I think after Coral Sea, both navies’ admirals were paralyzed by the thought of launching against the wrong target, and appearing stupid. The reserves they kept for discovering ‘true’ targets were a liability. The defeat can be traced to the original decision to keep half in reserve. Nagumo should have launched everything against midway, first thing. That could have shut down the base, and there wouldn’t have been ordnance or fueled planes lying around, greatly increasing the survivability of his fleet.
Same thing with fletcher’s reluctance to launch everything at eastern solomons (which he ended up doing anyway). Hornet’s decision to head west to keep looking for more carriers falls into the same kind of completely faulty decision-making, when they were at least two perfect targets. They went looking for a bird in the bush when they had two, and perhaps all, in hand. It’s baffling, I can’t explain it other than their egos getting the better of them, wanting to be the trailblazing hero instead of just doing their job.
This perfectionist mentality is what doomed the japanese : ‘first we’ll find all the carriers, then we’ll launch a perfect, coordinated strike’ – when they should have launched what they had, and sunk what was available – more in the spirit of the disjointed american attacks.
Only later on in the war did they catch on and at philippine sea they immediately launched when they saw an incoming strike, they told them to circle, attack land targets whatever, anything but keep planes on the ship ‘as a (flammable) reserve’. More Yamamoto’s fault really, but since nagumo was willing to ignore the order to keep the reserve, he shouldn’t have half-assed it.
I think after Coral Sea, both navies’ admirals were paralyzed by the thought of launching against the wrong target, and appearing stupid.
It's not about looking stupid, there are serious consequences to not being ready to attack a discovered carrier group in this era. You have to scout those things out, and scouting is not that easy. Pilots can get lost, misreport what they see and where, or get shot down without ever revealing where they were at the time. So being ready to go at a moment's notice once contact is made matters.
The defeat can be traced to the original decision to keep half in reserve. Nagumo should have launched everything against midway, first thing.
This point deceptively supports yours because the issue at Midway was that there weren't enough planes in general. If Nagumo had CarDiv 5, this might have been alleviated. But that's not a knock against the practice of holding reserve strikes in case more enemies are found.
Hornet’s decision to head west to keep looking for more carriers falls into the same kind of completely faulty decision-making, when they were at least two perfect targets.
It is a serious issue to know your enemy is sending 4 carriers and only having spotted 2. Those other two are threats that have to be found.
Really, you're going to defend the flight to nowhere?
Even if the carriers are not all at the confirmed original sighting (say, 50% chance (because, in reality, as we know they were at the sighting), you still have to have the luck to find them (maybe 20% chance) .
So basically you incapacitated an airgroup for a 10% chance to sink 2 extra carriers, assuming they are good.
While if you send them to the sighting, you have a 50% chance to sink 2 extra carriers, plus the increase in chance of sinking the confirmed carriers, who might have been missed by the original strike.
If Nagumo had CarDiv 5, this might have been alleviated.
Having more forces is not a strategy. Anyone can win with more.
Are you just arguing to argue( it's fine if you are), or do you really believe yamamoto's reserve order, and Hornet's void search were correct decisions?
Really, you're going to defend the flight to nowhere?
I'm saying it's not obviously stupid.
Are you just arguing to argue( it's fine if you are), or do you really believe yamamoto's reserve order, and Hornet's void search were correct decisions?
I believe the idea of reserving aircraft was good, but Yamamoto's in particular was not well thought out. It's a case where doctrine isn't necessarily bad in all regards, but the plan itself is so bad that doctrine begins to hamstring it.
Ah yes I forgot fletcher also held down yorktown in reserve at first. Again, total waste of an hour. They were so afraid of making a mistake when the worst mistake was inaction - Copenhagen ethics strategy. What if the japanese showed up in that hour. An extremely explodey carrier and no strike. Those admirals all sucked, except maybe spruance.
Fog of War is a serious issue and carriers were in short supply for the time being. Losing them meant not having any way to contest enemy airpower without having land-based aircraft in whatever region they were attacking.
Launching everything is both defensively and offensively superior - best way to keep your carriers intact.
Air strikes are a limited resource. Fuel isn't freely available at sea, you have to schedule fueling times and that's a dangerous thing to do in war near enemy waters. Moreover, there's some attrition as the environment can go south quickly, or a plane can develop issues and crash into the ocean. If you exhaust your primary method of destroying enemy fleets before a refueling/resupplying can happen, you're useless.
Regarding Hornet's flight, my only point is that we don't know why they did what they did. It's true that there was a mess up, but it's only a mess up if you assume the goal was to strike the two carriers known at the time. If they were searching for the other pair or trio, then it's not necessarily a mess up.
