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Culture War Roundup for the week of July 15, 2024

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This seems to me like a fairly usual level of competence from a bolt-on-security-as-a-product or compliance-as-a-service company. Examples:

  • CVE-2016-2208: buffer overflow in Symantec Antivirus "This is a remote code execution vulnerability. Because Symantec use a filter driver to intercept all system I/O, just emailing a file to a victim or sending them a link is enough to exploit it. [...] On Windows, this results in kernel memory corruption, as the scan engine is loaded into the kernel (wtf!!!), making this a remote ring0 memory corruption vulnerability - this is about as bad as it can possibly get". Basically "send an email with an attachment to pwn someone's computer. They don’t have to open the attachment, as long as they have Norton Antivirus (or anything that uses the Symantec Antivirus Engine) installed".
  • CVE-2020-12271: "A SQL injection issue was found in SFOS 17.0, 17.1, 17.5, and 18.0 before 2020-04-25 on Sophos XG Firewall devices, as exploited in the wild in April 2020. [...] A successful attack may have caused remote code execution that exfiltrated usernames and hashed passwords for the local device admin(s), portal admins, and user accounts used for remote access"
  • Okta data breach a couple months back: "For several weeks beginning in late September 2023, intruders had access to [Okta's] customer support case management system. That access allowed the hackers to steal authentication tokens from some Okta customers, which the attackers could then use to make changes to customer accounts, such as adding or modifying authorized users."

It's not that it's amateur hour specifically at CrowdStrike. It's the whole industry.

A general rule: the further a software product is away from "engineering candy", the worse it is.

Software engineers are some of the most entitled, overpaid people on the planet. (I should know!) They have lots of career options.

To get good engineers you need to either pay an outrageous salary or have an interesting product like a video game. Want to find engineers to work on your compliance software? Good luck. Hell, even Google engineers making 400k/year can't be bothered to work on essential but boring products, preferring instead to chase shiny baubles.

No one wants to do the dirty work where good job means not messing up.

I think the problem is that "good job" doesn't mean "not messing up" in the context of these compliance-as-a-service or security-blanket-as-a-service companies. Instead, "good job" is "implement as many features as possible to a level where it's not literally fraud to claim your product has thay feature, and then have a longer checklist of supported features in your product than the competition has so the MBA types choose your product".

CrowdStrike's stock price is only down by about 10% today on one of the highest-impact and highest-profile incidents of this type I've seen. I'm pretty sure their culture of "ship it even if it's janky and broken" has netted them more than a 10% increase in net revenue, so it's probably net positive to have that kind of culture.

Their net revenue is under a billion a year. The total economic damage caused by this single bug is almost certainly larger than the total net income of the entire history of the company. In fact, it is almost certainly larger than the total gross income of the entire history of the company. I do not know where the valuation is coming from, but it certainly isn't from their revenue figures.

Lol P/E of 644.

But it's a hyper-growth company bro, surely they'll be able to pivot to making money once they've captured the full market bro.

Yeah but if they're not liable what relevance does that have to their share price?

I don't know if they're liable or not. I doubt Crowdstrike knows if they're liable or not.

the further a software product is away from "engineering candy", the worse it is.

To get good engineers you need to either pay an outrageous salary or have an interesting product like a video game.

I mean, you could get good engineers with a video game project, but for that you have to be willing to also pay them the outrageous salary. Video game projects are more art than engineering, requiring more designers than engineers. And the brilliant engineers won't work for that much below market rate; if that were their goal they'd go into research or try to get into an early-stage startup, not join a project that's just the application of an existing engine to a new gameplay design. The game projects that appeal to engineers don't sell enough for AAA development, they're nerd games like Factorio or RimWorld (sorry friends).

Not that game companies don't capitalize on the appeal of their projects to talent. They just capitalize by taking lower-tier but motivated engineers/artists/designers and running them into the ground.

