The phrase "defensive alliance" is ambiguous. The rival meanings are not inherently incompatible. But in practise they tend in opposite directions. When the ambiguity is resolved some-one feels cheated.
To see the problem picture four countries, Timidland, Moralland, Weakland, and Aggroland. Timidland is spending more on defence than it wants to because it fears being attacked by Aggroland. Moralland is also spending more than it wants to on defence because it too fears attack by Aggroland. But the internal politics of Moralland are complicated. The moral thing to do is to build a larger army, attack Aggroland and liberate the people of Aggroland from the tyranny of the Chief Aggro. Or is that the moral thing to do? Isn't war bad?
Timidland and Moralland form an alliance. It is a "defensive alliance" meaning that Timidland will come to Moralland's aid if Aggroland attacks Moralland. But the people of Timidland are aware of the complicated internal politics of Moralland and it is explicit that if Moralland attacks Aggroland, then Moralland is on its own. Even instigating voids the alliance.
The problem arises because history isn't that neat. The 1914-1918 war starts with the Austro-Hungarian Empire giving an ultimatum to Serbia, Russia comes to Serbia's aid, Germany comes to Austria's aid, France and Britain have alliances to honour and end up fighting. If we want political theory to relate to the real world, we need to think about Moralland extending guarantees to Weakland.
Aggroland invades Weakland. Moralland supplies weapons to Weakland. And advisers. Eventually troops. Moralland artillery is shelling Aggroland invaders on Weakland soil from positions in Moralland. Counter battery fire from Aggrotroops in Weakland is hitting positions in Moralland. Does this trigger the defensive alliance and suck Timidland into the war?
Some Timidians argue that they never agreed to give guarantees to Weakland. Given the complicated history of the region, they would have refused to get involved if they had been asked. Others are saying that Moralland are the good guys. Of course Timidland must join the war. What use is a defensive alliance is you don't defend your allies? Peaceful Timidians feel that they have been out manoeuvred, and are being forced to honour guarantees to Weakland that they never made.
If Timidland is pulled into the war by the chains of the alliance, we can be more specific than calling it a defensive alliance. It was a "chaining alliance".
But what should we call a non-chaining alliance? I've picked the word "isolating". That is clearly wrong in theory. The terms of the alliance don't forbid Moralland from extending security guarantees to Weakland, they merely classify that as instigating; Moralland cannot call upon Timidland to help honour the guarantee.
But theory and practice disagree. The internal politics of Moralland has its guns-before-butter faction. They saw the alliance as a matter of building military strength, with a view to regime change in Aggroland, to save the world from the danger presented by the Chief Aggro. Moralland also has a butter-before-guns faction, that see the alliance as an opportunity to economise on defence spending, freeing up money for schools, hospitals, road, pensions, police, industrial policy, the climate emergency, tax cuts,... The list is endless. We see the likely outcome in Europe. NATO agrees that all members should spend at least 2% of GDP on defence. Most don't. The other priorities take precedence. In practice the non-chaining alliance leads to Moralland cutting defence spending. They are after all moral and pensioners deserve higher pensions, etc. The guns-before-butter faction are aghast to find that they have been out manoeuvred. They nearly had the army that they needed to protect Weakland from Aggroland. The alliance with Timidland was supposed to add to the army. In practise it subtracted. Moralland's own army has shrunk and Timidland's army is not available. The isolating alliance has left them isolated, unable to offer security guarantees to Weakland.
Obviously my fine distinction has contemporary resonances, but after World War Three reduces Europe and America to radioactive rubble, the run up to World War Four will involve China, India, Brazil, and Indonesia. Will they continue the tradition of talking about defensive alliances? Or will they embrace the distinction between chaining alliances and isolating alliances? I locate this essay in the British tradition of analytic philosophy, looking at words and attempting to resolve their ambiguities. Not all ambiguities; just those with large consequences.
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Notes -
Having a much larger military can be necessary to decisively win an asymmetrical war. Say Iran started lobbing ICBMs into NATO capitals. You can lob ICBMs back with little difficulty, but that might not actually get them to stop, maybe they're happy to take lots of losses if it means they can hurt the Western devils. If NATO actually wants to protect as many of its citizens as possible, they'll need to actually invade Iran in that scenario. And that'll take a very large military to win an offensive intercontinental war with a regional power.
Being able to define winning asymmetrically also helps. Israel isn't interested in destroying Tehran for the sake of it, and having the military capacity to send a terrifying signal is enough to force the other party to stand down. Dropping a single strike on Isfahan in retaliation for a (poorly executed saturation/wasteful show of force) missile salvo demonstrates capability while offering mutual outs: the jew can only hit us once, the persian can be hit where it actually matters. Large standing armies are signals, discouraging belligerents by the threat of actionable retaliation. This doesn't quite work when the other parties have warped risk/reward payoff structures, but it at least minimizes enough threats.
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That's not a practical scenario, it takes far too long for forces to get there no matter how large NATO armies are. You'd have to bring them down through Turkey, through all the mountains, get shipping and supplies. Look how long it took the US to get set up for the Iraq War. The geography of Iran is hellish for an invasion.
Missiles move in minutes, militaries need months.
The correct response to Iran firing nuclear missiles at Europe is to fire nukes back, not invade the country. Or if they fire conventional missiles, just fire conventional missiles back. It's not like they can do much damage with conventional warheads.
And IRL Iran is pretty careful and rational. They resist the urge to launch massive attacks at Western countries, Israel excepted. Even when the US assassinated Soleimani they only shelled some US bases.
I meant a non-nuclear ICBM. Or any other sort of explosive strike that kills hundreds that's very difficult to defend against.
This would be such a massive waste of money the west would internally consider it a win. Not even the US can afford to use ICBMs in this manner.
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