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No, not really.
You may need to re-read it, and then read the second, and the subsequent paragraphs, because that is not the concession you are looking for. Especially in light of response paras 4 and 5, which actually do address what you think paragraph one addresses.
Of course you can. The application of category qualifications is a basic skill.
If you understand what makes something qualify for a category, you can look for whether a new thing has the prerequisite characteristics to qualify. If we know that, categorically, something has characteristics X, Y, and Z, then if something we don't know doesn't have X, Y, and Z, we may not know it well, but it's not the category. In this case, 'the Cold War established when nuclear weapons would be used' is a category- the category of what sort of things would lead to nuclear weapons being used, i.e. the thresholds, i.e. existential concerns.
As the category already exists, then for novel example (war nearby rather than a ways away) to qualify for the category, you need to establish it as meeting the criteria. When the criteria are existential risk, you need to establish existential risk. If it does not, you can absolutely judge that it doesn't meet the category of concern.
At the end of the day, new things don't simply fall into pre-defined categories they haven't qualified for.
Now, you could try to argue that a starting premise is wrong- that we don't know Russian thresholds- but that would undermine the argument that we shouldn't send weapons because it would cross nuclear thresholds. The argument presumes an understanding of thresholds. If you don't, then there's no basis to the claim. If you do, then it's just discussing where the threshold is- and so far you've retreated from examples of non-threshold advanced weapon use.
Your position fails to have a causal mechanism because there is no objective relationship between claimed components due to in-build subjectivity and assumptions.
You don't define what a 'serious' threat to these areas is which allows retroactive retraction of any standard. You don't provide a causal relationship dynamic to explain how Crimea substantially differ from other areas Russia claimed are categorically the same but didn't nuke over and which thus demonstrate that control loss alone is not a threshold. You didn't establish why NATO should be automatically assumed to nuke, or why Moscow would choose to do so on the understanding of that, or why Moscow would escalate to MAD if it was willing to be nuked on that understanding in the first place. The is the classic conflation of rational and irrational nuclear actors- Moscow is simultaneously rational enough to resort to MAD, but irrational enough to instigate MAD.
You even conflate Crimea and Moscow for the same opposition point, despite that the scale of resources to remove Russian control from one is of entirely different magnitudes than the other. The Moscow-based Russian Federation does not face existential risk if it loses Crimea- it does if a force is capable of taking Moscow. The two forces are not the same, and the aid shipments that have to date not even allowed Ukraine to capture its own territory are demonstratably not enough to capture Moscow.
This is not a causal mechanism- this is basic assuming the conclusion on handwavium, while throwing in non-falsifiables that wave off the counter-examples.
It's not clearly a valid concern at all, since you pulled 5% out of the same source that you assumed the conclusion, but didn't actually contrast it to the existential risks that follow from NOT providing weapons sufficient to defeat an invasion and annexation of territory against a country that actually did give up nuclear weapon potential in the past.
This is a classic example utility monster logic application, which struggles with infinities and resorts to smuggling in the framing while denying other fictional metrics that would counter the desired conclusion. You can say there is a 5% chance that conventional arms leads to a nuclear war, and someone else could say NOT sending enough arms to conventionally defeat Russia leads to a 5.00005% chance of nuclear proliferation by security-concerned countries that leads to nuclear war. Both are negative infinities.
If you want to say infinity is equally bad in either direction, it doesn't matter- negative infinity either way is still infinity. If you want to say a more likely infinity matters more, you need to actually justify why. Otherwise, there's nothing valid about it- it's just an arbitrary claim to relevance.
Dude. I don’t know what to say.
The basic point I was an am making is that the Cold War is no guide contra to what you said. You haven’t provided any evidence it is.
Seems like you are trying to use some weird “debate trick” as opposed to address the substance of the argument. I’m not making the claim that “we shouldn’t send weapons because it would cross nuclear thresholds.”
I’m saying that sending weapons may cross that threshold (likely depending on Ukraine success) and therefore I don’t judge it to be worth the risk.
As for everything else, again it seems to be a weird debate trick as opposed to substance. For example:
I don’t need to. Losing territory that was small and not part of Russia prior to the invasion is different from losing Crimea which has been Russian for most of the last hundred years, is of key strategic value, and has been de facto Russian since 2014. They are of different categories so I would make a reasonable assumption that Russia would react differently. This seems obvious and happy to try to explain the assumptions but it doesn’t feel like a conversation.
Indeed, most of your argument comes down to “your argument relies on assumptions and judgements.” Yes. So does the argument for providing weapons. The question is which one is reasonable. Trying to play this weird gotcha game isn’t really all that interesting.
Not surprising.
I have repeatedly provided examples of non-threshold aid types and degrees. You have not provided evidence of an actual threshold. You are the one making a positive claim of a risk to justify a decision- it is on you to validate it.
You have been avoiding the arguments every reply so far, from the start to here.
To which you immediately follow with...
Which is an argument from the position that sending weapons would cross the threshold, or else there wouldn't be a risk.
You have not established why anyone should believe Ukrainian success is a credible threshold for Russian nuclear use, particularly when the nominal red line has already been crossed repeatedly already. Rather, you have had to waive away the reasons why the pass crossings didn't actually cross the threshold... which is the point. It's not actually a threshold.
You do, if you wish your judgement to be considered grounded in something more than propaganda narratives from a combatant who regularly and routinely engages in nuclear scaremongering for the sake of affecting decisions without reflecting actual nuclear risk.
There is nothing magical about the year of 2014 versus 2022, and it's not even a claim the Russian military make regarding their nuclear use considerations. This goes back to treating the Russians as irrational nuclear actors.
No. Most of my argument comes down that there is a good deal of historical examples and Russian doctrine and nuclear risk mitigation theory that goes against your judgement that conventional weapons equate to nuclear risk, and you are ignoring it while inventing conditions that even the Russians don't claim.
There's not much of a gotcha to get for a void of justification.
This is just ridiculous. No one knows what a the threshold is because nuclear weapons have only been used twice. But of course that’s the problem when dealing with extreme tail risk. You can’t really rely on history and getting it wrong is terrible. You seem to believe there is a knowable threshold and we need to just figure out what it is. My point is we have zero clue what the threshold is and therefore caution is prudent with respect to Ukraine. You keep saying I’m not responding to your argument but that’s because your argument is absurd — you are asking for me to prove what a threshold is BUT I’m saying that’s the completely wrong question to ask. We have a known unknown and need to make decisions in that context. Sure escalating may not result in nuclear war but it may. It isn’t handwaving to say “we don’t know;” it is the entire argument.
You don’t seem to get that. Instead you seemingly claim “we can look to the Cold War and the current situation of the war to ascertain what the threshold is.” But the problem is pretty much all of your analogs are so easily distinguished as to be beyond the point. That is, we are in sui generis situation meaning we are in known unknown land.
Still avoiding the arguments, I see. No surprise.
Projection.
Indeed you are. It was kind of a point you skipped.
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