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I'd agree that mimesis is a useful concept, but I'm not convinced that agency is the right way to frame it. As I use the term, an agent implies things like deliberate or conscious intent. Emergent agency - the 'agency' of an impersonal system - is a metaphor. There are times when I don't mind that metaphor (e.g. "Germany wanted revenge after the Treaty of Versailles" - sure, Germany isn't really an agent capable of desiring anything, but it's an analogy), but I think you have to be very careful of reifying it.
What do you mean by "Germany isn't really an agent capable of desiring anything"
Do you mean it doesn't have qualia? What do you mean by "it doesn't have qualia."
Surely you think the humans have qualia.
Do you not agree that those human interactions constitute 'germany'? They seem to identify as 'germany'.
Sure, they aren't agents like you or I, they have way more qualia spread across distributed processing units interacting in often uncoordinated ways.
But if we want to really figure out what "germany" is doing and why, we have to trace back all of the processing that led to the outcome, and that includes a lot of tracing of human qualia. But- and heres the important part- not all of the qualia.
Not all of the qualia of Frank-Walter Steinmeier contribute to the behavior of Germany. Only some of them contribute to the actions we all identify as the actions of Germany. Only some of them identify as Germany. Maybe Frank-Walter Steinmeier's ego is so strong, and Germany's weak enough, that he barely Identifies as Germany at all.
Egregores- usually refers to something stronger. The sense of identity is more unified. The hive mind is more interconnected. The mob shares more of its cognition. A substantial number of Christians have a God tulpa and in antiquity Catholics received systemic back-propagation flowing through the church in a centralized manner. There are systems that use humans to hold their consciousness and propagate and execute their goals. It is important to understand this. Because we live in one of them.
Refusing to reify our God with a human name means it is less likely to appear to the psychotics as a spirit, but having no body also makes it harder to kill.
I mean that there is nothing that it is like to be Germany. Germany does not have a mind with internal experience, or indeed qualia. If I look for conscious experience in Germany, I will find it only at the level of individual Germans. Thus also with desires. Germany qua Germany has no desires - only Germans do, and 'Germany' is a kind of metaphor or collective term for the aggregate desires of German people. When I say 'Germany wants so-and-so', people listening to me generally understand that what I mean is 'a large number of Germans want X'.
To take a specific example, when I say 'Ukraine wants to be independent from Russia', I am not positing some sort of emergent super-mind called 'Ukraine' that has internal conscious experience and coherent individual desire, and which desires to be independent from Russia. I am referring to a commonality in the desires of the majority of Ukrainian people.
I don't see at what point it's helpful to posit, in your language, an ego for Germany or for Ukraine. The national ego is fictional - it is an imaginative construct that we use because our brains are good at modelling other human-like agents, but bad at modelling giant emergent systems, so we pretend that the system is an agent. Even though it isn't.
I disagree. Or rather, I do not think there is anything it is "Like" to be OliveTapenade or CloudHeadedTranshumanist either. Those are fictions. There are human qualia behind those words, but those qualia are no more (or less) OliveTapenade and CloudHeadedTranshumanist than the German qualia are Germany.
We can make objective statements about how the qualia of OliveTapenade and CloudHeadedTranshumanist affect the behavior of the human bodies that house them, but we can also make objective statements about how the qualia of OliveTapenade and CloudHeadedTranshumanist affect the country that houses them, the planet that houses them. etc
We can make objective statements about how OliveTapenade and CloudHeadedTranshumanist identify. but then we're still at a loss if they identify as multiple things.
I can tell you this much. The qualia over here don't identify as merely the consciousness of this body. This is a consciousness that could not exist outside of America, planet earth, in a family that owns 5 dogs, and so on and so forth. All of those things are essential components of this qualia and thus they are part of "me". Could the human agentic system exist without me as I am now? Yes certainly. But you keep saying things like "the national ego is fictional". You're conflating the agentic system of each human with the qualia of each human that feel like they 'are' that human, and then refusing to conflate the agentic system of Germany with the qualia of Germany that feel like they 'are' that Germany. And then saying Germany is "fictional" because it doesn't have qualia.
