Do you have a dumb question that you're kind of embarrassed to ask in the main thread? Is there something you're just not sure about?
This is your opportunity to ask questions. No question too simple or too silly.
Culture war topics are accepted, and proposals for a better intro post are appreciated.
Jump in the discussion.
No email address required.
Notes -
The invasion makes more sense if you consider the underlying assumptions at the start of the conflict. Everyone expected the Russian army to roll up the entire country in a matter of weeks if not days. Furthermore, America hadn't sanctioned Russia in any meaningful way after the 2008 invasion of Georgia or the 2014 annexation of Crimea, and it was unclear whether Europe, let alone the world, would go along with anything more sweeping in the event the US tried to do something. It was assumed that Germany's dependence on Russian gas, not just for energy but for the feedstock of its chemical industry would leat to a split in NATO that could potentially be exploited later. All of these assumptions turned out to be wrong, and Putin didn't seem to have had a contingency for the possibility that he wouldn't be able to take Kiev.
Also given how reluctant US and EU was to help Ukraine before the war, and how pathetically US performed in Afghanistan, Putin wholly expected the West to roll over and give him Ukraine. And he wasn't entirely wrong - that was exactly what the West was prepared to do, until it turned out Ukrainians are not rolling over, and then it became too shameful to concede when Ukrainians didn't.
More options
Context Copy link
Interesting, @netstack expressed a similar sentiment below.
That makes sense to me (that the invasion was a miscalculation), but why continue the conflict now? If that were truly the case why wouldn’t Russia seek to de-escalate and extricate itself to rejoin the global economy?
Also, my recollection is that after 2014 Russia began saving up a rainy day fund of a few hundred billion dollars in foreign currency, which when combined with ongoing income from exporting natural resources meant they could withstand sanctions for a few years. Wouldn’t that indicate that they believed a prolonged sanctions regime was possible before they invaded?
From both sides, it’s now a face-saving thing. If NATO fails after giving Ukrainians their most advanced stuff, it looks fairly weak. We’re admitting that our best equipment, our intelligence, and our logistical support couldn’t drive back an army of a country with a third rate military. This would undermine Western hegemony in other parts of the world, countries would be more willing to challenge us openly, or to create groups that are not aligned with the International Community (which is run by and for the west and runs on westerners rules). China would be much more likely to try to take Taiwan and continue to try to control the South China Sea. The Middle East might well dump petrodollars for petro-yuans if the rate is better.
For Russia, their credibility as a cohesive country is at stake. Putin is playing for an empire, though I suspect he’s also sending a warning to other central Asian countries to not stray too far. This only works if Putin can take and keep Eastern Ukraine and prevent the rest of Ukraine from joining NATO and the EU. If that doesn’t happen, he reveals Russia as a weak country that cannot project power to its near neighbors. Which seems to me to encourage Central Asian leaders to look to other places for trade and support and so on.
I think China wins no matter what as long as the war can be dragged out long enough to deplete our weapons stockpiles. Every weapons system sent to Europe is one that cannot be sent to Taiwan.
NATO has not even started doing this (unless modern planes and long range missiles started to be delivered in large volumes - or any at all).
Modernish tanks and artillery was delivered but in small quantifies.
HIMARS was delivered in tiny volumes and had noticeable impact and continues to produce hilarious Russian claims.
That is based on assumption that noone made any procurement based on what happened. This is not true in general, and not fully true even for Germany.
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
Because the Great Emperor Putin can't just tuck his tail between his legs and admit he'd been beaten. And not just by some mighty American Jedi, but by stupid Ukrainians who are routinely laughed at and despised by Russians as stupid country yokes talking in stupid broken Russian and aren't capable of anything but serving as entertainment for the real great nations. They can not lose, because the whole world model that they have been building for years says they can not lose. And also, losers do not stay in power for long in Russia. If you kill 150 thousands Russians, and win - you are a military genius. If you kill 150 thousands Russians and lose - well, then you'd have to have some answers. So, they can not stop now.
They probably predicted some sanctions, but not as coordinated and deep as it is going to be now, because they expected Ukraine to collapse and the West to accept it with some token protests. Same as happened in 2014 and with Georgia and many times before. They certainly didn't expect the wide boycott, but what they're going to do now - admit it? They'd pretend it's all planned and go begging to China.