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Notes -
I think after Coral Sea, both navies’ admirals were paralyzed by the thought of launching against the wrong target, and appearing stupid. The reserves they kept for discovering ‘true’ targets were a liability. The defeat can be traced to the original decision to keep half in reserve. Nagumo should have launched everything against midway, first thing. That could have shut down the base, and there wouldn’t have been ordnance or fueled planes lying around, greatly increasing the survivability of his fleet.
Same thing with fletcher’s reluctance to launch everything at eastern solomons (which he ended up doing anyway). Hornet’s decision to head west to keep looking for more carriers falls into the same kind of completely faulty decision-making, when they were at least two perfect targets. They went looking for a bird in the bush when they had two, and perhaps all, in hand. It’s baffling, I can’t explain it other than their egos getting the better of them, wanting to be the trailblazing hero instead of just doing their job.
This perfectionist mentality is what doomed the japanese : ‘first we’ll find all the carriers, then we’ll launch a perfect, coordinated strike’ – when they should have launched what they had, and sunk what was available – more in the spirit of the disjointed american attacks.
Only later on in the war did they catch on and at philippine sea they immediately launched when they saw an incoming strike, they told them to circle, attack land targets whatever, anything but keep planes on the ship ‘as a (flammable) reserve’. More Yamamoto’s fault really, but since nagumo was willing to ignore the order to keep the reserve, he shouldn’t have half-assed it.
It's not about looking stupid, there are serious consequences to not being ready to attack a discovered carrier group in this era. You have to scout those things out, and scouting is not that easy. Pilots can get lost, misreport what they see and where, or get shot down without ever revealing where they were at the time. So being ready to go at a moment's notice once contact is made matters.
This point deceptively supports yours because the issue at Midway was that there weren't enough planes in general. If Nagumo had CarDiv 5, this might have been alleviated. But that's not a knock against the practice of holding reserve strikes in case more enemies are found.
It is a serious issue to know your enemy is sending 4 carriers and only having spotted 2. Those other two are threats that have to be found.
Really, you're going to defend the flight to nowhere?
Even if the carriers are not all at the confirmed original sighting (say, 50% chance (because, in reality, as we know they were at the sighting), you still have to have the luck to find them (maybe 20% chance) .
So basically you incapacitated an airgroup for a 10% chance to sink 2 extra carriers, assuming they are good.
While if you send them to the sighting, you have a 50% chance to sink 2 extra carriers, plus the increase in chance of sinking the confirmed carriers, who might have been missed by the original strike.
Having more forces is not a strategy. Anyone can win with more.
Are you just arguing to argue( it's fine if you are), or do you really believe yamamoto's reserve order, and Hornet's void search were correct decisions?
I'm saying it's not obviously stupid.
I believe the idea of reserving aircraft was good, but Yamamoto's in particular was not well thought out. It's a case where doctrine isn't necessarily bad in all regards, but the plan itself is so bad that doctrine begins to hamstring it.
Ah yes I forgot fletcher also held down yorktown in reserve at first. Again, total waste of an hour. They were so afraid of making a mistake when the worst mistake was inaction - Copenhagen ethics strategy. What if the japanese showed up in that hour. An extremely explodey carrier and no strike. Those admirals all sucked, except maybe spruance.
Fog of War is a serious issue and carriers were in short supply for the time being. Losing them meant not having any way to contest enemy airpower without having land-based aircraft in whatever region they were attacking.
Launching everything is both defensively and offensively superior - best way to keep your carriers intact.
Anyway, back to Hornet's flight, mitscher knew he fucked up, the insubordinate flight leader certainly thought it was stupid.
Air strikes are a limited resource. Fuel isn't freely available at sea, you have to schedule fueling times and that's a dangerous thing to do in war near enemy waters. Moreover, there's some attrition as the environment can go south quickly, or a plane can develop issues and crash into the ocean. If you exhaust your primary method of destroying enemy fleets before a refueling/resupplying can happen, you're useless.
Regarding Hornet's flight, my only point is that we don't know why they did what they did. It's true that there was a mess up, but it's only a mess up if you assume the goal was to strike the two carriers known at the time. If they were searching for the other pair or trio, then it's not necessarily a mess up.
Before the battle the issue is not to get fuel into your planes, but how to get it out of your hangars before it burns down the ship.
You're overcomplicating the hornet issue, like there's some 8D chess reason for a simple, yet major, fuckup.
Has anyone beside you ever thought it was a good idea, well-justified ?
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