Transnational Thursday is a thread for people to discuss international news, foreign policy or international relations history. Feel free as well to drop in with coverage of countries you’re interested in, talk about ongoing dynamics like the wars in Israel or Ukraine, or even just whatever you’re reading.
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Notes -
It looks like Bashar Al-Assad’s plane may have been just been shot down outside of Damascus.
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In a bit of public reflection on a past prediction of the Syrian war, Dean admits to getting a Quality Contribution post wrong...
Last week I made a post noting the surprise offensive in Syria that had seized Aleppo, Syria's second-largest city and the main northernmost city in Syria's northwest near the Turkish border region. For some strange reason [it even got nominated to the Quality Contribution thread[(https://www.themotte.org/post/1276/quality-contributions-report-for-november-2024). In that post, I made a concluding assessment where I hazarded a guess that-
Well, thank heavens for face-saving caveats and elaborating on reasoning, or that would have aged even worse.
A week has passed, and the offensive has continued, and the rebels have kept advancing (see map link). With all the usual caveats that tracking contemporary developments via open source media is prone to mistakes of the moment and other issues, what is clear is that Anti-Assad forces have captured Hama, the fourth largest city in Syria.. Hama was a government stronghold in the earlier civil war, and had one of the countries largest military airports, i.e. where Syrian/Russian airpower had established infrastructure to support strategic lift and airstrikes. It has symbolic value as well as a center of an uprising against Asad's father, and is and of itself an even worse major setback for the Syrian government. Government forces not only failed to resist in Hama as expected, and there are reports of abandoned vehicles between Aleppo and Hama that suggests that the retreat was so sudden that supply plans couldn't fuel the forces, leading to vehicle abandonments.
...and yet this isn't the worst news of the week, as the rebels are still advancing on the even more significant city of Homs, the third largest city, which would allow them to choose to advance on either Damascus, the capital, or at least cut the government into a coastal and landlocked interior zone. This is very much not a guarantee, but at the same time Hama wasn't a guarantee until the defenders didn't fight for it either. (Or, possibly, didn't reach it in time.)
Things are, in a word, bad, and many of Assad's highest partners are reportedly preparing for the worst. That includes high profile pullouts including Assad's immediate family to Russia](https://www.wionews.com/world/bashar-al-assads-family-flees-syria-presidents-whereabouts-unclear-reports-782206), the Russian naval base of Tartarus who was the nominal strategic prize of supporting Assad, and possibly even Iranian forces.
This isn't the same thing as a total collapse, however. Iran is also reportedly sending in other support, which may mean that the previous evacuations are more of change of support. Iran has reportedly mobilized it's Iraqi militias, at least a few hundred of which crossed into eastern Syria overland to try and drive to the front via southern border routes. However, the Iraqi militia option is complicated by some notable internal political actor opposition to Iraqi involvement, and of course the difficulty of driving all the way from Iraq to Damascus in scale and with speed to be decisive in time.
Further, and mixed, is the ongoing redeployment of forces from eastern Syria. For example, the Syrian army negotiated a withdrawal / turnover of Deir Ezzor to the American-backed groups. This is bad news for the regime in that it is the functional loss of territory to the US-backed forces, and corresponded to American airstrikes, but it does allow the reallocation of the retreating forces from unimportant / undefendable areas to the more important area.
All in all, it's a great big dynamic mess, with several unclear questions that will only be apparent with some more time. Will Iranian militia support arrive in time and mass to make a difference? Are the Syrian forces in a total collapse, or will they be able to reconsolidate defenses and resist an extended rebel-force? Can the Turkish rebels credibly advance much further, given the unexpectedly swift expansion to incorporating three of the largest four cities in Syria in their zone of control?
And also... why did this result? And why was my initial estimate so far off?
Well, these may have the same answer- it appears that the people who could have prioritized fighting for Syria, haven't.
Looking back to my initial assessment, I made two main justifications.
Both of these seem to have contributed to each other. The people who might have prioritized fighting the rebels, didn't, and as a result the Syrian forces didn't need as many resources to keep advancing which in turn denied time for the Iranians and Russians to respond.
The crux of the Aleppo fall seems at this point to have been surprise. Not only at the timing of the offensive, but in the use of drones which was a capability not really present in the 2015 war, but which Ukrainian and Turkish black market sources have reportedly enabled. The modern militarized drone can defeat the sort of tanks or armored vehicles which served as critical strong points for letting the 2015-Syrian army resist the more man-portable-dependent rebels of the time. This created a drone disadvantage against the Assad forces, likely worsened since Russia has been buying all the drones and hirable capabilities it could from global partners for the Ukraine War, and so the Aleppo front received an expectedly large and capable shock that the forces weren't prepared to absorb.