Which is particularly interesting, because I saw some commentators talking about how the war in Ukraine was causing big problems for many of the (relatively) poor debtors in china’s belt-and-road initiative, making china unhappy about the war and less likely to aid Russia.
I saw this idea (that belt-and-road debtors would be hard-hit by economic fallout from the war) floating around before the grain deal was struck, so maybe the state of the global economy is different now. There was that big showy meeting between Putin and Xi recently.
Also, isn’t it in China’s interest to have a weaker northern neighbor?
It's absolutely in China's interest to make Russia weaker - Russia has juicy resource-rich Siberia which is much closer to China than to any major Russian centers, and also getting some cheap oil and selling some low-quality phones and weaponry with inflated price tag wouldn't hurt either. China is ecstatic to see the West and Russia fight. But they don't want to lose the Western markets - so they'd help Russia as much as they can (and extract as much cash as they can from it) without pissing off the West enough to cause them to agree to suffer all the economic hardships that detachment from China would cause. Which leaves them not infinite, but pretty substantial space for maneuver. China is clearly the beneficiary there, and is interested in prolonging the conflict as much as possible, but not much in Russia winning (it's probably better for them if Russia loses, but after a very long war).
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
How long did it take the US to give up on Iraq and Afghanistan, nations culturally distinct and geographically distant from it? Now, imagine how long the US would fight to keep Canada or Mexico from joining an enemy bloc
Ukraine is the second largest nation of Russian speakers, it directly abuts Russia. Putin is also an autocrat, he can't just go "my bad" and walk away, unlike Bush (and, even then, a highly critical Obama couldn't just back out of everything).
And what does he get if he leaves? He'll have handed NATO an unconditional win, he would have strengthened the links between NATO and Ukraine and within NATO, left a more formidable enemy on his border and discredited himself at home.
If he keeps fighting he can try to lock in his gains, such as they are. Or hope that things get bad enough that the coalition breaks or tires and leans on Ukraine for some sort of peace. Things have gone badly but it's far from over.
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
Everyone meaning who? The underlying assumptions of who? Many non-western commentators didn't make these assumptions or claims.
The only way this would have been true given the invasion force was for the Ukrainian government to totally collapse. Many people did not think the Ukrainian government would immediately collapse. If anything, such claims from entirely Western sources evidenced their own failures (or ulterior motives) and not some clear outcome absent Russian failure or incompetence. Ukraine had been fortified for 8 years and had raised the largest army in Europe apart from Russia.
If anything, this simply points out how so many fell victim to obvious frame setting by NATO-mouthpieces to portray anything other than something which almost certainly would never have happened as failure and everything since then has been in the same vein.
The western media apparatus' shock and awe campaign was truly a sight to behold and its silliness continues to bear fruit.
absent government collapse, anyone who thinks <30,000 men were going to "take Kiev," a city of ~3m people is not a person worth paying attention to on these matters
how would it seem Putin didn't have a contingency despite having multiple other fronts which immediately took large swathes of land? if he was certain he was going to take kiev in 3 days or whatever with 30,000 men, why did he bother with the other stuff?
What pro-Russian sources or telegrams do you look at?
That's exactly what was expected - governmental collapse. Zelensky flees to the US, local Russian agents placed there beforehand take power, and in the matter of days the population finds itself under the new rule, which is fully controlled by Russia. Of course there expected to be resistance - but not from organized military, but from disorganized bands of poorly armed and poorly organized guerilla fighters, which could be suppressed with overwhelming force. That's why it went so poorly for them once the initial plan failed - some of the troops were "riot control" troops and not military, and the military expected more of "intimidating the guerillas into submission" than "fighting a well-organized military" mission.
It wasn't something that they just dreamed - they took Crimea this way more or less. They expected Ukraine to be harder, but not as hard as it proved to be.
Also, as far as I understand, the Russian leadership was sold a bill of goods about how much support Putin has in Ukraine and how many agents there are placed in key positions in Ukraine, while in reality most of the money allocated to that were stolen, and most of the people Russia bought were either not key people or too cowardly to do anything once the main plan failed. Though some places - like Kherson - were taken pretty easily, and there are still questions to be answered how exactly that happened. And some pretty key people - like the owner of the biggest Ukrainian aircraft engine manufacturer - were indeed working for Russia. So it wasn't total waste, just not as good as it was sold, and thus unable to deliver as promised.
