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DimitriRascalov


				

				

				
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joined 2022 September 05 05:21:04 UTC

				

User ID: 450

DimitriRascalov


				
				
				

				
0 followers   follows 0 users   joined 2022 September 05 05:21:04 UTC

					

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User ID: 450

Not that I disagree with the core idea of the argument here, but it's not unlikely that Finland would ultimately end up the same as a Russian province in comparison to staying part of the Western system. Russia is undergoing demographic change as well, and while it's not as fast as in Central and Western Europe, the Russia of 2100 will be a whole lot more Muslim and Central Asian than it is now, at least based on the trends of the last few decades. Whether that's better than the Afro-Arab Finland that seems to be the destination at the moment is of course a matter of debate.

My impression is that in terms of organized political resistance middle and lower class whites were certainly the drivers of that, but in terms of simply not giving a shit and going on with life regardless of what the state says that's definitely more of a minority thing, at least here in Germany. For the US I'm less sure, but it also depends more on the group. Using vaccine uptake as a vague proxy, Asians were all-aboard, but they're also more affluent on average, Hispanics were more likely than red whites but less likely than blue whites to take the vaccine, blacks were least likely overall. Another example are the riots after George Floyd's death which, while featuring plenty of white people as well, were disproportionately minority, and they were AFAIK the first large scale breakdown of public Covid discipline.

Normies don't decide what's popular. They adapt to what people with power tell them is. I you aren't yet convinced of this you can look at all the people who will suddenly become fine with Trump and his administration when they are the ones distributing treasure.

I think an even better example of this is Covid. A highly cautious view of Covid and of what measures were appropriate are highly correlated with class status and were particularly unpopular with less affluent, less white and overall less 'priestly' people both in the US and Europe. But at the end of the day, the priestly class still got its will for 1 to almost 3 years, depending on location, and hugely shifted norms of hygiene, social activity and economic behaviors like remote work among the rest of society. I still regularly see people here in Germany, mostly elderly and often of MENA heritage (confusing given that at group level they certainly had the least respect for any of the Covid theater), wearing a mask without covering their nose, and given the medical absurdity of this I struggle to think of this as anything other than an illustration of memetic elite dominance.

Putting aside I guarantee in the late 19th century there was in fact plenty of examples of massive population changes, even in more rural parts of the country. Ironically, many of the same people who put forth those population changes are now the ones scared of immigration, so in 50 years, as is American tradition, these Haitian immigrants will be saying we shouldn't be letting in the Bangladeshi's or whomever.

The various European groups that migrated to the US in the past were and are more similar to each other in terms of political views & shared cultural history than they are to the populations that arrived post WWII. Concluding that current migration is going to work out favorably from past European migrants being able to form a coherent new identity under vastly different socio-economic circumstances is a reach. From surveys like the GSS or others, it seems pretty likely that adding more migrants from places like Haiti, Central America or Africa isn't going to result in a smooth temporal continuity of extant American cultural sentiments about various things like immigration, free speech or the economy like you seem to imply.

As an aside, I remember reading a similar argument by you in the past, and sure enough going through my post history this turns out to be the third time I post this objection to the same kind of argument put forth by you. I don't expect you to concede, but given that you've never responded so far to me or others pointing out more or less the same thing, it'd be interesting to hear where you think this counterpoint goes wrong.

Can you post a link to the data you're referencing? Overall TFR regardless of ethnic origin is down to 1.34 last year and the number of births so far projects out to a similar or lower figure for 2024. There was minimal upwards movement in the late 00s and early 10s, but this could plausibly be related to immigration, see the jump between 2014-2016. I don't see at all where you're getting the present upwards trend you've mentioned from.

What's your opinion on how this will work out long term? If low fertility is the genuine preference of the average woman, as you say further down in this thread, and you don't approve of the more heavy-handed, right wing-coded measures that might have some success in pushing up birth rates, what will the solution be? As things stand, we will see massive problems with social welfare systems in particular and the entire economy in general in the next decades.

Projecting further out, because of large differences between birth rates between groups, the heavy-handed right wing-coded measures might be implemented anyway, because the vast majority of future people will be descended from disproportionately clannish, religious and generally non-Western-liberal demographics, and this will have obvious consequences on what society considers as the proper stance on things like women's reproductive rights etc. Given your stated preferences, this seems like an outcome that should be prevented, but I get the impression that you're more or less endorsing doing nothing.

Demographic projections predict Russia to be Muslim majority towards the end of the century, at roughly the same time Western European nations will become majority non-European. Moscow and St. Petersburg might achieve this much earlier, similar to other European capitals like London. Russian (ethno-)nationalists have been angry for years about the higher fertility of Muslim minorities and Central Asian migration that are the causes behind this.

The Kremlin's line on this has vacillated between vague overtures towards blood-based nationalism and civic nationalism à la 'no such thing as an ethnic Russian' in their rhetoric and doing basically nothing to stem the tide or even facilitating it with migration treaties in practical terms.

