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Culture War Roundup for the week of February 17, 2025

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Do American on The Motte feel that the country is generally in favour of breaking from its old European alliances?

What old alliance are you thinking of?

Define the alliance. What sort is it? What does it entail, who is providing what, and when was this understanding established?

For example: if I was to characterize the transatlantic alliance from 1975, it would be something along the lines of 'the Americans bribed the Europeans to be the front line fodder in a war with the Soviet Union.' Yes, it was in the Americans own interest to fight with the Europeans to prevent Soviet domination of Eurasia, but the Americans were paying for strategic deference (such as via the Marshal Plan and establishing favorable trade flows / market access for the Europeans), and the Europeans were the ones who would be the front line shield. In the crudest oversimplification, it was a mercenary relationship, where the Europeans were the mercenaries.

Around the late 90's/00's, however, my perception is that the desires of at least half of the alliance shifted. The Europeans did not want to defer to American strategy, but did want preferential market access. Which is why the EU formed with the common market barrier with often explicit purpose of negotiating a better deal vis-a-vis the Americans, and they had the strategic break over Iraq when the French and Germans tried to muster a pan-European boycott of strategic cooperation with the US. (This is not a criticism.) Come the 2010s, and the Germans were outright laughing at American warnings of vulnerabilities vis-a-vis Russia, and some of that was after Crimea.

Which is fine enough. Again, observational, not a criticism. But if the alliance has shifted from a mercenary dynamic, what sort of alliance is supposedly being broken?

Come the 2020s, if I were to characterize the sort of alliance the European establishment media and media spheres signals they want, it would be something along the lines of 'the Americans are to be the front line fodder in a war with the Russians... but also pay us for non-military cooperation on China.' Hence why when the US finally adopts a European-style domestic industrial policy as part of the anti-China strategy, there is significant lobbying for exceptions to let American subsidies to go to European factories importing Chinese material. And why the scandal of the hour is the US is failing NATO by... not sending yet more material support to a non-NATO country. When over the last few years, in the face of the biggest military crisis on the continent, major European power centers wanted to approach critical logistic shortfalls in things like Artillery shell production by... limiting contracts with these funds to only European manufacturers, and cutting off American producers who had already started expanding production at significant expense on the expectation of there being demand for such products.

Like, I'm not against supporting Ukraine. Even saying that is an understatement. I could even make a number of arguments why carve outs for the Europeans in industrial strategy is a good thing. But if you approach a major logistical bottle neck as the basis for a jobs program, it might just give a signal that the security issue is not actually the biggest concern, and that protecting your jobs program from competition from your security partner is.

Which, again, is fine. I have been an outspoken proponent that other countries have agency, and such decisions should be respected. If the Europeans, as I have been led to believe by the last few weeks of European media, truly believe that the US military is a security threat to them, I would not bat an eye if they demanded the US military leave germany, and I would expect the Americans to do so at all due (albeit deliberate) speed.

But that certainly isn't the same sort of alliance that was formed with NATO and the Marshal Plan and the Cold War.

As for what's going on in the present-

But the current situation re Ukraine is also sending confusing signals, as it had previously seemed as though the US wanted Europe to step up and be part of a solution for Ukraine, whereas currently it seems they actively want to stop Europe from having a role in peace talks. The motive for this appears to be stopping Europe from asking terms of Russia that would delay a solution the US and Russia find jointly satisfactory, though perhaps there is more going on beneath the surface.

Part of this is transactionalism, and part of this is that Trump has a memory and many of the major Europeans not-so-subtly loathed him and celebrated the partisan efforts of the previous administration to put him away.

The later is just choosing the wrong side of the American electoral culture war, which has been a European choice / mistake since the Obama years. When Trump came into office, the European center-establishment eagerly accepted the premise of the Russiagate conspiracy due to its parallels with European actors, generally accepted / echoed American-left framings in a symbiotic cycle, and greatly rejoiced when Trump left. When you choose political favorites, and join in to various degrees on the political warfare, you pay political costs when their enemies come out on top. By contrast, the Japanese and Koreans never joined in, and broadly got by without issue. It certainly also helps that Japan has always spent significantly on its navy, and the Koreans on their army, so were forced to be fought alongside of instead of in place of.

The point on transactionalism is more important, and goes up to what was stated before- the nature of the 'old' alliance has been changing, and with it the underpinning logic. The alliance going forward will be as strong as the clear and convincing benefit to the American electorate, as judged by the American electorate.

