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I am not saying that my morals are isolated. If Alice was born in a similar place to me, was raised with a similar culture to me, shares a religion or a nationality with me, then we will probably share similar moral axioms. In which case my reasoning for thinking Nazis are bad will be compelling to her. If she doesn't share my axioms, then my reasoning will not be compelling.
I have reasons that Nazis are bad that will be compelling to Alice based on her axioms, but that doesn't seem to rely on material truth, as the axioms are received.
On a larger scale, I think that morals are cultural traits that are evolved and mutated over time. Since they need to be fit in order to spread and survive they have utility, usually, but looking at them from that perspective we would still be making a mistake to argue that one moral position is "materially truer" then another. They represent different solutions to environmental and social problems. We can argue that some axioms have more or less utility, but that is not the same as truth. It's like saying feet are better than hooves. Which would be a weird argument - and also would have nothing to say about feet being truer than hooves. Saying that feet are truer than hooves doesn't make any sense.
I got my moral axioms through upbringing, education, cultural osmosis and to some extent reasoning, but that reasoning required an axiomatic foundation to work from and as that axiomatic foundation had to be received, the entire structure is built on received axioms. So it is all relative.
I mean that it violates my moral axioms and causes me to feel revulsion. The same way I might feel uncomfortable seeing someone violate a cultural custom, but a much stronger feeling.
I don't need my morals to be materially true to be the most important thing to me. Because of the circumstances of my upbringing, they are fundamentally part of who I am. Why is that not enough?
So, lets say that Alice has somewhat different moral axioms to you. Would you say that her moral axioms are "bad"? On what grounds would you claim this?
I expect most people to have slightly different moral axioms than me. Small differences are not problematic. The closer they are, the easier it is for us to make compelling moral arguments to each other. And there is a bit of flexibility to people's moral axioms so I may even be able to shift their moral axioms a little bit by making arguments using their other moral axioms. maybe I think some of their axioms are inconsistent and I can try to bring them closer to reflective equilibrium
But some people from cultures far removed from mine could have moral axioms that are bad or evil from my perspective. The grounds on which I would claim they are bad is that they violate the expectations laid out by my own moral axioms. Or that they always lead to ethical conclusions that I find abhorrent. Those moral axioms would be bad ones in my view. They are incompatible with my own to such a degree that I cannot tolerate them. It is likely that they would see my moral perspective as bizarre or evil as well.
I do not see morality as a truth claim. my morals are part of who I am. It's like my relationship with my family. I don't think that my family is the materially best family, that doesn't make sense. However, they are my family, and they matter to me more than anyone else does. They don't need to be the best, or most correct, or most true family, those aren't meaningful attributes of family. They are mine. Same with morals. They are my morals. They are part of who I am.
Can you explain why that account of morality fails or makes me a less moral person? I recognize that if I was born in a different place or time, to a different family, that my morals would be different. The children of christians tend to have christian morals, the children of muslims tend to have muslim morals, aztecs aztec morals. It seems pretty clear that morality is inherited, not reasoned out from first principles for normal people. Again, I would argue that that isn't even possible, moral arguments inherently need to rest on arbitrary moral axioms as a foundation. Any moral argument you make will ultimately be undone by agrippa's trilemma. I can keep asking why and you will eventually reach a foundational moral axiom that cannot be justified. It simply is your moral bedrock.
From Wittgenstein “If I have exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: 'This is simply what I do.” Though I might alter that slightly to be "this is simply who I am."
I believe this is how everyone's morality is. I think your morals rely on a foundation of inherited axioms that cannot be justified morally. Which is fine as far as I am concerned. Can you make an argument explaining how your morals violate my view?
That's grounds for saying that you don't like them, but it's not grounds for saying that they are bad. That badness is not actually attached to the thing; it is merely a state of mind that is attached to you. Why do you want to go further and claim/imply that there is some actual badness that attaches to the thing?
I think I've been very clear that I don't think that there is an objective badness attached to thinks that I morally oppose. I am using the term bad or evil to denote that my feelings towards them are much stronger than what "not liking" implies.
