OliveTapenade
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User ID: 1729
Reminds me of Umberto Eco's Cult of the Imperfect. He applies the idea even to acknowledged masterpieces - one of the reasons why Hamlet, for instance, has been so compelling is because it is in some ways badly written. Lakes of ink have been spilled on trying to interpret Hamlet's motives because they are not clear in the play - because they are actually rather arbitrary and inconsistent, in a way that would probably strike us as bad writing, if Shakespeare did not have the reputation that he does. And while you could just conclude it's because Shakespeare was rushed or made some bad calls, it's so much more interesting to treat the text as whole, the arbitrariness as intentional, and dive into psychoanalysing the hero.
Star Wars is also in that golden zone of imperfection, I think. Even in the OT, the films are frequently disjointed, and characterisation changes wildly without explanation. It's pretty obvious that ANH is written for a universe in which Luke's father and Darth Vader were different people, and Luke and Leia are not related, for instance. In ESB, Luke hates and fears Vader and wants to kill him, and Vader disloyally seeks an ally to stage a coup against the Emperor; in RotJ, without any explanation, Luke now regards Vader with this self-sacrificial love, and Vader is so broken upon the Emperor's will as to consider revolt impossible. It's not inconceivable that something happened in between the films to cause both of them to change their minds (maybe Luke struggled long and hard with the revelation that Vader was his father and eventually came to the painful conclusion that he must love him the same way he thought he loved Anakin; maybe the Emperor discovered Vader's plot and tortured him into submission), but there is no hint of either of these processes in RotJ. The characters are just... different.
And yet I can't make himself dislike Star Wars because of this, or view the OT as lesser. I even like the PT. I still love those films, all six of them. (There are only six Star Wars films.) In many ways I love Star Wars because of its flaws, not only because of its strengths.
I speculate that people who want to talk all day about haplotypes are too, well, boring to draw that much controversy. If you're very interested in the science of genetics there might be a good conversation there, but most people are not. Moreover, people who want to talk about that will probably learn that the Motte isn't a great place for deep dives into genetic science. That sort of conversation requires a lot of specialised knowledge that most Motters don't have.
By contrast, people who enjoy making edgy generalisations about this or that racial group seem like they're optimising more for drama and controversy, and this is a better place to get that. It's the culture war angle. Diving into the arcane complexities of genetic science is interesting, but it's not incendiary. It doesn't pick fights the way that its edgier cousin does.
Naturally get more of the latter type.
This is pretty much my take on 'HBD' or what I might term the 'neo-racialists'. It is no doubt true that there's genetic variation, on the population level, across the human race, and these variations to some extent correlate with racial categories. I can't really argue with that. However, the HBDers routinely outrun that observation and draw massive, sweeping conclusions about the desirability of using race as a proxy for a huge number of other issues, and therefore organising society, or even treating individuals, on the basis of race. The whole thing is just a motte and bailey.
But the problem with basing a theory on a hypothetical is that it feels like wishing, the infamous 'my ideology will be the one to arise from the ashes'. Trying to predict the world after an epoch-changing event is like trying to look inside or beyond a singularity.
Well, I think it's reasonable to take a position like, "the current order cannot or will not hold, massive changes are likely to come, therefore I/we should try to be resilient for now while being flexible to changing possibilities". If the political order is likely to radically change, in ways you cannot predict but which change the space of what's possible, then it makes sense to avoid investing too much in the current order while remaining open to the winds of change.
That said, oops, I had assumed you were American. Presumably you would need to adapt your specific concerns to your particular country.
Thank you for the serious answer, though. I appreciate it.
I'm not angling for a confession of wrongthink - I'm angling to translate either feeling or theory into practicable action. A political platform naturally requires some sort of plan for implementation. That plan doesn't have to be constrained by the Overton Window. A Yarvin-esque plan to build a shadow regime and step into power when the inevitable crisis of legitimacy comes is a valid answer; likewise a postliberal-esque plan to slowly build intellectual credibility while developing a new consensus in the shell of the old is a valid answer.
But in this case, if I'm reading you rightly, what you've got is basically "West Africans are really bad, and there's nothing that can be done about it".