Is Trump vain / greedy / [insert pejorative here]? Sure, why not. But he is also underscoring the benefits, or lack of benefits, by demanding things that would be beneficial to receive, while allowing the reaction to serve as a contrast. The contrast is the point, because the contrast is what will legitimize future decisions under the transactionalist paradigm.

Does Trump really expect Ukraine to sign over 50% of the resources (however you want to define that)? Almost certainly not. Does it make a big flashy point that the expenditure of aid does not directly increase future American wealth? Almost certainly so. Cost of support versus benefit from continuing.

Similarly with the Greenland saga. Does Trump actually in his heart of hearts believe Denmark will sell Greenland? Who knows, though obviously any businessman would insist he does. Do various European establishment media characterizations of the US as threatening invasion, and calls for sending european troops to the island make a big contrast with the lack of troops being advocated for Ukraine for the last few years? Probably. And it would also make it easier to draw down forces in Europe, if there are multiple major European media outlets and officials who can be caught on camera saying they think the American military is a threat.

Which, in turn, can be leveraged when engaging in the next round of, say, US-German base agreements and cost-coverage of American presence. Angela Merkel allegedly once protested to Trump that the US couldn't withdraw from German bases, because of the impact it would have on those German localities dependent on American military and soldier spending. This is not the right line of argument to take with Trump, who generally views such expenditures as a financial net cost (which is generally true) not worth the cost (which is debatable, but he's the one who has to be convinced).

Trump's approach to the European alliance this time around is fundamentally not going to be about equitable burden sharing. The Europeans laughed at him about that last time around. It is likely to be a very clear-cut transactional 'what about this is self-evidently advantageous to an American skeptic,' so that the American leaders gain rather than spend political capital working with Europe.

Helping Ukraine, while popular in many corners, was not exactly an election-winner. Giving military equipment away or at massive discounts while major European powers and media spheres moot the merits of blocking the US from the European arms market is certainly not an election winner in any way.

The flip side of that transactionalism, however, is that partnership will be available when there is clear, unambiguous benefit to the US for doing so, something that could be shown to the American electorate.

And since the Europeans generally lack military capabilities that would allow the US to achieve things it otherwise wouldn't, that's going to mean non-military trades for the American to point to.

Or- to return to the crudest metaphor of alliance logic-

Cold War NATO was an alliance in which the Europeans were the mercenaries being paid for on retainer by the Americans.

Cold War NATO died brain-death when the Europeans didn't want to be mercenaries, but still wanted the Americans to pay them.

Trump-Europe can be an alliance in which the Americans are the mercenaries paid for by the EUropeans... but mercenaries still have to be paid.

if I was to characterize the transatlantic alliance from 1975, it would be something along the lines of 'the Americans bribed the Europeans to be the front line fodder in a war with the Soviet Union.' Yes, it was in the Americans own interest to fight with the Europeans to prevent Soviet domination of Eurasia, but the Americans were paying for strategic deference (such as via the Marshal Plan and establishing favorable trade flows / market access for the Europeans), and the Europeans were the ones who would be the front line shield

I think one would be hard-pressed to come up with a more absurd characterization of the NATO alliance, at any point from April 4th, 1949 until now, as "Europeans were going to be the front line shield, and Americans were going to bribe them to do so," implying that the entire European continent wasn't a target of Soviet expansion from the second Berlin fell, and that Europeans would otherwise had the option of sitting out the Cold War, were it not for Americans sweetening the deal.

We were always going to be the shield to protect Europe from being overrun by the Soviets, and at most, we planned for some material support from our allies, but there was never, at any point, a belief that Europeans would be doing the heavy lifting. None.

but there was never, at any point, a belief that Europeans would be doing the heavy lifting. None.

I don't know about this; the whole idea of NATO came about in part because the aftermath of WWII made it clear that lots of Europeans, East or West, were not yet so tired of war that literally nobody was willing to pick up a rifle or drive a tank. Just a few years afterwards, European and British troops came along with us Americans to go push North Korea's shit in for a little while, AIUI.