This seems to have triggered the initial retreat from Aleppo, which- because it was so sudden and unprepared for- led to fuel shortages and abandonments already mentioned. This not only further weakened Syrian army forces, but since a number could have been captured more or less intact if all that was needed was a refuel that (so far) has not been the limiting factor, it increased the rebel capabilities.
This is where the advance on Hama led to the collapse of the willingness / ability to fight.
Having lost significant forces both in the surprise offensive but also in the retreat, it appears that the Syrian forces more or less kept retreating. Given how thin-stretched the Syrian military is due to the long war (and Russian prioritization of Ukraine), there was no second fallback army / defense force standing in Hama. As the Syrian army didn't have the defending forces or surplus stocks to reconsolidate, it seems they largely kept retreating ahead of the advancing rebels.
With the fall of Hama, however, came the fall of the military airbase, and thus the ability to simply fly in more forces and supplies closer to the front through established infrastructure. It also further enabled the rebels to capture what they could at minimal cost, rather than have to expend more forces / supplies fighting through it.
But from the public perception, the defeat / abandonment of Hama by the Syrian army seemed more an Afghan-style collapse, particularly with the immediate Syrian leadership response of Assad taking his family to Russia, rather than a Ukrainian-Zelensky commitment to defense. Leadership matters, and Assad being in Russia as Aleppo was falling, which likely an attempt to appeal for aid in person rather than actually fleeing, became perceived with the family-evacuation as the regime jumping ship, facilitating the perception of collapse.
With the fall of the Hama airbase, the Russians began a (limited) bug-out. Since the Russian presence in Syria was/has been primarily special forces (overwhelmed in the scale of the offensive), air power (disrupted by the loss of the Hama airbase), and the naval port, with the first two more or less severely disrupted, and Russians began to minimize potential losses. They are continuing to provide air power, but the Tartarus and Damascus evacuations contributed to the cyclic perception of defeat. Similarly- and now with time to recognize and capitalize on it- the US-backed Kurdish handover in the east was sort of an abandonment rather than fighting over the terrain, even though the forces likely are being reprioritized rationally.
At the same time, the Iranian efforts to support are complicated by logistical trail time (and international dynamics they don't control, like al-Sadr in Iraq). So while some elements of withdrawal were possibly true, the potential reinforcements would be much later, meaning a period of appearing to abandon rather than support Assad, contributing to the doom loop.
That was specifically made worse by the role, or non-role, of Lebanese Hezbollah, Iran's closest proxy ally in the region. Hezbollah had been absent from the Syrian conflict of late due to prioritizing the conflict with Israel, which it took a considerable beating in. This led to initial international reporting/perception that Hezzbollah would not come to Assad's aid. This has at least symbolically changed- a 'supervisory force' of Hezbollah advisors have reportedly gone to Homs to help bolster the defense- but compared to the significant participation in the 2015 war, the lack of Hezbollah-at-scale, again, contributed to the doom loop.
We seem to be at a point now where Iran is trying to move what proxy forces it can to Homs, but the big strategic question is if it will be enough to matter, or if the Syrian army itself is in a collapse-loop where failure/defeat/abandonment leads to more failure/defeat/abandonment.
Edit: Amusingly enough, within hours of posting this there is non-western media reporting (including Al Jazeera) that Homs has fallen, and that rebels are in Damascus. Dynamic situations are fun.
So where does this come to my failed assessment?
The second justification for believing a more limited impact on the war was-
The error was that the people who could have prioritized fighting, didn't, and so the rebels didn't spend as much time or resources fighting through Hama as expected.
Between the publicly troubled retreat (abandoned vehicles), the non-defense of Hama itself, and the associated perceptions of collapse, the Syrian army took what could have been a bad but survivable retreat to a secondary defense line and entered a state collapse doom loop, where the perception of disaster and elite abandonment led to further disaster. This not only reduced resistance, but in some respects gave new momentum to the advancing rebels to continue the advance, leading to real and propagandized advances emphasizing the dynamism.
This may be changing- the Russians are still applying airpower they can, the Iranians are moving militias to try and stop the rebel advance and force that sort of over-extension- but the lack of resistance when it mattered led to disproportionate impacts turned a 'nothing ever happens, they'll advance to the limits of advance' towards a new paradigm of 'things have changed so much, everyone will be reconsidering their options.'
I've said in the past that I have a dim view of any strategy that relies on an assumption of 'and then the enemy will lose the will to fight.' I stand by that, and the historical examples are plentiful. But collapse scenarios do occasionally happen, and when they do normally reliable assumptions (such as 'defending armies will fight better when defending in urban terrain') are no longer valid (the defending army chose to retreat rather than stop and fight in a defense). When incredibly unlikely but possible things do occur, exploiting the opportunity (or mitigating the risk) is part of good strategy, even if good strategy shouldn't rely on it.
Is this my worst off-the-cuff assessment ever? Hardly. And depending on what happens as a result, it may actually still hold true, which is the weird thing.