Okay, so, what's the practical takeaway from that? It can just be "well, the United States is screwed", at which point the next question is, "given that, what do you plan to do, or recommend that others do?" Prepare to leave the US, so that if/when continuing to live there is untenable, you can get out? Build some sort of resilient, presumably West-African-free, community in some part of the US and focus on local welfare? Something else entirely?
It's not unreasonable or searching for gotchas to probe someone as to the practical implications of their politics. I'm not arguing with you in this thread! I haven't contradicted you or challenged any of your points! I'm asking you to elaborate on their practical implications because I'm interested in where they lead you.
I asked a second question as well. To repeat:
Do you think the US should aim to disempower West Africans? What would that mean? Banning them from running for office? Banning them from voting?
Okay, I've processed that you think that West Africans are inherently destructive to national health. Sure. So, you say, you must not "let them have political power". Can you translate that for me into a practical programme? What do you think the US should do?
To clarify - 'them' in the last sentence means West Africans? Politically empowered West Africans means a bloated and corrupt government, you think?
Do you think the US should aim to disempower West Africans? What would that mean? Banning them from running for office? Banning them from voting?
No, it's actually just correct. Being a citizen of the US is a reward for anyone not entitled to it by blood. We're the best. Everyone knows it.
I have family members who lived in the United States for over a decade, on permanent visas. They went there for work, and undoubtedly contributed to American prosperity. Their presence was completely legal.
Eventually they were offered pathways to American citizenship.
They refused, because they didn't want to be American citizens. They wanted to leave and come back home to Australia, which they eventually did. They sometimes still visit the US for business reasons, but only for short stays. They tell me quite frankly that they prefer living in Australia and view Australian citizenship as preferable to American.
Are they wrong?
Yes, I suppose it's possible that it's to do with the level of testosterone, and maybe higher-T men are more aggressive, and lower-T people more, for lack of a better term, intellectual or interested in abstracts.
I have no idea whether that's true, though. I obviously don't know my own level of testosterone or how that compares to other men. I would hazard that personality has to do with way more than just a single hormone, though, and while testosterone does make one more aggressive, the behavioural consequences of that seem like they would vary widely with everything else that goes into making up one's personality.
I could just as easily suggest that this forum might select for more testosterone, because I'd guess that it's unusual for people to actively seek out argument. People who post on the Motte are probably positively selected for enjoying conflict.
Ultimately I just really don't know. It would be interesting to have statistical data on the hormone profiles of Motters, but that data is inaccessible to us. I suppose I will file it away as something that would be mildly interesting, but which we won't know. Oh, well. It is an ever-growing file.
Without getting too biographical, I work in a Christian field with a heavily Chinese population, and I find there's something very clarifying in the way people born and raised in non-Christian cultures receive the gospel. It forces you to think a lot about culture, nationality, Christianity, and the interactions between them all. Nowhere does the gospel obliterate or destroy the base culture - instead, I prefer to think of it in similar terms to C. S. Lewis, where the gospel refines and enhances whatever praiseworthy, God-given elements exist in the base.
In Mere Christianity he uses metaphors of light and salt for the way that the gospel enhances individual personalities:
Imagine a lot of people who have always lived in the dark. You come and try to describe to them what light is like. You might tell them that if they come into the light that same light would fall on them all and they would all reflect it and thus become what we call visible. Is it not quite possible that they would imagine that, since they were all receiving the same light, and all reacting to it in the same way (i.e., all reflecting it), they would all look alike? Whereas you and I know that the light will in fact bring out, or show up, how different they are. Or again, suppose a person who knew nothing about salt. You give him a pinch to taste and he experiences a particular strong, sharp taste. You then tell him that in your country people use salt in all their cookery. Might he not reply "In that case I suppose all your dishes taste exactly the same: because the taste of that stuff you have just given me is so strong that it will kill the taste of everything else." But you and I know that the real effect of salt is exactly the opposite. So far from killing the taste of the egg and the tripe and the cabbage, it actually brings it out. They do not show their real taste till you have added the salt. (Of course, as I warned you, this is not really a very good illustration, because you can, after all, kill the other tastes by putting in too much salt, whereas you cannot kill the taste of a human personality by putting in too much Christ. I am doing the best I can.)
