Background: https://www.cnbc.com/2023/03/07/chinas-new-foreign-minister-qin-gang-holds-first-press-briefing.html
What is the rational course for US foreign policy regarding e.g. the Taiwan problem? What is China's? What is Taiwan's? Are the US, China, and Taiwan currently acting in rational ways in regards to this geopolitical issue? If not, why? If every actor was acting rationally, would this result in the possibility of cooperation to solve the problem peacefully? Or does at least one actor's rational course of action necessarily put them on a 'collision course' with the others? Or, worse, for this situation, is it possible that it is in every actors' most rational course of action to desire the same peaceful resolution/treaty, but some type of tragic coordination problem renders this impossible?
To avoid this being a culture war topic, let's avoid talking about what type of resolution would be best in the sense of most moral, just, etc. Let's only discuss what would be the most rational course of action for every party involved, whatever that may mean.
Of course there have been many attempts to solve geopolitics in the past (see: the various schools of international relations theory). Even still, I'd hope that this wouldn't prevent us from having a discussion of our own about this. Most schools of IR theory attempt to explain why nations do what they do, and some schools ascribe this to possibly non-rational reasons e.g. social constructivism which says that sometimes culture of a nation might explain that nation's actions, and of course often times cultures can hold irrational beliefs or encourage irrational actions. Other schools e.g. realism attempt to explain international relations by stating that nations are rational actors at least as wealth/power-maximizers, but this is obviously contentions, and even if true it could be said that nations that always act as wealth/power-maximizers are not acting rationally, etc.
I'll start the discussion by giving an example of what I consider to be an extreme version of an irrational geopolitical actor, and one for whose actual historical actions have well-understood explanations other than rational behavior: the Empire of Japan after the Meiji restoration. At a certain point it became clear to many Japanese elites that their country was on an undesirable path, one that put them on a collision course with the United States. This war was correctly predicted by many Japanese leaders to be an un-winnable war, if not at least a highly undesirable one. With this in mind, it would probably have been 'most rational' for Japan to abandon their colonial possessions in Manchuria and Korea in the interwar period in order to avoid war with the US, rather than starting a new and more ambitious war with China to try and expand their empire to acquire the natural resources required to prop up those colonies, instead. However, due to ideological sentiment, any Japanese leader against the expansion of empire was essentially selected against by a series of ultranationalist assassins, leaving only irrationally hawkish leaders to direct their country in terms of foreign policy. Thus, Japan irrationally went to war in China, which eventually brought them into war with the US which was disastrous for them.
And, I will provide examples of what I consider to be rational geopolitical actors, as well: both the US and the Soviet Union during the Cuban missile crisis. The Soviet Union initially began to emplace nukes in cuba for a variety of reasons, but for one because they correctly determined that they were at a disadvantage in terms of MAD and putting nukes in cuba could bring more core American territory into range, in order to better ensure their deterrence against a US first strike. Ensuring national security against that of e.g. nuclear destruction, for example, seems to me like a rational goal. The US felt rationally quite threatened by the development, and as well felt their global political situation was threatened unless the responded properly, and so there was a crisis. The US considered doing nothing, which is a rational thing to at least consider, but correctly concluded that a better outcome for their own self-interest could be reached by brinksmanship. The US (namely, Kennedy) also rationally decided against a full scale invasion of cuba despite the unanimous advice of the joint chiefs, probably correct in his assumption that an escalation such as that would have been beyond the pale, and would probably be matched by a soviet invasion of at least west berlin, etc, which would necessitate further escalation, and so reasoned again that a better resolution could be reached through diplomacy. Eventually, the crisis was resolved through a decently clever compromise, with the nuclear disarmament of cuba in exchange for the secret nuclear disarmament of turkey -- a resolution which involved both actors properly considering the others' positions and being willing to make concessions in order to accommodate for the other's circumstances, rather than being driven by ideology, pride, etc. at least in and of themselves. Khrushchev is considered to have lost face from this outcome, and it perhaps seriously contributed to his eventual ousting two years later, but considering the alternative was potentially nuclear armageddon, (i.e. a situation which would have greatly harmed the Soviet Union) it seems notably rational to have leaders at the helm of your nation willing to lose face/sacrifice their own personal career in order to achieve better outcomes for the nation as a whole such as not having it destroyed by nuclear bombs. If any actor can be said to be irrational in this situation, it might be the United States considering that there is an argument to be made that nukes in cuba wouldn't have seriously worsened the soviet nuclear threat and that Kennedy/US was more beheld to the irrational whims of the US public, and that they should have been the ones to rationally decide to take the PR hit by 'losing' the crisis in order to avert even the risk of extremely negative outcomes posed by engaging in brinksmanship. However, I think both the US and the USSR acted rationally enough on balance, at least to demonstrate enough individual examples of rational international relations behavior over the course of the historical anecdote, for the example of them as 'rational' to be sufficient.
