site banner

Culture War Roundup for the week of January 30, 2023

This weekly roundup thread is intended for all culture war posts. 'Culture war' is vaguely defined, but it basically means controversial issues that fall along set tribal lines. Arguments over culture war issues generate a lot of heat and little light, and few deeply entrenched people ever change their minds. This thread is for voicing opinions and analyzing the state of the discussion while trying to optimize for light over heat.

Optimistically, we think that engaging with people you disagree with is worth your time, and so is being nice! Pessimistically, there are many dynamics that can lead discussions on Culture War topics to become unproductive. There's a human tendency to divide along tribal lines, praising your ingroup and vilifying your outgroup - and if you think you find it easy to criticize your ingroup, then it may be that your outgroup is not who you think it is. Extremists with opposing positions can feed off each other, highlighting each other's worst points to justify their own angry rhetoric, which becomes in turn a new example of bad behavior for the other side to highlight.

We would like to avoid these negative dynamics. Accordingly, we ask that you do not use this thread for waging the Culture War. Examples of waging the Culture War:

  • Shaming.

  • Attempting to 'build consensus' or enforce ideological conformity.

  • Making sweeping generalizations to vilify a group you dislike.

  • Recruiting for a cause.

  • Posting links that could be summarized as 'Boo outgroup!' Basically, if your content is 'Can you believe what Those People did this week?' then you should either refrain from posting, or do some very patient work to contextualize and/or steel-man the relevant viewpoint.

In general, you should argue to understand, not to win. This thread is not territory to be claimed by one group or another; indeed, the aim is to have many different viewpoints represented here. Thus, we also ask that you follow some guidelines:

  • Speak plainly. Avoid sarcasm and mockery. When disagreeing with someone, state your objections explicitly.

  • Be as precise and charitable as you can. Don't paraphrase unflatteringly.

  • Don't imply that someone said something they did not say, even if you think it follows from what they said.

  • Write like everyone is reading and you want them to be included in the discussion.

On an ad hoc basis, the mods will try to compile a list of the best posts/comments from the previous week, posted in Quality Contribution threads and archived at /r/TheThread. You may nominate a comment for this list by clicking on 'report' at the bottom of the post and typing 'Actually a quality contribution' as the report reason.

13
Jump in the discussion.

No email address required.

What they were supposed to do?

Not fuck up Russia in the first place with the Clinton administration's disasterious attempt to 'reform' a post-Soviet Russia and seek partnership instead of hegemony? Agree to a healthy buffer zone in Eastern Europe? Not create and amplify the various revolutions in Eastern Europe, including the various 'Color Revolutions', and more recently and relevantly the heavy American involvement in Euromaidan and Ukrainian politics generally? Not deliberately antagonize Russia by constantly demanding Ukraine and Georgia should be admitted into NATO (despite their questionable strategic value) the same way the US would never tolerate a country in their immediate sphere (Monroe Doctrine) to ally with a hostile power (e.g. China or Russia) let alone one on their border?

Agree to a healthy buffer zone in Eastern Europe?

Nope. If you let Russia reconquer this area again then it may be many things but it will not be healthy.

Not fuck up Russia in the first place with the Clinton administration's disasterious attempt to 'reform' a post-Soviet Russia

Neoliberal policies and selloffs of Soviet industry were an absolute disaster and this should have been predictable but we have to recall that this wasn't a Japan situation where MacArthur and America could totally get their way (though I wonder if they'd have followed the same policies if occupation had happened in the 90s...)

Even at its weakest Russia was never occupied and was a nuclear-armed state. A lot more of their destiny was in their hands.

Yeltsin and co. could have had a less corrupt process for privatizing resources but their country has no long history of democracy and transparency so it isn't surprising it went the way it did. But that's still a failure of Russians and Russian institutions.

