I am not assuming it, I know it, as I know any observable reality. It's not some mental construct, it can be plainly seen. The neo-imperialism bent of the Russian elites is completely obvious to anybody who watched them for the last 3-5 years. All the state propaganda machine has been pushing these ideas for a while now. If you understand Russian, all the evidence you need is plainly there, whereever you go - from the government-controlled TV channels to the lowliest telegram or VK troll groups. Everybody wants to repeat the Great Patriotic War victories and raise the glorious Mother Russia from her knees. Well, maybe not literally everybody (there are always traitors) but among the "true patriots" that has been the dominant tone for a while. And if you observe the actions for the last couple of decades - Transnistria, Georgia, de-facto anschluss of Belarus, then the Ukraine invasion - it is clear that Russia treats the ex-Soviet states as their legitimate playing ground and ultimately the target for "re-unification" if possible. In Ukraine, it was openly stated when it looked like it was possible. When turned out it was a pipe dream, the "re-unification" target contracted to the areas occupied by Russian forces, but the idea stayed the same - everything that has been USSR is legit Russia.
Now, how NATO plays into this is of course a logical conclusion, but I think it is a very natural one. If you consider Ukraine legit your territory, temporarily misled by "nationalist government" into being a "fake state" (this is all quotes from actual Russian propaganda) - then of course this government joining NATO and gaining Article 5 coverage is a major problem. Of course they don't like it - it kinda puts the end to the project - now what they have, a piece of Georgia, a tiny piece of Moldova, Belorussia and that's the whole Empire? Pathetic. Of course they went all in to try and not let that happen.
Observing the last 3-5 years does nothing to explain the 3+ decades prior to that in which Russians were also vehemently opposed to NATO expansion, which is in large part what the article is discussing.
I didn't observe it for the last 3-5 years, I observed it for much longer, it is the last 3-5 years when the neo-imperialism has become so dominant, so prominent and obvious that any diligent observer, without special knowledge or deep analysis, would be able to instantly pick it up. Before that, during the previous 3 decades, it wasn't the single direction at all. During the 90s, where Russian democracy was still alive, even though flawed (aren't all real democracies?) - the eternal Russian struggle between slavophiles and westerners has been also alive. Some people wanted more European direction, some wanted to go "our own way" - but the imperialist ideas weren't the only game in town at all. It all happened much later, building on the cult of the Great Victory in part, and on dismantling the democracy under the premise that it was the reason why 90s felt so miserable and chaotic for many. During much of this time, most of the fractions didn't really care about "NATO expansion" - because they weren't hostile to the West and the Western culture, and they did not nurture the dream of rebuilding the Empire. Surely, some fractions did - but they became the only game in town much later. Even the Chechen wars were presented as much more about security and terrorism (and TBH, not without a cause - Chechens weren't exactly innocent there) than about preserving the Empire. It was a long process, and I am not sure Putin himself thought in 1999 that he is going to become what he is now.
Thus, I do not think 3+ decades prior to that in which Russians were also vehemently opposed to NATO expansion is a proper description of what happened. If we limit ourselves only to Putin, which is more like 2 decades, he was never a particular fan of NATO (which is no wonder for a KGB officer), but he wasn't "vehemently opposed" to it until his imperialist doctrine coalesced, and as for other Russians, it was not true for even longer. Putin did blame NATO for the failure of his soft-takeover plan of Ukraine, which involved installing a puppet ruler (in which he eventually succeeded) and roping Ukraine into being a permanently subservient satellite state, just like Belarus (at which he failed). But that hostility began somewhere around 2004, before that the relationships were definitely not friendly, but also not openly hostile. And even then the idea was still more of "we want to control neighboring states" rather than "we want to assimilate them and restore the Russian Empire" for a while.
Yeltsin repeatedly reiterated his opposition to NATO expansion as early as 1993. And while he may have waffled a bit in ‘93 (as the Tribune article notes), probably because he’d been told some misleading things on the subject by US diplomats, he infamously blew up at Bill Clinton over the matter in late ‘94. I cannot find any comparable waffling from him after that point. There may have been internal divisions over this, but I think that the public Russian position was pretty clear even in the early 90s.
I don't think Yeltsin ever had designs on conquering Ukraine or anything close to that. He was upset that the USA does not treat Russia as an equal partner (this inferiority complex goes back centuries deep), and felt Russia is being humiliated by the West taking unilateral steps without Russia getting some respect in return. Also, he was very upset that NATO actions may jeopardize his chances on the coming elections - due to the pressure from the anti-Western fractions that perceived him to be too pro-Western. It is both about respect and about internal politics, but not really about any imperialist designs. TBH, his complaints about lack of respect were not entirely baseless - Russia lost the Cold War (or USSR did, and Russia took over the business after that), and while they still wanted the same stance as USSR used to have, they really didn't have that kind of pull anymore. So the nature of the disagreements was substantially different back then.
1994 also was exactly when the infamous Budapest Memorandum was signed. When Russia and USA (and UK) agreed to be partners in security the existing borders of Ukraine, in exchange for which Ukrainians gave up their Soviet nukes. We all know how well that worked out.
