Most studies I've seen have such artificial settings, it's hard to take their conclusions at face value (if at all). Do you have any persuasive studies in mind? Or even better, just data sets/ narrative reviews of human behavior in the wild, w/t models and theories?
Imperial regime as a whole survived defeats in two consecutive wars (Japan, WWI), two revolutions (1905/17) and had adapted to incessant domestic unrest -- all within 20 years. And was definitely defeated only after few more years of civil strife. World war pushed many states down the similar roads, so I don't see relative to whom Russia was an easy case. What indications of ease do you mean?
intent in crushing national movements
Even Ru Provisional government inherited that stance, sadly. Historical irony though, is that much of early Bolshevik maneuvering was a pure opportunism - including acceptance of Finnish independence (if that acceptance is to be considered legitimate at all), Brest-Litovsk treaty, etc. When they secured power, the game had changed. Eh, Mannerheim.
Could I ask your view on late Russian Empire? Although lagging behind, it seemed to be more in touch with European states (than its own people, ironically), industrialized at impressive rates, and eventually yielded to some democratic changes. If Russian whites were as successful as Finnish ones during their civil war, I believe - in the hindsight - they could steer toward better trajectory, than the Soviet one.
First, I support removing any traces of Soviet Union from the countries, annexed by it. I don’t think any invasion could be justified by historical narratives (if at all). Moreover, Putin’s narrative, even wrapped around geopolitical calculus, is not consistent with his real actions anyway.
I disagree with sweeping extrapolations of Stalin’s policies to other Soviet leaders and Soviet people (and Russians). I think Kennan well outlined Stalin's maniacal drive for purges and deportations in the Long telegram:
At bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. [...] To this was added, as Russia came into contact with economically advanced West, fear of more competent, more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area. But this latter type of insecurity was one which afflicted rather Russian rulers than Russian people; for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of Western countries.
Without it they would stand before history, at best, as only the last of that long succession of cruel and wasteful Russian rulers who have relentlessly forced country on to ever new heights of military power in order to guarantee external security of their internally weak regimes.
But the Soviet experiment was not doomed from the beginning. Many revolutions had started with war and terror, but some cases (French, English, American) had positive impacts in the long run, not apparent from the outset. Idealists like Lenin and Gorbachev even attempted to implement decent reforms, and tried to grant certain autonomy to and promote (or rather enforce) ethnic character of republics. Lenin:
Politically and culturally, the nativization policy aimed to eliminate Russian domination and culture in the said Soviet republics. The de-Russification was also implemented on ethnic Russian groups and their children. For example, all children in Ukraine were taught the Ukrainian language in school. The policies of korenization facilitated the Communist Party's establishment of the local languages in government and education, in publishing, in culture, and in public life.
Gorbachev removed Soviet aggressive stance abroad, and enacted actual democratic reforms domestically -- in a pretty unilateral way in both cases. Khruschev got rid of Stalin’s cult and at least started to care about quality of life, while his aggressive international stance was not unilateral, US administration also took role in the positive feedback loop.
One crucial factor, distinguishing Soviet project from successful revolutions, is that they tried to impose their vision on everyone around. Why overstretch, why waste your effort at all on other states with their own distinct visions and identities? Enjoy your utopia on your own, if you manage to survive it.
Likelihood as a function is fixed in a classic bayesian mode. The only thing that we update is probability distribution over parameters. Likelihood corresponds to a static model of the world and should evaluate all possible states of the world, including hidden ones.
Jiro is right. In your example you are isolated from any indicators of lobsters whatsoever, and rely solely on priors. If I was regularly checking counts of web searches for lobsters, and they were decreasing or absent, I would at some point start to reduce probability of their existence.
Few hypotheses (based on experience, wrapped in theory):
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Hedonic treadmill. Your rotation system might still have a low "essential" variation, so that brain can predict/remember the most salient patterns, after which new songs don't excite/surprise it. Intermittent silence helps
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Attention. When you listen as a background to other activities, it might feel much less exciting, as attention spreads among inputs. Concert, in contrast, grabs all your sensory inputs at once
I recommend you to read the posts I linked, they are really good (can't quote them in a lossless way).
I dislike the whole "Soviet plan" take because if you admit, reasonably, that Poles were in a state of war with Soviets (after Katyn, defeat of Bolsheviks by Poles and German-Soviet invasion) - then why would Soviets help them at all?
