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Colorado Supreme Court Thread

Link to the decision

I don't know to what extent there are established precedents for when a topic is worthy of a mega-thread, but this decision seems like a big deal to me with a lot to discuss, so I'm putting this thread here as a place for discussion. If nobody agrees then I guess they just won't comment.

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The thing is that if democracy is so dangerous that it must be stage managed and the candidates must be within 1σ of the correct opinion, then democracy is a failed idea. You’re saying so more or less yourself in suggesting that the idea form of democracy is one in which voting is merely to tell the rulers whether or not they like them. Why bother with the fig leaf of voting if the people voting get no choices? At that point, just have an autocracy of one sort or another and dispense with the voting.

then democracy is a failed idea.

Only depending on how you define “democracy.”

You’re saying so more or less yourself in suggesting that the idea form of democracy is one in which voting is merely to tell the rulers whether or not they like them

Not my argument, but the view of someone who went by the handle “Ken’ichi” on TAC’s now-lost pre-Disqus comments sections.

Why bother with the fig leaf of voting if the people voting get no choices?

There’s actually several answers to this. And a note: it’s not no choices, it’s limited choices — at the very least, a “thumbs up” vs. “thumbs down.”

First, as noted, there’s the “dynastic cycle” argument. Perhaps the most classic of fall-back “motte” arguments for democracy is the “you can vote the bums out” argument. That is, that people have a way of expressing serious displeasure with the Establishment other than outright rebellion. It lets people unhappy with the system vent their displeasure, rather than letting it fester, hidden, until it explodes out. It lets the ruling elite know that they need to do something to avoid losing the Mandate of Heaven — whether that’s making reforms moving in the direction of the voters, or “educating” the masses until enough of them understand that the unpopular thing the government is doing is really for their own good, is for skilled experts to decide.

Which leads into the second reason — feedback is important. There’s a classic problem institutions can fall into, which is often illustrated in a greatly exaggerated form in fiction via the villain who “shoots the messenger” when brought bad news. When people downplay or omit “bad news” in reporting to superiors, said superiors end up with an overly-rosy picture of circumstances, and will end up failing to act until the disastrous reality comes crashing through the information bubble. You don’t want to become Visser Three.

Third, there’s the utility of elections as a civic ritual, through which we collectively enact our shared citizenship and identity. Consider this Psyche piece by Emilee Booth Chapman, this Rich Harwood essay, and this Graeme Orr essay (hosted on the Australian Parliament’s webpage). From that last:

Lawyers and government officials prefer to think in terms of analytical classifications or normative goals rather than messy things like culture. Figure 3 offers a diagram which I discuss with my students in the law of politics. It shows the various answers to the question 'Why do we have elections?' The diagram groups together the different concepts through which we can understand electoral democracy, and the goals that might drive regulation.

The top two quarters of the diagram are by far the dominant strains in official and academic thinking. Officially, we think about elections either as instruments of government or as triumphs of liberal democracy. Yet when you talk to the media, or follow conversations at parties, the bottom half of the diagram rears its head. The elections as charade view is a cynical, outsiders' counterpoint to the idea of elections as integrity mechanisms. My theme today however occupies the neglected other quadrant. It is the idea of electoral democracy as a 'secular ritual'.

Don't get me wrong. Each of these perspectives is vital to encapsulate the ideal of free and fair elections. However, we—especially academics, bureaucrats, politicians and judges who study or shape the electoral process—rarely address elections from the experiential dimension. There are exceptions. Some historians have focused on early elections as communal events.6 Sociologists also sometimes consider the colour and meanings of wider political practices, like public demonstrations. In recent years, two insightful professors of politics, Ron Hirschbein and Stephen Coleman, have explored the rites and experiences of voting in the US and the UK.7

The study of electoral systems however has largely lacked this dimension. It has been fixated on the outcome of electoral democracy and not on the journey. It concerns itself with 'purposive goals' rather than the 'latent function' of elections, to quote from Professor Jean Baker.8 We purport to know a lot about elections, through abstractions, book learning and through quantitative studies of voter behaviour and electoral statistics. We do so without sufficient concern for knowing about the electoral experience, let alone how systems and rules shape that experience.

Cocooned in these instrumental and liberal analyses, we forget that elections are nothing if not grand social events, events whose configuration shapes our experience of electoral democracy. Elections are giant rituals. They are recurring political masquerades and festivals. Each election itself is then made up of lots of what I call 'everyday rituals': campaign activities, balloting, declarations of results, investitures. They are events whose rhythms, patterns and activities are either set or contoured by law and administrative institutions.

That experiential and social function of elections, of reinforcing the nation’s collective identity in the hearts and minds of the people, can remain even as their function as instrumental competitions for power is reduced; it does not go away just because the menu of options presented to the voters is sharply constrained. (And the abstract of Ora John Reuter’s “Civic Duty and Voting under Autocracy” seems somewhat relevant here as well.)