Taking country of 40 million is a lot of work. Decapitating the government is just the part of it. Capturing key strongholds the other part. Controlling the energy infrastructure, the road infrastructure, etc. Even with the collapse it would be a large and complex plan. Russia didn't just intend to destroy Ukraine, it intended to take over - and taking over such a large territory and such a large population is a massive undertaking. Of course they needed a lot if "other stuff" beyond taking Kiev.
I've been following this pretty closely from sources on both sides of the conflict, sources which have proved to make true claims for years, and, frankly, I don't think we have something close to a similar enough view of what happened to really discuss this without getting into bickering "sources" wars about specifics, e.g., the make-up of the <30,000 soldiers in the Kiev push.
The <30,000 soldiers and a few hundred VDV landing at the airport were going to do a decapitation strike, but the entirety of the Russian aeroforce couldn't be bothered to use a single missile to target government leaders? This isn't believable. What is believable is a pinning maneuver to establish a landbridge to crimea if the government collapse didn't happen, except if that is accepted one also has to admit contingency plans.
Ukraine government collapse was a possibility and a hope, it was not a foregone expected conclusion.
Not sure what do you mean here. Russian airforce did quite a lot of strikes. But hitting "the government leaders" isn't as easy as you think - first, you have to know where they are. Second, you need to get there - and these places would be ones of the best protected. Third, you need to actually strike the target - which Russians were consistently dismally bad at, unless the target it "any random residential building in the two-mile radius". Fourth, your strike has to have some effects - and if you saw the actual buildings we're talking about (I did), they are pretty sturdy. Not accounting to what defenses were built in in the soviet times (that I don't know but I am sure there's at least the basement there).
The goal of Russians never was to convince you, so they may have omitted a couple of steps to make it believable to you. They didn't try to carpet bomb Kiev for the chance to hit Zelensky because a) Ukrainians have anti-aircraft missiles and fighters too (which btw Russians declared destroyed but very very soon found out they aren't) and b) they would spend a lot of effort to bomb one place and Zelensky would be in another place. If they had a way to know where Zelensky is at any given moment, they could kill him a hundred of times, because he has been visiting places within direct artillery or missile strike from Russian forces many times. They just didn't know where he is. You, of course, are free to believe whatever makes you feel better.
Yes, of course they wanted the landbridge to Crimea. If they didn't want it, they wouldn't capture it, obviously. But that was one part of the plan. The other was the decapitation. Somehow in your mind, the capturing of the land bridge to Crimea contradicts the decapitation plan, but however I try, I just can't see how.
Speaking of the bridge, btw, the south was where the collapse in parts did happen - that's where the strategy of recruiting local traitors worked the best, and that explains how Russia captured so much territory with almost zero resistance. They expected the same to happen everywhere, but it didn't. So they had to scramble for the plan B - which means mass mobilization, for which their army absolutely wasn't ready (one more proof they didn't expect needing it) - in fact, some in the military now saying if they do another mobilization like that, the army would not survive, because the chaos and disorganization it caused was horrible (for them, of course, for Ukrainians it was what allowed them to stop the Russia's advance).
It was an expected occurrence, though not the conclusion of the war, just the decisive phase of it - the composition and arrangement of the forces all point to it, so does contemporary propaganda, which nowhere nearly mentioned the possibility of year-long exhausting campaign requiring sending entire Russian prison population to serve as soil fertilizer. Everybody - including top generals and the Khuylo himself - expected quick collapse of the governmental structure. They certainly expect the war not end at it, but they expected the war to be won. It could take a lot of time from the decisive moment to the full victory - in WW2, it took several years - but the break had to occur quickly. It didn't, so now they need to conduct the campaign which they didn't expect to have to conduct.
Was there even one attempt at targeting government leaders? Your claim is that Russia had an extensive network of people ready to take over who chicken out, but they couldn't feed adequate enough intel for Russians to engage in a specific strike against government leaders in a "decapitation strike"? Instead, you want to claim the VDV + <30,000 soldiers were them doing this. Or was it the mysterious cowardly agents who were going to rise up but didn't? This isn't a strong argument.
