The phrase "defensive alliance" is ambiguous. The rival meanings are not inherently incompatible. But in practise they tend in opposite directions. When the ambiguity is resolved some-one feels cheated.
To see the problem picture four countries, Timidland, Moralland, Weakland, and Aggroland. Timidland is spending more on defence than it wants to because it fears being attacked by Aggroland. Moralland is also spending more than it wants to on defence because it too fears attack by Aggroland. But the internal politics of Moralland are complicated. The moral thing to do is to build a larger army, attack Aggroland and liberate the people of Aggroland from the tyranny of the Chief Aggro. Or is that the moral thing to do? Isn't war bad?
Timidland and Moralland form an alliance. It is a "defensive alliance" meaning that Timidland will come to Moralland's aid if Aggroland attacks Moralland. But the people of Timidland are aware of the complicated internal politics of Moralland and it is explicit that if Moralland attacks Aggroland, then Moralland is on its own. Even instigating voids the alliance.
The problem arises because history isn't that neat. The 1914-1918 war starts with the Austro-Hungarian Empire giving an ultimatum to Serbia, Russia comes to Serbia's aid, Germany comes to Austria's aid, France and Britain have alliances to honour and end up fighting. If we want political theory to relate to the real world, we need to think about Moralland extending guarantees to Weakland.
Aggroland invades Weakland. Moralland supplies weapons to Weakland. And advisers. Eventually troops. Moralland artillery is shelling Aggroland invaders on Weakland soil from positions in Moralland. Counter battery fire from Aggrotroops in Weakland is hitting positions in Moralland. Does this trigger the defensive alliance and suck Timidland into the war?
Some Timidians argue that they never agreed to give guarantees to Weakland. Given the complicated history of the region, they would have refused to get involved if they had been asked. Others are saying that Moralland are the good guys. Of course Timidland must join the war. What use is a defensive alliance is you don't defend your allies? Peaceful Timidians feel that they have been out manoeuvred, and are being forced to honour guarantees to Weakland that they never made.
If Timidland is pulled into the war by the chains of the alliance, we can be more specific than calling it a defensive alliance. It was a "chaining alliance".
But what should we call a non-chaining alliance? I've picked the word "isolating". That is clearly wrong in theory. The terms of the alliance don't forbid Moralland from extending security guarantees to Weakland, they merely classify that as instigating; Moralland cannot call upon Timidland to help honour the guarantee.
But theory and practice disagree. The internal politics of Moralland has its guns-before-butter faction. They saw the alliance as a matter of building military strength, with a view to regime change in Aggroland, to save the world from the danger presented by the Chief Aggro. Moralland also has a butter-before-guns faction, that see the alliance as an opportunity to economise on defence spending, freeing up money for schools, hospitals, road, pensions, police, industrial policy, the climate emergency, tax cuts,... The list is endless. We see the likely outcome in Europe. NATO agrees that all members should spend at least 2% of GDP on defence. Most don't. The other priorities take precedence. In practice the non-chaining alliance leads to Moralland cutting defence spending. They are after all moral and pensioners deserve higher pensions, etc. The guns-before-butter faction are aghast to find that they have been out manoeuvred. They nearly had the army that they needed to protect Weakland from Aggroland. The alliance with Timidland was supposed to add to the army. In practise it subtracted. Moralland's own army has shrunk and Timidland's army is not available. The isolating alliance has left them isolated, unable to offer security guarantees to Weakland.
Obviously my fine distinction has contemporary resonances, but after World War Three reduces Europe and America to radioactive rubble, the run up to World War Four will involve China, India, Brazil, and Indonesia. Will they continue the tradition of talking about defensive alliances? Or will they embrace the distinction between chaining alliances and isolating alliances? I locate this essay in the British tradition of analytic philosophy, looking at words and attempting to resolve their ambiguities. Not all ambiguities; just those with large consequences.
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Notes -
Where does public opinion, or if you are cynical the media manipulation thereof, and other genuine cultural bonds come into your theory of alliances?
Did Helen's face launch a thousand ships because the technical terms of Tyndaerus forced them to, or because being seen to break that oath (whether technically or in the spirit of it) would have done irreparable harm to their ability to rule? To be seen dishonored and cowardly would have destroyed the esteem of their subjects, and lead to their destruction.
Your model seems to be more or less a map-style RTS, with leadership having full autonomy to do whatever they choose within the constraints of their physical ability to do so. It is one where the peaceful, or simply cow-like, public is told who to go to war with and does not resist overly hard. This is not always a clear dynamic.
It seems to me like a major constraint, not just in a modern democracy but throughout history, has been public opinion at home. The public is often bloodthirsty and ready to fight, refusing to abandon those they feel are friends and brothers.
This is less of an issue for making an alliance than it is for refusing to make one. NATO could be abolished along with all other legal alliances among the Anglo states, no British PM would survive refusing to come to the aid of Canada/USA/Australia/NZ if one were seriously attacked.
So it seems like there's a separate category of cultural or natural alliance, that is built less on paper than it is by ongoing natural or planned cultural exchange and cultural depictions. They can be influenced by political leaders, but they are not their creatures. In general I think it is rare for political leaders to face significant opposition to forming alliances with distasteful countries, but more common for a public to get whipped into a war frenzy by aggressive media.
These cultural alliances can form absent a formal alliance, or in concert with a formal alliance, but their terms are less clear. The technical language of an alliance is unimportant compared to the spirit of it, and how that can empower a "War Party" at home against a hesitant or peacenik government, can enable enemies of the regime to rally the public behind the idea that the government is behaving dishonorably.
The USA and UK are the classic example. But I think the USA and Japan provide an interesting hypothetical. The US was probably more firmly committed to defending Japan from aggression in 1954 than it is in 2024, but the American public is probably more interested in or committed to defending Japan from aggression in 2024 than it would have been in 1954. Because the Japanese are widely perceived as a brother people, their video games and film and literature and food are core to modern American pop culture, Ohtani is the Dodgers unquestioned star. The American people would be easy to rally to help Japan under attack. This is an unpredictable element in the story, how the public reacts, and how they can be manipulated into reacting.
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