This line on Russia also seems a bit paradoxical: the demand seems to be that the US treat Russia as an equal (it wasn't; they lost) but also that the US is responsible for Russia's economic and political malaise , as if it was a vassal or occupied state like Japan or South Korea (which, btw, didn't just uncritically bow to neoliberal policy- if a small Asian country could forge a smarter path...)

This line on Russia also seems a bit paradoxical: the demand seems to be that the US treat Russia as an equal (it wasn't; they lost) but also that the US is responsible for Russia's economic and political malaise , as if it was a vassal or occupied state like Japan or South Korea (which, btw, didn't just uncritically bow to neoliberal policy- if a small Asian country could forge a smarter path...)

It's not paradoxical because I never used the word equal. As with all the other times, I commented on this issue on the Motte, I will say that Russia is and can only ever be a regional power in its current state. I used the word 'partnership' which does not require equal status. This is contrast to 'hegemony' which this absolutely the approach the US has taken in this region and many others. As to the issue of America's responsibility to the current political and economic status of Russia, I strongly recommend reading "Russia's Road to Corruption" a US Congressional report on the issue from the year 2000. At best, you can say this was the result of gross incompetence by the Clinton administration and their economic advisors. At worst, it wouldn't be remiss to believe that that Clinton administration's policies were actively malicious. At some level, it's hard to distinguish between the two.

It's not paradoxical because I never used the word equal.

Fair enough, I was riffing off Brzezinski's take that Russia wanted a level of deference to its considerations that was simply out of whack with its power at the time (which may still be true), but I shouldn't have applied that language of "equality" since you didn't say it. My apologies.

As to the issue of America's responsibility to the current political and economic status of Russia, I strongly recommend reading "Russia's Road to Corruption" a US Congressional report on the issue from the year 2000.

I actually went through this. Well, skimming parts, but reading at least most of it.

This is not really a neutral appraisal of "Russia's road to corruption", it's a partisan Republican attack on the Clinton administration. This is its obvious function from the name on – and the fact that all the Reps indicated as writers are Republicans. It just takes negative developments in Russia in the 90s and then blames everything it can on Clinton admin on very loose grounds, utilizing an everything-and-the-kitchen-sink approach. The things that happened before Clinton admin took power, ie. before January 1993, can be blamed on the Russians, since doing otherwise would of course be putting a blame on a blameless Republican president. Everything after that, though? It's Clinton and Gore.

One chapter of the assessment consists of Clinton assigning the Russia portfolio to Gore (it’s not really explained why this would be so bad, since Gore, through his congressional career, would be expected to genuinely have more natsec experience, and of course it might be noted since Clinton powerful vice presidencies with serious duties have been pretty normative anyway). Gore is then blamed for dealing with Russian Prime Ministers – who would probably be pretty much who you’d expect him to deal with.

There’s little substantive criticism and a lot of reaching – one chapter seemingly blames the entirety of the rise of Russian organized crime in the 90s on the fact of Gore-Chernomyrdin commission existing! - and it’s obvious the point here is that it’s 2000, the election year, Gore was the Dem candidate, and moreover the GOP candidate was the son of George Bush sr., who of course is only praised here.

Probably the most substantial criticism is that IMF kept extending loans to Russia despite its problems, but even here far too much conjuncture is made on first straightforwardly blaming Clinton for this, then blaming basically all of Russia’s economic woes on IMF credit being too easy (at most one could say that this bolstered somewhat decisions that the Russians would have most likely made anyway), and then the claim is that this so discredited Americans in Russian eyes (the same Russians who made these decisions) that Russia just had no choice but to sell weapons to countries it would have probably sold weapons to anyway. Again, the main point is bashing Clinton moreso than be some sort of a real analysis of America-Russia relations in the 90s.

Since the criticism is so loose and unfocused I don’t generally really get what the Republicans even think the Clinton administration should have done. The Republicans claim that Clinton admin basically pushed the Russians towards “state interference” and “centralization” instead of “building a free market economy”, expect the Russian privatizations were bad, because they were done before the Russians had built a market economy. But to do what they want would have almost certainly required a more centralized and structured effort, requiring state interference. Disastrous crash privatizations are what happens when one doesn’t have that.

