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Notes -
Bukele isn't seeking abnormal domination of a national political sphere- he could absolutely be an oligarchic power behind the throne and rule through others if he wanted to. My read is that Bukele basically aspires to be a 'normal' national leader by 'normal' international standards, where being re-elected when you have 80+% public approval is a natural sequence, not a scandal.
A somewhat longer but still short version is that Bukele doesn't consider himself an autocrat, or desiring to be an autocrat in the model of the more malign actors in latin america, but seeking 'normal' political longevity that is utterly uncontroversial in other countries. Re-election is not a particularly controversial thing in 'normal' democracies, and certainly many more politicians have gotten re-elected on a lot less public achievements than Bukele, but few considered, say, Angela Merkel an authoritarian-by-default for seeking considerably more than a Honduran president's time in power. This is where we note that many of the relevant executives in the hemisphere are not only incumbents, but incumbents with far greater corruption or authoritarian bonafides than Bukele is accused of in El Salvador, but they are considered normal / respectable / legitimate. Just in the immediate neighborhood, to the north elements of Guatemala are trying to basically overturn the results of the last election by targetting the president elect, to the east Honduras is ruled by a political dynasty where the power behind the throne is a former president who was removed from office at the order of the country's supreme court, and to the south is, well, Nicaragua. And that's without going further north- where the US is in a two-incumbent election cycle, and further south Brazil is ruled by a re-elected elder statesman who was complicit in one of the largest corruption scandals in hemispheric history.
Bukele can't simply rewrite the constitution because that particular part of the constitution is unmodifiable, and building a new constitution isn't so simple. Letter-of-the-law is simpler. But there's also an element that there's no real indication that Bukele wants to overturn the general constitutional order, as much as chafes at this particular bit.
This is harder to describe eloquently, but part of central american politics is chaffing at the double standards and paternalizing by larger and outside powers. Sometimes that's eachother, sometimes that's the US, it's the typical small-polity-vs-larger-polity mismash. Here, the small-inner identiy is El Salvador, one of the only countries to ban self-succession, and the bigger-outer is every democracy that permits re-election. Having all the hemisphere's major and acknowledged/respected democracies be on board with re-elections for successful/popular leaders, but it being forbidden to El Salvador, can be a grating sort of cultural chauvenism and paternalizing (and paternalism was absolutely a part of that part of the Constitution). There's basically a 'real / normal countries get to do this, but you can't be trusted with it' dynamic, which is going to be frustrating to a country that, well, feels paternalized and bullied by larger neighbors enough that it once went to war over an ugly football game (and a heck of a lot of context of discriminatory / geopolitical abuse).
With that in mind, there's something of a zeitgeist that not only has Bukele been a turning point in El Salvador into a 'normal' country in the sense of being safe enough that it's no longer exceptionally dangerous, but that a re-election of Bukele is a turning point in El Salvador being a 'normal' democracy. Normal democracies have safe streets. Normal democracies have notable public libraries (like the one the Chinese just delivered on for Bukele). Normal democracies also get to fudge and bend the rules of their own rules and constitutions from time to time, whether it's courts inventing new requirements or standards in the absence of clear text, or ignoring plain reading of politically inconvenient text- especially if it can be done to the letter of the law, and with the support of the people.
Bukele doesn't seem particularly interested in running an autocratic one-party state (though that may well be because he doesn't need to at this time). He does, however, seem consistently interested in running a normal democracy. It just so happens that the constitution of the democracy he's in was more concerned about the recent Cold War experiences than in enabling a normal democracy.
That's what I'm asking though, if they don't like the constitution / don't feel like it allows them to be a "normal" democracy, why not just amend it? The single term thing isn't some American imposition or Cold War measure, they've had that rule across their constitutions since the 19th century, in large part because they've had a consistent issue with executives trying to overstay their welcome.
In general where you say "normal democracy" you would be better served saying "nice country". Guatemala is nothing like a normal democracy, as I've covered closely here, and isn't a reasonable comparison of normalcy. Carefully skirting laws put in place by your people to prevent powerful executives, fighting gang violence by suspending traditional rule of law or freedom of the press, having the military threaten lawmakers who disagree with you, etc, may make El Salvador a "nicer country" from some people's perspectives, but it's a stretch to say it makes them a more normal democracy.
Amending that part of the Constitution has a 'it is everyone's obligation to have an armed revolt.' Hence, letter-of-the-law observence.
For your second paragraph, I'd disagree with your characterization on multiple grounds.
Skirting laws to prevent powerful executives is incredibly normal across democratic systems the world over- it's practically a joke that modern uncontestedly democratic leaders have more formal and informal tools of power than all but the most totalitarian of leaders of old. Fighting gang violence by changing the balance of civil liberties and prosecution is incredibly normal. Having a living history of tensions between the military and civilian government is absolutely normal. These may not be desirable from the perspectives of democracies with already established and comfortable status quos (typically status quos of empowered multi-term executives, low crime, established informal political elite-media alignment, and long times since military-civil disagreement), but they're absolutely normal across the global and last century's experiences of many states that are now considered democracies, particularly those that have faced extreme domestic violence issues (such as insurgencies) in the last century.
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