The original prediction, after all, was on the prospects of a 're-opening of the civil war.' if Assad totally collapses then there would indeed not be a re-opening of the civil war. In fact, one of the stated goals of Turkey, who was the key backer of the rebels who started this Aleppo offensive, was to get Assad to agree to a civil war ending roadmap. Assad had rebuffed that process with the support of Russia and Iran, and it had seemed unnecessary. If this offensive culminates with a strained sort of peace talks rather than full scale win, or even just that more powers don't jump back into the civil war proxy game, that could be considered a qualified success.
Except it would be being right for the wrong reasons, and the reasons I gave were... not even unreasonable in and of themselves, I feel, but certainly didn't imply what ended up happening.
So, instead, let's say it outright. I was wrong.
As it has been before, so it will be again, c'est la vie.
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Irish general election results
Pretty much a holding pattern. There were concerns that Sinn Féin (a party with close historical ties to the IRA) would make such massive gains that they'd be able to form a government on their own. But it looks like Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael (the two centrist neoliberal parties) will be able to form another coalition government with the minor parties, and Sinn Féin in opposition. The Greens got hammered, with only the party leader Roderic O'Gorman retaining his seat. Modest gains for the two centre-left parties. No far-right candidates elected, with the arguable exception of one independent TD from Tipperary.
Why were the Greens wiped out?
The Guardian argues that voters blamed them for controversial environmental legislation:
In the gender-critical circles in which I move, they've also attracted controversy for their socially progressive agenda, with party leader and Minister for Children Roderic O'Gorman being a consistently outspoken advocate for trans issues being taught in primary schools.
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Why is there an increase in total seats?
Per Wikipedia:
Frankly I think the amount of seats is obscene. Ireland has 7% the combined population of the UK, but our lower house is more than one-quarter the size of theirs.
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Pretty quiet week for me, but then again I'm focused on events that could escalate. The South Korea martial law declaration was poorly executed (compare with the 1981 Spanish coup), and overall I thought it wasn't a big deal. Maybe I'm just desensitized. As the Lebanon front closes a new front emerged in Syria, which seems like a bigger deal (because it's a bigger country), but nothing decisive has happened there yet.
Russia moved some assets outside Syria, perhaps suggesting that it will not reinforce Assad.
United Healthcare CEO assassinated
Meta plans to build $10B spanning undersea internet cable for its exclusive use.
Hezbollah fires the first missiles since ceasefire
Estonia launches large-scale NATO exercises near border with Russia, together with France, the United Kingdom, the United States and Latvia. I like Estonia and consider them competent.
Catholic bishop attacked and robbed in Sudan, by the RSF. Meanwhile the pope calls for peace
Marburg virus has been spreading a bit. I previously was vaguely paying attention to it, but now it's come up often enough that I'm more actively tracking it.
UK orders 5M doses of H5 vaccine
China state news point out how the US has repeatedly promised and failed to provide security to Africa.
Pakistan army kills some jihadist insurgents
The South Korea military law declaration seems like a nothingburger.
Syrian conflict continues.
Flu-like disease kills 143 in Congo.
French prime minister resigns. Unclear if Macron (President) will hang on to power.
Meanwhile, Senegal and Chad asked France troops to leave. France presence in Africa has declined a lot over the last few years.
China banned exports of various raw materials to the US.
Interesting comment about the undersea cable. It's no Starlink, but that level of infrastructure in the hands of a private company is somewhat unprecedented.
The Chinese export ban seems like the most important item here. They are dominating manufacturing and control much of the raw resources, so this is a direct and preemptive attack on Trump's promise to raise tariffs on Chinese goods.
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Meanwhile I'm still running my little intelligence agency, and we keep putting out weekly minutes (of which stuff like the above is my draft for Thursday). Today I was very frustrated because someone wants to give us a grant but their ops is fucked up and so we might have to pay $5k in overhead basically just because. On the plus side, my cofounder has been doing very fast wargames for the items in this list and these have generally been very enlightening, because they make it much easier to think through what the "obvious steps" are in catastrophes like that in a way that more abstract thinking doesn't do it for me.
Yesterday I posted a blogpost on the "grain of truth problem", where you can't really update well if you observe something which you previously thought had probability ~0—many of the big picture frameworks people use to make sense of AI have fail and imho will continue to fail because they are too rigid. I put it on twitter, but it failed to reach anybody with real power.
/end of rant.
Maybe it is just me but that font is unusable for prose for me. Maybe it would work for code.
also "proffessional life" and "problme"
Also, for bold predictions about new unprecedented field I would expect basically all detailed predictions to fail. And I would not treat that as giving much info.
(posted this nitpick as you complained about no reach and maybe this has some sort of influence on this, or maybe no - let me know if that was unwanted)
Thanks, typos fixed
Also changed the font to something which might be a bit better
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