What isn't believable is your argument given what actually happened in the opening stages of the war for the reasons I specified in my comment. It is difficult and yet they didn't try to do it at all. Or are you claiming they did try, but it's hard and they didn't succeed a single time? I haven't seen anything to support that. When I read a breakdown of the things destroyed in the opening stage of the war, none of it was government buildings.
Please read my comments carefully. My argument is the claim Russia thought government collapse was a foregone conclusion because Putin "seemingly had no contingency," is poor because the large force moving to take the land bridge is evidence there was a contingency if the Kiev push didn't arrive to a collapsed government. The contradiction is in the claim I originally responded to in a discussion you injected yourself into.
if memory serves, this was at the end of September (6 months post invasion)
What I saw in the opening month makes me think it was a hope, but would serve as a pinning force for Russians to get into position inside Ukraine if this didn't come to pass, which it did.
Not a successful one. Obviously, I can't know about unsuccessful ones. There were attempts to send attack groups to capture/kill the leaders, but those were stopped way before they could reach their goals. That was the part of the decapitation attempt, yes.
Yes, they had a lot of people who kinda liked Russia, even more people that were willing to take money from Russia, but way less, and not enough people to actually do something for Russia, and not high enough to be able to feed that high level of classified info. I'm not sure why it surprises you. If Putin wanted to capture the US and offered some US people tons of money, probably there would enough people who would take the money. There are people supporting Putin in the US right now. None of them would be able to tell Putin the exact location and schedule of the US president. For that, you need completely different level of access. Russia has some scores there - as I said, they gained a lot on the south basically for free, and has - and still have, on the occupied territories - people glad to work for them. But way not enough to achieve their goals.
Part of it, yes. The VDV's mission was primarily to capture the airports to allow reinforcements to land closer to Kiev, which is the standard Russian strategy, and at which they failed. It is also the standard strategy - not only for Russia - to first capture vital points with small and rapid force and then keep it until the bulk of the force arrives, while denying the enemy coordination and ability to mount any defense. That's why their attack looks kinda spiky if you look at the map - the direction is at major centers, like Kiev, Kharkiv, Kherson, Maruipol, Odessa. At those, they had success at Kherson, and after much struggle, Mariupol which by then was undefendable. All others failed.
And the planned size of Russian force was never <30K. It was 150-170K. Of course, only part of it was dedicated to Kiev specifically.
No, it started much earlier. As always, in Russia the official state of affairs and the real state of affairs is much different. At first, as you described, they thought it could be done with small forces and the rest mopped up at leisure. Then they had to involve other army units (remember, they had more than a million at hand, even though obviously they couldn't use them all at once) - initially they publicly promised no enlisted personnel at all will be fighting in Ukraine, only volunteers on contract, since this was not a war, but "special operation". In fact, you could be jailed (maybe still could) just for calling it a war. Then they started "volunteering" other military units. In April, the first summons to reservists started to appear. Those were weakly enforced t first, but for those silly enough to show up, they were pressured to sign "voluntary contracts" with the promise (false of course) that they will be only used as supply units in the rear and never see the frontline. Some were stupid enough to buy it. On May 28 Putin signed an order removing age limits for such recruitment. In June, they started enlisting prisoners. In Donetsk and Luhansk, the mobilization started in February, and by June became compulsory, with frequent manhunts, for any able-bodied man (they surely felt very protected by Putin by then). Most of the mobilized were dead or disabled soon after arriving at the frontlines, because nobody bothered to adequately train or supply them. And only after exhausting all these options, in September indeed, Duma officially passed the law serving as the base for the official mobilization.
Overall, there was a clear expectation at each step that they have enough resources and wouldn't need more, only to need more within the next month or two. Initially, they denied the mobilization would be needed - but with time, they realized this is the only thing that would save them from immediate collapse. Yes, it took time - given severe resource constraints and the vast sizes of the arena (over 1000km battle line). During that time, Russia was persisting in denial that they are at war and that they will need more resources. But gradually they had to recognize it. This does not match the idea that they expected the long at hard campaign from the start - they absolutely did not. They expected a quick win. Then maybe a not-so-quick win. Then maybe a moderately long win. Then maybe a slow win. Then "at least something we could declare a win without losing face". Now they expect maybe at least not lose what they had in 2021. It will get worse for them.