Your question was how would I explain to someone else that they were bad, and I said that if we had overlapping moral axioms then they would find my reasoning compelling. Between two people with overlapping moral axioms, there will be agreement on what is bad or evil. Is your point that bad and evil are fundamentally objective terms? I am saying I specifically do not think that moral badness or evil are material facts. They are subjective judgements only.
If by actual badness you mean badness as a material fact, then I don't want to make that claim as it is not coherent. I think subjective things are still things. But if you are referring to badness as a material fact I would say that 100% does not exist. The physical world does not contain morality or "badness". That is reserved for the subjective world of humans. It is still very real, but is not a physical characteristic that could be measured using an evilometer.
This is getting pretty esoteric, but I guess I would say that evil and badness are states that I apply to things through judgement. Thereby attaching badness to the thing, subjectively. Another example would be beauty. It is real, but not a physical attribute. But I don't really feel strongly about this area of the argument, as it seems to be mostly semantic to me.
If you are only interested in badness as a material physical attributes of things, fair enough. my answer in that case would be that I simply do not believe that morality or goodness or badness exists as a material physical attribute of any assortment of matter. I think believing otherwise is incoherent and I challenge you to argue that it is coherent.
It makes a lot of sense that you would intertwine these things. Like, some people would just find the Nazi regime to be beautiful, with the colors and the efficiency and all that. They just feel that way. One person just happens to like Nazis, feels like they're "beautiful" and "good", while another person just happens to dislike Nazis, feels like they're "ugly" and "bad". It's definitely an aesthetic thing, and that's just going to vary person-to-person; there's nothing actually about Nazis that makes them actually be "bad". Individual aesthetics very much develops over time via upbringing, education, cultural osmosis and to some extent reasoning.
I suppose you can be forgiven for using language too casually in a way that would normally seem to imply that there is something about Nazis that actually is bad, so long as you're able to clear it up. Would recommend you avoid using that language in the future, though.
Ok, at this point I don't feel like you're arguing in good faith. You don't specifically say that you think I don't hate nazis enough, but if I read you correctly you are implying it. You're saying that the way I find abhorrent people abhorrent is incorrect?
You're expressing pretty strong judgements and I don't feel like you are backing the up in a helpful way. If you have such a strong judgement, please say it straightforwardly, and back it up. I've tried to engage with you honestly. You are shaming instead of trying to convince me at all.
You clearly think the position I've put forward is despicable, but despite your questions I don't feel like you've actually argued with what I've said in good faith.
I don't see why what I've said is offensive to you. I don't see why saying that "who I am is what makes nazis abhorrent to me" is not enough. That seems like a strong moral judgement. Why do you think that is not enough.
I do think that nazis actually are bad. I do not think that morality is a material attribute. If you find that position so gross can you please attack the reasoning I have given. You have not even tried to argue that subjective things aren't real and only objective things are real, while I have repeatedly made it clear that I do not agree with that. I believe subjective things are truly real.
I didn't say that I don't think you hate nazis enough, make strong judgments, say that your position is despicable or offensive. I just tried to understand and describe your position accurately.
In what sense? Probably not in the traditional sense of the word.
Lol fair enough. I am not a moral realist. I mean real as in subjective things actually exist, but I am fine taking the moral realist definition in this case. There are plenty of philosophers who have have argued that subjective things are "real". I agree with those philosophers, but I'm not interested in defending the definition of real as it's not really needed for my position right now.
Instead, how about I say that subjective things can be overwhelmingly profound and important. They are in no way of less importance than physical material facts. They are not secondary.
I think that's dishonest. What is your honest moral judgement of my moral judgement of bad/evil people? You are saying that when I say that people are bad, I don't mean that they are actually bad. How is that not the same as saying that my moral judgement is not the right kind of moral judgement?
You have continually implied that moral relativism as a position is insubstantial or just incorrect. I am not offended, that's the default position. I just want you to argue with what I have said.
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