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Culture War Roundup for the week of January 9, 2023

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There's a number of ways you can take that further as well. One of the key insights of Clausewitz- the 'war is an extension of politics by other means' as it's often raised- is also relevant in this. When war is remembered to achieve political objectives, the conduct of soldiers- if that conduct carries political impacts- also impacts the political strength of the state to resolve the conflict favorably. Given the ever-increasing cost of war, both when it extends in time and the 21st century quality of arms support, political impacts from war crimes can far, far outstrip both short-term advantages of breaking laws of war, but also the direct military impact of poorly disciplined forces.

One of the key points in the early Ukraine war, what I would call a seminal moment that galvanized war support for an extended conflict and moved 'a cease fire as soon as possible, to mitigate the costs' outside the Overton window, was the Bucha massacre. In the last week of March, there was an ambiguous period where it was clear that the Battle of Kyiv had been lost by the Russians, but it wasn't clear what should follow next- the Russians had major gains in the south, the east wasn't lost but was precarious, and while the Ukrainians were starting their counter-offensives in the north it wasn't clear how hard the Russians would fight for the territory. There was quite a bit of discussion in the foreign policy / diplomatic circles about what should follow, and 'Kyiv should make concessions for a cease fire at least vaguely on its terms, even at territorial cost' was still being mooted in key circles, especially in Europe, which was just getting over the initial crisis response but hadn't worked a consensus on how much / how long to support Ukraine.

If there was a time Russia might have been able to use a near-miss and leverage it into a diplomatic concession, this was probably the last time... until Bucha.

Bucha changed both domestic and foreign Ukrainian politics. For domestic Ukrainian politics, the massacre in Bucha- a city northwest of Kyiv and so outside of even the most 'moderate' of territorial concessions or Russian-speaking areas of influence- served as a demonstration of sorts for Russian intentions for all of Ukraine. Ukrainians already under Russian control from occupation- not combatants, but under the administration- being imprisoned, tortured, murdered, and in some cases raped- was a natural template for what Russia was likely not only already doing, but would continue to do, to other Ukrainian areas. Leaving members of the nation-tribe to Bucha- where the atrocities preceeded the fighting and couldn't even be blamed on fighting for the city- made a national-level political concession basically untenable in the short-to-medium term. That alone would have extended the conflict by several months- and thus a considerable amount of Russian military expense of prestige and hardware.

But Bucha also affected the international space, because it suddenly discredited everyone who had been willing to argue that leaving the Russians in part of Ukraine wouldn't be so bad, and that Russian actions would be limited to the ethnic-russian areas of interest and could spare the rest. Bucha- far outside any claimed Russian area of interest, and not in the context of ongoing military operations- made that sort of concession, a requirement for any sort of Russian sphere of interest in eastern Ukraine, a politically impossible stance for even the most war-fearing European diplomats to push, lest their own publics vote the governments out. And so European elements who might have tried to pressure Ukraine to concede were disempowered, and were largely unable to gather any sort of force for another several months, leaving the gates open for expanding European aid across time and types.

For Russia- whose war plan success hinged on a political capitulation by the Ukrainian government, and political concession by the Europeans- Bucha was an absolute disaster and counter-productive incident at a decisive part of the war. Whatever the goal was at the time, the consequence to the war was absolutely against Russia's strategic interests.