Although this is not exactly what you're looking for as it's neither text nor particularly rigorous, I can warmly recommend Peter Santenello. He does vlog-style videos where he goes into communities and tries to get into conversations with people. While he does obviously have a certain viewpoint that shines through, it's very far from the sort of highly-online politics you're alluding to and he mostly lets the people he is interviewing do the talking. Relevant to your specific request, he has done videos on black neighbourhoods in LA (e.g. 1, 2), New York, Chicago as well as on the Black Belt or Gary.

If you like his content, I also highly recommend watching his videos on the NYC Hasidic Jews and the Amish, those are probably his two best series.

Wouldn't this same logic hold for all sorts of other policies that did and continue to get enacted? I'm thinking of stuff like carbon taxes, tariffs, tax raises etc. It's plausible that economic considerations held back anti-immigration measures, but if that were an essential part I'd expect more or less total gridlock on a large number of issues where, in reality, there don't seem to be any hesitations at all for the Western political class in comparison to immigration.

How much of this is simply the result of selection? Muslims that make it to America are more educated, wealthier and probably more inclined towards typical Western sentiments to begin with than those that go to Europe. The ability of America to assimilate would have to be tested with, say, the unorganized crossing of several millions of Syrians through the Mexican border to make an accurate comparison.

They are even confused and disoriented about the flashpoint of the current disorder: unlike what their prejudices told them the person who killed the three girls in Southport was not a fresh of the boat Muslim migrant but rather a black Welsh 17 year old child who had been born in the UK having a schizo moment. The true facts about the stabbing coming out did not placate their desire for an orgy of violence in the least.

Ignoring the unseriousness of the rest (great bait, btw), this bit struck me because I've seen this take a lot from commentators on social and traditional media. I don't get what the rioters are supposed to be confused about, has a large number of them or some kind of representative spoken out about these riots being specifically directed against Muslim immigration? Under the idealized policy that most of the rioters would likely endorse for the past and present UK, the actual perpetrator wouldn't be in the country because his ancestors wouldn't have been let in, regardless of his religion.

This might be mitigated if Muslims are less likely to go through the civil marriage process in comparison to other groups. I have a friend from a German Evangelical free church that's not integrated with the state like the mainline Lutheran and Catholic ones, they refuse to register their marriages with the local magistrate and therefore their children count as born out-of-wedlock in the eyes of the state.

What is it that they're saying? When the controversy popped up, I found this reddit thread and the arguments seem convincing that Yasuke was a samurai or at least plausibly could have been. Is there significant doubt about the veracity of the sources we have on him?

The architectural preferences also suggest an aversion to experimentation which, while it can produce a lot of short term ugliness, is necessary in the long run to avoid boring homogeneity and settling for not-so-great local optima.

I realize that a lot of this is down to personal views on what constitutes short-term and local optima, but I don't buy that there is significant experimentation or perceivable progress going on. AFAICT, humanity has been stuck in glass, steel and concrete + mildly-to-weirdly-deformed geometric shape architecture for prestige buildings since roundabout the end of WWII. How many more of these are needed before we can move on? For more practical housing we went from stuff like this to this in the suburbs or from this to this in the urban core.

Here in Berlin, old buildings command significant rent premiums and the districts which feature coherent blocks of old architecture untouched by the bombs or post-war city planners are by far the most popular. I realize it would be bad and boring if we tiled the universe with brownstones or Parisian boulevards, but it doesn't seem to me like modernity has really been much more dynamic and creatively vibrant than the past in terms of architecture, instead we just have a different kind of monotony, albeit one that many people, me included, perceive as aesthetically inferior.

It's not really fair to expect our understanding of God to not change over time. God himself doesn't change, of course, but human ideas of him do.

Maybe I misunderstand something here, but why would this be unfair? Aren't there a number of ideas that are unchanging or at least variable only in a narrow space of possibilities? Take something like the laws of logic for example, they are as far as anyone knows eternally true, and what's more they seem to be intuitively undeniable and, in a manner of speaking, to impose themselves on any rational mind and, failing that, at least the material reality of the irrational.

In other words, it does seem to be possible for God to put ideas into the minds of all humans that are relatively stable and undeniable by any serious thinker. Why did he not do that for belief in himself?

It's certainly not the way I'd word it, but I think that "infinity migrants" does capture something about how this is treated in mainstream discourse. Does European leadership have an actual end state where all of this is going to lead to in mind, a certain ratio of natives:immigrants where they'll close down the borders? I don't think so. Instead, there is a vague sense that immigration is good and that, as long as people are willing to come, we should continually take in a significant number, whether on moral or economic grounds. At least that's how I'd describe most European political organizations from the center leftward on this topic.

I'm now old enough that I can remember three distinct phases of a few months to maybe a year where politicians were making migration-skeptic noises and sometimes even went through with some measures that mildly decreased the inflow for a while (like the recent border police controls here in Germany). These were triggered by momentary increases in the number of arrivals or terrorist attacks. Of course, these phases came and went and in the meanwhile, the numbers go up and up, sometimes slower, sometimes faster, but always up. Infinity is an exaggeration, but it's the direction things are and have been going towards for all of living memory.

