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Transnational Thursdays 11

Spain

Last week I reported that the socialists had clinched a surprise win insofar as the center right PP and the far right Vox had failed to win a majority, leaving the leftists better positioned to find a coalition partner (because Vox is toxic to many other parties). Votes have now been counted up from overseas and have propelled the right wing forward, placing both the left and right flanks at exactly 171 out of 350 seats. Now either party needs to secure only five more votes and the remaining parties are awkwardly in between. PSOE’s remaining hope for a third coalition party is now Junts, the Catalan independence party, which leans right but has had a good relationship with PM Pedro Sanchez in the past. Things are complicated by Sanchez’ thus-far refusal to entertain their demands. PP has also reached out to Junts for negotiations, but are constrained in what they can offer by their partnership with Vox, whose very existence was partially inspired by a nationalist backlash to Catalan independence. Worse case scenario nobody is elected, and they have to have another election in two months.

Italy

Watchers have been wondering for a while how Meloni will address Italy’s relationship with China, as Italy seeks to balance sustaining its economy with their alliances. The government has now formally said joining China’s Belt and Road was a mistake with scant economic benefits for the country. Italy will now make moves towards leaving the agreement, if possible without damaging their relationship with China.

After a White House meeting with the US president, Joe Biden, on Thursday, the Italian prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, said her government had until December to make a decision on the BRI, and also announced she would soon travel to Beijing.

I know a lot of readers here have an impression that American foreign policy is oriented around spreading progressivism or some such - I highlight this to make the point that no, really America’s goal is hegemony and it’s more than willing to tolerate right-populist governments like Italy, Hungary, or Poland if they give meaningful support against American enemies. Speaking of which:

Thailand

The Thai elections in May were a major upset for the military-monarchy axis that rules Thailand, bringing two populist, anti-corruption parties, Move Forward and Pheu Thai, into the forefront. Despite winning a majority in the House, Move Forward was blocked by the military dominant Senate and has now been excluded from the coalition by Pheu Thai, which has decided that it now it supports the monarchy, will coalition with the military appointed MPs, and wants a smarmy real estate mogul to lead their anti-corruption party. The courts are reviewing whether it was unconstitutional to block Move Forward but no one expects them to defy the military. In the meantime the King has allowed Chan-Ocha, the former Army Commander who has ruled since the 2014 coup, to continue to rule as normal.

You may have noticed the US hasn’t formerly condemned this anti-democratic measure by a government dominated by ostensibly our two least favorite things: kings and soldiers. America and the Thai military have actually had a very close relationship for a long time, one that was damaged by the 2014 coup because it saw Thailand buying more military equipment from China. Since then Thailand has shifted back in our orbit, losing confidence in the benefits of the unfinished Belt and Road projects and joining the US-backed anti-China alliance, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. While (to the extent they follow it) American civil society and media may support Move Forward, the American government is indifferent/opposed. It is much more important that Thailand balance towards us and away from China (and they weren’t thrilled with our recent refusal to sell them F-35s), so the US is unlikely to oppose them here.

Haiti

Of all places, Kenya has offered to send a military force to Haiti to bolster security and also train local police forces. Haiti (uh, whoever still represents them diplomatically), the US and other Latin American nations have endorsed the plan and will bring it up as a formal UN Resolution, where Sec General Antonio Guterres has already given his support. Keep in mind Haitian President Jovenel Moise was assasinated two years ago and Haiti has been largely in a state of anarchy since, so it’s somewhat astounding it took the world this long to agree on a half hearted intervention, and one from a country with a serious police brutality problem and that speaks an entirely different language no less. Things have gotten especially bleak lately as more and more aid organizations have left the island due to attacks on their staff; Tuesday featured a huge Haitian protest against the kidnapping of an American nurse and her child. America will likely help fund the intervention effort to some extent but it’s unclear to what degree.

Colombia

Over the past few months there has been something of an internecine war in the Colombian government. Unlike many countries, the Attorney General is neither appointed by the President nor elected but instead appointed by the Supreme Court. Because prior to the current left wing Administration Colombia had basically only been governed by the right/center-right, the Supreme Court is conservative as well, and thus so is current Attorney General Francisco Barbosa Delgado. Delgado has made it somewhat of a personal mission to root out corruption/stop President Petro from doing anything at all, and has targeted several other high ranking members of the Administration with investigations. From the outside it’s very hard to tell what is actually corruption vs what is politically motivated, but things have now culminated in the arrest of Petro’s son who was accused of taking cartel money by a seemingly credible source, which is to say: his wife. The wife (Petro’s daughter in law) has now been arrested as well and an ongoing investigation remains on Petro’s brother. Many of Petro’s primary reforms were unable to pass in the previous legislative session and the weight of these corruption scandals is unlikely to make things any easier in the upcoming session.

Niger

The hypothetical coup seems very much to have turned into a full military coup in Niger. The West African regional body ECOWAS responded by sanctioning Niger, freezing all of their assets, and demanding that the military relinquish power. In a twist, Mali and Burkina Faso (which both recently also had military coups) responded by actually threatening war if ECOWAS intervened. This is a semi-laughable threat as, despite literally being ruled by the military, neither Mali nor Burkina Faso have much in the way of a meaningful military, hence their reliance on French/Russian forces (and remember, these countries are basically already at civil war with Islamist insurgents). Still, it’s unlikely that the other West African states, many of them dealing with instability of their own, have much appetite for a real conflict. On the other hand, the US has announced its support for ECOWAS, has invested a lot in Nigerien security, and is increasingly worried about growing Russian influence, so they may be a factor as well. If the Niger coup remains it will likely join the ranks of Burkina Faso and Mali in kicking out the French military (France is already evacuating its citizens after attacks on its embassy) and becoming closer with the Wagner Group instead.

Lebanon

Significant violence has broken out in the Lebanese Palestinian refugee camps between supporters of the PLO (the nominal government of Palestine, in charge of the West Bank) and Fatah (the Islamist faction that runs Gaza), causing thousands to flee (as an aside, a Palestinian woman once told me that people joked the Israeli Palestinian refugee camps were five star resorts compared to the Lebanese camps.) Both Hezbollah and the PLO have called for an end to the violence.

Riad Salameh, looong time head of the Lebanese Central Bank, has finally stepped down in disgrace for mismanaging the crisis and for embezzlement charges. Three years after the explosion in Beirut, Lebanese citizens still have limits on how much they can withdrawal from their bank accounts to prevent a bank run, inflation is rampant and 80% of the country lives in poverty.

The factional Lebanese government has struggled to formerly appoint a replacement. Wassim Mansouri will take over as the interim Governor in the meantime, and has promised to oversee reforms, including “setting up a capital control law, a financial restructuring law and a 2023 state budget within six months”

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