And then in That Hideous Strength he applies something like this to nations. He has the idea that every nation or culture has what he calls a 'haunting', the hint of its redeemed self, and these hauntings are naturally all different. The only one he names is Britain's, which he calls 'Logres', but he goes on:
“You’re right, Sir,” he said with a smile. “I was forgetting what you have warned me always to remember. This haunting is no peculiarity of ours. Every people has its own haunter. There’s no special privilege for England — no nonsense about a chosen nation. We speak about Logres because it is our haunting, the one we know about.”
“But this,” said MacPhee, “seems a very round-about way of saying that there’s good and bad men everywhere.”
“It’s not a way of saying that at all,” answered Dimble. “You see, MacPhee, if one is thinking simply of goodness in the abstract, one soon reaches the fatal idea of something standardised — some common kind of life to which all nations ought to progress. Of course, there are universal rules to which all goodness must conform. But that’s only the grammar of virtue. It’s not there that the sap is. He doesn’t make two blades of grass the same: how much less two Saints, two nations, two angels. The whole work of healing Tellus depends on nursing that little spark, on incarnating that ghost, which is still alive in every real people, and different in each. When Logres really dominates Britain, when the goddess Reason, the divine clearness, is really enthroned in France, when the order of Heaven is really followed in China — why, then it will be spring.
Now we might quibble the specific details, or go back and forth about what the real essence of Britain or France or China is, but I wouldn't want to get bogged down on that. Probably Lewis and his characters are struggling to express something very rich and complicated. But I have found this idea helpful in the past.
And in that light I interpret people like Inazo Nitobe, or Yuan Zhiming, however clumsily or even incompetently, as trying to articulate the divine haunting of Japan or of China, and in that way find not only themselves, but also their entire peoples in God's plan of salvation.
(And it should probably be noted that the latter quit his ministry and asked forgiveness after a rape accusation, so I'm including moral as well as intellectual incompetence.)
In Revelation 21:24-26, we are told, of the New Jerusalem, that "the kings of the earth will bring their glory into it", and that "people will bring into it the glory and honour of the nations". I'd like to believe that every nation has its own particular glory, its own particular honour, and that as part of the world's salvation, all of these will be brought to the altar before God.
(This is a long tangent, please forgive me.)
There are different versions of that theory, some of which are obviously nonsense. You can find more of Yuan Zhiming's version here. (His whole book is here if you can read Chinese.) Much of it is nonsense and some of it is just obviously falsehood. For instance, dào does not actually mean the same thing as Greek logos. It's true that logos in John 1:1 is translated as dào in some translations, but this is a somewhat free translation. In their more natural senses, dào means 'path' and logos means 'word'. Translating "in the beginning the dào was with God and the dào was God" is not being terribly literal with the words, but is an attempt to convey some of the same meaning in a different cultural context.
However, there are some attempts to inculturate Christianity in Asian cultures by looking for pre-Christian or proto-Christian resonances that I'm much more sympathetic to. Arguably the same thing happened in Europe - they found points of connection or resonance with pre-Christian philosophy, in order to reconcile Christianity with existing cultural and intellectual heritages. Plato or Aristotle or Homer didn't get thrown out entirely, and where there were commonalities, as with Greek conceptions of virtue, or philosophers verging on quasi-monotheistic ideas, they emphasised those.
One example I'm a little fond of is from Inazo Nitobe's infamous Bushido: The Soul of Japan. While this book is often disliked for being the source of a lot of romanticised, historically inaccurate information about samurai, I think it's fascinating because Nitobe himself was a convert to Christianity who was educated in the West, and indeed the book shows an erudite understanding of the Western canon. What Nitobe wanted to do was find some way to reconcile his Christian faith with a strong affirmation of Japanese tradition and nationhood. He does this by asserting, if not quite a proto-Christianity, at least ways in which God made himself known to the ancient Japanese, which would prepare them for the fullness of revelation later. Thus he writes:
Should any of my allusions to religious subjects and to religious workers be thought slighting, I trust my attitude towards Christianity itself will not be questioned. It is with ecclesiastical methods and with the forms which obscure the teachings of Christ, and not with the teachings themselves, that I have little sympathy. I believe in the religion taught by Him and handed down to us in the New Testament, as well as in the law written in the heart. Further, I believe that God hath made a testament which maybe called “old” with every people and nation,—Gentile or Jew, Christian or Heathen.
[...]
