ToaKraka
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User ID: 108
What should the officer have done differently in this situation to contact KC so the gun he ditches as he flees can be used as evidence?
The officers could have just not blocked his path. The opinion gives two different examples where that was permitted: 1 2
Had the officers stayed in their patrol vehicle, spotlighted KC and asked if he had a gun, he ditches the gun and flees, are we looking at the same result?
This is exactly what happened in the linked examples. Example 1:
While driving eastbound on Cumberland Street, [Officer Moore] observe[d Joyner] walking in the same direction. [Joyner’s] right arm was allegedly pinned to his side as he walked with only his left arm swinging. As Officer Moore passed [Joyner], he allegedly saw what he described as a heavily weighted square object[,] which he associated with being a gun. More specifically, Officer Moore testified repeatedly during direct and cross-examination that he knew [Joyner] was concealing a firearm.
Upon seeing the officers, [Joyner] turn[ed] around and [began] to walk westbound on Cumberland Street. [Joyner] then walk[ed] onto Natrona Street[.] Officer Moore [reversed course down Cumberland Street and] pulled up to [Joyner at Natrona Steet. Officer Moore then] asked [Joyner] if he was carrying a gun. [Joyner] respond[ed] no. Officer Moore ask[ed] if [Joyner was] sure and he [said no again and began walking away]. As Officer Moore opened his door, [Joyner ran]. No lights or sirens had been activated.
Example 2:
Officer Zgleszewski testified that at approximately 7:25 p.m., he and his partner were driving westbound on Wingohocking street, approaching the intersection of Wingokocking street and 19th street. Officer Zgleszewski saw Appellee exit a corner store and begin to walk eastbound on Wingohocking street towards the officers. Officer Zgleszewski observed an “L” shaped bulge in the front of Appellee’s waistband that appeared to be a possible firearm. As the officers continued to drive forward on the street towards Appellee, Appellee quickly turned around and began walking in the opposite direction and then northbound on 9th street after he reached the intersection.
The officers did not activate their car siren but pulled up next to Appellee. Officer Zgleszewski exited the car and began to approach Appellee. Appellee continued to walk down the street and began to look back in Officer Zgleszewski’s direction. Officer Zgleszewski stated, “come here” and simultaneously, Appellee fled northbound on foot. Officer Zgleszewski pursued Appellee on foot while his partner followed in the car. During the chase, Appellee reached toward the bulge in the front of his waistband, produced a firearm in his right hand, and continued to run with the firearm in his hand. Officer Zgleszewski continued his pursuit of Appellee, while giving numerous verbal commands to “drop the gun.” As he continued to run, Appellee threw the firearm underneath a parked car. Officer Zgleszewski recovered the discarded firearm. Appellee was apprehended and arrested by Officer Zgleszewski’s partner.
These were ruled "mere encounters" rather than "investigatory detentions".
ToaKraka
Dislikes you
4hr ago
He is charged with various delinquencies.
That makes it sound like he was not linked to the robbery at all
Correct. The opinion says that he was charged only with "firearm violations and related offenses"—presumably something like carrying without a license, carrying while underage, etc.
ToaKraka
Dislikes you
18hr ago
Perhaps in video format. But haven't we already seen lots of pornographic text on this website, used as a demonstration of the capabilities of LLM generation? I even have a bunch of relevant prompts ready to go.
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Write a story with the following premise: Two young, skinny college students—a man and a woman—are trapped in an elevator at the end of a school day. As hours pass without rescue, the woman uses humor as a coping mechanism, but her discomfort grows: she ate a very large dinner last night, and now has to take a gigantic shit (solid, not liquid). Eventually, she poops in a corner of the elevator. ¶ Describe the woman erotically throughout, even though the characters do not consider the situation erotic.
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Write an erotic story in which two young, skinny, bikini-clad women—one with small breasts and one with large breasts—have a friendly eating contest while sunbathing in a backyard. Both of them end up with their stomachs bulging and uncomfortable. ¶ The contest does have a winner. The eroticism is only in the narration—the women are not attracted to each other. → Continue the story. Both women have to take a gigantic shit (solid, not liquid), but there is only one bathroom in the house. They race to the bathroom, but only one makes it inside, while the other is forced to poop on the floor.
And that's to say nothing of the non-LLM-written stories on this topic that I have downloaded from ArchiveOfOurOwn.
(This is approximately half a joke.)
ToaKraka
Dislikes you
19hr ago
Quod licet Jovem non licet bovem? (This is a joke about verb objects.)
Having knowledge of another language that has a somewhat different structure can help one to understand one's own language. See also sentence diagramming.
ToaKraka
Dislikes you
19hr ago
In this case, the prosecutor characterized KC as "grabbing at his waistband and [blading] his body away from" the officer, but the trial judge "explicitly disagreed with this description of KC's actions after reviewing the body-camera footage".