Isn't the obvious objection here that during the first period, citizenship and power in institutions mostly rested with WASPs and similar demographics while in the second one, although immigration had been restricted, now a large share of the native born population consisted of (descendants of) Italians, Irish etc., i.e. ethnic groups that down to the present day have markedly different attitudes towards redistribution or even things like free speech in comparison to English- or German-Americans?

Unless the hope is that quasi-accidental effects like 'diversity reduces societal cohesion -> less unions form -> unions can't interfere with growth' outweigh this, I'd wager that continually adding more people who come from countries that practice more distribution and, when asked in surveys like the GSS, explicitly say that the government should intervene more and reduce income inequality, will in fact eventually result in a society that redistributes more and values economic freedom less.

After we reopened our borders government spending and union participation went back down

Maybe I'm misinterpreting you or you meant spending coming back down from the highs of WWII, this claim doesn't seem true, whether for overall spending or social spending in particular, both of which have a strong upward trend starting in the early 20th century.

Eh, the Italians were relatively Republican (as were the Germans) while the Irish leaned Democratic (AFAIK there's still a decent-sized partisan gap between Americans of German or Italian ancestry and those with Irish ancestry.).

In the GSS, Italians lean more heavily Democrat than the Irish and both are significantly more Democrat than Republican. In this sample, the only white categories that don't lean Democrat overall are the British, the Scandinavians and the Germans & Dutch.

Is this true? This is what I could find online:

  1. (via Wiki) This paper from the 90s claims based on census data that between the 60s and 80s intermarriage rates between blacks and whites were much higher in the Western US than in the South. In 1980, 16.5% percent of all marriages involving a black person were with someone from another race on the West Coast in comparison to just 1.6% in the South.
  2. This map by Pew shows no obvious trend in the South. Metro areas in Texas and Florida have high rates, but basically the same as SF or LA and not that far above Chicago or NY. Elsewhere in the South it looks like average or slightly below to me. (caveat: this is for all races, not just black-white, and it's just urban areas)
  3. As a proxy for intermarriage, although 56% of all black Americans live in the south, just 41% of mixed-race Americans with black heritage do so. Naively, this seems to point to higher intermarriage rates outside the South, although this might be skewed by internal migration.

I think the idea is that people in those times, especially pagans, saw supernatural forces as much more involved than people today do. The sun is Helios himself driving across the horizon, plagues or earthquakes were sent by God, the coin you put in a grave will be used to pay Charon etc. Given that context, a virgin birth doesn't violate nearly as many assumptions about how the world (usually) works as it would even for a typical contemporary theistic account of reality.

Wouldn't this only work if you are in a profession that contributes significantly to the capital stock? If you're a hairdresser or professional athlete, you can be as extra productive as you want, nothing you do during your work life aside from having children will make goods and services any more abundant (societally) at the time when you need them in your old age.

France does have birthright citizenship (with some minor, practically pointless limitations), along with a host of cultural habits such as not asking anyone about their race or insisting that everyone with their passport really is a Frenchman. Their outcomes aren't much better than anywhere else in Europe, arguably even worse, given that something like a plurality of race riots in post-1945 European history happened there.

Yes, yes, yes, I know 3rd or 4th generation college educated immigrants are all SJW's who complain about America all the time. Well...what's more American than that?

You seem to imply some sort of seamless assimilation here. That's simply not the case. Persistent differences in voting patterns and political attitudes between post-Hart-Celler immigrants and the legacy population are pretty well known, but even within the ostensibly fully assimilated white group there are significant differences. A US without e.g. Italians or Irish would be much hostile to the welfare state or restrictions on free speech.

A more interesting question is why obesity came out of nowhere in the mid-20th century and exploded from the 1970s onwards.

Obesity is defined as being above the threshold of a BMI of 30. Imagine a population where currently everyone has a BMI of 25, but it starts to increase by 1 every year from now. What would the corresponding graph like the one you linked look like? It would be 5 years of no change, until in year x+5 obesity "explodes" to 100%, despite the fact that the actual causal trend has been going on linearly for 5 years!

If we look at actual weight itself to avoid thresholding effects like I described above, there doesn't seem to be anything special about the 70s at all, they're right on trend. There's other data like discussed in this that indicate that the surge in weight had already begun around WWI, subsided a bit around the Great Depression and accelerated again in the immediate aftermath of WWII.

There is no ill will against Poland in Germany by and large. Apathy and condescension, yes, but no bad blood. The people from the former eastern territories are dead or soon will be and their descendants don't recognize themselves as such, so basically no one has any real historical grievance against Poland. Negative feelings are reserved for admonishing Poles about LGBT rights or abortion.

There'd be little enthusiasm among the general populace, but if Poland asked and genuinely needed assistance the German government would definitely send help. NATO commitments and ethics aside, they would do it for the sole reason of it being an excellent addition to the post-WW2 German national mythos.

It's likely that the author of the article misread the original study. Here's the source the article was referencing probably, it's the bar chart titled "Zufriedenheit mit der Bundesregierung". 20% are happy or very happy with the current government, the rest is not.