One cause of the failure of mission work is that most of the missionaries are grossly ignorant of our history—“What do we care for heathen records?” some say—and consequently estrange their religion from the habits of thought we and our forefathers have been accustomed to for centuries past. Mocking a nation’s history!—as though the career of any people—even of the lowest African savages possessing no record—were not a page in the general history of mankind, written by the hand of God Himself. The very lost races are a palimpsest to be deciphered by a seeing eye. To a philosophic and pious mind, the races themselves are marks of Divine chirography clearly traced in black and white as on their skin; and if this simile holds good, the yellow race forms a precious page inscribed in hieroglyphics of gold! Ignoring the past career of a people, missionaries claim that Christianity is a new religion, whereas, to my mind, it is an “old, old story,” which, if presented in intelligible words,—that is to say, if expressed in the vocabulary familiar in the moral development of a people—will find easy lodgment in their hearts, irrespective of race or nationality. Christianity in its American or English form—with more of Anglo-Saxon freaks and fancies than grace and purity of its founder—is a poor scion to graft on Bushido stock. Should the propagator of the new faith uproot the entire stock, root and branches, and plant the seeds of the Gospel on the ravaged soil? Such a heroic process may be possible—in Hawaii, where, it is alleged, the church militant had complete success in amassing spoils of wealth itself, and in annihilating the aboriginal race: such a process is most decidedly impossible in Japan—nay, it is a process which Jesus himself would never have employed in founding his kingdom on earth.
[...]
It has been predicted—and predictions have been corroborated by the events of the last half century—that the moral system of Feudal Japan, like its castles and its armories, will crumble into dust, and new ethics rise phoenix-like to lead New Japan in her path of progress. Desirable and probable as the fulfilment of such a prophecy is, we must not forget that a phoenix rises only from its own ashes, and that it is not a bird of passage, neither does it fly on pinions borrowed from other birds. “The Kingdom of God is within you.” It does not come rolling down the mountains, however lofty; it does not come sailing across the seas, however broad. “God has granted,” says the Koran, “to every people a prophet in its own tongue.” The seeds of the Kingdom, as vouched for and apprehended by the Japanese mind, blossomed in Bushido. Now its days are closing—sad to say, before its full fruition—and we turn in every direction for other sources of sweetness and light, of strength and comfort, but among them there is as yet nothing found to take its place. The profit and loss philosophy of Utilitarians and Materialists finds favor among logic-choppers with half a soul. The only other ethical system which is powerful enough to cope with Utilitarianism and Materialism is Christianity, in comparison with which Bushido, it must be confessed, is like “a dimly burning wick” which the Messiah was proclaimed not to quench but to fan into a flame.
To Nitobe's credit, he does not present some nonsensical theory of historical origins - rather, he thinks that God has, in each culture prepared the ground in certain ways, and that the gospel must be planted in that native soil.
We may not want to go the full way with him, and we may not want to automatically or thoughtlessly proclaim every culture a repository of divine revelation, but in broad strokes, I have a lot of sympathy for this approach. Start by looking for whatever elements of grace or truth are found in the pre-Christian culture, because God is very unlikely to have left that culture with nothing - and then look to the gospel to redeem and perfect the rest, rather than obliterate it.
(I'm fond of of "logic-choppers with half a soul" as a criticism of utilitarians. Ha! Forgive my pettiness.)
In some ways I'm surprised that it's not more popular among nerdy male rationalist types. That's the kind of demographic that gets really into Campbellian monomyths, loves mythology, and is also obsessed with creating and then tweaking complicated symbolic languages. It's exactly the sort of thing I would expect to be popular.
But for some reason tarot is female-coded, and maybe that's a killer?
I can understand it with violence, or I'd speculate possibly with competition or dominance in general? There is a thrill I get from competition, including physical competition, and that involves a certain level of aggression. When I was going through puberty I was involved in fencing, at school, and that was one of the co-ed sports. I remember trying to be chivalrous about it, but... you can't really go all out against the girls, and it's not the same. I wanted to push myself. I wanted to be allowed to be fierce.
That was probably a major difference, because I did recognise that trait in some other boys, but much more rarely in girls. There was definitely a female kind of aggression, but it did not manifest the same way.
