Since the Great Recession, the Fed has transformed itself into an entity more and more responsible for asset prices. This was the stated goal since 2009 as the Fed adopted a new philosophy called the "Wealth Effect." The thinking behind it was simple: growth in asset prices would translate to an increase in consumer spending and hence demand itself. It was a 'trickle down' economic philosophy an increasingly financialized economy.
This backdrop has defined our post-2009 era which stirred certain pathologies that were reflected in the greater culture and politics. It was the time when 'finance became a culture' and actual-productivity plummeted across most developed economies, especially the United States. But somehow in spite of the accumulating dysfunction across most key areas, everything kept trudging along, partly thanks to investors being satiated with record returns.
While the near-zero interest rate regime may now be ending, it is worth considering how much of the water we were all swimming in excused poor state capacity, distorted economic fundamentals, and how it even kept a lid on the dysfunction potentially blowing up in our faces. Now that we have to reckon with these realities, it may be wise to ask how many worldviews were simply products of the the cheap money regime - which is now, in a shock to many, coming to a close. Whether or not it will easily be let go, however, is another matter.
Jump in the discussion.
No email address required.
Notes -
I suppose the T-34 issue is a matter of trade-offs. Reliability for throughput. The 1941 models were definitely poorly made, certainly, but they were at least there when they were most needed. At least the Russians had a card they could play, even if the Germans had the full deck of ground-air coordination, good training, veteran commanders, good NCOs and combined arms warfare... They needed to get all those things before they could start counter-attacking successfully and win the war.
The Narribri gas project I was talking about seems to be in our version of the 'fast lane'. But the actual gas wells haven't yet been drilled! There are apparently a few more hurdles to overcome. As you say, the civil service is still obstructing it.
https://12ft.io/proxy?q=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.afr.com%2Fcompanies%2Fenergy%2Fnarrabri-gas-project-cleared-by-native-title-tribunal-20221220-p5c7qk
The Narribri gas project pipeline has been designated 'critical infrastructure' as of December, 10 months late. They even managed to get the planning for the pipeline through, overcoming the native title issues in the tribunal. But 'critical infrastructure' doesn't exempt it from yet more environmental assessments:
https://www.dpie.nsw.gov.au/news-and-events/articles/2022/narrabri-gas-lateral-pipeline-declared-critical
What have they been doing for the last 10 years, if not environmental impact statements? It beggars belief that this is how we handle critical infrastructure! This project could supply half of NSW's gas needs, lowering prices considerably. We could then export more gas to our allies and make a lot of money in profits and tax revenues.
I agree with you completely about the civil service obstruction but the scale is just so egregious. Why haven't we learnt the lesson that spending 10+ years on regulatory nonsense isn't wise? Nobody is talking about this, not even on the right wing who is just ideologically against price caps as a knee-jerk reaction. There's just a debate about price-cap or no price-cap, how precisely we'll introduce the price cap. It's sucked all the oxygen out of the issue.
Oh I meant that right now the US is buying ammunition at whatever price, to refill arsenals depleted by their Ukraine aid. Not in WW2. There are certainly capital and skill problems but they're also rooted in the regulatory system. If you have to spend $1.5 billion on legal nonsense before you can drill, why leave capital here lying idle? I'd imagine the pipe manufacturers don't have much capacity either, for the same reasons. Much the same is happening with artillery shells, which are only produced by a single American factory IIRC.
This is a common argument, but I'm not persuaded by it. Surely there was something else that everyone involved in making, driving, fueling, supplying, transporting, and fixing those crappy 1941-1943-vintage T-34s could have been doing which was more productive than throwing away their time, resources, and lives into machines that either broke down before ever facing the enemy, or promptly exploded upon entering combat. That was a lot of man-hours, steel, fuel, transport capacity, and food/supplies that just got wasted, bogging down all the other, actually productive things that were happening around them.
Bringing the metaphor back to the energy space, I would argue that streamlining new projects is only useful is they're done right. Do it wrong, and you're not just gonna have to deal with sloppy externalities down the line; the productivity of the well may also suffer, or the transportation infrastructure won't be right, or...[fill in the blank].
I'm a Californian. We have to deal with CEQA. I sympathize.
Because no-one thinks in terms of "10+ years of regulatory nonsense"; they each think of individual discrete steps and safeguards, each of which have their own particular justification. "Oh of course you want an ecosystems expert to look at the hydrology report, because only they are best placed to know whether this well is likely to have downstream effects on habitat vital for any threatened or endangered aquatic species..." etc. ad nauseam. Each safeguard will have its own little list of sympathetic horribles associated with noncompliance, and its own constituency militating that any cuts made in the name of regulatory expediency should fall on someone else's department/subject matter. Each of these constituencies will care about their own little fief far more than the general public will care about the general issue of bureaucratic scleroticism and compliance costs, and so it will be rare that any of these requirements will be eliminated or even temporarily waived. It's the classic story about how motivated and organized minorities run circles around large, disorganized, unmotivated majority interests over and over and over.
