Industrial policy has been a frequent subject on Smith's blog, for those who don't follow it. (He's for it, and thinks that Biden's industrial policy was mostly good - it's worth following the links in this post.) This post focuses on defense-related geopolitical industrial policy goals and pros and cons of anticipated changes under the incoming Trump administration and Chinese responses. Particularly, he highlights two major things China can do: Restrict exports of raw materials (recently announced) and use their own industrial policy to hamper the West's peacetime industrial policy (de facto policy of the last 30 years). These are not extraordinary insights, but it's a good primer on the current state of affairs and policies to pay attention to in the near-future.
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Neither does the U.S., and yet we continue to keep it aligned. Cooperative. The legacy of WWII was that you don’t have to literally occupy a territory to get value from it. Set up the right rules, and the subsequent international order serves your interests.
China would prefer a different set of rules. That’s why they’re reclaiming SCS islands, pushing the rules on international waters, and making passes at Taiwan, eroding the (admittedly weak!) rules about self-determination. The SCS connects major U.S. allies to the rest of the world. Handing those routes over to Chinese control would seriously damage the current order.
I do not believe this can be done while abandoning the world stage. Hand-wringing over whether we’re worthy of dominating the planet is quintessential slave morality. Extending it down to surrendering our own borders and our own cities—isn’t that the source of most of your complaints?
I think that’s a difference of opportunity rather than one of character. Say what you will about modern Chinese urbanism; I draw the line at whitewashing the Cultural Revolution.
Well…yes. I desperately hope it doesn’t come to this. If the CCP is rational, they hope it won’t, too. We can make it out of this without any nightmares.
If anything, I’m an American imperialist. I think America should directly rule the majority of the world, especially Central and South America, Western Europe and probably Japan and Korea. I just don’t care about China. The Chinese have no great imperialist instinct the way the Japanese, Russians, Anglos and French have or have had. They don’t seek to rule me or convert me to the Chinese system and never have. Theirs is not - in a deep sense, deeper than surface level marxism - an imperial civilization with global aims.
That is absolute nonsense. Where you got this idea? See: Xinjiang, Tibet, nine dash line. See: long line of emperors. See: obsessive superiority obsession. See: growing military. See: their wolf diplomacy self-inflicted mess. See: belt-and-road attempts.
Well, for now they try for example with Latvia, Tibet, Hong-Kong, Taiwan, bunch of places in Africa (all in various coercive stages). Hopefully they will bungle it as most as they can.
And on top of that, I expect that they - like any other humans and nearly all animals - would proceed to run extractive imperialism if they could get away with it. (to the limits of their abilities, for deer it would be gorging on all the grass they have. Still smarter than say praising Mao.)
It really feels like a stretch to say that they'll domino their way from Tibet and Hong-Kong to the US. Those places are chinese speaking neighbors that were part of their territory not long ago. I really can't imagine them trying to invade Europe or the US. They might try to dominate the economy and make censor movies but... that's what the US is already doing.
If they fuck around Taiwan then you immediately will be hit by effects. See where CPU are produced.
Also, I was not disputing "USA will not be invaded" claim. I was disputing mainly "The Chinese have no great imperialist instinct" and "not (...) an imperial civilization with global aims."
"they will not invade USA in predictable future" is hardly proof of "have no great imperialist instinct"
It feels like you're making a bizarre 19th century type argument over which countries have an "imperialist instinct" or are an "imperial civilization." Should we also go after Mongolia and Macedonia just in case they try to take over the world again?
I also find it dubious that the US would fight WW3 just to protect our high-end gaming rigs and bitcoin miners. It's more likely we would simply onshore production (as we are already attempting to do) and put up with slightly decreased performance for a few years.
I am disputing claim that they have some unique "imperialist instinct" or are an "imperial civilization." or lack thereof.
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*proceeds to ignore the 1st/2nd largest population country on earth*
Bruh.
No one can afford to be imperialist in the coercive military sense anymore. Wars take far too long and are far too expensive, even for relatively small fronts (see: Ukraine). We're talking about Taiwan, which is a tiny island very very close to Mainland China. Even taking that would likely push the Chinese economy to the brink ... and they may still try.
What matters is who is at the "center" of the world order - economically, military, politically (in the power projection sense). USA is still number 1 in this but it's easy to identify the likely challengers; look at the places with the most people and largest economies contained within a totally self-governing polity. That's China. For a while in the 1990s-2000s, there was some speculation that the EU might create a new pan-Europa, but this was largely a feels based analysis and any intelligent observer saw that the political architecture of the EU and its member states created all sorts of horrible barriers to collective action that would be necessary to displace the Americans. But, I digress.
The Chinese aren't going to sail to Hawaii and San Diego to murder all of us counterrevolutionaries. But they, starting with Taiwan, can change the balance of power in East/Southeast asia .... an area with about 1/3rd of the global population and disproportionate importance in global shipping and trade ... and really disproportionate importance in the semiconductor industry.
"Letting China have Taiwan" doesn't result in the Taiwanese only having a no-good-very-bad-day, it results in the kind of trade war that can destabilize and, frankly, deflate (in all ways) the economic prosperity of the entire planet. The end state scenario of an ascendant China is a generation or two of global depression.
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Throughout most of it's history China had a tributary empire, regarding itself as the centre of civilisation (hence the 'Middle/Central Kingdom'). Neighbouring states were generally forced to adopt Chinese customs and pay tribute (with those that didn't being considered barbarians). It also expanded considerably over the centuries.
It wasn't colonial in the same way as Western European powers were and didn't have overseas territorial expansion or settler colonies (presumably largely due to China having such extensive land borders and territory to expand into), but it was definitely imperialistic.
One might argue that imperial Chinese history has little to no bearing on the posture of the modern Chinese state. As I understand we don't have good insight into the internal dynamics and political factions within the CCP, so it's difficult to talk definitively, but I do think it's pertinent that:
In terms of foreign relations policy the argument is more mixed. Certainly the CCP's stated foreign relations principles generally emphasise territorial respect, non-aggression and non-interference, and as I understand it the CCP does generally vote in accordance with these at the UN. However:
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