NATO came about because:

  1. Everyone understood that the Soviet Union had designs on all of Europe; they were not going to mind their own business and co-exist with the West
  2. It was not in the interest of the United States to have a Soviet-domniated Europe
  3. Europe had no hope of resisting a Soviet invasion, individually, or collectively

This is why the US had bases, and large numbers of forces, stationed throughout Europe. This is why the OPLANS all have the US being in command of the combined militaries, and why they assume the US would be providing the lion's share of forces in the event of a Soviet invasion. This is why everyone and their mother noted the irony that the one time Article 5 got invoked, it was because the US was attacked; this wasn't what NATO was created for, everyone knew what was supposed to happen was the US coming to Europe's aid when the Soviets finally came a knockin'.

This doesn't look anything like Dean's suggestion of Europe as a "mercenary" between the Soviet Union and the US; mercenaries are otherwise uninterested parties that you have to pay to fight for you, not people you promise to defend and you spend a fortune stationing your troops in their territory to do so.

...European and British troops came along with us Americans to go push North Korea's shit in for a little while, AIUI.

Allied contributions to the Korean War effort were around 10% of the total manpower, and the casualties are even more lopsided towards the Americans. The allied contingent was there for political purposes, to keep up the pretense that this was not just the US vs. the Commies, but the "whole world" versus a belligerent state. Any effort in "pushing North Korea's shit in" provided by the Commonwealth nations was just gravy, and appreciated, but it wasn't the point.

What old alliance are you thinking of?

Having re-watched the Lord of the Rings movies fairly recently, I can't help but feel like all of the comments about "the Old Alliances" there felt very relevant to today's geopolitics situation, even though it was published after WWII. Some of the significant political moments felt very relatable: political leaders either feeble in their old age and fed questionable information by disloyal advisors, or stewards uninterested in the worldly success of their constituents. There is a real sense that the alliances have frayed and that, should the beacons be lit over the reluctance of one kingdom, forces of good will choose to fall divided rather than answer and stand together against the forces of Sauron. And this all takes place in the backdrop of the Elves, one of the members of the alliance choose to withdraw completely from the surrounding world and board ships to somewhere. I'm not sure whether I'd map Europe to Gondor or the Elves in this situation: both feel fairly pertinent at different times.

Obviously it's not a perfect allegory, nor do I think it was meant to be: Monarchy isn't really that popular of an idea these days, wingnut "God-Emperor" memes aside, and right-wing leadership feels far short of Theoden or Aragorn. And I'm not sure how the populace would feel more allegorically about how orcs, goblins, and such are rigidly type-cast as followers of evil: to those wanting to type-cast immigration as "the forces of darkness" here, Europe and America are hardly homogenous kingdoms, and never really have been either.

Sure.

And just to add to it- when I first read through Lord of the Rings many years ago, I never felt anger/contempt that the old alliance of history might not be honored. It was sad, sure, and unfortunate in the context, but also understandable- the spirit of the alliance had died long before the crisis came. The fact that the allies came was uplifting, but it was all the more uplifting because it was not an expectation/obligation- it was people who chose rather than were obligated to. Were it people who grudgingly showed up to because they had to because their masters made them on behalf of promises none of them were alive for, it would have been lesser, maybe even worse than if they had not at all. After all, if they only showed up because of a piece of paper despite the apathy or neglect, they would practically be slaves to their forefathers' whims. There's little agency in 'I'm going so because I was told I have to,' and little health in an alliance built on the same.

I think it's also worth noting / remembering that Putin is not Sauron. For all the memes of the Russian orks, the antagonist of [current year] is not the beneficiary of Tolkein-style plot armor / power. Putin is inept, incompetent, a warmonger with a midlife crisis, and even genocidal by the UN definition used in other conflicts in the world, but he is not fated by the power of plot narrative to win if Gondor's Call to Aid is not answered... and in this case, the Call to Aid, while certainly worthy, is no Gondor-scale cataclysm if it fails either, with the mobilized armies marching on without resistance.

Mind you, I was also one of those people who never really 'got' Sauron as a narrative force, and even now I can understand without sharing the sentiment some feel.

Were it people who grudgingly showed up to because they had to because their masters made them on behalf of promises none of them were alive for, it would have been lesser, maybe even worse than if they had not at all.

Funnily enough, the movies' interpretation of events is basically that. They added a scene in Helm's Deep where elves show up and say, "Idk, we were allied thousands of years or so or something, so we'll stick around and help out ig." Basically, completely distorting Tolkien's intentions with what Alliances represented (to say nothing of the relevance of elves in the war by that point).