naraburns nihil supernum
1yr ago
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Israel-Gaza Megathread #2
This is a refreshed megathread for any posts on the conflict between (so far, and so far as I know) Hamas and the Israeli government, as well as related geopolitics. Culture War thread rules apply.
IMO, we are moving to a multi-polar world with the powers being US, Russia, and China. During this transition the powers are trying to find their place in the new hegemony and we are seeing the areas of friction such as the war in Ukraine and now a looming war in the ME. Our rivals, seeing us weakened, are likely to take the opportunities to strike or make moves for their own position.
The ME is kind of a wildcard IMO as they are not organized, and without a regional polar power, split themselves between US and Russia as protectorates. This conflict has the possibility to provide a unifying rallying cry for the Arab states. You can see the reshuffling of the cards now with the diplomatic disposition of Saudi Arabia and Jordan to name a few.
Again IMO, I think this is signalling the end of Pax Americana and our leadership is just not capable of realizing it. Russia will win and gain some clout, some ME countries will throw off the yoke of the US, and I await a Chinese flex. I'm not sure exactly how things will play out but it seems like something is going to happen in these calamitous geopolitical environments.
we are moving to a multi-polar world with the powers being US, Russia, and China.
Russia? Are you serious? Freaking EU is more powerful, after taking into account that it is amorphous blob of various countries.
Russia is flailing in war against its former vassal. Yes, Ukraine has some supplies from USA, other former Russian vassals and NATO, plus some bonuses.
An increasingly centralized EU could be a world power if it takes the direction that the US did early on and gradually become a single state. Barring that, no single EU state is powerful enough to qualify, and too restrained by the rest of the EU to flex the requiref muscles.
Russia will likely be more of a regional power than a world power, I agree. However, do not underestimate the psychological impact that backing the losing horse has on international opinion. Ukraine will likely lose the war, which means Team USA lost the war.
Doesn't matter how costly it was to Russia, it demonstrates that even very heavy US backing doesn't protect you against even a dysfunctional regional power, which means many smaller states will look elsewhere, such as forming their own regional blocks.
Ukraine will likely lose the war, which means Team USA lost the war.
maybe, but Russia will not get more powerful as result of that adventure. Maybe if Ukraine would unconditionally surrender today they would end ahead in total, but soon even that would not help. And in more realistic scenarios it is unqualified disaster for Russia even if they will declare mission accomplished in the end.
Russia will not get more powerful as result of that adventure
No, but they will acquire 62,000 sq mi of land that is better than most of the land that they currently possess. And the cost is what? Weapons that would have expired anyway? Some consumer goods shortages for things that no population actually needs to begin with? 180,000 men? That's only 3 men per square mile, a hell of a deal! And that of course is leaving out the possibility of Russia winning anything more than it has already gotten.
Maybe there are some more extreme long-term costs that I'm not seeing, but I really don't think so. What move could possibly have better contributed to Russia's long-term overall position.
The problem for Russia is that they have not finished paying costs.
True, but I guess I'm not just expecting their costs to mount much higher without a proportionally larger gain. The front has largely stagnated. Any operations large enough to move the meter would also be liable to shred what's left of Ukraine's fighting population and end with much larger land gains.
Russia is not really having shortage of land, this is not a Singapore.
It's not about square footage, it's about production capability. Major steel manufacturing industries, a very significant chunk of farmland, some of the world's larger lithium deposits and (if they can push into Kharkiv province,) significant natural gas deposits. For western countries that are living on their inheritance, things like that aren't too important. For everyone else, resource extraction is vital. Even what they've taken now is a win. In the case of unconditional surrender? It becomes the biggest material win any country has had since World War II.
When thinking about the land gains through conquest, it's worth looking at through a lens of "How much would you have to pay to acquire that area and everything in it minus the people?" There is no way anyone could acquire it cheaper than the price Russia will pay for the war.
Now of course, all of this is predicated on "If they can keep it," but with the combination of nuclear MAD and the unwillingness of any other major powers to step into a full-scale hot war, that seems likely.
An increasingly centralized EU could be a world power if it takes the direction that the US did early on and gradually become a single state. Barring that, no single EU state is powerful enough to qualify, and too restrained by the rest of the EU to flex the requiref muscles.
That's always how the EU, and each step of centralization, was sold. But who knows, maybe superpowerdom is just around the corner.
I mean, it's still a long ways off from being centralized enough. It doesn't even have a single unified military structure. The change a few years ago to be able to take on debt at the federal level was a big move in the right(?) direction though.