Where, based on what, targeting who and this is proved by what? I have never seen any supporting evidence of anything remotely like this. I have seen lots of evidence of the opposite, i.e., Russians knowing about where government leaders were and not attacking them.
They sent waves of missiles which destroyed important military targets all over the country from Karkov to Lvov. There are countless examples of this. And yet not a single civilian leadership building was destroyed? Your entire claim rests on soldiers attempting, but failing, at targeting government leaders, but I haven't seen good evidence of this.
"Government leaders" != only the President, the most guarded and secretive government leader of any country
Lots of those people could indeed say where mayors were, where deputies were, where representatives were, etc. Difficult? Yes, for some. Impossible for all? No.
I have always been speaking specifically about the Kiev push.
My understanding is that summonses to reservists are a normal part of the operation of the Russian military, absent if a war is going on or not. Is this accurate? Russia's hybrid military system is very foreign to me. In the US, reservists are regularly called up for all sorts of functions and are regularly deployed anyway as normal operation of the military irrelevant of wars or whatever else.
So they received summonses, but then they weren't enforced, and if they did show up then they would sign voluntary contracts despite them being reservists and receiving summonses anyway? What happened if they showed up and didn't sign "voluntary" contracts? Do you have any idea how many people this happened to?
https://www.cnn.com/videos/world/2022/03/01/ukraine-kharkiv-government-building-explosion-marquardt-ovn-intl-hnk-vpx.cnn
"Large explosion takes out government building in central Kharkiv"
And for question "why official residence of president was not bombed" - I am pretty sure that Zelensky is not staying there.
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
I will admit that I don't look at pro-Russian sources very much. That being said, do you have any examples of pro-Russian or otherwise non-Western sources who argued that Ukraine would be difficult to take and likely to lead to stalemate? And what ulterior motives could the West have possibly had for intentionally underestimating Ukraine's defense capabilities? To convince Russia that Ukraine was a soft target so that they'd invade and get bogged down? It's possible, but if that was the case, and there was plenty of non-Western concern about Ukraine's capabilities, then Russia took the bait hook, line, and sinker. I'm not sure exactly what you're trying to argue here. You seem to be at least mildly pro-Russian, but you're essentially arguing that Russia is incompetent because they knew that situation was likely to turn into the fiasco it has become but decided to go in anyway. That's why the OP was asking what the point was, because from where things stand now, the war doesn't look rational.
Simultaneous pressure is a pretty standard military tactic. If he thinks he can take Kiev in a few weeks, his job is made a lot harder if the Ukrainians concentrate their forces there. If he attacks on a broad front from the South and East, in addition to the North, the Ukrainians have to spread themselves more thinly—defending Kiev is kind of pointless if the Russians roll across the rest of the country unopposed. Moscow had also been pushing the idea for years that Russian-speaking Ukrainians were an oppressed minority who would prefer to be part of Russia, and there was some thought that heavily Russian regions of Ukraine would lie down like Crimea did in 2014.
There is a chasm between Ukraine being "difficult to take" and "rolled within weeks or days." No, I do not have a ready list of examples from over a year ago. Do you have a single Russian source making that claim? How many examples of pro-Russian sources would convince you Russians didn't think they would take Ukraine within weeks or days?
If you frame something which almost certainly won't happen as the measure of "success," because it's simply expected, then the thing which won't happen will be evidence of your enemy's failure. It sets up a narrative of the heroic defense and given the laughable propaganda stories pushed by major Western outlets for the last year, e.g., ghost of kiev, spaghetti sauce anti-air, snake island defense, and many more, it sets the opportunity to help. Ukraine is winning, they're engaged in heroic defense, Russian failure is immense, their military is totally incompetent, and they could be defeated with just some help.
The media campaign starkly changed before the invasion and after the invasion. It went from years talking about beefing up Ukrainian defenses and army to Russia conquering Kiev in 3 days or else they're a joke. I have seen nothing to think any of this western "info"tainment had any effect on Russian decisionmaking at all.
I am not pro-Russian. I have been following this war since the maiden coup in 2014. I am arguing none of that. I answered the OP in another comment.
