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Notes -
No, not at all. The US knew what it was doing at the strategic and operational level, but it failed at the tactical level. The reason for this was inexperience, America just didn't have the experience the Japanese did with carrier flight operations and especially combined carrier strike launches. They had some, it wasn't like the US was completely clueless as to how carriers operated. But Kido Butai had many, many years of experience over their counterparts, including constant working of the men and machines in the six months prior to Midway.
Remember, neither side thought that carriers were the primary means of delivering power that we think of them as today. They saw battleships and the "big gun" as the capability around which many other things followed.
The success of the blunders is only a thing because of the luck at 10:20 A.M. Had only Yorktown's planes found their target, it would have been a 3 vs. 3, but the US carriers would have a big chunk of planes and pilots missing. Not an easy fight to win, and they may have just cut their losses right there.
I was not able to find any discussion of a hypothetical scenario in which all US strikes were perfectly coordinated at the carrier level i.e dive-bombers and torpedo planes working in concert, all escorted by fighters. But I would hazard a guess and say the Japanese would not have had so much success before 10:20 A.M.
I guess I'm trying to say that you should never rely on your poor military performance to somehow be exactly what you need to have luck roll in your favor.
Part of the problem with that is that I'd either have to zoom out much more, or you'd get one mega-post that people would just get tired of reading.
Oh, no, I meant to say that it's probable that one of the only hard guidelines of war is that, while it's not ideal to fuck up, all that matters is if you fuck up less than your opponents, which probably held true in Midway.
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