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I’m an atheist and consider myself a moral relativist, which is to me is quite distinct from being a moral nihilist. Morality, to me, is a subjective human construct but that doesn’t mean it doesn’t exist; it exists in that same sphere as concepts, ideas and beliefs. It’s based on axioms which are essentially arbitrary; the only thing you can do is point out logical contradictions ensuing from them. In that manner, it’s quite similar to maths, which also don’t materially exist but certainly can be studied.
I find the very concept that morality could ever be objective to be logically incoherent; whatever moral “truth” you come up with, I can immediately just invent another worldview that contradicts it due to having different axioms. Even if God existed, I don’t see why I couldn’t disagree with his morality. The fact that he created me or the universe doesn’t grant him any philosophical authority any more than my parents, and being omnipotent just makes him a cosmic dictator with the power to punish me if I stray from his own personal beliefs.
I think the idea of objective morality might be coherent. There may not be such a thing in practice, or it may not meaningfully distinguish human moral systems, but if it were revealed somehow that there exist logically watertight rules by which our object-level beliefs can correctly unfold into preferences, having something to do with what a preference means, then there'd be a way to say that some preferences are objectively wrong, in the sense that a person could not have legitimately arrived at them and is just spouting confused nonsense that conflicts with his own ultimate priorities (which would presumably be shared between agents, because there is only one objective reality to have beliefs about). As you say, a given moral system can be logically incoherent; this just takes it to another level.
Source: getting high
Right. Did you change your mind about this?
This isn’t a gotcha, let’s not squabble.
No. There is no contradiction. «Objective morality» might be a logically coherent idea/concept (I actually think it is, but that can plausibly be due to my lacking intelligence). I still believe it's not a thing that factually exists in our Universe; and even if it does, it could not be satisfactorily established.
OK. But then when people talk of objective morality, you should treat it as that attempt at coherence. Because in practice, denial of objective morality is used to dismiss every morality out of hand as equally worthless as any other moral system. Much like the denial of objective reality dismisses every epistemology (‘ways of knowing’) as equally worthless.
«Logically coherent» is still a rather weak ontological status. People may try whatever, I just don't think they can succeed, and they certainly cannot positively convince each other (me included) that they have.
Denial of objective morality is objectively correct and a prerequisite for any non-deluded attempt at negotiating social norms. It is exactly because there is a single shared objective reality (presumably) that we can discuss our distinct interests in common terms, instead of immediately concluding that the only solution to disagreement is brainwashing or genocide.
What if it was not ‘rigorously, formally proven’ but useful nonetheless, like objective reality, and most of science?
They can convince each other, just not you. When a guy like me or a christian tells me he won’t murder me for peanuts even in the absence of earthly retribution, I believe him, and he believes me, because I see it as rational, mutually beneficial position. And when people like you tell me they will, I believe them too. Is it not rationally justified for me to treat them differently?
You wear a defector badge, and when you inevitably get defected against, you’ll presumably see that as a vindication of your worldview, knowing you successfully avoided doing the thing that wasn’t proven. While elsewhere, us cooperating morons reap the fruits of our delusions.
Do you twobox newcomb?
Existence or nonexistence of objective morality is fundamentally a question that transcends expedience. Consensus morality, habitual or intuitive morality, game-theoretical morality are different.
When did I tell you this? But of course I did not, you choose to interpret my words about objective morality as proclamation of total absence of moral code. Why? Because you're pissed about being torn to shreds on this anon forum, along with your half-baked moral philosophy. Grow up.
This is of course gaslighting. I do not. I just believe you are an immature coward who's unable to admit his errors of reasoning. This is no grounds to lash out like this and try to save face.
Christians believe that "defecting" against me constitutes adherence to their "objective" morality. People like you defect against others because you worship power and are devoid of any human moral feeling. Your position that you express in this debate is one of a gleeful oprichnik who asks his victims "if you're so right, then why do you stand against the wall? Should have cooperated harder, eh?".
I wouldn't have killed you for peanuts, but for freedom – absolutely. It is my regret that I never did kill one of your kind, as a matter of fact.
It's a stupid intuition pump. If I am in a world where Omega can exist, I onebox. In our world, both boxes will be empty at best.
Isn’t that the straightforward point of the gyges story?
Come on, man. Would you stop? Reasonable people can disagree. Although I’m on the record condoning the murder of any and all authority figures in nazi germany, so if I was who you think I am, we don’t even disagree on that. Nor do our theoretical disagreements on the legitimacy of power translate to actual disagreement on putin or oprichniks.
You know, when I said ‘pal’ originially when you came in guns blazing, that wasn’t sarcastic. As far as I’m concerned, we are pen pals, and I like you. The reason I talk to you here is because I think you could benefit from adopting a less subjective view of morality. And for me there’s always the remote chance that you are correct. I said pretty much the same thing to kulak when he expressed similar views.
In an environment where politeness was less enforced, I would keep talking to you, but I don’t want you to get mod attention like last time, so I’ll make this the last time we talk. Just tell me if you have a change of heart.
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I remember when I reached this salient and powerful realization about morality in my own theological musings. It features heavily in my own estimations of morality.
