Industrial policy has been a frequent subject on Smith's blog, for those who don't follow it. (He's for it, and thinks that Biden's industrial policy was mostly good - it's worth following the links in this post.) This post focuses on defense-related geopolitical industrial policy goals and pros and cons of anticipated changes under the incoming Trump administration and Chinese responses. Particularly, he highlights two major things China can do: Restrict exports of raw materials (recently announced) and use their own industrial policy to hamper the West's peacetime industrial policy (de facto policy of the last 30 years). These are not extraordinary insights, but it's a good primer on the current state of affairs and policies to pay attention to in the near-future.
Noah Smith: Manufacturing is a war now
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Notes -
The flipside of the rules of the US hegemony being that US interests at best end at the adversary's border is that the victory conditions for the US, as far as perceptions are concerned, are much steeper. Just like both sides agree that a loss for Ukraine would be a loss for NATO, the US would likewise already lose if Taiwan were taken, or SK/JP forced into neutrality (with the attendant removal of US bases): geopolitical implications aside, there is the cold logic of bluster that says that if you assert or imply that you will never allow something happen and then you let it happen anyway, all other claims you made that you will never let something happen will also become suspect in the eyes of pretenders. Each bluff called successfully moves the boundary to be tested a bit further inwards, and if the US getting its way does not seem quite as inevitable anymore, Iran would be a little more tempted to make a swing at Israel, assorted South American populists might once again be tempted to kick out DEA and the United Fruit Company for cheap votes, Turkey would seize some Greek islands and/or buy more Russian air defense with telemetry enabled, and before long even Germany might resume trading with the Russians and installing Huawei tech. How many of those could the US actually weather in the long run, without all the interlocking benefits it currently reaps from its position entering a downwards spiral?
The US stance on Taiwan is still strategic ambiguity, doesn't really seem like there's been a "this will never happen" bluff
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