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Botond173  2yr ago (text post)   Edited 2yr ago   2806 thread views

On the destruction of the Soviet obelisk in Riga

Recently it was widely reported that the – to use its lengthy official name - Monument to the Liberators of Soviet Latvia and Riga from the German Fascist Invaders was destroyed by local authorities in the Latvian capital. This is certainly not without precedent, as numerous Red Army monuments have been removed in the Baltic states and also in Poland, Czechia and other nations formerly in the Warsaw Pact, many of these decisions being clearly driven by events in the Ukraine since 2004. I think we on this forum are mostly aware of the talking points used to justify their removal so I won’t bother to repeat those here. Instead I’d make the simple assumption in this particular case that those Latvians who support this decision are clearly unhappy with the direction their national history took in the past, and ask the question what sort of past they’d have preferred to have. I suppose this is a relevant Culture War question in Eastern Europe.

Let’s suppose, for the sake of argument, that Operation Barbarossa begins as it did, and then history develops differently. From then on, I think Latvia had the following options:

A – Germany wins decisive victory in the East and incorporates Latvia directly into the Reich; it only remains as an administrative area, if that; presumably, local Jews and Russians are either deported/killed or used as slave labor, and German settlers move in

B – same as A, but Latvia is allowed to retain limited autonomy as a vassal state / protectorate

C – the war in the East concludes with a separate negotiated peace in 1941 or 1942, and Latvia remains an independent nation as part of some demilitarized neutral zone between Germany and the USSR

D – same as C, but Latvia remains under German influence and its autonomy remains limited in the practical sense, maybe the Germans even retain military bases in Latvian territory

E – the war concludes with decisive Allied victory, but Stalin recognizes the independence of the Baltic states and withdraws his troops from there; still, Soviet influence remains palpable

F – same as E, but the USSR incorporates Latvia into a new military and economic system of cooperation under Soviet hegemony, and maintains military bases on Latvian soil; also, the Soviets have enough influence, soft power and political mechanisms to ensure that Latvia cannot leave this sphere of influence

G – everything happens as it actually did, but the Baltic states get nominal independence after 1945 instead of getting turned back into Soviet republics. Basically, the Warsaw Pact and COMECON have 3 more members.

I assume hardliner Latvian nationalists would prefer B (even for them, A is too extreme), and more moderate nationalists would prefer C or D. For obvious reasons however, even in the current climate of general anti-Russian/Soviet sentiment, I very much doubt they’d be willing to say this out loud. After all, A, B, C and D all mean that Nazi Germany remains undefeated, and Latvian Jews get genocided and pogromed. For the same reason, I believe these 4 options are unacceptable for the Russian and Jewish minorities in Latvia. After all, even C entails the strong possibility that they get oppressed and ethnically cleansed.

Also, I cannot help but notice that the same very obviously applies to Ukrainian nationalists in general, no matter how much leeway they currently get in Western media.

I’ll make the guess that E is the most ideal option in the eyes of Latvian centrists/normies at first sight; however, it still means that, realistically speaking, Latvia never gets to join either NATO or the EU. It’s the same as Finland’s fate but worse, as the border region between Russia and Finland at least consists of dense forests and numerous lakes, practically impassable ground for Russians if they invade (again). Also, I think it’s clear that the Soviets would agree to something (in their eyes) so unrealistic only if the US agrees to the same in Western Europe. In short, this means that even if NATO is formed, it remains limited in its geographical scope i.e. West Germany never gets incorporated into it, in other words, either the two German states remain neutral or the German state never gets divided and remains neutral.

G is very obviously unacceptable for most Latvians, as the difference from what actually happened is negligible.

F is, I think, also something most of them would only begrudgingly accept. However, the issue with this is that it’s basically merely the local version of NATO, but overseen by Russians. If our position today is that this would be unacceptable and violates our political norms, we’d also have to say that it was not acceptable for the Americans to maintain hegemony over Western European states and station their military units and nuclear weapons on their soil. (I’ll make an expectation for West Germany, as it was a defeated enemy and no peace treaty was signed.) Alternatively, one can make an argument that “but it’s different when the Americans do it, the Russians have always been Mongoloid Ugric-Turkic savages”, but I don’t know how many normies would be willing to say this unironically.

Also, both F and G entail the very real likelihood that the Soviets still get to erect a huge monument in Riga. Even in the case of E it’s relatively likely.

So where does that leave us?

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Not due to. You use them to arrive at conclusion that confederates were bad. Or not bad. It's a good example, as there seems to be much less agreement across US on their legacy and how to cope with it.