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Notes -
I am not assuming it, I know it, as I know any observable reality. It's not some mental construct, it can be plainly seen. The neo-imperialism bent of the Russian elites is completely obvious to anybody who watched them for the last 3-5 years. All the state propaganda machine has been pushing these ideas for a while now. If you understand Russian, all the evidence you need is plainly there, whereever you go - from the government-controlled TV channels to the lowliest telegram or VK troll groups. Everybody wants to repeat the Great Patriotic War victories and raise the glorious Mother Russia from her knees. Well, maybe not literally everybody (there are always traitors) but among the "true patriots" that has been the dominant tone for a while. And if you observe the actions for the last couple of decades - Transnistria, Georgia, de-facto anschluss of Belarus, then the Ukraine invasion - it is clear that Russia treats the ex-Soviet states as their legitimate playing ground and ultimately the target for "re-unification" if possible. In Ukraine, it was openly stated when it looked like it was possible. When turned out it was a pipe dream, the "re-unification" target contracted to the areas occupied by Russian forces, but the idea stayed the same - everything that has been USSR is legit Russia.
Now, how NATO plays into this is of course a logical conclusion, but I think it is a very natural one. If you consider Ukraine legit your territory, temporarily misled by "nationalist government" into being a "fake state" (this is all quotes from actual Russian propaganda) - then of course this government joining NATO and gaining Article 5 coverage is a major problem. Of course they don't like it - it kinda puts the end to the project - now what they have, a piece of Georgia, a tiny piece of Moldova, Belorussia and that's the whole Empire? Pathetic. Of course they went all in to try and not let that happen.
Observing the last 3-5 years does nothing to explain the 3+ decades prior to that in which Russians were also vehemently opposed to NATO expansion, which is in large part what the article is discussing.
I didn't observe it for the last 3-5 years, I observed it for much longer, it is the last 3-5 years when the neo-imperialism has become so dominant, so prominent and obvious that any diligent observer, without special knowledge or deep analysis, would be able to instantly pick it up. Before that, during the previous 3 decades, it wasn't the single direction at all. During the 90s, where Russian democracy was still alive, even though flawed (aren't all real democracies?) - the eternal Russian struggle between slavophiles and westerners has been also alive. Some people wanted more European direction, some wanted to go "our own way" - but the imperialist ideas weren't the only game in town at all. It all happened much later, building on the cult of the Great Victory in part, and on dismantling the democracy under the premise that it was the reason why 90s felt so miserable and chaotic for many. During much of this time, most of the fractions didn't really care about "NATO expansion" - because they weren't hostile to the West and the Western culture, and they did not nurture the dream of rebuilding the Empire. Surely, some fractions did - but they became the only game in town much later. Even the Chechen wars were presented as much more about security and terrorism (and TBH, not without a cause - Chechens weren't exactly innocent there) than about preserving the Empire. It was a long process, and I am not sure Putin himself thought in 1999 that he is going to become what he is now.
Thus, I do not think 3+ decades prior to that in which Russians were also vehemently opposed to NATO expansion is a proper description of what happened. If we limit ourselves only to Putin, which is more like 2 decades, he was never a particular fan of NATO (which is no wonder for a KGB officer), but he wasn't "vehemently opposed" to it until his imperialist doctrine coalesced, and as for other Russians, it was not true for even longer. Putin did blame NATO for the failure of his soft-takeover plan of Ukraine, which involved installing a puppet ruler (in which he eventually succeeded) and roping Ukraine into being a permanently subservient satellite state, just like Belarus (at which he failed). But that hostility began somewhere around 2004, before that the relationships were definitely not friendly, but also not openly hostile. And even then the idea was still more of "we want to control neighboring states" rather than "we want to assimilate them and restore the Russian Empire" for a while.
Yeltsin repeatedly reiterated his opposition to NATO expansion as early as 1993. And while he may have waffled a bit in ‘93 (as the Tribune article notes), probably because he’d been told some misleading things on the subject by US diplomats, he infamously blew up at Bill Clinton over the matter in late ‘94. I cannot find any comparable waffling from him after that point. There may have been internal divisions over this, but I think that the public Russian position was pretty clear even in the early 90s.
I don't think Yeltsin ever had designs on conquering Ukraine or anything close to that. He was upset that the USA does not treat Russia as an equal partner (this inferiority complex goes back centuries deep), and felt Russia is being humiliated by the West taking unilateral steps without Russia getting some respect in return. Also, he was very upset that NATO actions may jeopardize his chances on the coming elections - due to the pressure from the anti-Western fractions that perceived him to be too pro-Western. It is both about respect and about internal politics, but not really about any imperialist designs. TBH, his complaints about lack of respect were not entirely baseless - Russia lost the Cold War (or USSR did, and Russia took over the business after that), and while they still wanted the same stance as USSR used to have, they really didn't have that kind of pull anymore. So the nature of the disagreements was substantially different back then.
1994 also was exactly when the infamous Budapest Memorandum was signed. When Russia and USA (and UK) agreed to be partners in security the existing borders of Ukraine, in exchange for which Ukrainians gave up their Soviet nukes. We all know how well that worked out.
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