I don't know to what extent there are established precedents for when a topic is worthy of a mega-thread, but this decision seems like a big deal to me with a lot to discuss, so I'm putting this thread here as a place for discussion. If nobody agrees then I guess they just won't comment.
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Notes -
Adam Unikowsky has a new article arguing pretty persuasively that the "holding office vs running for office" distinction is not going to fly. I don't think that's a conclusion that anyone here is going to resist very strenuously, but I thought it was a novel and intriguing argument and liked seeing it analysed seriously.
I don't think the "Not everything that is permitted is mandatory" part is very coherent. It would be a wonderful argument if there were clear statutory restrictions preventing insurrectionists from going on the ballot -- yet if such existed, we wouldn't be futzing around with these weird third- or fourth-degree restraints. Both Colorado's role and Baude/Paulsen position more generally is not that a state can block insurrectionists from the ballot, but that it must do so where any role to review qualifications exists. Unikowsky tries to shove this problem as if Thorton were the only limit, but Thorton is why Trump's lawyers argue this is clearly and egregiously wrong rather than merely incorrect.
The pragmatic argument is a lot stronger -- kicking this can down the road opens up a tremendous amount of worms, and heightens the risk of people literally marching on SCOTUS among far worse things -- but the pragmatic arguments give a lot of strong arguments toward either completely disqualifying Trump across the board, or completely limiting disqualification, and Unikowsky isn't making either of those arguments in context for Michigan.
((Separately, Unikowsky's aversion to clever solutions isn't as awkward as when coming from the emoluments clause fandom, but it's still pretty nakedly new given the man's role in Espinoza. Or, for that matter, when one examines how 'clever' this is, here.))
I think part of the argument is that Colorado does indeed have a statutory restriction preventing ineligible candidates from being on the ballot. You don't need to go the full Baude/Paulsen to say that Colorado is permitted to do so. One could easily imagine a Thomas opinion arguing that states have the right to put whoever they want on their ballot for any damn reason they choose (as a separate question to the issue of whether Trump fails the criteria they set).
But Colorado does not have a statutory restriction preventing ineligible candidates from being listed on the ballot, and the Colorado Supreme Court did not find one. In fact, it held that :
Hence the emphasis on "“wrongful act” that runs afoul of section 1-4-1203(2)(a) and undermines the purposes of the Election Code", and why there's so much emphasis on what's implied for 1203 purposes. But it doesn't matter; this is a state law question, and SCOTUS isn't going to punt because of it, and it wouldn't matter if they did (even for Colorado, for reasons I'm not discussing publicly).
It just makes Unikowsky's argument really weak at a philosophy-of-law level.
Huh. I admit I've kind of brushed over the questions related to Colorado law specifically, so I guess I'm a bit lost as to where the SOS authority to disqualify candidates comes from exactly. All I can say in my defence is the citations of Gorsuch in Hassan v Colorado made me assume that there was some well established existing authority for Colorado to do that.
There was a lot more authority and clear case-law on the matter before a bunch of the Colorado election code was revised in the last decade, although its bounds had a limitation. But that's... about as much detail as I'm comfortable giving publicly.
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