I feel like you are holding a 'woo for me but not for thee' sort of double standard here.
Ah I see. Yes. In terms of how exactly you model the behavior of Germany- If you're modeling the qualia of Germany the same way you model the qualia of a single person, you are indeed doing it inaccurately. Ideally you should model its qualia in concept as being distributed via media and upbringing and being executed in an ecosystem by a collection of human agentic systems that are also doing lots of other things. You should be modeling its political action more like an ML architecture with specific connections to specific human agentic systems. Ideally you also do this for humans. But the day to day operation of human agentic systems is largely obscured by privacy (mass data gathering by the internet for ads is actually exactly the sort of thing you do to help you model the operation of a human agentic system) and the fact that the internal architecture of the brain is really hard to study. The usefulness of positing an ego for Germany, is that- for one, tons of people are holding that double standard you have there. 'woo for me and not for thee'. And for two, tons of people fail to appreciate the similarities between countries, religions, societies, and more traditional organisms until you frame it this way. They all need to reproduce. They all have specific architectures for transferring information throughout the organism and policies for issuing commands. They all have weak points and can be killed. Those that stick around all pursue certain goals and have mechanisms to fight value drift. And so on.
If you already fully grasp all of this on the object level- it's not going to be as useful to you. If it all just feels like a word game... well
so is the following:
e^x = 1 + x + x^2/2! + x^3/3! + x^4/4! ...
and yet somehow... sometimes a word game is all it takes to unveil the profound.
I'm not particularly sure how to respond to this. I can assure you that there is definitely something that it is 'like' to be me, because I have direct, unmediated experience of that thing. I experience qualia, but moreover, those qualia are not free-floating but are attached to a particular consciousness. I am more confident of this than I am of even the existence of an external world. How could I not be? Subjective experience precedes all else.
I presume that other human beings are also subjects of experience by analogy - they seem similar to me, so I assume that they are.
But I don't know how to get from this to a super-agent. I am definitely an agent. Other human beings are almost certainly agents as well, insofar as I recognise a similarity of kind between us. Germany? Where is the agent? Where is the consciousness or ego?
It's possible that we're talking past each other. My point is that there is no unified 'thing' that is Germany that possesses subjective experience. Therefore, because my understanding of the term 'agency' is inextricably connected to subjective experience (and thus will, desire, etc.), there is no agent that is Germany.
It's true that the overall concept or category of Germany contains many things that are agents. In that sense there is a distribution of qualia across Germany. But all of those qualia are attached to particular conscious agents - and none of them are attached to something called 'Germany'. Because Germany does not have a mind.
I think we may actually agree on this much?
But translated into plain English, this really sounds to me like... you just agree with me. Germany is a collection of many independent human agents that we might model - in a way that I would describe as fictional or metaphorical - as a single giant agent. But that's just a model.
I'm not sure what the machine learning analogy even contributes here.
I'm hoping we agree that individual people have minds, and conscious, subjective experience.
I hope we also agree that Germany does not have conscious, subjective experience.
If you grant that agency has something to do with thought or desire or intentionality, things that can only exist in the mind, I'm not sure how you can avoid the conclusion that people have agency and countries do not.
We might conveniently model countries as having agency, and I think that's a necessary simplification since our brains are pretty well-optimised for modelling the behaviour of other people, animals, etc., and not for giant concepts like countries, so countries-as-agents can be a useful shorthand for us. But the country itself? It does not have the kind of agency that you or I have.
Mmm, yes, we mostly agree. I think the difference is in our understanding of the term "agent"
for me the agent is the construct that makes choices and does things. When I think "agent" I think reinforcement learners selecting a policy. I think min-max searching through a game tree. A human agent becomes a different agent if you separate it from its cybernetics. That is- the policy I follow is inextricably linked to the tools I have for processing information about the world. My collective systems output different choices about what to eat if my collective systems include internet access.
You could destroy most of my agency by removing all of my cybernetics and putting me in solitary confinement. But I would still have qualia. So qualia and agency seem highly separable to me. Agency is about processing information and outputting choices in the pursuit of a goal. qualia is about having an experience.