With this in mind, how should we describe the geopolitical courses of China, the US, and Taiwan regarding the problem of Taiwanese sovereignty? Are any, or perhaps multiple of the involved actors making decisions meaningfully similar to imperial Japan on the leadup to war with the US i.e. irrationally? If so, why? Or are any or perhaps multiple of the involved actors acting more like the US/USSR during the cuban missile crisis, i.e. acting rationally -- but perhaps still on a collision course, even possibly on a collision course with other rational actors?
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Notes -
Rational world politics would be recognizing that one should either shit or get off the pot. World Systems theory as an approach to history tells us that, historically, China will become the single most economically important and powerful country in the world if it is united. It is big, well organized, filled with people, this outcome is an inevitability over millennia. Therefore, we have two choices: use force to maintain a divided China, or accommodate a China that is powerful as a partner in global economic governance. There is no third option, you cannot maintain a weak, united China by any means over the long term.
China in the Late Qing to Deng period is the only time when it was not the center of the world economy, when global trade did not center around obtaining Chinese goods and moving them West. The ascent of a unified, modern China as the center of the world economy is a return to historical norms, not a new aberration. American policymakers will bring up China eclipsing the US as the world's largest economy as nightmares, despite the fact that given the population difference that would only make the average Chinese citizen 1/4 as rich as the average American. From the Chinese perspective, such an American policy of maintaining a 1st place in GDP rankings requires that Chinese citizens be in poverty relative to Americans, and further is dethroning the middle kingdom from its historical role, is denying China its basic dignity earned over centuries.
Current American policy is looking for a third choice, one that does not try directly to undermine China and divide it, nor does it seek to accept China as an equal partner. Only the most aggressive China hawks talk about bringing down the Chinese Communist party, and none of those have any real plans to do so; to my knowledge no one at all proposes dissecting China into Manuchurian, Tibetan, Sichuan, etc republics. Yet policymakers insist on crowing about China being an enemy, a rival. "Be Nice, Until You Can Coordinate Meanness." If we do not intend to
A serious, rational, path requires that "the West" decide to either confront China directly with the goal of destroying China as a unified state, or accommodate China as an equal partner. Even the most hawkish Taiwan defense plans do not do the former, while even the most dovish trade plans do not really envision the latter. Defeating a Chinese invasion of Taiwan as envisioned in the wargames cited by Dase will not permanently castrate the Chinese threat or lead to a divided China that can be kept weak; it would just set up round 2 in a few decades. Expecting China not to claim Taiwan while enriching the Chinese through trade will not happen. A path must be chosen and stuck to, I fear that neither side is capable of such serious rational choice.
I appreciate the wisdom of your comment for the most part, but these assertions in particular seem like the largest flaw.
True, always in world history before late Qing was China in large part the economic center of the world. However, it is just as true that never before during that span of world history did something like the USA even exist. The conditions of the world are different than they were before, in a major relevant way: 330 million people live in a powerful, technologically advanced, industrial, resource rich nation across the ocean from China. I think this idea of 'returning to the historical norm' loses credibility as something so inevitable when you consider how irrevocably different the world is with the USA existing in its current form across the Pacific from China rather than e.g. geopolitically irrelevant Native American tribes (or really, just unexplored ocean).
And this is to mention nothing of India. I think you overstate just exactly how central China was to the historical world economy, not that it wasn't central in a major way. But my understanding is that India shared a significant portion of that economic centrality throughout history, as well. It seems to me that a 'return to the historical norm' would be an economically multipolar world split with China and India as focal points both in their own right, not China alone.
I would distinguish India in that "India" is kind of a tough concept, where China is a pretty direct one. India historically is more like "Christendom:" a cultural, religious, and semi-ethnic zone inhabited by numerous nations of similar people. Occasionally the important parts of Christendom/India have been united by political entities, but most of their history has been of a variety of warring powers, foreign conquerors, and division. This collection of maps of Indian empires is illustrative, other than the brief period under the Mauryans, no native empire united all of India, or even all the important bits, only foreign conquerors like the English and the Mughals did so. The parallel with Rome is illustrative for westerners, a great empire united culturally, split apart into warring political states. Even today, it is rather silly to historically split off Pakistan and Bangladesh as separate nations, those are "Indian" heartlands historically.