Imagine a monument to "famine relief policy of the metropole", erected in one of its colonies. Arguably, metropolitan policies often rather aggravated the consequences of famines, which conveniently served to suppress resistance. If you agree with this, you would be willing to get rid of the monument as commemorating a deliberate lie. Or you might think govt policy was a genuine, but ineffective attempt to help. That's causal inference.

I think this sort of thing comes in degrees. Nobody outside the lizardman constant seriously thinks the overall effect of the red Army in Latvia was liberation. A significant number of people in your scenario probably think the policy was sincere but ineffective, or that a particular Confederate monument was commemorating what is written on the monument and not commemorating slavery.

Agreed, our degree of uncertainty varies across cases. I admit the consensus about Soviet impact on Latvia. What I am arguing for -- is that counterfactuals matter, while people pretend they don't.

Another example (with placebo group) is when Soviet army stopped short of Warsaw at the moment of Polish uprising against Germans. Allegedly Soviets waited for Poles and Germans to destroy as much of each other before entering. When you know about Soviet-Polish mutual hate and Soviet extermination policies against Polish army, you might readily impute that motive to them. But, if there was no evidence on that particular case, would it be right to impute it? Would you erect a memorial to victims of Red army, that intentionally stopped?

Would you erect a memorial to victims of Red army, that intentionally stopped?

No. Who'd do that? On the other hand, the allegation assumes that the Red Army was capable of entering Warsaw in time to (theoretically) support the uprising. Due to a successful German counterattack, it actually wasn't:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Radzymin_(1944)

Red Army was waiting on other side of river Wisła.

Also, USSR sabotaged efforts to supply uprising (some resupply missions were flown from Italy). See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warsaw_airlift

denied flyover rights from their Soviet allies, who shot at them when the planes entered Soviet airspace (...) The airlift was further hampered by the Soviet Union not allowing Western Allies the use of its airfields for several weeks

Maybe they had some excuse to avoid helping, maybe they were truly unable. But in cases where they were able to help they deliberately sabotaged things.

Red Army was waiting on other side of river Wisła.

From the Wikipedia article linked above:

Already on 1 August, the leading elements of the 19th and 5th SS Panzer Divisions, closing from the west and east respectively, met at Okuniew, cutting the 3rd Tank Corps off from the other units of the Second Tank Army. Pressed into the area of Wołomin, the 3rd Tank Corps was pocketed and destroyed on 3 August 1944. Attempts to reach the doomed tank corps by the 8th Guards Tank Corps and the 16th Tank Corps failed, with the 8th Guards Tank Corps taking serious losses in the attempt.

Wołomin is roughly 20 kms to the east of Warsaw.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warsaw_Uprising#Soviet_stance

The role of the Red Army during the Warsaw Uprising remains controversial and is still disputed by historians.

Despite the fact, both of these objectives had been mostly secured by September. Yet the Soviet 47th Army did not move into Praga (Warsaw's suburbs) on the right bank of the Vistula, until 11 September (when the Uprising was basically over). In three days the Soviets quickly gained control of the suburb, a few hundred meters from the main battle on the other side of the river, as the resistance by the German 73rd Division collapsed quickly. Had the Soviets done this in early August, the crossing of the river would have been easier, as the Poles then held considerable stretches of the riverfront

On 1 August, the day of Uprising, the Soviet advance was halted by a direct order from the Kremlin.

All contemporary German sources assumed that the Soviets were trying to link up with the resistance, and they believed it was their defence that prevented the Soviet advance rather than a reluctance to advance on the part of the Soviets.[152] Nevertheless, as part of their strategy the Germans published propaganda accusing both the British and Soviets of abandoning the Poles.

Other explanations for Soviet conduct are possible. The Red Army geared for a major thrust into the Balkans through Romania in mid-August and a large proportion of Soviet resources was sent in that direction, while the offensive in Poland was put on hold.

Declassified documents from Soviet archives reveal that Stalin gave instructions to cut off the Warsaw resistance from any outside help. The urgent orders issued to the Red Army troops in Poland on 23 August 1944 stipulated that the Home Army units in Soviet-controlled areas should be prevented from reaching Warsaw and helping the Uprising, their members apprehended and disarmed.

Meanwhile, on 1 August the Polish Home Army had launched an insurrection in the city. Although they seized large areas in downtown Warsaw, the insurgents failed to secure the four bridges over the Vistula and were unable to hold the eastern suburbs of the city (Praga). During the ensuing weeks, while the Warsaw uprising progressed and ultimately failed, the Soviets continued their drive against Army Group Center northeast of Warsaw. For whatever motive, 1st Belorussian Front focused on holding firmly to the Magnuszew bridgehead, which was subjected to heavy German counterattacks throughout mid-August, and on driving forward across the Bug River to seize crossings over the Narew River necessary to facilitate future offensive operations.