I was thinking particularly of descriptions of impulsivity, immediacy, and emotional intensity. I read accounts by trans men saying that all their desires become both powerful and immediate, as if someone had switched caps lock on for their desires. They didn't get hungry, they got HUNGRY. NOW! And so on. Ironically, the emotional balance they described reminded me more of being a child, prior to puberty, so it was hard for me to associate that with puberty or testosterone.
For what it's worth, I myself had a quite gentle puberty - it was a gradual slope, rather than a wall breaking. As such I've never subjectively understood either why some kids fear it, or why some adults describe it as a very painful, tempestuous time of their lives. It just happened to me quite smoothly, and over a few years my voice dropped lower, I got more hair, and I experienced sexual attraction, but there was never a moment where I found it painful or disconcerting. I was even a little disappointed that nothing dramatic happened. Maybe sex ed at school had just hyped it up too much.
Anyway, their descriptions of getting very horny on testosterone didn't seem to match my experience of sexual desire. I had my sexual awakening just like anyone else, the phase where I hid pictures of sexy women underneath the bed and snuck guilty glances at bikini-clad models on magazine covers, and so on. But it was never a consuming fire for me. Maybe I'm just unusual and this is a universal experience I'm missing, but I don't think that's it? I got turned on by the hot girl sitting in front of me in class. All the basics seemed to happen to me. It just internally didn't feel like this overwhelmingly, uncontrollably powerful force. It felt like, "oh hey, that's happening to me, all right, deep breaths, focus on something else".
I'd be somewhat interested in other men's experiences of this. It's not something I really talk about with other people, since it's obviously a personal and embarrassing subject, and I suspect that the kinds of men who talk about it openly are self-selected for being uninhibited and horny.
(And I say this as someone who likes playing around with tarot imagery but don't treat it as serious.)
In the hope of trying to find something more positive to talk about -
I wonder if there are any other Motters with a passing interest in tarot? I used to be fascinated by it as well. I give no credence whatsoever to divination, but I think the imagery of the tarot is extraordinarily rich and multi-faceted. Its supposed divinatory powers, I hazard, have more to do with the way that that imagery is both endlessly open to interpretation and psychologically provocative. If you find yourself mentally 'stuck', a randomised pile of images from the tarot may well give you the jolt you need to consider new perspectives.
I don't use it for advice myself, but I can still appreciate the symbolic language it provides. If there are any other Motters familiar with it, maybe it's worth a chat in the Fun Thread one day?
Clearly I'm coming at this from the angle of someone who naturally had these hormones all my life, so I can't speak as to what it would be like to experience the effects for the first time.
This has always fascinated me when I read accounts by trans men. Their description of what testosterone does to their mental processes sounds completely alien to me. I cannot relate to it whatsoever. There are a number of possible explanations for that, one of which is, indeed, that I've had this level of testosterone all my life, and my body is accustomed to it. It's just part of the way I think, and any downsides or difficulties that come with it are things that I have had decades of practice compensating for. Someone who suddenly shifted from a much lower level of testosterone to the level of a natal male like me, however, probably would experience it as an overwhelming flood, and that might explain, for instance, them having problems with impulse control that I have never had.
If so I can only guess that it's plausible that a natal male suddenly taking a much higher dose of estrogen would experience a similar shock, but in the other direction, and that it would be something that natal women cannot relate to either.
Of course, as the top-level poster mentioned, it also seems likely that there's some element of placebo as well. If you're telling yourself that you're taking a chemical that's going to make your more feminine or girly, well, you can probably just think yourself into that absent any chemical effects at all. All the more so if you're also making intentional behavioural or social changes. So plenty of grains of salt seem warranted here.
While the word 'religion' isn't indigenous to this context, there is definitely a Chinese sense that the Confucian school, so to speak, is the same sort of thing as Daoism or Buddhism. This is depicted allegorically, and indeed forms the 'three traditions', as you term them.
Speaking of language, the Chinese term for Confucianism is 儒教 (rújiào) - the former character means 'scholar', and the latter means 'teaching', 'school', or sometimes 'religion'. Confucianism is the teaching of the scholars. I bring this up because it's similar to the names of schools that are uncontestedly considered 'religions' in the West. Daoism is 道教 (dàojiào, 'teaching of the way'), Buddhism is 佛教 (fójiào, 'teaching of the Buddha'), Christianity is 基督教 (jīdūjiào, 'teaching of Jesus', this term tends to have a more Protestant connotation), Catholicism is 天主教 (tiānzhujiào, 'teaching of the lord of heaven'), Protestantism specifically is 新教 (xīnjiào, 'new teaching'), Islam is 伊斯蘭教 (yīsīlánjiào, 'teaching of Islam', they just transliterated the name directly; 回, huí, is also common for Chinese Muslims as an ethnicity), and so on.