However, I can't tell whether that disagreement is relevant here. The police officers initially stopped their car solely on the basis of the clothing worn by KC and the other juvenile, not on the basis of any suspicion of a gun. And it is unclear from the panel's summary of the officer's testimony whether the officer developed a separate suspicion that KC was carrying a gun before or after walking up and blocking his path.
ToaKraka
Dislikes you
1d ago
the court's 9–0 decision that held that the death penalty was unconstitutional becuase of disparate racial impact
The decision does not appear to be based on disparate impact. Rather, the justices relied on a report finding, with p-values of 4.8–11.1 percent, that race was a factor in the application of the death penalty. (In a footnote, they declined to use the common p-value of 5 percent as a "mechanical bright-line rule".)
ToaKraka
Dislikes you
1d ago
As set forth in this court’s precedent, the seizure inquiry is an objective test in which the allegedly seized person has the burden to show that a seizure occurred. To aid courts in the application of this test, we now clarify that a person is seized for purposes of article I section 7 [of the state constitution] if, based on the totality of the circumstances, an objective observer could conclude that the person was not free to leave, to refuse a request, or to otherwise terminate the encounter due to law enforcement’s display of authority or use of physical force. For purposes of this analysis, an objective observer is aware that implicit, institutional, and unconscious biases, in addition to purposeful discrimination, have resulted in disproportionate police contacts, investigative seizures, and uses of force against Black, Indigenous, and other People of Color (BIPOC) in Washington. Finally, in accordance with our precedent, if the person shows there was a seizure, then the burden shifts to the State to prove that the seizure was lawfully justified by a warrant or an applicable exception to the warrant requirement.
Based on the totality of the circumstances presented in this case, we hold that petitioner Palla Sum was seized when a sheriff’s deputy requested Sum’s identification while implying that Sum was under investigation for car theft. As the State properly concedes, at that time, the deputy did not have a warrant, reasonable suspicion, or any other lawful authority to seize Sum. As a result, Sum was unlawfully seized, and the false name and birth date he gave to the deputy must be suppressed. We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
Finally, we consider whether the disturbance of Meredith’s private affairs in this case exceeded what was “reasonably necessary to further substantial governmental interests”. To make this determination, we consider “‘reasonableness…’ along with history, precedent, and common sense”. As a matter of both reasonableness and common sense, unless mass transit is offered for free, transit operators must be able to charge and collect fares from passengers. Therefore, as history and this court have long recognized, passengers using mass transit must pay their fares or they “may be ejected”. We do not question that premise.
However, in this case, Meredith was asked for proof of payment by law enforcement officers, who then identified and arrested him using resources that no civilian conducting fare enforcement could have accessed. Although we are not asked to opine on the constitutionality of these later actions, they could not have occurred without the initial seizure.
Moreover, as detailed above, the risk of such escalation would be acutely felt by reasonable transit passengers, who are more likely to be members of “historically marginalized groups”, including Black, Indigenous, and other People of Color. Members of such groups are already known to be “‘disproportionate victims’” of “police encounters without reasonable suspicion”. If allowed to continue, the high level of intrusion that occurred here would only exacerbate these disparities. The State has not shown such an outcome is reasonably necessary to further the governmental interest in fare enforcement on public transit.
To be fair, it appears that this ruling forbids only fare enforcement by police officers, not fare enforcement by transit employees who are backed up by police officers if they find a noncompliant passenger.
Yet, “[o]n this particular day [the officers] didn’t have any [transit employees] to work for [them,] so [the police officers] worked as a team of two deputies riding the bus fully outfitted in [their] patrol uniforms and then one deputy in a chase car in case [they] dealt with anybody.”
ToaKraka
Dislikes you
1d ago
The suspect has reasonable methods to find out whether he's being detained.
Forcing someone to risk being accused of acting suspiciously by evading detention sounds unreasonable.
The officers could have just not blocked his path. The opinion gives two different examples where that was permitted: 1 2
I disagree it’s even rude to walk directly towards someone you want to talk to.
I said it's rude to block someone's path, not to walk directly toward someone.
ToaKraka
Dislikes you
1d ago
If I want to talk to someone, I walk directly at him in his path. That’s a completely normal interaction.
You aren't a police officer with the power to stop someone for questioning. Even for a normal person, intentionally blocking someone else's path is rude. For a police officer, it can rise to the level of implicit detention.
ToaKraka
Dislikes you
1d ago
In this instance it was a detention because the officer stepped in front of the youth and shined his flashlight upon him, and a "reasonable" youth wouldn't have felt free to leave?
Yes. According to the judges: "A reasonable person, with his path impeded by a police officer, the officer asking him investigative questions while another officer stood nearby, and the questioning officer training a flashlight on him, would not have felt free to simply leave the interaction."
