abc.net.au
This dropped a few days ago: the head of ASIS (Australia's version of MI6 and the CIA) gave an interview. It's 26 minutes with no speedup option, so while most of it's pretty interesting I'll give some timestamps for things that are relevant to the broader geopolitical situation and thus might be the most interesting for non-Australians (as opposed to "how does ASIS work" and "reflection on specific past incidents"): 5:00-7:00, 9:17-11:17, 21:59-25:29 and to some extent 16:25-18:19.
Thought this might be of interest to you guys; also interested in what others think he meant with the various vague allusions, since I have my own ideas but I could be projecting my prejudices.
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Notes -
Pretty much this. I'd like to see whether Australia has its own state narrative or whether it just has one derived from Turbo-America's narrative. But first I'd like OP to write up a summary of the interesting bits (pinging @magic9mushroom). As a Motteposter I can stomach 80,000 word manifestos with ease but I'm allergic to any video more than 3 minutes long.
Well, since you're fine with 80,000-word manifestos and since I'm looking for confirmation/disproof of what I'm reading into it making any summary I might write into a closed epistemic loop, I'll just transcribe the aforementioned sections (not like the ABC is going to sue me since it's not-for-profit). I stripped out filled pauses and stammers for clarity (though meaningful repeated words like "I think that that is" are reproduced, and I've reproduced a few grammatical errors verbatim). This is in chronological order and the third part's attenuated at 17:27 since I stripped out him talking about the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Interviewer: From your vantage point as Director-General, how would you characterise our changed world?
Paul Symon: I think that the changes we're experiencing right now is that, for the first time in my military career and my intelligence career, the prospect of major-power conflict is no longer unimaginable, and I think that that is the reality of the situation at the moment. Major-power conflict is no longer unimaginable. Now, I'm obviously channelling here, what's going on in Europe; I'm channelling what is going on in our region. And, of course, peace and stability is absolutely the #1 priority of government and of all the agencies, like mine, that support the government.
Interviewer: After holding this position for five years, and having access to the intelligence that you have had, are you more fearful or less fearful for the future of your children and grandchildren?
Paul Symon: I'm an optimist, and I know that I'm talking about military and intelligence matters. I think that humans matter; you know, there is human agency in the calculations that leaders, the political leaders, make about conflict, peace and stability. And, you know, we know through history that leaders, statesmen, humans do have agency, and we're not on a linear path. So, to a degree, I think, a lot of the assessment and analysis has to consider a linear path, if the current settings remain the way they are, what does that look like on a linear path. I remain a glass-half-full sort of guy; I would like to think that peace and stability continues to be the overarching underpinning of any parent, of any grandparent, for their children or for their grandchildren, and that ultimately that sentiment will prevail.
[...]
Interviewer: If we were to have a broader conversation, with the public, about threats and possibilities, how would you like that to be held - or would you like it to be held? Do you think it would behoove us to have a broader public conversation?
Paul Symon: Oh, look, I think so, because I think, as we've discussed earlier, I think that, you know, the risk of miscalculation, the risk of major-power - well, I use the term "it's no longer unimaginable" - the prospect of major-power conflict. I think it's more important than ever that the public be informed by people like me, by national-security officials, and that we elevate - you know, to the comfort level of the government and, broadly, the public - elevate the discussion, I think that--
Interviewer: More public, in other words.
Paul Symon: More public. And I think that will accelerate again early next year, when Stephen Smith and Sir Angus Houston present to the public. I'm in favour of more rather than less. And I would also add this, Geraldine, and that is, I think that one of the hallmarks of the Russia-Ukraine conflict is the extent to which the US intelligence community in particular declassified intelligence, and it helped European governments in particular - and the public - better think about, or understand if you will, what should be an appropriate reaction to an incursion of that nature. Should we provide aid, either lethal or non-lethal aid? Should there be sanctions imposed? I think when you declassify intelligence in an appropriate way, you give the public an opportunity to really debate it and think about what's at stake here, and I think that was, I think what happened with, in the early stages of Ukraine-Russia has probably set the bar high for intelligence officials going forward, to do what they can to help inform, you know, not only government but the public.
[...]
Interviewer: "Locus of power", this phrase you've used several times, can you just help us understand a little more what you mean by that?
Paul Symon: I mentioned earlier on this idea of human agency. Humans matter, you know, leaders matter. So the concept is, very much, you accept that premise; leaders - the political leaders, the economic leaders, the military leaders) of those countries is of interest to us.
Interviewer: As much as the defence materiel they might have, for instance.
Paul Symon: Yes. Well, in many ways, the materiel that they have, the equipment that they have, the capability is relatively easy these days to determine, and there are any number of open-source institutions, think-tanks and the like that produce, you know, extraordinarily rich reports on capability, military equipment, acquisitions, all those sorts of things. But it's the intentions of humans that we're trying to get to the core of, the bottom of. You know, the calculations that have been made by leaders really matters.
[...]
Interviewer: In your assessment, having run ASIS for five years, how serious is the security threat to Australia from China?
Paul Symon: You've singled out China, and I'm not gonna single out any one country, but I've just explained, I guess, the richness of democracy, the powers of democracies to adjust. And I'm not sure whether China, Russia, North Korea, a number of countries have the capacity to be able to adjust in the way that we do. I think that, sadly, intelligence officials in those sort of countries will say what they need to say to retain power; I think the sort of truth to power that we encourage in our system should be sustained and is an important component of the way that we can adjust as democracies. So, you know, I wouldn't single out China but I would say there are two very stark systems at play here, some very autocratic systems where, you know, the architecture of intelligence communities, of national security institutions is very, very, vastly different to what we have.