The point is that linguistically these all seem to be treated like different species of the one family - they are all types of jiào. Not all ideologies or systems of belief are jiào. For instance, communism, liberalism, and fascism, in Chinese, are all called 主義 (zhuyì, which means 'position' or 'doctrine'). The word jiào suggests something roughly similar to our word 'religion'.
The historical context, as hydroacetylene alludes to, is that Matteo Ricci and some of the early Jesuits in China really didn't want Confucianism to be a religion, because they liked Confucianism. If Confucianism is not a religion then Chinese people don't have to give it up in order to become Christians, which is obviously very helpful if you want to convert a bunch of elite Confucians, as Ricci did. (This is also why the name for Catholicism is so bizarre - Ricci tried to equate God with ancient Chinese belief in Heaven or some kind of Lord of Heaven, in order to make the case to the Chinese that embracing Christianity would be consistent with the ways of their ancestors. Interestingly, some modern Chinese Christians try to make a similar move - people like Yuan Zhiming preach pseudohistorical theories whereby ancient Chinese were prophetically proto-Christian. For instance, Zhiming argues that the Chinese character for 'greed', 婪 (lán), depicts a woman standing beneath two trees, suggesting some ancient lost knowledge of the Eden narrative.)
If you ask me, I'm not totally without sympathy for Ricci's approach - a Chinese convert to Christianity is not obligated to abandon everything taught by Confucius, but only those things incompatible with the gospel. Everything else may be retained, and that may well end up being an awful lot. But "Confucianism is a different religion, therefore it must all be thrown out" and "Confucianism is not a religion, therefore it's all fine" are both lazy shortcuts. They're attempts to shortcut past real discernment of the content of a teaching with the cheap label 'religion'.
Even so, if we have to use the label for convenience, I'd say Confucianism is more like a religion than it is not.
I don't accept your definition of "anti-semitism". "Anti-semitic" is an emotionally-loaded slur intended to denounce and pathologize any criticism of Jewish identity, religion, or culture whether it's rational or irrational, true or false.
Is there a definition of 'anti-semite' that you do accept as applying to yourself?
Would you agree with a statement like, "SecureSignals opposes and dislikes Jews?", absent any comment about whether or not you are rational in doing so?
Anti-Semitism can be rational or irrational, true or false. All it requires is engaging in criticism of Jewish behavior, culture, and identity, and there's no word for when Jews do the same to Gentile race, religion, or culture. And I do those things, so I accept the label, although I don't accept that label denotes irrationality- that's just a vain attempt to pathologize rational criticism as being crazy-talk.
All right, let's accept this. You would presumably say that you are a rational anti-semite, in that you are rationally opposed to Jews?
This is progress, because this means that our disagreement has now been precisified. We no longer need to argue about whether you are opposed to ('dislike', 'hate', etc.) Jews. We only need to argue about whether it is rational for you to do so.
(I do think there are clear ways to express the idea of a Jew who hates Gentiles - Jewish supremacism definitely exists. You can find Jews who hate non-Jews. But I don't want to get sidetracked. We're talking about you.)
I also don't accept "you hate the Jews" that's just a proto-woke slur also intended to intrinsically attach irrationality to a critical perspective of Jewish behavior and identity.
I think it's fair to say that your posting on the Motte displays, at the very least, a pathological interest in Jews. You keep bringing them up all the time, and always do so in the context of opposing or criticising them.
Rounding that off to 'you hate Jews' seems like a reasonable use of language to me. You certainly regard Jews with a great deal of hostility.
Which is why I don't respond to it, those accusations very conveniently derail from the arguments I'm making (by design), so if you just get bogged down in trying to convince everyone you aren't a neo-Nazi or you don't want to kill all the Jews you are just operating within the same consensus that I reject.
Will you respond to the question, "What do you want to do about Jews?"