China, by contrast, is closer to "England" as a concept: typically the important parts have been united and ruled by a single political entity, with parts of the hinterland added/subtracted as dynasties waxed and waned. Look at this map today which shows population density in China, and these which show historical Chinese dynasties. Everything to the East of the population line on the modern map has a unified history of dynastic rule dating back over one thousand years. The Han dynasty, around the era of Rome, already controlled and united what were essentially all the important parts of China today! Certainly the Yuan, Ming, Qing, and CCP dynasties all controlled essentially the entirety of modern China. The history of the important, populated, productive bits of China is one of unity, broken by occasional disunity. "The empire long divided..." and all that. China controls all of its historical heartland and cultural territory other than Taiwan.
That all being said...
This is very true! I do not advocate that the United States wave the white flag and kow-tow to our Han overlords (though judging from local elections, we are likely to be saluting a mix of largely Han/Brahmin elected officials in the USA soon enough). Rather, a multipolar world is probably what we envision when we have a united American empire, the EU uniting the European portions of the Roman Empire, etc. But Atlanticist policy makers still want to maintain an essentially unipolar world! One where the colonial values of the British-American-UN-GloboHomo apparatus can be inflicted on the populace anywhere from Lviv to Taipei to Timbuktu on a moments notice. We need to adjust to the idea that China gets a say. I don't think that American think tanks and government leaders have adjusted to that idea yet.
To clarify before anything else: I want to avoid making a value judgement about what is 'good' or 'just' or 'moral.' For example, I don't have any particular leaning as to whether a multipolar world where, as you've put it, China gets a say, or a unipolar one dominated by American colonial interests, is better or more just than the other. Instead, I'm merely trying to think about what's actually most likely to come to pass.
That's what I took away from your comments regarding 'return to the historical norm;' that you were implying that a world with a major pole centered around Beijing is the likely future, considering it has been such a frequent theme of history, at least before quite recently. This, e.g. that the future will contain a world where China is the suzerain of at least most of East Asia (if by historical example it is we are reasoning) is what in particular I'm not convinced is true. Again, perhaps it would be more fair... but I what I want to try and figure out right now is how likely it is, really.
Do you yourself really have any reason to think a continued Chinese rise is particularly likely, other than because of China's historical global centrality? Again, I'm not solely convinced of the likelihood of a Chinese-centric world (or at least one with a major pole emerging from Beijing) by way of the fact that historically this was often true, because again historically it was also true that the US didn't even exist, and yet, the US does exist. With this in mind, what's your main reason to believe that for example China will eventually continue to rise to such a strength that it can feasibly challenge the US over something like Taiwan, or (perhaps because that is too narrow of scope) anything beyond that, such as the Philipines, South Korea, South Asia, etc. ?
I think that many of the counter-arguments to China bullishness are relatively strong. For example it seems that a significant portion of China's growth has occurred in the exact way that leaves it vulnerable to the middle income trap -- do you think that they will navigate this problem, or that the middle income trap isn't real, or that I'm wrong with the premise, or what? What about the supposed demographic decline? Do you think the birth rate problem is overstated, or somehow fixable, etc.? What about the lack of allies -- i.e. it seems for the most part that given the choice between CCP suzerainty and US-American-UN-GloboHomo colonial apparatus, most Asian nations would actually choose American Globohomo status quo rather than Chinese authority, even including e.g. Vietnam and South Korea, two historical Chinese vassals.
These in general seem like strong arguments as to why, even without directly being decisively smashed/disassembled by the West, the Chinese rise might peter out at around the [Extremely major regional power]/[Second-degree global power] level, e.g. without constituting a major pole of a multipolar world order in their own right. But I very much want to hear what you have to say -- if you think that the GDP/capita of China really can reach even half that of the US, or greater, as I think would be required for them to 'erect' such a pole -- what do you see as the route there? Again, currently they're so reliant on their manufacturing economy that seems exactly like it would be middle-income-trapped -- are they going to shift numbers of people on the scale of hundreds of millions to employment in higher-paying services-economy jobs? For what, 'inward consumption' as Xi Jinping has put it? Is there even really theoretical economic demand within China, or worldwide for that matter, for even e.g. 300 million Chinese services-economy jobs in the first place?
My reply is primarily the opposite of our guy /u/Lepidus , I think China will ultimately have some degree of success because I have studied, worked and lived with too many students from the PRC who were smart and hardworking and talented and creative, and ultimately I don't think you can keep good people down. At scale, as long as China can educate and empower some portion of the massive population of intelligent youths that it produces, China will make good. The smartest 20% of China is the size of the United States, that kind of size and scale can't be kept down by even a mildly incompetent government, it takes late-Qing or Mao level incompetence to keep that country weak.
My initial post might read as though I think China will inevitably dominate, I don't think that is true, but I do think China will achieve some success.
*I'm not a hard-HBD guy here, but if you are you can insert this into the argument pretty seamlessly, or not and just go by scale, it doesn't really matter either way.
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