Yeah, it's not that there isn't the will to try and ameliorate a shortage; its that no-one foresaw the sudden surge in expenditure coming, and so didn't bother to keep backup production available, so now the whole supply chain has to be stood up.
Were T-34s from '41 to '43 that bad? By 1942 they had simplified production costs a lot and fixed some of the awful ergonomics. I heard that the Soviets did the numbers and worked out that they didn't need to be too reliable because they'd be destroyed quickly by the Germans anyway. What else could they do? Make more anti-tank guns and heavy tanks? That might be a competitive build in Hearts of Iron IV but I'm sure there's a reason everyone tried to have a staple medium tank. There are places heavy tanks can't go, issues with German airpower destroying tanks regardless of their frontal armour... Most academics seem to agree that the T-34 was the best tank of the war as an all-rounder. They can't just base that on the T-34/85 (which was pretty good), the '76 was alright as well.
I suppose I am arguing for the gas and assorted pipelines to be streamlined 'right' but is that really so hard? This is fairly old technology, we're the 5th largest gas exporter in the world. We ought to be capable of this. If we're not, we should aspire to be capable of this politically, legally and industrially. I think that you can and should streamline tank production in wartime, that we can and should have streamlined gas production.
True and sad, I suppose. We take these things too seriously. If there's a competition, you'd think Big Gas would be able to win. They have a big financial incentive.
Disturbing given the US has been writing all these strategic reports about the return of great power competition. Building up reserves of munitions is surely a good idea if you're worried about large-scale wars. What were they thinking? There are military planners whose whole job is to make sure things like this don't happen, that the US/NATO doesn't get caught off guard. I would've thought maintaining capacity for large scale production of munitions would be a no-brainer. NATO spends about 20x more than Russia on military spending, you'd think their arsenals would actually be larger, yet Ukraine alone was supplying about 10x more shells to Russia pre-2014 than America was producing overall, if this twitter fellow is to be believed.
https://twitter.com/spawnofKahn/status/1554705365383757824
By late '42 they had mostly figured the biggest production problems out, but legacy issues (like massively over-heating the armor steel, which caused significant interior spalling on impact and a lot of needless crew-deaths, and the absolutely nightmarish gearbox which required significant force to even get into 3rd gear, and would frequently break gear levers on attempts to get into 4th) remained for years.
I mean, maybe? But given that a lot of the problems that went into T-34 production actually caused significant combat-losses before even making contact with the enemy (breakdowns, fuel problems, lack of spare parts, defective ammunition, etc.), and also significantly reduced the performance of the tank in combat (i.e. made it much more likely that their tanks would be destroyed by "inferior" opposition), I doubt it.
Focus on logistics, and adequately supporting those numbers of well-functioning vehicles and units they had. That "Enemy at the Gates" meme that the Soviets didn't have enough guns to arm all their soldiers is false - they had oodles of materiel (admittedly, much of it outdated), but their logistics were so shit, and they were so myopically-focused on things which obviously looked good on paper (i.e. the number of soldiers, tanks, etc. in front-line units) that they completely failed to ensure that their soldiers and weapons at the front were able to actually fight. They were also getting thousands upon thousands of lend-lease tanks from the western allies, including many, many, many Shermans (called "Emcha" by Russian crews). So it's not like they were hurting for medium armor; they were just shit at designing and making it.
Every technician man-hour spent repairing shitty broken T-34 gearboxes could, and arguably should, have been spent fixing supply jeeps and rail systems. Every railway carriage ton dedicated to carrying badly-equipped T-34s to the front lines could have been used instead for food, water, ammunition, or other badly-needed supplies for existing front-line units. Etc., Etc.
Interestingly, a lot of big gas companies are staffed by the same PMC urbanites staffing every other ESG enterprise out there. And those folks (plus all the good ESG folks in major lending institution) took one look at projected fossil fuel usage charts which were super-optimistic about the "green transition", noticed that demand would allegedly be tanking in the mid 2020s, and stopped funding new infrastructure/exploration efforts, which wouldn't have enough time to make back their investment until fossil fuels were (allegedly) obsolete. Amazing, I know. But seriously, investment dropped by like 30%.
The Pentagon, which is the lion's share of that NATO spend, has never passed an audit, and after significant reform (and finding new ways to sweep things under the rug) still can only account for 39% of its assets. Shit's broken, yo.
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link