Soviet 47th Army remained the only major force opposite Warsaw until 20 August, when it was joined by 1st Polish Army. Soviet forces finally broke out across the Bug River on 3 September, closed up to the Narew River the following day, and fought their way into bridgeheads across the Narew on 6 September. On 13 September lead elements of two Polish divisions assaulted across the Vistula River into Warsaw but made little progress and were evacuated back across the river on 23 September.

Political considerations and motivations aside, an objective consideration of combat in the region indicates that, prior to early September, German resistance was sufficient to halt any Soviet assistance to the Poles in Warsaw, were it intended. Thereafter, it would have required a major reorientation of military efforts from Magnuszew in the south or, more realistically, from the Bug and Narew River axis in the north in order to muster sufficient force to break into Warsaw. And once broken into, Warsaw would have been a costly city to clear of Germans and an unsuitable location from which to launch a new offensive.

(emphasis mine)

https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-monographs/252382

But, if there was no evidence on that particular case, would it be right to impute it?

"No evidence for X" isn't a free parameter about the world that you can change while changing nothing else. Changing the world to "no evidence for X" also changes the likelihood that X is true.

"No evidence for X" isn't a free parameter about the world that you can change while changing nothing else. Changing the world to "no evidence for X" also changes the likelihood that X is true.

This is incorrect. The absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. I might sit at my desk all day without seeing a lobster or any evidence there of, but that doesn't change the likelihood of lobsters existing or one of my coworkers having had Surf-and-turf for lunch.

Likelihood as a function is fixed in a classic bayesian mode. The only thing that we update is probability distribution over parameters. Likelihood corresponds to a static model of the world and should evaluate all possible states of the world, including hidden ones.

Jiro is right. In your example you are isolated from any indicators of lobsters whatsoever, and rely solely on priors. If I was regularly checking counts of web searches for lobsters, and they were decreasing or absent, I would at some point start to reduce probability of their existence.

The absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.

From a Bayseian point of view it absolutely is.

(It's especially so in a world where you'd expect to find evidence for X. The lack of clear Bigfoot pictures in the cell phone era is evidence against Bigfoot.)

From a Bayseian point of view it absolutely is.

Then the Bayseian point of view is wrong.

I don’t know of archival evidence, showing that Soviets planned to destroy Polish home army through deliberate timing of operation. I’ve read only a few AH posts, which usually have careful summaries (cc @Botond173). My sense is that Stalin was clearly hostile and antagonistic; Soviets and Poles hated each other and were almost in the state of war of its own; Soviet army at that direction exhausted its offensive momentum, but they seem to be able to act anyway; in the event there was no coordination.

My point was that this data leaves some open space, which everyone would tend to fill in as he likes. Even my whole presentation is biased in ways I don't see. Does it seem wrong to you? If you have a better account, I’d appreciate you sharing it.

USSR sabotaging efforts to supply uprising was more clear cut (some resupply missions were flown from Italy). See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warsaw_airlift

denied flyover rights from their Soviet allies, who shot at them when the planes entered Soviet airspace (...) The airlift was further hampered by the Soviet Union not allowing Western Allies the use of its airfields for several weeks

I recommend you to read the posts I linked, they are really good (can't quote them in a lossless way).

I dislike the whole "Soviet plan" take because if you admit, reasonably, that Poles were in a state of war with Soviets (after Katyn, defeat of Bolsheviks by Poles and German-Soviet invasion) - then why would Soviets help them at all?

As it happened, there were numerous instances of AK cooperation with frontline Soviet forces, particularly at the beginning of Burza. Kowel, Lwów, and Wilno in particular were jointly liberated by the AK and Red Army, but in each instance the AK was subsequently disarmed by the Soviets. The stories of these arrests spread and many AK units in the east actively withdrew ahead of Soviet forces to avoid being disarmed.

So yes, you would be more or less correct that the Rising did not expect or envision much in the way of direct Red Army support and cooperation. The entire point of the Rising was to liberate the capital during that window of opportunity presented by the advance of the Red Army towards Warsaw and the withdrawal of German forces from the area.

I see this as more of a malicious form of neglect than a dedicated plan by the Soviets to allow the Germans to wipe out the AK for them

Airfields/supplies: they assisted, albeit in a clearly formal way

The US specifically requested the use of Soviet airfields for refueling of their flights to Warsaw on 20 August, but this request was denied by Stalin on 22 August. Soviet airfields were only made available to the US on 18 September, after which they were again denied until after 30 September and the effective end of the Rising. Red Army Air Force provided its own limited supply drops, but only starting 13 September. Soviet air drops to the Rising were also significantly smaller in volume than US efforts

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