Yes, that's the point. You don't need to wildly speculate about motives, understandings, or anything, you can simply read what Russians are saying. It's odd most of the people on this board refuse to do any of that (they're lying after all) and at the same time swallow NATO talking points through their obvious mouthpieces in western media and have formed their entire opinion based on it.
Not only this - there are Russian sources widely available that had, in the first days of the war, proclaimed this already happened. They already had the content prepared for the collapse of the Ukraine government and the glorious Russian victory, and in the rush to be the first to celebrate, somebody hit the button a little too early and that content became available to all. With all the texts about Ukrainian nazi government collapsing and Ukraine gladly joining the brotherly embrace of Russia and all that. Yes, I saw those with my own eyes, as did everybody in the internet who understands Russian (not sure if it was ever translated? Google probably can do it well enough by now).
You can, just don't believe what they are saying this minute has anything to do with the truth. They say a lot of things, and only some of them can be believed. They also say a lot of diametrically contradicting things, and a lot of things that are plain lies. So you need to correlate what they are saying with what they are doing. If they say "we are going to smash Ukraine because it's fake state and it all belongs to Russia" and then they try to smash Ukraine - then it's clear they were telling the truth. If they say "we are here only to protect the civilian population" and then they blow up a theater full of refugees and a residential neighborhood - they it's clear they were lying.
Neat. So what? I didn't make the claim that no Russian said it.
Perhaps this is true and perhaps you did, but the person I am responding to did not and that's part of the point of my post. He writes as if this was some sort of universally agreed upon outcome and it didn't happen because of reasons X, Y, or Z, all of which he believes because he only looks at particular sources while not seeing anything else even while acknowledging those sources are comically biased and have incentives to lie.
you cannot simultaneously claim these things
I didn't write Russians only tell the truth. What has been done is what Russians are saying now and have been saying for decades is ignored and instead in its place are the rambling speculations of NATO funded "thinktanks" printed in op-eds across Western media to present a narrative to support the debacle in Ukraine.
Yes I can. Russians will say whatever serves them at the moment (or at least whatever they think does, most of them aren't geniuses). It could be the truth, or it could be lies, it could be revealing their intent or concealing it. You need to consider who said it, when, why and in what context - and then even lies can reveal some truths behind them. For example, Russian lying about Ukraine being "fake state with fake nation" reveals the truth that Russia wants to destroy Ukrainian statehood and not just secure a couple of enclaves with Russian-speaking population. You can't believe their words but you can believe the intent behind them.
Exactly the opposite. Exactly from studying what they lied for decades and what they are lying now, and identifying the rare cases they didn't lie and when these cases happened, we could deduce so much about their real thought process and their real intent. You are confusing "ignoring" and "taking at face value". One absolutely shouldn't ignore them and also absolutely should never ever take it at face value.
I'm not sure what this means. Nobody on the West supports Russian invasion into Ukraine (at least nobody that has access to op-eds, there are all kinds of people around of course). So what narrative are you talking about?
Okay, you only meant to make a comment on the intent of the speaker. Many Russians and pro-Russians sources do in fact care about how closely their statements reflect reality, i.e., the truth, and this is evidenced by them being consistently correct about statements they have made about the conflict.
No, I mean the Western media literally ignored them for the most part, i.e., didn't bother to address the statements they were making for the reasons they didn't any particular thing or disagreed with any particular thing. I agree no statements should be taken at face value when there are reasons to think they're not. However, this cuts both ways in this conflict.
The narrative of the conflict. How it began, the history of the conflict, how it's going now, which side is good, which side is bad, etc. It is true no one writing op-eds in WaPo or similar "news" orgs support Russian invasion of Ukraine and this has caused much of the problem of perceptions in places such as these compared to realities on the ground or the history of the conflict.
Instead of addressing Russian statements of concern or demands, they're simply waived away and instead convenient narratives about what really happened and what Putler really wants fill the pages of Western media. Looking at both sides of the media complexes, whether or not Russians would love to manipulate and lie or not, their capability to actually do so isn't even on the same planet as the shock-and-awe campaign carried out by Western media on their various populations in order to establish support for proxy war in Ukraine. Almost comical lies have been disseminated and are still believed by large portions of people in the West, e.g., the snake island last stand, ghost of kiev, spaghetti sauce grandma anti-air extroidinaire, casualty numbers, etc.
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link