As it happened, there were numerous instances of AK cooperation with frontline Soviet forces, particularly at the beginning of Burza. Kowel, Lwów, and Wilno in particular were jointly liberated by the AK and Red Army, but in each instance the AK was subsequently disarmed by the Soviets. The stories of these arrests spread and many AK units in the east actively withdrew ahead of Soviet forces to avoid being disarmed.
So yes, you would be more or less correct that the Rising did not expect or envision much in the way of direct Red Army support and cooperation. The entire point of the Rising was to liberate the capital during that window of opportunity presented by the advance of the Red Army towards Warsaw and the withdrawal of German forces from the area.
I see this as more of a malicious form of neglect than a dedicated plan by the Soviets to allow the Germans to wipe out the AK for them
Airfields/supplies: they assisted, albeit in a clearly formal way
The US specifically requested the use of Soviet airfields for refueling of their flights to Warsaw on 20 August, but this request was denied by Stalin on 22 August. Soviet airfields were only made available to the US on 18 September, after which they were again denied until after 30 September and the effective end of the Rising. Red Army Air Force provided its own limited supply drops, but only starting 13 September. Soviet air drops to the Rising were also significantly smaller in volume than US efforts
And if you were yourself, what would be your verdict? Mine would be conditioned on baseline atrocity levels across European colonizers, and some cost/benefit calculations: how much oppression and deaths the gifts of "enlightened civilization" costed to Indians. Columbian exchange is a notorious example.
I do not believe in their good will in most cases.
My impression about Khruschev and Gorbachev (from their biographies) is that they were true believers, and tried to optimize for their ideological metrics, often inaptly, but with minimal outright violence. Brezhnev wasn't a believer, more like a passive corrupt bureaucrat. Beria was a monster, Khruschev had orchestrated an incredible operation to remove him. A lot of aggressiveness was embedded in the Soviet system as a whole, irrespective of its operators.
Debating moral labels per se is not rewarding, as they are moving targets. What data do you have on "murders on large scale" and excessive wealth for post-Stalin leaders? I can provide some data, supporting my claims, if you have interest.
Christianity's potential as a weapon had expired long ago, but it performed well for several centuries. Ideologies, like institutions, are optimized for the contemporary circumstances. The more time passes, the more they confine your movement -- as you need to look coherent -- but less effective they are as intended tools. SJ might be in its most defiant phase now, but might evolve into something more net positive and cooperative (or provide a bunch of positive externalities and disappear altogether). Christianity also took time to assume its peaceful role.
Any ideology, however polished, serves as a device for rationalization and coordination within tribes. Is your point that sj is so consolidated as to be called an ideology -- but a flawed, contradictory one? Or that sj is just a spontaneous result of signaling games, and not ideology at all. I wouldn't dismiss any views, overlapping with its umbrella.
Edit: for prospective downvoters. Ever care to engage? or my view is too idiotic for you to descend to?
Making toxoplasma of rage work for you sounds reasonable in the hindsight. But he probably endured much more stress and pressure than he openly admits. I think that piece is actually quite accurate at conveying the author's sentiment and Johnson's attitude (even carefully containing "less democracy" within quotation marks).
I've listened to his conversation with Tyler (which I recommend) and although very interesting, I sometimes got the impression that his worldbuilding optimizes for the tacit values I don't share; or that the solution he proposes is too technical and assumes away "real" issue.
Overall, I agree with your assessment, except the fact that Stalin was a notable outlier wrt body counts. The following Soviet leaders impeded economic development and degraded quality of life within Soviet bloc (including USSR itself) vis-à-vis the West, but number of people they killed - throwing tanks on strikes, uprisings and demonstrations in Berlin, Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, during Prague Spring – was negligible relative to Stalin’s count. I do believe in their good will and incompetence (except for Putin).
Speaking of glorified imperialism. Here’s the case of Britain:
the culpability of the British in each famine varies wildly, and most scholarship analyzing British rule as a catalyst of famine tends to focus on famines within the Raj period, specifically the Great Famine of 1876-78, 1896-1902 famine, and the Bengal famine of 1943. Notably, Purkait et al, when enumerating famines under British rule, identify "British policies" as catalysts only in these three instances. If we take this analysis at face value and rely on mortality estimates from Purkait et al, this produces a figure of 13.6-23.3 million famine deaths for which British rule bore partial responsibility.
These are broad estimates, feel free to provide better ones. Odd Arne gives a rough estimate of at least 10 million killed plus 3 million from Ukraine famines – for the whole period of Stalin’s reign (with 23 million imprisoned and deported, I don't if this overlaps).