There's no hidden agenda there. Let's suppose for the sake of argument that everything you've argued in the past about Jews is correct. What follows from that? What policies would you recommend? You've clearly indicated that you regard Jews as opponents - what, then, would you do?
I don't think that's an unfair gotcha. There are certainly groups that I regard as 'political and cultural opposition' to myself, so it would be fair game to ask me, "Olive, what do you want to do about the communists?" If I tried to avoid answering that, or if I treated that question as being inherently in bad faith, it would reflect badly on me. So too with you.
(I want to discredit communism as an ideological position in public debate and defeat communists in elections. There, see, it's easy.)
I can think of examples, I suppose, where mood is a relevant piece of evidence for judging a person's sincerity.
Suppose I'm favour of stronger welfare policies and more generous handouts for people in poverty, and I'm arguing with a person who believes that, however well-intentioned, public handouts like this are bad. They disincentivise people working to better themselves, they involve the government in what ought to be private charity, and so on. The state providing free welfare for the poor is ultimately detrimental both to the poor and the state. I suggest that their position is heartless, and they protest, "Not at all! My heart goes out to the poor as well. I really care about their plight. We just disagree about the best way to help them."
Suppose I then discover this person cheering as people get kicked off the dole and laughing. I would probably conclude that they're insincere and that their real motives are not empathy. Even if they sincerely think the dole is bad, mockery of desperate people is a cruel thing to do, and unlikely to coexist with genuine empathy. Alternatively, suppose I instead discover that this person volunteers at the soup kitchen run by their church. I would probably conclude that they are sincere, they really do empathise with and want to help the poor, and that they realy do believe there's an important moral distinction between public and private interventions.
I'm sure you can think of lots of examples like that. The key there is that the person presents as having certain motives, but behaves consistently or inconsistently with that motive.
(To boil down my disagreements with those premises, I think Jews are pretty assimilable if you make an effort, I think any form of HBD on Jews is much, much more suspect than HBD on Africans/Austronesians/Everyone Else due to shorter timescales, and given that of the Jews and part-Jews I've notably interacted with (and I am part-Jew myself, though it's a small part) most of them seemed fine (and the one major exception was probably just a case of misplaced righteousness meeting overconfidence in a risky plan) I'm not really feeling the whole "Jews are evil" thing.)
The latter matches my experiences as well. I don't think I knew any Jews growing up, but I ran into a couple at university, and eventually got to know more as an adult, including spending some time at a synagogue and engaging in adult Torah study with them, and the main thing I took away from that experience was, to put it bluntly, how boring and unremarkable they are. Synagogue really is very similar to church, and a very similar culture prevailed - though there were some different holy symbols, a bit more Hebrew instead of the occasional Greek or Latin, obviously no New Testament or Church Fathers or the like but the Talmud and rabbinic writings instead, but the animating spirit felt basically the same.
The mundanity of both Jewish religious ritual and just Jews in general was probably a very powerful inoculation for me against conspiracism. Part of that meant, in contrast to the way certain groups get very bothered about Jewish IQ, noticing that in practice, in everyday life, Jews certainly did not appear noticeably more intelligent than Gentiles. Torah study was interesting but not more insightful than Bible study. There were plenty of Jewish idiots and Jewish midwits, as well as their share of bright people, and I wouldn't say they compared particularly favourably or unfavourably to people in comparable groups in churches, mosques, or temples.
Jews are just - and no offense intended to any Jewish mottizens - not very interesting. Probably the best thing that came out of that engagement was that I made friends with a couple of Jews who are really into theology and we sometimes meet up for chats, but, again, they're not noticeably smarter or for that matter more sinister than the Catholics or Muslims or Buddhists with whom I do the same thing. It's all just quite normal. I understand why I do this, because I'm fascinated by religions of all types, but for people who aren't like me? These people just aren't that special.
That's fair. I should have clarified that I meant ethnic or racial groups.
I've always been very ambivalent on the 'missing mood' argument.
On the one hand, if someone's explicitly-stated argument seems like it implies a particular emotion, and the person making the argument lacks that emotion, that does seem like a good sign that the argument is not motivating for them. The argument is excuse or justification, rather than the real motivation for the position.