On the other hand Clinton-Gore gets blamed for ruining US relationship with Russia (wasn’t this one of Bush campaign themes?), on the other hand the report constantly indicates that Clinton-Gore should have meddled much more in the Russian policies, condemned Russian weapons trade with Iran and the Chechnya War, enlarged NATO even faster than it did, dealt with figures other than official Russian state figures like Gaidar and Chernomyrdin (apparently Yavlinsky – that eternal Western hope of a sensible Russian liberal, with 30 years of failure running currently to make a mark in the Russian society) etc. – ie. done stuff that would have ruined the US-Russia relations far more and would have probably led to a good chance of a figure more radically anti-Western than Putin getting in power, possibly sooner than Putin’s anti-Western turn really happened.

Of course, there are actual points here, I am ready to accept that US should have been more forceful about condemning Russian policy in Chechnya, or critical of the way the 1993 Duma standoff was handled, or about Russian corruption, or a host of other things, but even there it’s not really about US interfering too much, is it? The most substantial charges are basically not that Americans interfered with Russia to bring it disaster but that they didn’t interfere enough. It’s an opposite point to what you are arguing!

Once one removes all the Clinton-bashing, what remains is mostly evidence that the fundamental power was Russian post-Soviet corruption. Reading all this actually increases my confidence that 90s were just another case of Russia getting ruined by Russians, and the latter-day assessments that it was the Yanks wut done it are a powerful form of cope.

The US allows Cuba and Venezuela to maintain alliances with hostile foreign powers. It is actually backing the pro-Russian and Chinese faction in Brazilian politics.

seek partnership instead of hegemony

The US tried that in the 1990s, when they gave billions in aid to a country that had recently been an enemy, even as Yeltsin was shelling his parliament, supporting Serbia against NATO (as best Russia could at that point), and using the Russian army to occupy parts of sovereign countries next to Russia.

How much more should the West have given Russia in aid? And what fewer conditions should they have given on internal reform?

Agree to a healthy buffer zone in Eastern Europe

This might have been an option in 1945. By the 1990s, it was too late for Russia to say "We'll be good, honest."

supporting Serbia against NATO (as best Russia could at that point)

If the U.S. was not acting as a hegemon against Russia, NATO would not have been helping Albania annex part of Serbia in the first place. (Ironically, in pretty much the same way Russia is now trying to annex parts of Ukraine but with less historical justification.)

Last I checked Kosovo wasn't part of Albania, it was a corrupt semi-independent disputed territory, and it's not semi-independent because of an Albanian invasion, but because the country it had been part of (yugoslavia)dissolved in a brutal civil war.

That's the problem with partnership when you have different interests.

The 1990s window of opportunity for a US-Russia partnership is a myth. Yeltsin only stepped back from Russia's imperial role insofar as he had to do so to keep the lights on, the bread in stores, and the army from overthrowing him. Insofar as he could, he kept Russia powerful. Clinton and Bush were the same: they mostly supported Yeltsin insofar as either (a) it benefited the US's interests directly or (b) it indirectly helped the US by encouraging Russia to move towards a peaceful capitalist democracy.

That (b) failed was outside of anybody's hands by the 1990s, I think. Russia has ended up without democracy or peace, though there is certainly enough capitalism for Putin and the elite to get very rich.

There is no evidence of heavy American involvement in Euromaiden. The evidence shown is Americans discussing what is going on which is quite normal.

In retrospect America should have looked for hegemony in Russia after the USSR failed and written big checks like a Marshall Plan. As things have played out that was a better game.

It would have looked pretty silly if the US aided Russia just as anti-US generals took over in a coup, as nearly happened in August 1991. Or Yeltsin created a dictatorship, which looked quite plausible given what was happening in 1993.

There was never a golden dawn of democracy and pro-Western elite sentiment in Russia.