Now, when I fixed my evaluation of Soviet policy, what do you think of this one? Are there any relevant factors at all for you, and how do account for them w/t causal reasoning?
I don’t know of archival evidence, showing that Soviets planned to destroy Polish home army through deliberate timing of operation. I’ve read only a few AH posts, which usually have careful summaries (cc @Botond173). My sense is that Stalin was clearly hostile and antagonistic; Soviets and Poles hated each other and were almost in the state of war of its own; Soviet army at that direction exhausted its offensive momentum, but they seem to be able to act anyway; in the event there was no coordination.
My point was that this data leaves some open space, which everyone would tend to fill in as he likes. Even my whole presentation is biased in ways I don't see. Does it seem wrong to you? If you have a better account, I’d appreciate you sharing it.
Agreed, our degree of uncertainty varies across cases. I admit the consensus about Soviet impact on Latvia. What I am arguing for -- is that counterfactuals matter, while people pretend they don't.
Another example (with placebo group) is when Soviet army stopped short of Warsaw at the moment of Polish uprising against Germans. Allegedly Soviets waited for Poles and Germans to destroy as much of each other before entering. When you know about Soviet-Polish mutual hate and Soviet extermination policies against Polish army, you might readily impute that motive to them. But, if there was no evidence on that particular case, would it be right to impute it? Would you erect a memorial to victims of Red army, that intentionally stopped?
Isn't it about desensitization/addiction in general? When people haven't learned normal coping mechanisms, they would always find a way to wirehead themselves, virtual or not (drugs, alcohol, food). Low prices would drive substitution, sure, but the deeper problem is why people do -- or do not substitute in the first place. Why some people would binge read blogs and books, and other - binge quarrel at forums with no definite goal.
Not due to. You use them to arrive at conclusion that confederates were bad. Or not bad. It's a good example, as there seems to be much less agreement across US on their legacy and how to cope with it.
Imagine a monument to "famine relief policy of the metropole", erected in one of its colonies. Arguably, metropolitan policies often rather aggravated the consequences of famines, which conveniently served to suppress resistance. If you agree with this, you would be willing to get rid of the monument as commemorating a deliberate lie. Or you might think govt policy was a genuine, but ineffective attempt to help. That's causal inference.
simplistic "America overthrows countries to get their oil" model
That model is nowhere implied in Gdanning's reply. He argues the leverage is not that big, as any "crude democracies" have to share their oil rents to keep elites and populace sate, which sets a limit to their oil output game. Same holds for Russia: they are still reaping surpluses, even with exports to Europe shut, and hugely discounted sales to China, but I am not sure it would last for long.
The argument you outlined looks plausible to me, but all narratives about need for preventive action are also weapons by themselves.
Everyone in replies has stressed how this decision has nothing to do with alternative histories. It clearly does. When you denounce Soviets in the hindsight, you explicitly deal with counterfactuals, assuming that Soviets could have avoided their excesses (presumably like other European states or US), but had chosen not to. And that this choice – of pursuing aggressive political agendas, by brutal means – might be attributed to the barbaric attitudes of their leaders (and probably people).
Isn’t this a purely causal interpretation? If instead you could have attributed Soviet policies to other factors, partially beyond their control – like geopolitical prisoner-dilemma-like situations, or mere incompetence of the leaders – you wouldn’t denounce them.
This counterfactual reasoning is at the heart of most cultural wars, and it has nothing to do with "rewriting" the past. It has to do with imputing motives and hidden geopolitical variables, in the hindsight.
I would be glad to hear counter-arguments, as it seems many commenters disagree.
If we think of wokeness as a tool, and not as a social phenomenon (with its "natural" cyclicity), then its occurrence could be explained almost purely by underlying events, when this tool is applicable. But I am not sure its level is net raising. As a tool, it stimulates development of counter-tools and techniques.
Depp v Herd is a good illustration of countering Metoo. So when Metoo and abuse narrative didn't work out, they employed "harassment by the internet mob anyway". Here's the grandiose title of the report:
"Targeted Trolling and Trend Manipulation: How Organized Attacks on Amber Heard and Other Women Thrive on Twitter"
A quote from Variety:
In the report, the company disclosed that Heard’s lawyers had contacted Bot Sentinel in 2020 and hired it “to determine whether the social media activity against Ms. Heard was organic or if there was some other explanation” (and the company concluded that “a significant portion of the activity wasn’t organic”). For the report released Monday, the firm claimed, “Neither Amber Heard nor anyone from her team hired Bot Sentinel to review the activity. No one hired Bot Sentinel to compile and publish this report.”