Fourth, there’s the resolution of conflicting values. We have here essentially two propositions in tension:

  1. We live in a “democracy.” Democracy is what makes our system legitimate, and democracy is the only legitimate form of government

  2. We can’t just let whatever person a plurality of the voters want have actual power in the government.

One way to resolve it is, as you note (and as I, personally, would also prefer), to reject #1. But another way is to note that they are contradictory only if you define “democracy” as “the voters get to elect who they want.” Thus, another way to resolve it is by saying that the “democracy” that legitimates our way of life must therefore mean something other than that. Such as the appeal to Rousseau’s “general will.”

I’m really going to have to recreate that essay, aren’t I?

“The people” never actually rule directly. Even in the “direct democracy” of Athens, the assembly was a small minority of the population of the city-state. The Iron Law of Oligarchy ensures that a society is always run by an elite class, even a democratic one. The difference, then, is to whose benefit do they rule? In past and present “undemocratic” societies, the argument went, the ruling class pursues only their own narrow class interest — under hereditary rulers, the government serves only the interests of hereditary aristocrats; under a military junta, the government serves only the interests of military officers; under a plutocracy, the government serves only the interests of wealthy “capitalists,” and so on. A democracy, then, is when the ruling class instead pursues the good of not only their own class, but of society as a whole — Rousseau’s “general will,” which is the best interest of the country as a whole, and thus definitionally never wrong.

My “steelman” analogy here is to consider individuals who need a “representative” to act on their behalf. Children, the senile, the mentally ill, and so on. What makes a parent, a legal guardian, a representative with “power of attorney,” a good representative? Well, one who acts to their own personal benefit, to the expense of the person they’re representing — one who embezzles funds, for example — is definitely a bad one. This is analogous to the “non-democratic elites” outlined above

But consider the opposite end. I’m reminded here of Bill Cosby’s “chocolate cake for breakfast” stand-up routine. If your kids answer the question of what they want for breakfast with chocolate cake, should you give them what they want? If a schizophrenic wants a doctor to open up their skull and remove the CIA mind-control chip beaming thoughts into their head, does a good guardian start looking for a brain surgeon?

No, a good representative acts in the best interest of the person they represent. A good representative respects their clients wishes… so long as it isn’t against their best interests. Here, the analogy to the overly-permissive parent or guardian is the sort of politician people like the essayist denounce as a “populist” (with or without the “authoritarian” modifier), and you or I might call genuinely democratic. Someone who enacts the popular will — which, per Rousseau, is just another “particular will” — instead of the “general will”. (As I once saw it put, the difference is that the “popular will” is the will of The People (plural) while the “general will” is the will of The People (singular).)

Note that there’s not a strict binary. It’s not “let your kids have chocolate cake or ice cream for breakfast” vs. “you dictate entirely what your kids will have for every meal, they get no choice at all.” You can let them pick which breakfast cereal they might want, or between pancakes and waffles, between oatmeal or French toast, and so on. You can give them a constrained choice among a menu of acceptable meal choices. Even an institutionalized schizophrenic, or an elderly person with senile dementia, has rights to some measure of choice around their activities, circumstances, treatment, and so on; but only when it’s not counter to their own best interests.

Hence, a “stage managed” “defensive democracy” with a strictly limited menu of choices for an electorate who, between public choice theory “rational ignorance” and Marxist “false consciousness”, don’t always know what’s in their own best interest, nor which potential representative is most skilled at determining what that societal best interest is.

Fifth, in line with above definitions, it’s also because they don’t see themselves as “an autocracy.” Even as he began the Roman Empire, Augustus didn’t see himself as ending the Republic, but as saving it, taking the emergency measures needed to end a disastrous civil war, and changing institutions so as to “fix” them and keep them “alive” despite increasing failures. Only centuries in hindsight did the scale of the transition become clear. And even then, there remained reasons why all the Caesars, no matter how much of a monarch they were in practice, used the title of Imperator and not Rex.

Which leads to point six, perhaps the most cynical one. Even if there had been in Rome an alt-Augustus who had wanted to kill the Republic and establish a monarchy, his best path for doing so would be pretty similar to that of the actual Augustus. It makes for an easier transition to preserve the surface forms of the old regime, even as you hollow them out and transfer actual power into the new forms. After so much “your vote matters,” it’s best to make sure any realizations that no, it actually doesn’t, spread through the population as slowly as conditions allow.

So, to tl;dr summarize, in answer to your question “why bother with the fig leaf of voting?”:

  1. It lets people safely vent their displeasure with the government, rather than start organizing for a violent revolution.

  2. It lets elites know how unhappy the masses are well before armed rebel bands begin making their way toward the capital.

  3. Even when it has little practical effect, it serves a psychological and social role as a communal secular ritual.

  4. Because at least some (probably most) of the people pushing this actually think they’re “saving democracy from itself” ̉— that is, they’re trying to salvage some workable definition of “democracy” while also avoiding what they consider the unacceptable failure mode of “populism.”

  5. And because even those who aren’t will still find the “fig leaf” makes the de facto transition to an autocracy go down more smoothly with the masses.

That said, I’m with you on finding “just have an autocracy of one sort or another and dispense with the voting” personally preferable.