newcomputerwhodis
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User ID: 3218
I'm not endorsing it - I'm just using it as an example more people are likely to know by name. It is the type of protection you want to see - disc encryption that only unlocks under the right conditions.
You are, in principle, correct but that's exactly what dedicated cryptography hardware like a TPM is there to resolve. The BIOS stuffs some values not known ahead of time but measured/detected during the boot process (like a hash of the values in a bunch of different registers at point D during an ABCDEFG register sequence) into the hardware gizmo. Then the OS polls the gizmo for its current value and tries to decrypt its main boot volume using that as the key - wrong value, fail to boot. A compromised BIOS will now get different results from the measurements/hashses and can't reproduce that same state. If it had full control over the TPM, it could, but it doesn't - it does not respect ring 0. To be clear, there is still a way to beat this - you just have to monitor the values sent to the gizmo and then replay them in order, rather than trying to do the measurements yourself, but you can't accomplish that without physical access to the internals of the machine and some kind of sensor/probe to watch whichever bus the traffic goes over. You can also try to crack open the gizmo and read back its state, but that's also access-to-internals level.
It shows that people who "can be relied upon to turn out" would prefer a third party if they didn't feel like they "had to" vote against whoever they hate, like if their state ever went ranked choice. Without the vote swapping, they hold their nose and their third party signal vanishes. It does nothing for this particular election, but it maybe, just maybe, increases the odds of escaping the two party trap in the future.
This could be less serious than it seems. If the voting system is designed right, a BIOS password would be insufficient to cast a fraudulent vote - one possible example is in the vein of Windows' Bitlocker. A modified BIOS would cause the OS to reject the boot attempt, so you'd fail to get anywhere. If you booted something else, like a facsimile of the actual voting system but that swaps 25% of the votes for Trump to Harris or something, then you wouldn't have the credentials to submit the votes gathered and your pack of votes would be tossed.
But you could also use that as the attack, if you deploy machines that look like they're doing the right thing but then have bad/missing credentials and their votes are not counted, you could poke holes in areas that lean heavily Trump. This would be detectable after the fact - there'd be machines that mysteriously "glitched out" but you can't trust the machine so those votes can't come back in.
Either way, that's assuming there's decent security design in place. And of course, if they are right that you need access to the machine to put in the password and there's no remote management gunk somebody forgot to disable and they're under 24-7 guard, then the leak isn't actionable in the first place.
So overall effect - if you trust them to be mostly competent, things are in fact fine (unless/until a bunch of machines' worth of votes are tossed).
Completely aligned. The current medical standards are hogwash, Skrmetti will likely prevail, and yet I am not satisfied by that outcome. Wrong tool for the job, second and third order effects worse than the cure. This is just How Things Are Done These Days, apparently. I want to get off Mr Bones' Wild Ride.
Thoroughly endorsed, subscribing to your newsletter. Any discipline that begins to sound like graduate philosophy has a major problem.
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30% vs90% (tilde number percent space tilde number percent) is showing non-strikethrough in my preview box, so it clearly can work and the real problem lies elsewhere. Now I'll post and it'll strikethrough and I'll look like an idiot.More options
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