Really, you're going to defend the flight to nowhere?
Even if the carriers are not all at the confirmed original sighting (say, 50% chance (because, in reality, as we know they were at the sighting), you still have to have the luck to find them (maybe 20% chance) .
So basically you incapacitated an airgroup for a 10% chance to sink 2 extra carriers, assuming they are good.
While if you send them to the sighting, you have a 50% chance to sink 2 extra carriers, plus the increase in chance of sinking the confirmed carriers, who might have been missed by the original strike.
If Nagumo had CarDiv 5, this might have been alleviated.
Having more forces is not a strategy. Anyone can win with more.
Are you just arguing to argue( it's fine if you are), or do you really believe yamamoto's reserve order, and Hornet's void search were correct decisions?
Really, you're going to defend the flight to nowhere?
I'm saying it's not obviously stupid.
Are you just arguing to argue( it's fine if you are), or do you really believe yamamoto's reserve order, and Hornet's void search were correct decisions?
I believe the idea of reserving aircraft was good, but Yamamoto's in particular was not well thought out. It's a case where doctrine isn't necessarily bad in all regards, but the plan itself is so bad that doctrine begins to hamstring it.
Ah yes I forgot fletcher also held down yorktown in reserve at first. Again, total waste of an hour. They were so afraid of making a mistake when the worst mistake was inaction - Copenhagen ethics strategy. What if the japanese showed up in that hour. An extremely explodey carrier and no strike. Those admirals all sucked, except maybe spruance.
Fog of War is a serious issue and carriers were in short supply for the time being. Losing them meant not having any way to contest enemy airpower without having land-based aircraft in whatever region they were attacking.
Launching everything is both defensively and offensively superior - best way to keep your carriers intact.
Air strikes are a limited resource. Fuel isn't freely available at sea, you have to schedule fueling times and that's a dangerous thing to do in war near enemy waters. Moreover, there's some attrition as the environment can go south quickly, or a plane can develop issues and crash into the ocean. If you exhaust your primary method of destroying enemy fleets before a refueling/resupplying can happen, you're useless.
Regarding Hornet's flight, my only point is that we don't know why they did what they did. It's true that there was a mess up, but it's only a mess up if you assume the goal was to strike the two carriers known at the time. If they were searching for the other pair or trio, then it's not necessarily a mess up.
You're overcomplicating the hornet issue, like there's some 8D chess reason for a simple, yet major, fuckup.
I never overcomplicated it once. You're the one assuming I'm defending the decision in total, I'm only arguing that it cannot be so obviously dismissed as a stupid thing. Maritime Historian Craig Symonds wrote a piece in 2021 about this exact topic. The relevant section is below.
To try to resolve this mystery, it is essential to re-examine what the Americans knew—or thought they knew—about Japanese intentions that day. Remember that most of the high command—including Mitscher—believed the Japanese were operating in two carrier groups: the one that had been sighted, and a second one, which was presumed to be operating 80 to 100 miles to the rear. Mitscher knew that the planes from the Enterprise were going after the two carriers that the PBY had sighted and reported, and he may have harbored fears that even if that strike were successful the other two enemy carriers would remain untouched—and more important, that the element of surprise would be lost.
Pete Mitscher was the most senior U.S. Navy aviation officer afloat that day. Rear Admiral Bill Halsey, an aviator who was supposed to have commanded at Midway, was in the hospital. Captain George Murray, commander of the Enterprise, was Naval Aviator No. 22, and Spruance had designated him as tactical air officer for the strike. But Mitscher, who was Naval Aviator No. 33, had been selected for promotion to rear admiral, and his staff already was referring to him as “Admiral Mitscher.” In Halsey’s absence, Fletcher was the senior officer afloat, but neither he nor Spruance were aviators. It is easy to imagine that, in Mitscher’s mind, it was up to him to ensure the proper coordination of the air strikes.