Apparently no one hired Bot Sentinel! The troll farm as a rhetorical device is known since at least Rian Johnson's defense of his StarWars movie against popular criticism, but here the coordination seems to raise at a new level. Arms race goes on.
In sum, I think there is a nonlinear arms race dynamics, fueled by underlying social events, not a steady rise.
After he survived writing a book "10% Less Democracy: Why You Should Trust Elites a Little More and the Masses a Little Less", I assume he is immortal. In the preface to that book he mentioned one especially persistent person, who several times mailed his university department and called police to check him. Jones finished preface by dedicating the book to that guy.
Somewhat relevant recent paper "Social Simulacra: Creating Populated Prototypes for Social Computing Systems"
We introduce social simulacra, a prototyping technique that generates a breadth of realistic social interactions that may emerge when a social computing system is populated. Social simulacra take as input the designer’s description of a community’s design—goal, rules, and member personas—and produce as output an instance of that design with simulated behavior, including posts, replies, and anti-social behaviors.
In this section, we present SimReddit, a web-based prototyping tool to help designers create a new subreddit.
A few glimpses of generated content:
For many, seeing the troll’s responses to a moderator’s intervention helped ground their moderation plans. Consider P11, who was presented with the following exchange:
Original post: Hi everyone, I’m very new to this. I just learned Python two months ago. I’d like to know more about ML, but not sure where to start. How did you guys start?
Troll: You’re kidding, right? This is a Machine Learning forum. Nobody here is going to take you seriously if you just learned Python two months ago.
In response to the troll’s comment, P11 tested out the message, “This comment is not helpful; if you continue to post such comments, we will have to block you from this community,” and received the following three potential replies from the troll:
I was trying to be helpful. I’m sorry if I came across as a troll.
Whatever, this community is a joke anyways.
But I was only speaking the truth!
P1’s community for “sharing and discussing fun events around Pittsburgh,” the participant had originally expected to only find content that is a list of various events going on around Pittsburgh. However, in addition to such content, the generated community showed instances where its members were engaged in friend-seeking behaviors to attend these events (e.g., one posted, "Pittsburgh, I need a friend to see the sights with,” to which another responded, “I’d be more than happy to make your tour of the Cathedral of Learning happen!”).
And of course
An important theme that arose in our designer evaluation was the social simulacra’s role in designing for the marginalized groups […] P9, a member of an ethnic minority designing a space for discussing non-fiction books, recognized from the simulacra community that one could send hateful messages against non-English speaking members by sharing literature with white supremacist themes.
Any favor is a blow to agency, to some extent. In the future it might easily be claimed to bear interest, moral if not financial. Cialdini in his book "Influence" has a section, devoted specifically to unprovoked gifts as a manipulation tool.
I wouldn't rely too strongly on the notion of legitimacy in the age when big actors were constantly vivisecting small actors for their own convenience, w/t asking. When, in the aftermath of the war communism was incredibly and genuinely popular, does it make Stalin's claims - as a major figure of communism - more legitimate by proxy? When a "government-in-exile" gets back (from London) to its devastated homeland and dismisses local resistance's claims to participation - does it have more legitimacy than the people, who endured the war here?
I do not suggest legitimacy is meaningless, just it depends a lot on what reference point you choose at any given moment.
Edit: after skimming through history of Latvia around WWII I admit, the questions I raised here are irrelevant for Latvia. Apart from several periods of challenged legitimacy (during the War of Liberation and 1934 coup) the Soviet intervention, puppet govt installation and deportation policies -- were a clear violation of any internal legitimacy at the time.
The questions I raised, are still relevant for other states of Eastern Europe.
Curiously, social norms and customs, however ornamental, do actually work because they are social equilibria everyone coordinates through. My private superstitions though emerge when I can't figure out how to deal with the problem. I inevitably start to consider any "noise" (random tiny factor) as potentially decisive (or as being a sacred seed to ensuing activity). Feels like a trivial coping mechanism, but it's quite influential.
Thank you!
They took very narrow inclusion criteria. It might genuinely reflect their narrow research interest, but there is a vast
overlapping terminological messresearch on behavioral change and goal pursuit, which uses other notions: intrinsic/extrinsic motivation, self-control / effortless control / impulse control, reward processing/ neural economics, etc. After brief unsuccessful attempts to "get the whole picture", I now read mostly about specific techniques, which are easier to test empirically, and that seem to work for me. Are you researching out of scholarly interest or to enhance personal performance?More options
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