On the other hand, taken too seriously, the missing mood argument also sounds a lot like, "You don't feel the way that I imagine you ought to feel - therefore you are not serious." But human psychology is extremely diverse and unpredictable, the way people express their deep emotions varies very widely as well, and you should not typical-mind. Caplan summarises it as, "You can learn a lot by comparing the mood reasonable proponents would hold to the mood actual proponents do hold", but the phrase "the mood reasonable proponents would hold" is doing a lot of the work there. What is the mood reasonable proponents would hold? Are you sure? Is there only one such possible mood? How confident are you of what's going on inside another person's head?
I suppose I think missing moods can be a weak piece of evidence, which may suggest that we ought to look more deeply into a person's agenda, but nothing more than that. Unfortunately the actual examples Caplan gives in his piece are unconvincing and suggest a lack of moral imagination on Caplan's own part. Other people don't appear to feel what Caplan thinks they should feel, so he concludes they're insincere. But maybe Caplan is just wrong about they ought to feel. Maybe he's assuming that they accept facts and moral principles that Caplan himself accepts, and if he looked closer he would realise that they don't.
Let’s try this in different language, then.
I recently called you an anti-semite. Judging from this post, while you object to being called a neo-Nazi (fair enough, Nazism is a specific ideology), you would broadly accept the labels ‘anti-semite’ and ‘white identitarian’ or ‘white nationalist’.
When I say that you’re an anti-semite, what I mean is that your posts seem to me to have, as an animating principle, a very strong and irrational prejudice against both Jewish people as an ethnicity and Judaism as a religion. I think this is visible in both the subjects you choose to address and the normative valences you put on them. That is, I think that you consistently want to talk about Jews and steer every subject back to Jews, no matter how tangential they are to the topic, and I think that your judgement of anything involving Jews is prejudicially negative.
You constantly want to talk about Jews, and no matter what a Jew does, you interpret it in a maximally uncharitable light. The conclusion I draw from this is that you are anti-semitic. You just hate Jews.
Do I know what specific policy you recommend towards Jews, particularly in the 21st century United States? No, I don't. As Amadan and magic9mushroom have noted, you are strategically very cagey about that, and when you are directly asked, you respond evasively. You constantly suggest that something ought to be done about the Jews, but do not indicate what you think that something ought to be. It's a simple question, one which you surely must have considered, and you squirm to avoid answering it.
In this context I don't think it hugely matters. Maybe you want them all to be killed. It's a possibility. I will say that, at the least, I think that if they were all killed, you would not shed any tears. But maybe you just want them all deported or expelled, or want their property expropriated, or even just a social norm where non-Jews refuse to associate with Jews and treat them with scorn. Those are possibilities too. I don't care that much because even supposing that your 'secret' position is the mildest of these, it's still bad, and it's still motivated by a prejudice that is both irrational and worthy of moral condemnation.
And for the record, this would be the case regardless of the group in question. If you were obsessed with, I don't know, Tibetans, that would be equally as bad. If you had a similar level of both obsession with and hostility to Azeris, that would be just as bad. Jews have no special status. The same goes for Europeans, and if it's necessary, I condemn Ignatiev as well.
Let me then ask you straightforwardly: do you object to being characterised as anti-semitic? Do you disagree with the statement "SecureSignals hates Jews"? Or is that simply an accurate description?
Surely it makes no sense to blame TikTok for anti-white, anti-male, or anti-American attitudes on campuses? TikTok was first available in 2016, and I believe its popularity only really started to shoot up in 2018. Campus nonsense well predates that.
That line doesn't even read as praise of Hanania, much less the point of the post.
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This is something I'm inclined to disagree with. No comment on patriotism, which I think is a snarl word that admits of too many different meanings to be useful, but I think what you've done here is an instance of fetishism. Voting is one thing that dutiful citizens often do. It is not identical to dutiful citizenship. I think you're mistaking one expression of a duty with the duty itself.
As I would have it, responsible democratic citizenship does require participating in the political life of the community. That often involves voting, but voting itself is not sufficient for it. A responsible citizen may choose not to vote in certain circumstances (as act of protest, for instance); and an irresponsible citizen may exist even while regularly voting. I don't deny that there's a correlation - responsible and thoughtful citizens vote more often, the irresponsible and incompetent vote less - but the correlation shouldn't be seen as absolute. Moreover, there are many ways for a citizen to participate in the life of their community and support their fellows that do not involve voting, and I value a lot of those ways above voting itself.
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