I have always been of the opinion that antivirus is a poor idea, and at best, a half-baked solution preventing you from adopting better solutions, such as sandboxing/virtualization and general human security hygiene. I haven't run an antivirus (besides Windows's built-in Defender) in years on any of my computers or phones, and I've never gotten malware on my systems simply because I don't open any sketchy apps or files, and if I do, it's in a virtual machine isolated from the rest of my system.

That an entire industry (the antivirus industry) exists based on the premise of a bad idea that is not only ineffective but adds massive attack surface simply because attackers can exploit what is essentially a privileged system component with deep access to all parts of the system - a cure worse than the disease - should be a lesson in how easy it is for someone to get the basics of a skill (such as security) wrong.

The problem is that simply receiving a text may count as "opening a sketchy file". You really can't expect every boomer pecking at a computer to know the ins and outs of security.

This is not to defend this particular software, but your view leaves out some things as well.

Bad example? If you're targeted with zero-days like Pegasus, an antivirus software is not going to stop it. In fact the standard defense for this sort of thing is what I've advocated - isolation of system components via sandboxing/virtualization. I'm not sure what your argument is.

AV can at least detect anomalous network traffic or unexpected processes, which is obviously not as good as preventing the infection in the first place but is still valuable.

In this case, the systems were sandboxed - FORCEDENTRY escaped the sandbox. Sandboxing isn't a magical technology without vulnerabilities.

Would antivirus have actually detected this infection? Ignoring the fact that phones don't usually run antivirus (because they employ sandboxing security measures), in the case of FORCEDENTRY, the exploit was discovered because Citizen Lab specifically examined the phone of an anonymous Saudi activist. They don't say what exactly led to the phone being examined by them, but I'm willing to bet that it exhibited signs of infection that any general-purpose antivirus like McAfee wouldn't have detected.

Yes, sandboxing technology can still be vulnerable, but antiviruses are not a better security practice than sandboxing. Moreover - since you brought up a targeted spyware attack - if you're being specifically targeted by nation-state actors aided by NSO Group, you need to up your security anyways. So your comment that

You really can't expect every boomer pecking at a computer to know the ins and outs of security.

immediately after discussion of FORCEDENTRY confused me, because if your threat model includes zero-day attacks like FORCEDENTRY (for example, you're a political activist, journalist, or whistleblower), then yes, I do expect such a person to know the ins and outs of security. They should stay on top of their game, because their life literally depends on it. At that level of threat modeling, if you're genuinely worried about attacks from well-funded nation-states, then security is not something you can just ignore and expect to have taken care of for you.

Yes, sandboxing technology can still be vulnerable, but antiviruses are not a better security practice than sandboxing.

It's not one or the other.

Moreover - since you brought up a targeted spyware attack - if you're being specifically targeted by nation-state actors aided by NSO Group, you need to up your security anyways.

Bringing this up as an example was my mistake since it seems to have derailed the conversation.

There are plenty of vulnerabilities out there that are not zero days. There are plenty of systems out there that are vulnerable to such attacks. Not everything is patched as soon as the CVE is published and not every system is updated as soon as the patch is published. It's a simple fact of life that there is a time period between a vulnerability being disclosed and all systems being updated, even if those systems are enrolled in some kind of regular update scheme. Arguing against the need for at least detection and monitoring for threats because you have a lot of faith in sandboxing does not make sense.

Yes, you need to detect and monitor threats. But no, an antivirus is not the sole solution for doing so and I have doubts that an antivirus alone is an adequate solution for this task. I am not arguing against the need for detection and monitoring, and there are better ways to do detection and monitoring that don't come with the added attack surface of an antivirus.

I incidentally just learned about the Okta breach yesterday simply by getting frustrated with it and searching on Twitter evidence on whether everyone else hates using it continuously as much as I do.

I have the opinion that the more data you give out, the more likely it will just get breached. Especially personal data meant to authenticate your identity. The best thing to do would be to not give data out at all - data that doesn't exist, can't be stolen - but most of the rest of the world doesn't think the same way, and are extremely unlikely to question why we have normalized people giving away their data without a second thought.