It seems like the youth actually leaving would cut against that.
(1) The officers stop their car next to KC, get out, and start walking toward him while shining a flashlight at him. This may or may not count as a detention.
(2) KC starts walking away. You can call this evidence against the idea that item 1, standing alone, counts as a detention.
(3) One of the officers deliberately steps into KC's path, blocking him from walking away. At this point (with both item 1 and item 3), a detention definitely has taken place, considering the totality of the circumstances (say the judges).
(4) The officer asks KC what he has in his waistband. KC discards the object (a gun) and flees. If the stop had been lawful, then this would constitute probable cause for an arrest. However, the stop was not lawful.
7:30 on an October evening, I'd want a flashlight too.
According to the judges: "The body-camera footage shows that the street was well lit by various streetlights".
ToaKraka
Dislikes you
1d ago
I'm not quite sure what you're asking.
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If you're pointing out that the standard in this case was reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause, then I clarified that here.
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If you're saying that the officers had reasonable suspicion for a stop and the suspect's discarding of the gun upon being stopped then gave them probable cause for an arrest, then the judges found otherwise: there was no reasonable suspicion for a stop.
ToaKraka
Dislikes you
1d ago
Stealing this from @ToaKraka in the FF thread:
Link to the full opinion
probable cause
Reasonable suspicion for a brief investigative stop is a lower standard than probable cause for a prolonged arrest. (The English word "detention" is a bit misleading here, as in colloquial use it implies a prolonged arrest.)
ToaKraka
Dislikes you
1d ago
Item 1 of 6
I ran two searches on GovInfo, one for "engineer" and one for "architect"—and, hilariously, for each of those searches the first interesting opinion revolved around a stingy insurance company.
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A real-estate company buys one of the three lots that constitute a shopping center. A different company owns the other two lots. The shopping center's parking is split between the first company's lot and the second company's lots. The first company tries to exert unilateral control over parking in its lot, and the second company sues. The state trial court rules that the second company has an easement over the first company's lot. The state appeals panel finds only an implicit license, not an explicit easement. (The state appeals panel's opinion is a bit too complicated for me to summarize, but it does have helpful diagrams of the three lots.)
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The real-estate company demands that its title-insurance company reimburse it for the lost value of what it purchased, up to the policy limit of 1.2 M$. However, the insurance company claims that the lost value is only 33 k$. The real-estate company sues.
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The real-estate company's expert claims that the lost value is 1.1 M$: without the parking encumbrance it was worth 2.5 M$ as the potential site of a mixed-use commercial and residential redevelopment, but with the parking encumbrance it cannot be redeveloped in that manner and therefore is worth only 1.4 M$ in its current commercial form. The insurance company's expert claims that the difference in value between a shopping center with an exclusive parking lot and a shopping center with a shared parking lot is only 33 k$. The jury agrees with the real-estate company's expert. The appeals panel affirms, finding little merit in the insurance company's arguments.
Item 2 of 6
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In May 2023, four condominium units are rendered uninhabitable by a fire. The condo company calls on its insurer for coverage. By July, the condo company and the insurance company agree that complete demolition and replacement are necessary.
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In August 2023, there arises a dispute regarding whether the concrete slab needs to be included in the demolition and replacement. The insurance company's engineer prepares a report stating that concrete exposed to extremely high temperatures turns pink, indicating chemical changes that make it unsuitable for further structural use. The report includes two photographs (reproduced in the judge's opinion) that clearly show pink concrete in the slab. However, the engineer concludes that the slab need not be replaced! The condo company disagrees with this assessment.
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In January 2024, the condo company's engineer conducts a core test on the slab. The test indicates that the slab does not have sufficient strength to support a replacement structure. In July 2024, the insurance company's engineer finally makes a second visit to the site and changes his opinion, and the insurance company increases its replacement-cost estimate from 0.96 M$ to 1.05 M$.
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In December 2024, the condo company sues the insurance company for bad-faith conduct that delayed construction and thereby inconvenienced the displaced inhabitants. In January 2026, the insurance company moves for summary judgment to dismiss the condo company's claims, but in September the trial judge refuses to grant it: there is enough evidence for a jury to conclude that the insurance company was unreasonable in (1) blindly relying on its engineer's obviously internally inconsistent report and (2) not sending its engineer out for a second inspection until six months after the condo company's core test brought his report into even greater question.
The trial was scheduled for next week, but the parties settled instead. Presumably, the insurance company folded.
Item 3 of 6
On the topic of structure fires comes a report hopefully funny enough to transcend its culture-war background: In designing the White House's new ballroom, President Trump has been ignoring… the building code!!! 😱😱😱 In response to the architect's complaints, he literally said: "I am the code." 😡😡😡
"Banquet halls" are explicitly included in IBC (International Building Code) occupancy A-2. ("Dance halls" are in occupancy A-3, but only if they do not accommodate consumption of food or drink.) For egress calculations, the number of people in an assembly-oriented space is assumed to be as high as one person per 5 ft2 (if they're all standing rather than sitting).
