naraburns nihil supernum
1yr ago
(text post)
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Israel-Gaza Megathread #2
This is a refreshed megathread for any posts on the conflict between (so far, and so far as I know) Hamas and the Israeli government, as well as related geopolitics. Culture War thread rules apply.
Overall, the first barrier is a barbed-wire fence without sensors. The second barrier codenamed Hoovers A is 20 meters off and consist of a road and a fence with sensors. These existed before 2005. A new element is a 70-150 meter wide buffer zone codenamed Hoovers B with motion sensors in the ground and surrounded by a new sensor-equipped fence with watchtowers…
Then it should have worked unless there was detail not available to the public which I'm sure is the case (or the barrier was a fabrication displayed to be a deterrent). A barrier system like that, but somehow amazingly the enemy managed to push across in force without response or detection? Someone fucked up big time, or they're lying about the implementation. Or perhaps the response force was asleep on the job.
Never underestimate the power of holding the initiative.
The party line right now is that response teams were stretched too thin. Some Hamas forces were able to pin them down while others went and shot up music festivals. The Israeli strategy wasn’t prepared for this many coordinated attacks.
Now, there is an obvious case that intelligence fucked up big time, and missed signs of the buildup. I don’t know if this is true! Hindsight, after all, is 20/20. But it’s separate from the question of whether a border fence and buffer is sufficient. Israel tried that, tried to staff it with appropriate response teams, and Hamas worked around it anyway.
My understanding is that the Hoovers B section was sometimes thinner than initially promoted, sometimes down to 50m, and there's some amount of mumbling for how deep the underground anti-tunnel wall components of the barrier was, but otherwise the implementation was largely as described.
No land mines or electrified fence.
Both Kerem Shalom and Erez crossings were taken early, but so there were also breaks at least five other fence locations that did not have crossings, many of which were at parts of the border that matched the specifications exactly, along with limited aerial and boat forces.
I haven't seen a complete tactical breakdown of the initial attack, and some of it probably will never be released to the public, but my impression's that Hamas (and other related groups) overwhelmed or misdirected the immediately available response capabilities, then struck the observation and command posts before either a general alarm or backup response troops could be mustered. Some of that reflects reduced staffing because of a religious holiday, but more generally I don't think the IDF expected that Hamas could achieve this degree of coordination nor the simple amount of weapons and manpower without clear intel piling up for the IDF, nor that Hamas could accurately identify the observation control centers for the sort of strike blinding the surveillance side.
there were also breaks at least five other fence locations that did not have crossings
This is the real concern. This wasn't an isolated failing, but an indication that the system was wholly inadequate.
There needs to be an expansion of Defense in Depth with an appreciation of Hamas' now proven capabilities. As far as I can tell, this is actually the plan regarding annexing a buffer region around the border of Gaza. With a larger buffer/sterile zone you improve the ability to detect as well as provide enough delay to allow for a response.
Besides the physical and electronic security controls, there will need to be an overhaul of governance (response procedures), training and manpower requirements. No more skeleton crews on holidays. There's also more patchwork that needs to happen around air and seaborne detection of assaults as well as the border intersection with Egypt.
Basically the whole system needs upgrading with a big uplift in the amount of money, resources and manpower to maintain it.
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Notes -
Then it should have worked unless there was detail not available to the public which I'm sure is the case (or the barrier was a fabrication displayed to be a deterrent). A barrier system like that, but somehow amazingly the enemy managed to push across in force without response or detection? Someone fucked up big time, or they're lying about the implementation. Or perhaps the response force was asleep on the job.
Never underestimate the power of holding the initiative.
The party line right now is that response teams were stretched too thin. Some Hamas forces were able to pin them down while others went and shot up music festivals. The Israeli strategy wasn’t prepared for this many coordinated attacks.
Now, there is an obvious case that intelligence fucked up big time, and missed signs of the buildup. I don’t know if this is true! Hindsight, after all, is 20/20. But it’s separate from the question of whether a border fence and buffer is sufficient. Israel tried that, tried to staff it with appropriate response teams, and Hamas worked around it anyway.
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My understanding is that the Hoovers B section was sometimes thinner than initially promoted, sometimes down to 50m, and there's some amount of mumbling for how deep the underground anti-tunnel wall components of the barrier was, but otherwise the implementation was largely as described.
No land mines or electrified fence.
Both Kerem Shalom and Erez crossings were taken early, but so there were also breaks at least five other fence locations that did not have crossings, many of which were at parts of the border that matched the specifications exactly, along with limited aerial and boat forces.
I haven't seen a complete tactical breakdown of the initial attack, and some of it probably will never be released to the public, but my impression's that Hamas (and other related groups) overwhelmed or misdirected the immediately available response capabilities, then struck the observation and command posts before either a general alarm or backup response troops could be mustered. Some of that reflects reduced staffing because of a religious holiday, but more generally I don't think the IDF expected that Hamas could achieve this degree of coordination nor the simple amount of weapons and manpower without clear intel piling up for the IDF, nor that Hamas could accurately identify the observation control centers for the sort of strike blinding the surveillance side.
That explains a lot, thanks.
This is the real concern. This wasn't an isolated failing, but an indication that the system was wholly inadequate.
There needs to be an expansion of Defense in Depth with an appreciation of Hamas' now proven capabilities. As far as I can tell, this is actually the plan regarding annexing a buffer region around the border of Gaza. With a larger buffer/sterile zone you improve the ability to detect as well as provide enough delay to allow for a response.
Besides the physical and electronic security controls, there will need to be an overhaul of governance (response procedures), training and manpower requirements. No more skeleton crews on holidays. There's also more patchwork that needs to happen around air and seaborne detection of assaults as well as the border intersection with Egypt.
Basically the whole system needs upgrading with a big uplift in the amount of money, resources and manpower to maintain it.
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Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link