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I don’t see the problem. Yes morality is relative. Yes my moral values are not materially truer than yours, so what? My morals are my morals, and they are correct, for me. I will act accordingly. I see no reason for this to collapse into nihilism.
“Be it so. This burning of widows is your custom; prepare the funeral pile. But my nation has also a custom. When men burn women alive we hang them, and confiscate all their property. My carpenters shall therefore erect gibbets on which to hang all concerned when the widow is consumed. Let us all act according to national customs.”
Does Might make Right? Is Justice as simple as "Whatever the strong impose on the weak"?
I don't think that is what I said but I am trying to follow your point. morality is an evolved shared thing. It often stops the strong from imposing on the weak. Again, I don't see why that requires it to be objective. It is a cooperative custom.
Regardless of what justice is the strong will impose on the weak. Different cultures will evolve different customs to limit that. Limiting the strong being cruel to the weak seems good to me and also seems to be selected for in the evolution of morality. I think it is a blessing that that tends to happen.
might is not the only factor, culture and argument can affect things certainly, but maybe in this context you would see that as might too. People who can make convincing arguments or manipulate their peers will impose on those who can't
The first post in this chain said that morality is subjective not objective. Which I agree with. morality is crucial but not a material fact. It is based on inherited axioms that are evolved.
The response to that post that I replied to argued that that position leads inexorably to nihilism. Which I disagree with. I believe I can have a substantial moral position while recognizing that it is relative. The post I replied to said:
I don't see why morality can't do the things he wants it to do while being relative.
If I think that the Nazis are bad, which of course I do, I can fight them. Recognizing that my morals are not materially more true than their's doesn't stop me.
What, then, do you mean by "bad"? Like, if you were to say to another human, let's call her Alice, that you thought the Nazis are bad, what does that entail? Does it mean that you have a reason, which you think should be convincing to Alice, to believe that... oh, I don't know, that their morals are materially less true than yours? Are you just merely expressing some feature of your personal morals, completely isolated from anything else in the universe? Like, what's going on here?
I am not saying that my morals are isolated. If Alice was born in a similar place to me, was raised with a similar culture to me, shares a religion or a nationality with me, then we will probably share similar moral axioms. In which case my reasoning for thinking Nazis are bad will be compelling to her. If she doesn't share my axioms, then my reasoning will not be compelling.
I have reasons that Nazis are bad that will be compelling to Alice based on her axioms, but that doesn't seem to rely on material truth, as the axioms are received.
On a larger scale, I think that morals are cultural traits that are evolved and mutated over time. Since they need to be fit in order to spread and survive they have utility, usually, but looking at them from that perspective we would still be making a mistake to argue that one moral position is "materially truer" then another. They represent different solutions to environmental and social problems. We can argue that some axioms have more or less utility, but that is not the same as truth. It's like saying feet are better than hooves. Which would be a weird argument - and also would have nothing to say about feet being truer than hooves. Saying that feet are truer than hooves doesn't make any sense.
I got my moral axioms through upbringing, education, cultural osmosis and to some extent reasoning, but that reasoning required an axiomatic foundation to work from and as that axiomatic foundation had to be received, the entire structure is built on received axioms. So it is all relative.
I mean that it violates my moral axioms and causes me to feel revulsion. The same way I might feel uncomfortable seeing someone violate a cultural custom, but a much stronger feeling.
I don't need my morals to be materially true to be the most important thing to me. Because of the circumstances of my upbringing, they are fundamentally part of who I am. Why is that not enough?
So, lets say that Alice has somewhat different moral axioms to you. Would you say that her moral axioms are "bad"? On what grounds would you claim this?
I expect most people to have slightly different moral axioms than me. Small differences are not problematic. The closer they are, the easier it is for us to make compelling moral arguments to each other. And there is a bit of flexibility to people's moral axioms so I may even be able to shift their moral axioms a little bit by making arguments using their other moral axioms. maybe I think some of their axioms are inconsistent and I can try to bring them closer to reflective equilibrium
But some people from cultures far removed from mine could have moral axioms that are bad or evil from my perspective. The grounds on which I would claim they are bad is that they violate the expectations laid out by my own moral axioms. Or that they always lead to ethical conclusions that I find abhorrent. Those moral axioms would be bad ones in my view. They are incompatible with my own to such a degree that I cannot tolerate them. It is likely that they would see my moral perspective as bizarre or evil as well.
I do not see morality as a truth claim. my morals are part of who I am. It's like my relationship with my family. I don't think that my family is the materially best family, that doesn't make sense. However, they are my family, and they matter to me more than anyone else does. They don't need to be the best, or most correct, or most true family, those aren't meaningful attributes of family. They are mine. Same with morals. They are my morals. They are part of who I am.
Can you explain why that account of morality fails or makes me a less moral person? I recognize that if I was born in a different place or time, to a different family, that my morals would be different. The children of christians tend to have christian morals, the children of muslims tend to have muslim morals, aztecs aztec morals. It seems pretty clear that morality is inherited, not reasoned out from first principles for normal people. Again, I would argue that that isn't even possible, moral arguments inherently need to rest on arbitrary moral axioms as a foundation. Any moral argument you make will ultimately be undone by agrippa's trilemma. I can keep asking why and you will eventually reach a foundational moral axiom that cannot be justified. It simply is your moral bedrock.