Mitscher knew there would be only one chance to effect surprise, and that once surprise was lost, the battle would become a toss-up. If the Enterprise planes succeeded in surprising and sinking the two enemy flattops at the known coordinates, it is entirely reasonable to assume that Mitscher may have calculated the best use of the Hornet’s air group was to find and sink the two carriers that had not yet been sighted—but which presumably were operating 80 to 100 miles behind the other Japanese ships. In consideration of those factors, Mitscher may have told his air group leader, Commander Stanhope Ring, to take the entire air group to a position 80 miles behind the leading Japanese carriers. If one calculates that bearing from the Hornet’s position that morning, it turns out to be about 265 degrees.
If that is what happened, Mitscher apparently did not share the revised objective with any of the four squadron commanders—just with group commander Ring. That would explain why the commander of Torpedo Eight, Lieutenant Commander John Waldron, was so surprised—and then angry—when he was told the course he was to fly. He knew that a course of 265 would not lead them to the coordinates he had carefully plotted in the ready room that morning based on the location of the sighted Japanese carriers.
This is just explaining the fuckup, not justifying it. Mitscher perhaps thought it was a good idea, but it was still stupid - or as the article says, unwise.
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Notes -
Really, you're going to defend the flight to nowhere?
Even if the carriers are not all at the confirmed original sighting (say, 50% chance (because, in reality, as we know they were at the sighting), you still have to have the luck to find them (maybe 20% chance) .
So basically you incapacitated an airgroup for a 10% chance to sink 2 extra carriers, assuming they are good.
While if you send them to the sighting, you have a 50% chance to sink 2 extra carriers, plus the increase in chance of sinking the confirmed carriers, who might have been missed by the original strike.
Having more forces is not a strategy. Anyone can win with more.
Are you just arguing to argue( it's fine if you are), or do you really believe yamamoto's reserve order, and Hornet's void search were correct decisions?
I'm saying it's not obviously stupid.
I believe the idea of reserving aircraft was good, but Yamamoto's in particular was not well thought out. It's a case where doctrine isn't necessarily bad in all regards, but the plan itself is so bad that doctrine begins to hamstring it.
Ah yes I forgot fletcher also held down yorktown in reserve at first. Again, total waste of an hour. They were so afraid of making a mistake when the worst mistake was inaction - Copenhagen ethics strategy. What if the japanese showed up in that hour. An extremely explodey carrier and no strike. Those admirals all sucked, except maybe spruance.
Fog of War is a serious issue and carriers were in short supply for the time being. Losing them meant not having any way to contest enemy airpower without having land-based aircraft in whatever region they were attacking.
Launching everything is both defensively and offensively superior - best way to keep your carriers intact.
Anyway, back to Hornet's flight, mitscher knew he fucked up, the insubordinate flight leader certainly thought it was stupid.
Air strikes are a limited resource. Fuel isn't freely available at sea, you have to schedule fueling times and that's a dangerous thing to do in war near enemy waters. Moreover, there's some attrition as the environment can go south quickly, or a plane can develop issues and crash into the ocean. If you exhaust your primary method of destroying enemy fleets before a refueling/resupplying can happen, you're useless.
Regarding Hornet's flight, my only point is that we don't know why they did what they did. It's true that there was a mess up, but it's only a mess up if you assume the goal was to strike the two carriers known at the time. If they were searching for the other pair or trio, then it's not necessarily a mess up.
Before the battle the issue is not to get fuel into your planes, but how to get it out of your hangars before it burns down the ship.
You're overcomplicating the hornet issue, like there's some 8D chess reason for a simple, yet major, fuckup.
Has anyone beside you ever thought it was a good idea, well-justified ?
I never overcomplicated it once. You're the one assuming I'm defending the decision in total, I'm only arguing that it cannot be so obviously dismissed as a stupid thing. Maritime Historian Craig Symonds wrote a piece in 2021 about this exact topic. The relevant section is below.
This is just explaining the fuckup, not justifying it. Mitscher perhaps thought it was a good idea, but it was still stupid - or as the article says, unwise.
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