Interviewer: Obviously, though, China is our major customer, is of interest to a lot of Australians. It's also, you know, a troubled relationship, has been for some time.
Paul Symon: Yeah.
Interviewer: Do you think Australia can get to a footing where it has a good relationship with China without jeopardising any of our values or interests?
Paul Symon: I think that, well, it comes back to human agency, doesn't it, and the centrality of leaders to adjust settings. You know, I think that for all the right reasons, 10-15 years ago, the Australian public, the Australian government was very optimistic about its relationship with China. Business, very, very optimistic, and they had every right to be. You know, we were the beneficiaries of that relationship with China. What's changed? Well, humans have made calculations that have changed the nature of the relationship. So, can we be optimistic? Well, you know, again, the crystal ball is opaque on that front because at one level, on a linear path, you know, it's hard to be as optimistic as we were 10 or 15 years ago, but I don't think these issues follow linear paths and I just hope that, you know, for our children and our grandchildren, we step off a linear path - and when I say "we" step off, I'm talking, you know, globally, the relationship between many nations - place a little bit more emphasis on peace and stability.
Interviewer: After a 42-year career in both the military and ASIS, what do you think is the likelihood that in the next 5 or 10 years Australia may end up in a war with China over Taiwan, and would Australia, do you think, automatically join if the United States did?
Paul Symon: Well, on the latter question I don't think anything is automatic; I think it's always got to be put in context, you know, and at the end of the day an Australian government will always act in the national interest, Australia's national interests, and I think everyone knows that. Any political leader from any nation-state in the world knows that ultimately they'll act in the nation's interests at the time, so "I don't know" is the answer to - I don't know the answer to either of your questions, John, because these suggestions that these things are pre-ordained: they're not. There is ample licence for leaders and humans to make a difference, and to step up, and to change the sort of paths and the settings that we're on, and I guess that's been my message today, is that I hope that that happens.
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Australia has pretty much swallowed the American narrative. Outside of ex-Prime Minister Keating who remains anti-anti-Chinese and anti-New Cold War, everyone else is lined up with the US. Australia is part of AUKUS against China, Australia sent troops to Iraq to support the American Special Military Operation there, sent equipment to Ukraine against the Russian SMO. Australia does freedom of navigation exercises in the SCS, booted Huawei from 5G, tries to counter-bribe Pacific Islands away from China...
America does not have a more loyal or subservient ally than Australia. Even Britain didn't show up for the Vietnam war.
WRT Paul Keating, he's one of the old guard of 90s-00s China analysts whose model of China is still Deng's "hide your strength and bide your time" and haven't got it through their heads that Xi is starting to move to the next phase of capitalising on that and throwing China's weight around. There are a bunch of other old China analysts who think like Keating does; it's just that as an ex-PM who pursued a closer relationship with China, Keating still gets given a microphone while the rest get basically ignored.
WRT loyalty to the US side, I'd suggest reading the transcript I posted above. Personally I'd want us to follow the 'States if it came to war (even if that meant I or some of my relatives got killed), but it should be remembered that over 2% of our resident population in Australia was born in Mainland China and a decent chunk of them (particularly the younger, more recent immigrants and those who're here for university) are loyal to Beijing either via PRC indoctrination or "do what we want or your relatives back in China get punished" blackmail, creating a serious pro-PRC lobby*; there are also the standard "someone else do the dying pls" elements who urge neutrality (the Greens, for instance, want us to stay out to avoid dying, and they get 12% of the vote).
*Note that most of the Chinese-culture-and-community institutions in Australia have been quite thoroughly co-opted by Beijing as intelligence and influence networks. This means that if we were to go in with the USA in a war over Taiwan, we would have an organised resistance on our hands consisting of something like 0.5% of the resident population. I can't see too many viable solutions to that other than bulldozing those institutions and mass-interning a huge chunk of Chinese-Australians, and if we did that we'd have anti-racists screaming bloody murder (with, y'know, more than zero justification).
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Vietnam is interesting, mostly because I didn't know Australia participated until I played Rising Storm 2 for the first time. I have to wonder if it's simply because they're in the Pacific and thus much closer to Asia and the happenings there. They were concerned about the Japanese during WWII, I think.
Plus, also, the sparse urbanization of Australia probably helps its cultural makeup be similar to that of the US. Also, cars (we Americans have our muscle cars, the Australians have their V8 sedans).
Out of curiosity, do you mean sparse urbanization in that our cities are low-density, or sparse urbanization in that we have a large rural population? The former is true, but the latter definitely isn't
I did mean more "large stretches of nothing," but I can accept that it probably is nowhere near the same extent as the US.
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Indeed, there was a lot of concern about Japan invading in WW2. The most interesting thing is that despite all this concern about Japan and now China, the Australian military is a complete disaster. 60,000 troops across all services - barely even a drop in the bucket. Submarines are a complete disaster, acquisition is at least a decade behind schedule, something like a billion paid in fees to the jilted French consortium. No nuclear submarines until the 2040s.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/nuclear-powered-submarines-for-australia-what-are-the-options/
https://youtube.com/watch?v=ZRSb9c-mHM0
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