From Wittgenstein “If I have exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: 'This is simply what I do.” Though I might alter that slightly to be "this is simply who I am."
I believe this is how everyone's morality is. I think your morals rely on a foundation of inherited axioms that cannot be justified morally. Which is fine as far as I am concerned. Can you make an argument explaining how your morals violate my view?
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Justice is what keeps a social group cohesive instead of turning on each other. A “weaker” tribe with a functioning social system can often outlast a stronger one that tears itself apart due to power struggles and revenge over perceived slights.
But different societies absolutely have different conceptions of justice, how do you know yours is the objective truth? Many things you do, people from other nations or time periods would find absolutely abhorrent, and vice versa.
The world is moving closer and closer to a monoculture, of which societal differences are obliterated from the twin forces of capitalism and social media. What justice would such a society have? It would be permanent and immutable, and if you dislike it even in the smallest part it will be imposed upon you.
The relativist stance is descriptive of a reality that is fast disappearing. Current academics feel no shame of imposing their morality on the distant past. It is post-modernist babble that is completely unhelpful to the vital question of what is right and good.
The relativist stance simply describes the reality that morality is constructed by humans. If I live in a monoculture I have to live under its moral axioms, which is fine. If I need to make a moral argument I will use those axioms as my starting place. I don't see why that position is abhorrent to you.
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Isn't math usually seen as objective - i.e. its truth or falseness is mind-independent? After all, we use it to come up with falsifiable theories of how the universe works. In fact, one line of argument for theism is that math is unreasonably useful here.
Um, what? It really is "heads I win, tails you lose" with theism, isn't it? I guarantee no ancient theologian was saying "I sure hope that all of Creation, including our own biology and brains, turns out to be describable by simple mathematical rules; that would REALLY cement my belief in God, unlike all this ineffability nonsense."
It's a hard problem from all possible directions, that people have been grappling with since before recorded history. There's going to be a pretty wide diversity of answers.
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There's two catches with that. The first is that "As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality." (Albert Einstein)
Witness his special relativity, wherein 2 apples plus 2 apples might still be 4 apples but 2 m/s plus 2 m/s turns out to only be 3.9999 (and another dozen or so 9s, admittedly) m/s.
So we can come up with conceptual universes of axioms and prove all sorts of interesting things about them, but we can never be totally sure how completely any of them are really relevant to the actual universe we're in, rather than just amusing games. The fact that we've invented so many pure amusing games that turned out to be good descriptions of the building blocks of reality makes this a surprisingly tricky question.
The second is Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems. Any reasonable (able to handle basic arithmetic, not obviously inconsistent) system of foundational axioms for mathematics is inadequate to prove all statements which are true in that system, and is also unable to prove its own consistency. We can sometimes use a more complex system to prove the consistency of a less complex system, but then at that point it's turtles all the way down.
There are a lot of ways to interpret the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics. To some extent the discovery of how much complexity can be derived from ridiculously simple rules hints at possible alternatives to theism, though I'm not exactly all on board the Tegmark train myself.
I've always been taken by Godel's theorem's as it really cuts us down to size. But if I'm understanding it properly, it doesn't preclude the idea of a proof itself from a series of other proofs, just we can't prove a system of them all lining up together on the same axiom base. But that's not quite the same as having an ambivalent confusion about everything in mathematics...?
These days I like Iain Mcgilchrist's left-brain, right-brain algorithmic vs gestalt brain thing. A lot of our thinking and limitations are because we mistake the left-brain view of the world for reality. The key scientific insights of the 20th century, Godel, quantum physics, relativity and, yes, postmodernism are all pointing us to somewhere else...
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IIRC from my physics class in college a long time ago, this isn't even a "somehow." It's that complex numbers were formulated and used because they were useful in physics, specifically for modeling behaviors of real-world objects, not some obscure electromagnetism effects happening in a circuit or whatever. I wish I could remember the details and/or how apocryphal the story was, but it's certainly one of the less intuitive things that square-roots of negative numbers are so useful in real-world physics, looking at math from the outside.
This isn't true. They were originally developed to solve equations. The physics applications came much later
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Nah; the whole reason imaginary numbers are called "imaginary" is that they were first used in formal, temporary, intermediate results in algorithms for calculating the "real" cubic/quartic polynomial roots that people care about. That was like 1600. I think Euler's formula a century later was when engineers and physicists first really started treating complex numbers as things of non-temporary interest, and quantum mechanics was when complex numbers started to feel more "real" than real ones.
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I endorse this wholeheartedly, how exactly does one assess the objectivity of a moral maxim? If the heavens opened up and the Abrahamic God handed us a new set of commandments, where does his authority to set objectivity lie?
Personally, I'm a moral relativist, but I have no compunctions about being a moral chauvinist and thinking my set of values are superior and ought to be promulgated. Any disagreeing is welcome to do the same, neither of us can stop each other after all.
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