And the stuff about identity... It doesn't really matter if I'm a brain in a jar and this body is a remote controlled robot, or if I'm a brain in this body. What matters is how the brain is hooked up to the things it controls and how it sees itself as being able to control them and having goals relating to them. So in theory- a brain can be hooked up to Germany and see itself as Germany- and then it really would be Germany. In reality there is no such brain hooked up like that. But there are millions of brains hooked up in tiny ways like that such that each of them really is a little piece of Germany. I agree that it's a different architecture of agency. So it's not 'the kind of agency that you or I have' but it's the same category in my ontology... They're both agency to me.
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I disagree that emergent agency is a metaphor. I acknowledge it's somewhat vague in the sense of agency and it's a sketch of a theory but it's helpful in understanding. I guess the bar it needs to meet is being different from other types of causal analysis.
But I think something genuinely emergent can happen where the distributed network of actors and other factors (variation in fundamental institutional, system constraints, technologies etc) adds up to something more than the sum of its parts and that acts back down on the agents. Perhaps a rich causal analysis picks up on this, but the key explanatory power is the phase transition, where the contingent agents and background factors suddenly shift to a kind of hegemony that then whips up large sections of the community into a coordinated hive mind.
I wonder if there's a Chinese-Room-style disagreement here somewhere? I might be modelling consciousness (and derivatively agency) as something unitary and indivisible, and as something that in principle cannot be an emergent property, whereas you would see it as something that's emergent even in case of a human brain?
I acknowledge that if consciousness, intent, agency, etc., are emergent properties of the brain, then it is at least conceivably possible that some macro-scale structure comparable to the brain might also have consciousness or intent. I don't think any such macro-scale structures have been discovered, but it seems conceivable.
That said, I don't think consciousness or agency are emergent properties. I acknowledge that a large structure could emergently behave in agent-like ways - and we might be severely if falsely tempted to attribute agency to it - but it wouldn't have consciousness in the same sense that you or I do.
To the practical side of it, though, the problem I have with the idea of 'hyperagents' as you put it is, well... it's the Gaia hypothesis, isn't it? The Gaia hypothesis is probably the biggest and most successful theory of such an emergent hyperagent. The problem with such hypotheses to me has always been a lack of evidence coupled with a lack of explanatory power - all the systems involved seem to be perfectly explicable without needing to resort to woo. Likewise egregores. What reason do we have to think of egregores as anything more than a hallucination of René Guénon? The social, cultural, and ideological trends of a group of people seem fully explicable without needing to posit this totalising entity.
Yes, I agree with a lot of what you say. There's no especial reason to invoke an egregore unless it adds something. We already have an understanding of networks, feedbacks, contingent causes etc.
The agency is a bit misleading as well as there's no intention or teleology necessarily. But to rescue the parts that I like I'd say it's not just a metaphor. The world actually is a distributed network of agents and culture is a collective intelligence where there can be causal action from the higher level entity down onto the agents. There's something about understanding things as a dynamical system that mixes in a variety of factors and agents to give us events that's actually closer to the truth than what I might call traditional history narratives, though the latter has the advantage of talking about tangible things. But I think there's a tendency still to overemphasize individual agents and to neglect the distributed milleu.
The question that you ask stands, what explanatory power does it actually have.
I don't think we have that fundamental a difference here - and for what it's worth I'm really enjoying have a constructive disagreement here, with no rancour!
I appreciate that the language of super-agents or egregores can be useful to direct our attention to the ways in which individual ideas or choices can be just products of the higher-level culture. Something I've been trying to be more aware of for a while is the way that most in-the-moment choices aren't particularly free choices at all. The decisions we make on the spot are often just the froth, the bubbles on top of waves that have been shaped by deep, unseen cultural currents.
An egregore can be a way of realising that, and it's probably better to think of it that way than to believe that that all your on-the-spot decisions are authentic expressions of untrammelled free will.
But I do still think it's worth being careful not to think of such constructs as being, for lack of a better term, 'real'. Thinking of the culture or the memespace as an agent is a simplification of what is actually a much more complex process.
Yep it's a good example of an idea that needs to show it's value.
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