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To the extent that this is true, it seems to me that in this context, it's still better-defined as a concept than "computation". That is to say, we can describe free will and its apparent connection to our behavior with considerably more detail, precision and evidence than we can with "computation".
The usual argument is that physical laws are sufficient to explain all our observations, computation is the physical process that gives rise to the highest-complexity ordered behavior we observe, the apparent existence of free will appears to contradict the physical laws, and so the best explanation compatible with those laws is computation. Would that be the essence of your argument?
Could you define "free will"? I have never seen a definition of free will that didn't boil down to sentiment or incredulity. (Mathematical function evaluation, OTOH, has a rigorous definition.) I agree with the argument from parsimony that you've presented in that I don't see a need to admit anything beyond physics to explain our experience, including our perceived sentience. I additionally find that "free will" is too vague to even reject specifically notwithstanding that we don't need to specifically reject it because physics is sufficient anyway.
I want to do things, and I do them. I don't want to do other things, and I don't do them. Neither other people nor other things can directly override either my apparent individual motivation, nor my individual ability to manifest that motivation into action. Every conscious experience of my entire life serves as evidence of this apparent capacity, and every functional system humans build or interact with is based on the assumption that this apparent reality is how things actually work.
"Don't see a need" is an interesting phrase. I'm pretty sure you don't have an empirically-verifiable explanation for what caused the Big Bang, so there's at least one experience, the physical world around you, that physics as we understand and can test it pretty clearly can't explain. Nor is there empirical evidence that we can see behind the Big Bang even in principle; all the evidence we have indicates that we will never be able to. This does not mean that there might not be some deeper version of physics inaccessible to us that is, in fact, seamlessly complete, only that we have no access to any such deeper physics, and thus appeal to that deeper physics is is strictly unfalsifiable.
To the extent that you are satisfied by appeals to the unfalsifiable, I am as well. The difference is that I assert that what we see is what we get: we see apparent free will, and so I assert that free will exists. Your position is that what we see is an illusion, caused by a completely different process, which only appears to be free will in every single way we can observe or test. Notably, your general position is the end-state of a decades-long retreat into a Determinism-of-the-gaps, as much stronger and more falsifiable Deterministic claims were in fact consistently falsified.
Claims that Free Will is parsimonious are exactly backward; to the extent that Determinism must be true because Free Will breaks Materialism, the strong evidence of Free Will's existence and the consistent falsifications of testable Determinist theories are in fact significant evidence against Materialism.
So do I. My desires are outputs of a function incorporating my history and a bit of randomness. Nothing mystical about it.
"Free will" isn't required to model humans as organisms with intrinsic drives and memory that respond to incentives.
Sure, but there's a pretty strong case for post-big-bang materialism.
I'm not sure any physics can answer the question 'Why is there something rather than nothing?", at least not without recurring into a different "something ". This question vexes me, but seems independent of consciousness and experience and so on, which we can explain using physical laws given the singular prior that something indeed exists.
Can you elaborate on these falsifications? To be clear, I'm not talking about naive functionalism. Human actions are not merely the result of immediate inputs. We have state. We have an internal history. We can introspect. I'm merely asserting that parsimony suggests we treat this reflection as a computational process grounded in the material world.
Assuming "function" here means some sort of mechanistic/deterministic process, what direct evidence do you base this claim on?
"Free will" is the data provided by observation. We evidently have it in all senses and in all ways that we can empirically test. That doesn't preclude it being an illusion generated by some hidden process, but if so, all that can be said is that we have no direct evidence of that process.
With the exception of free will, sure. But now we're at two really important things that Materialists predicted their approach would explain, and those explanations failed without apparent recourse. "Materialism answers all our questions, except the questions we ignore because Materialism can't explain them" doesn't have quite the same ring to it.
To put it another way, we have two very important phenomena that cannot be explained by empirical materialism. If empirical materialism itself is forced to resort to non-empirical explanations or to "material" that cannot be observed even in principle, then it has no grounds to object when other philosophies do likewise, does it?
We can't explain either consciousness or experience, though. Like, at all. We can tell a story where they're the outcome of vague, undefined processes, and we can insist that these processes must be materialistic even though we can't rigorously define them or explain how they work, but that is not in fact an "explanation".
Demonstrate either mind reading or mind control, and I'll concede that you have explained consciousness and experience. This doesn't seem like an unreasonable request, since many prominent scientists have previously claimed that they could totally do either or both, and no small number of materialists still insist it should be possible, occasionally claiming it's arrival as soon as the next decade.
Sure, but all these things were equally obvious to epiphenomenalists, Marx among them, who concluded that thought was essentially meaningless and the brain was a simple machine to be engineered to our preferences. Likewise Watson and Skinner and the behavioralists, who claimed that they knew how to arbitrarily shape minds as they saw fit. And certainly, in retrospect, it's obvious that all these claims were very stupid, and that the people making them were being absurdly overconfident. But it evidently was not obvious to either those making the claims or to their contemporaries, and that fact should give us pause.
It doesn't seem to me that parsimony can be validly applied in a case where you know that significant data is missing.
Treating the mind as a computational process grounded in the material world will be reasonable when doing so allows us to either make testable predictions or engage in engineering. Right now, it does neither. "Treating the mind as a computational process" enables only speculation and philosophical discussion, and it seems likely to me that this will not change in the near future.
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