I mean, it's still a long ways off from being centralized enough. It doesn't even have a single unified military structure.
for start, idea of EU-as-a-superstate does not even have a clear support
it does not even have well unified goals, and even shared projects to produce weaponry were far from success as different countries have massively different needs and priorities
Right now "single unified military structure" is nonstarter. Though there are some very local unifications.
Well yes, that's the point of the boil-the-frog style gradual centralization. I don't expect them to achieve it anytime soon. More like 100 years from now.
Or something that will end up dragging the continent to the bottom, because the whole structure is corrupt by design. We'll find out eventually, I suppose.
This same diatribe has been written every year for the last 70 years. We’ve been in a unipolar world for about 30 years (before that it was still America first for 40 years). We’ve had Israeli Wars before it’s not a new thing. We’ve had oil embargo’s at a time when the US was dependent on importing energy. We’ve had 2 afghan wars. We’ve had Vietnam. We’ve had the Cuban missile crisis. We’ve had third world countries playing a bit of both sides.
Only one thing has begun to change and that’s the rise of China.
The fall of dollar hegemony has been on Bloomberg once a month from some goldbug every month for decades.
I see big geopolitical risks in the next few decades. There is the arrangement the west makes with China on issues. And there is the risks of the west being eaten internally by immigration. A bigger issue for those in Europe who are going to have to deal with Africas population boom and a potential tsunami of immigrant invaders of which they face a real risks of being replaced.
I’ve got a neat little book on my shelf titled “The Future of Conflict in the 1980s”. It was written at the dawn of the Reagan administration. Yes, it basically has the same concerns as @forestboomer.
New areas of friction. New conflicts over energy resources and military basing. The South China Sea was of interest, albeit for different reasons than today. Lots of emphasis on asymmetrical fights, brush wars, the strategy for US interventionism in a changing world.
I’ll have to see about writing it up one of these days.
I would be curious if the Roman Empire had people talking about its imminent collapse constantly. They probably did.
I’ve probably read 50k of the end are near articles. Someday I will be wrong discounting them. It’s most likely not tomorrow. Someone else will look like a genius just like Nouriel Roubini did once. But the genius probably wasn’t a genius and it was just dumb luck.
Russia isn't strong enough to be a pole on its own. It's certainly willing to burn a higher share of its economy and exhaust its military stockpiles to punch above its weight, but that's not sustainable in the long run. Like Iran in the ME, it has very few natural allies, which further limits its influence.
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Notes -
IMO, we are moving to a multi-polar world with the powers being US, Russia, and China. During this transition the powers are trying to find their place in the new hegemony and we are seeing the areas of friction such as the war in Ukraine and now a looming war in the ME. Our rivals, seeing us weakened, are likely to take the opportunities to strike or make moves for their own position.
The ME is kind of a wildcard IMO as they are not organized, and without a regional polar power, split themselves between US and Russia as protectorates. This conflict has the possibility to provide a unifying rallying cry for the Arab states. You can see the reshuffling of the cards now with the diplomatic disposition of Saudi Arabia and Jordan to name a few.
Again IMO, I think this is signalling the end of Pax Americana and our leadership is just not capable of realizing it. Russia will win and gain some clout, some ME countries will throw off the yoke of the US, and I await a Chinese flex. I'm not sure exactly how things will play out but it seems like something is going to happen in these calamitous geopolitical environments.
Russia? Are you serious? Freaking EU is more powerful, after taking into account that it is amorphous blob of various countries.
Russia is flailing in war against its former vassal. Yes, Ukraine has some supplies from USA, other former Russian vassals and NATO, plus some bonuses.
An increasingly centralized EU could be a world power if it takes the direction that the US did early on and gradually become a single state. Barring that, no single EU state is powerful enough to qualify, and too restrained by the rest of the EU to flex the requiref muscles.
Russia will likely be more of a regional power than a world power, I agree. However, do not underestimate the psychological impact that backing the losing horse has on international opinion. Ukraine will likely lose the war, which means Team USA lost the war.
Doesn't matter how costly it was to Russia, it demonstrates that even very heavy US backing doesn't protect you against even a dysfunctional regional power, which means many smaller states will look elsewhere, such as forming their own regional blocks.
maybe, but Russia will not get more powerful as result of that adventure. Maybe if Ukraine would unconditionally surrender today they would end ahead in total, but soon even that would not help. And in more realistic scenarios it is unqualified disaster for Russia even if they will declare mission accomplished in the end.