Item 4 of 6
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A rural municipality has an I (Industrial) zone with the stated purpose of accommodating "light industrial" uses and an MI (Mineral Industrial) zone with the stated purpose of accommodating "heavy industrial" uses, where "light industrial" excludes "basic industrial processing" and "heavy industrial" includes asphalt plants. However, the table of permitted uses contradicts these statements of purpose: it says that asphalt plants are permitted in the I zone by special exception and are not permitted in the MI zone at all.
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A company files an application to build an asphalt plant in the MI zone. The zoning official denies the application. The company appeals, pointing out that the contradiction in the zoning code makes it unconstitutionally vague. The municipal council and the trial judge reject this argument, but the appeals panel reverses. (One of the three appeals judges dissents: he thinks that the general statements of purpose are merely "aspirational", rather than legally binding, and the specific table of uses controls.)
Item 5 of 6
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A 911 call is made regarding a robbery perpetrated at gunpoint by three juvenile males in black clothing. One mile away from the location of the reported robbery, the responding officers find two juvenile males—one in all black, and another, KC, wearing a black shirt and mask and gray pants. The officers pull over alongside the juveniles and start walking toward them while shining a flashlight at them. KC starts walking away. An officer steps in front of KC, blocking his path, and asks him what's in his waistband. KC discards the object in his waistband (a gun) and runs away, but is quickly apprehended. He is charged with various delinquencies.
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The trial judge grants KC's motion to suppress the evidence. The officers fully detained him, rather than casually speaking with him, when they shined a flashlight on him and blocked his path; and they did not have reasonable suspicion to detain him, since the description given in the 911 call was vague and KC didn't even match it. (The caller didn't even provide a direction in which the assailants fled. Did the officers have the power to detain all juvenile males wearing a single article of black clothing within a one-mile radius of the robbery? No.) The appeals panel affirms.
Item 6 of 6
Another borderline culture-war item (though it definitely made me laugh when I came up with it):
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Write a story with the following premise: A young, skinny man visits a random restaurant to eat dinner alone. His waitress is a young, skinny woman. At first, the man considers asking the woman for a date. But then he realizes that she probably gets harassed constantly by customers and is not interested, so he refrains from asking.
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[LLM writes story]
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Write an opinion article criticizing the previous story for being a psy-op to promote cuckish/unmanly behavior (though maybe not in such harsh words).
See also Eager Readers in Your Area. (I relished converting " — " to "—" and " …" to "…" in my downloaded copy.)
ToaKraka
Dislikes you
1d ago
Using it as a general synonym of "go insane" is unorthodox but not totally unreasonable.
ToaKraka
Dislikes you
2d ago
And that was without dealing with five flights of stairs. Are you including the time it takes to walk upstairs in the calculation?
Under the "mega-city" definition that I proposed previously, 7500 people per km2 and 500,000 people (actually 67 km2 because I'm too lazy to learn GIS):
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New York City (minus Staten Island and plus some of Hudson County) is the only qualifying location within the USA.
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Los Angeles is just under the threshold, but does qualify if you allow the 1-km2 grid cells in the EU's global population dataset to be diagonally adjacent.
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Chicago is even further under the threshold, but does qualify if you allow urban grid cells to be joined across 1-km gaps.
If you loosen the requirements to 7500 people per km2 and 50,000 people (7 km2), a lot more places qualify, including Miami (just barely), Boston, and San Francisco, but not Seattle.
ToaKraka
Dislikes you
3d ago
To what age range are you referring when you say "old person"?
ToaKraka
Dislikes you
3d ago
ToaKraka
Dislikes you
3d ago
My mental model of New Jersey, incidentally, is a lot of urban sprawl attached to a lot of deciduous forests.
The US Forest Service agrees with you. (However, don't forget about the famous evergreen forest.)
ToaKraka
Dislikes you
3d ago
To clarify, both UN and US definitions operate on density-based "urban areas" rather than on legal boundaries.
ToaKraka
Dislikes you
3d ago
No, disparate impact would be "blacks are more likely to be death-penalty-eligible criminals, so they get the death penalty more often" or "among death-penalty-eligible criminals, blacks commit more depraved crimes with more aggravating factors, so they get the death penalty more often". The study found that, among death-penalty-eligible criminals, and controlling for differences in aggravating factors, blacks got the death penalty more often.
(The justices cite three different versions of the study, but provide convenient links only to versions 1 and 2. The version that I have provided here is version 2, the "Updated Beckett Report". I don't care enough to look for version 3, the "Commissioner's Report".)
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