' risk, but conversely the risk to the Saudis that the 'Shia crescent' encircles Arabia is existential in a way that Israel certainly isn't, Turkey has a strained relationship with Iran even if it isn't hostile for now, Egypt certainly doesn't want Hamas to gain in prestige because a resurgent Muslim brotherhood inevitably means some degree of destabilization. Failed ceasefire attempts have been ongoing in Yemen for years. For them to put aside their differences would take a lot.
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That Egypt scenario is a complete nonsense. Egypt doesn't want the war no more than Israel wants the war, especially a war for Hamas which Egypt has very little use of, besides the obvious joy of making Israel suffer. It wants Israel to have all the troubles in the world, but so that it ends on the Egyptian border. The time where Egypt sponsored the Fedayin was 70 years ago.
And this turn of phrase:
Implying like it's just "Israel claim" which is super suspect, all while the Houthis themselves admitted they did it, and bragged about it profusely. Really, this can't be serious.
People really should stop mentioning this in 2020s as something that is highly relevant to what happens today. It was a very brief episode in the 1980s, and treating this as - which is clearly implied here - that Israel created Hamas from the ground up and there wouldn't be any Hamas if not Israel - is just stupid and counter-factual. Yes, Israel briefly considered using (then younger and weaker) Hamas to fight Fatah, that was 40 years ago, and that idea didn't last long and was soon abandoned. Treating it as it was definitive episode in the history of Hamas and Israel is like saying "US created the USSR" because they were allies for a while in the fight with the Nazis. Even order of magnitude sillier because the ties between Hamas and Israel were never even order of magnitude that close as between US and USSR.
The Jordan angle is bullshit too, unless there's a complete collapse of Jordanian government (not mere "instability") - which they are very determined not to let happen, and are willing to kill a lot of Palestinian Arabs for that, as they amply proved in the past, exactly nothing would happen there. And to achieve such a collapse would take a direct military action from somebody like Iran. Which would a) require them to somehow cross Iraq without Saudis noticing and doing anything, not to mention Iraqis, and b) do that all right under the nose of US air carrier group stationed next door, and also them not doing anything. I don't see how it's a possibility.
The problems of fighting the tunnels are real, and the fact Hamas has been building it for 16 years is real too. But Israel also knew about them for all these years, and they consider it doable. The main problem would be time - the more Israel stays in Gaza with boots on the ground, the more pressure there will be from the Kind People of the World. And if they can easily afford to tell Europe to take a long hike off a short peer, that wouldn't fly with the US, especially not with Dems in power who has their own sizeable pro-Hamas wing to placate. That would be the main problem for Israel for the middle term.
I largely agree. Reading through it, it came across as a 'just-so' story in the same vein as the Trump-era 'how Trump could lead to a nuclear war with North Korea!' book rather than something from someone with actual experience on the subject matter. Far more of a mediocrity of geopolitical punditry by someone clearly not particularly familiar with the geopolitics, or just the regional national politics, involved.
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Your theory :
1.) Egypt lets jihadists into gaza
2.) Israel is forced to attack Egypt ?
I think it goes
2.) Gaza turns into ISIS-P
3.) No one gives a shit when israel levels the place
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This is fantastic. My previous view was that Hamas launched the attack out of pure evil or stupidity, but after reading this I think they have a real chance of permanently crippling Israel. There is an equilibrium where if most of Israel's neighbors turn against Israel, Israel doesn't have a chance and then, I suspect, the Jewish population of Israel moves to the US, Canada, and/or Australia.
We've seen that twice before. Israel had a chance.
Yes: unless Arab military culture has changed in the past 23 years, the key threat to Israel is not a conventional conflict with its neighbours. A success of Palestinian human shield/"hit while crying" tactics to shift opinion (especially in the US) is more likely and more of a threat, though not necessarily likely.
https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/meria/meria00_den01.html
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