No, but they will acquire 62,000 sq mi of land that is better than most of the land that they currently possess. And the cost is what? Weapons that would have expired anyway? Some consumer goods shortages for things that no population actually needs to begin with? 180,000 men? That's only 3 men per square mile, a hell of a deal! And that of course is leaving out the possibility of Russia winning anything more than it has already gotten.
Maybe there are some more extreme long-term costs that I'm not seeing, but I really don't think so. What move could possibly have better contributed to Russia's long-term overall position.
The problem for Russia is that they have not finished paying costs.
As mentioned "Maybe if Ukraine would unconditionally surrender today they would end ahead in total".
Russia is not really having shortage of land, this is not a Singapore.
True, but I guess I'm not just expecting their costs to mount much higher without a proportionally larger gain. The front has largely stagnated. Any operations large enough to move the meter would also be liable to shred what's left of Ukraine's fighting population and end with much larger land gains.
It's not about square footage, it's about production capability. Major steel manufacturing industries, a very significant chunk of farmland, some of the world's larger lithium deposits and (if they can push into Kharkiv province,) significant natural gas deposits. For western countries that are living on their inheritance, things like that aren't too important. For everyone else, resource extraction is vital. Even what they've taken now is a win. In the case of unconditional surrender? It becomes the biggest material win any country has had since World War II.
When thinking about the land gains through conquest, it's worth looking at through a lens of "How much would you have to pay to acquire that area and everything in it minus the people?" There is no way anyone could acquire it cheaper than the price Russia will pay for the war.
Now of course, all of this is predicated on "If they can keep it," but with the combination of nuclear MAD and the unwillingness of any other major powers to step into a full-scale hot war, that seems likely.
Well, I have different expectations/hopes/hopium. We will see.
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That's always how the EU, and each step of centralization, was sold. But who knows, maybe superpowerdom is just around the corner.
I mean, it's still a long ways off from being centralized enough. It doesn't even have a single unified military structure. The change a few years ago to be able to take on debt at the federal level was a big move in the right(?) direction though.
for start, idea of EU-as-a-superstate does not even have a clear support
it does not even have well unified goals, and even shared projects to produce weaponry were far from success as different countries have massively different needs and priorities
Right now "single unified military structure" is nonstarter. Though there are some very local unifications.
Well yes, that's the point of the boil-the-frog style gradual centralization. I don't expect them to achieve it anytime soon. More like 100 years from now.
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Or something that will end up dragging the continent to the bottom, because the whole structure is corrupt by design. We'll find out eventually, I suppose.
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This same diatribe has been written every year for the last 70 years. We’ve been in a unipolar world for about 30 years (before that it was still America first for 40 years). We’ve had Israeli Wars before it’s not a new thing. We’ve had oil embargo’s at a time when the US was dependent on importing energy. We’ve had 2 afghan wars. We’ve had Vietnam. We’ve had the Cuban missile crisis. We’ve had third world countries playing a bit of both sides.
Only one thing has begun to change and that’s the rise of China.
The fall of dollar hegemony has been on Bloomberg once a month from some goldbug every month for decades.
I see big geopolitical risks in the next few decades. There is the arrangement the west makes with China on issues. And there is the risks of the west being eaten internally by immigration. A bigger issue for those in Europe who are going to have to deal with Africas population boom and a potential tsunami of immigrant invaders of which they face a real risks of being replaced.
I’ve got a neat little book on my shelf titled “The Future of Conflict in the 1980s”. It was written at the dawn of the Reagan administration. Yes, it basically has the same concerns as @forestboomer.
New areas of friction. New conflicts over energy resources and military basing. The South China Sea was of interest, albeit for different reasons than today. Lots of emphasis on asymmetrical fights, brush wars, the strategy for US interventionism in a changing world.
I’ll have to see about writing it up one of these days.
Yes agree.
I would be curious if the Roman Empire had people talking about its imminent collapse constantly. They probably did.
I’ve probably read 50k of the end are near articles. Someday I will be wrong discounting them. It’s most likely not tomorrow. Someone else will look like a genius just like Nouriel Roubini did once. But the genius probably wasn’t a genius and it was just dumb luck.
Early Christians were pretty insistent about the imminence of the end times.
Here's a fun wiki article, too.
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Russia isn't strong enough to be a pole on its own. It's certainly willing to burn a higher share of its economy and exhaust its military stockpiles to punch above its weight, but that's not sustainable in the long run. Like Iran in the ME, it has very few natural allies, which further limits its influence.
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